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Preface
Abbas Amanat
Yale University

This volume of the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental
Studies Bulletin Series, entitled Transformations of Middle Eastern
Natural Environments: Legacies and Lessons, is based on an interna
tional interdisciplinary conference by the same name organized
by Yale’s Council on Middle East Studies. The conference, which
was held October 30-November 1, 1997 at the Yale Center for
International and Area Studies, brought together an array of
scholars, practitioners, and journalists interested in and concerned
with the natural environments of the Middle East.
The interdisciplinary nature of the conference and this volume
are significant. It is our belief that just as environmental problems
transcend national boundaries and present widespread concerns
throughout society, issues of the environment should not be dis
cussed solely by people of the same discipline or profession. Given
the complexity and diversity of environmental degradation in the
Middle East, a comprehensive approach which takes into account
historical and societal, as well as ecological and technical aspects, is
the most congenial approach to a broad understanding of the prob
lems in question. This present undertaking is but one step toward
such an understanding. It is our hope that the following essays will
represent the state of today’s scholarship, illuminate what we can
learn about the past, and suggest what the future may entail. We
hope furthermore that this volume may not only be useful for those
scholars and practitioners currently working in the field, but also to
students and others who wish to know more about the Middle East
and its environments.
The conference and this publication would not have been
possible without generous financial support from Yale’s Kempf
Memorial Fund at the Provost’s Office, the Yale Center for Interna
tional and Area Studies, and Yale’s School of Forestry and Environ
mental Studies. My thanks are due to Arline McCord, Associate
Provost, Professor Gustav Ranis, Director of the Yale Center for
International and Area Studies, and Jared Cohon, the former Dean
of the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies. My
special gratitude is also due to three Ph.D candidates, Jeff Albert,
Magnus Bernhardsson and Roger Kenna, whose contributions were
crucial to the organization of the conference and the editing of this
stimulating volume. The quality of the papers presented and the
overall format of the conference and of this volume testify to their

  



   

dedication and diligence. Professors Frank Hole, J. A. Allan, and
Harvey Weiss provided sound advice and helped with identifying
which key areas should be covered. They also helped organize three
significant panels in their area of interest. Furthermore, Jane
Coppock, Bulletin Series Co-editor and Assistant Dean at Yale’s
School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, was critical in the
publication process. Without her energy and enthusiasm this vol
ume would never have reached its present shape. I would also like to
express my appreciation for the work Bulletin Series Co-editor
Joseph Miller was able to contribute to this project before his death
in July of this year after a long illness.
I would also like to thank all the participants in the conference,
many of whom traveled great distances to come to New Haven. A
conference is only as good as the quality of its participants. And in
our case, we were especially fortunate, as the conference was charac
terized by high academic and professional standards, reflected both
in the following essays and in presentations, observations, and con
versations which enriched the conference but by their ephemeral
nature cannot be incorporated into a written volume.
I hope that the dialogue initiated at our conference and contin
ued in this volume will bring the issue of Middle Eastern environ
ments the attention it deserves.
ABBAS AMANAT is Professor of History at Yale University and the Chair of Yale’s Council on Middle East Studies.
A graduate of Oxford University, he specializes in modern Middle Eastern history, in particular the modern history of
Iran. He is the author of numerous publications including Pivot of the universe: Nasir al-din Shah and the Iranian monarchy
(1997) and Resurrection and renewal: the making of the Babi movement (1989).
Abbas Amanat, Council on Middle East Studies, Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 34 Hillhouse Ave.,
New Haven, CT 06520. Tel: 203.432.6252. E-mail: abbas.amanat@yale.edu
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Introduction
Jeff Albert, Magnus Bernhardsson, and Roger Kenna
Yale University

Scholars recognize at least two profoundly important characteristics
that have combined to give the Middle East its enduring importance in
world history. First, the region has been a wellspring of major civiliza
tions and religions, and second, it is located at the junction of Asia,
Europe and Africa, and has long contributed to important exchanges of
goods and ideas. A less discussed, but crucial thread woven into the
tapestry of Middle Eastern history is the long and complex relationship
between the region’s natural environments and its human inhabitants.
If one conceives of “the environment” as the physical, chemical,
and biological integrity of natural ecosystems, the contemporary
Middle East can certainly be thought of as a place in crisis. Burgeoning
human populations and rising standards of living are testing the limits
of plant, water, and air resources, while sensitive territories are
placed increasingly at risk. At the same time, pastoral lifestyles which
have survived for centuries are now threatened, and international
tensions are compounded by pressing environmental issues such as
water scarcity and pollution.
Notwithstanding the serious environmental threats currently
facing the region, however, it can be argued that Middle Eastern
peoples, in fact, were among the first to become privy to the sensitivity
of natural environments.
There are clear historical examples of the consideration paid by
the region’s pre-modern residents to the fragility of nature, and the
lessons that that fragility has taught. The Fertile Crescent was home to
one of the original departures from hunting and gathering to seden
tary cultivation, and it has been posited that soil salinization from
irrigation played a central role in the demise of Sumer in the second
millenium BCE (Jacobsen and Adams 1958). But as Paul Ward En
glish points out in these pages, groundwater has also been sustainably
extracted for centuries with the use of self-regulating chain wells,
known as qanats. Indeed, the venerable age of the civilizations of the
Middle East requires that the notion of “environment” be defined
in ways very different from how it has been presented in the modern
West. Sharif Elmusa, a contributor to this volume who grew up in the
region, once remarked that the first thing that comes to mind when he
thinks of “nature” is a plowed field, not a tract of wilderness.
Early 20th century scientific models of human-environment
interactions focused on disturbance and recovery, as though the envi
ronment were a passive receiver of human action. Later formulations

 





conceived of an interface of natural systems and social systems, a partial
intersection of two sets (Bormann et al. 1993). Others have gone farther
still, disputing that any portion of the natural system is isolated from
human influences, asserting that even apparently “virgin” environments
show evidence of human impact (Vogt et al. 1997). They place empha
sis on ecosystem “legacies,” signs of the momentum of a natural system,
which have been imparted to it by the history of its interaction with
humans. Middle Eastern history, many would claim, supports this view.
Despite such a long history of human-environment interaction,
the Middle East is an area of surprising biological diversity. Al
though the stereotype of the Middle East as a barren landscape is
predominant, the reality is quite different. The area that was Man
date Palestine, for example, is host to nearly 90 plant species/1000
km2 (more than double that of the United States). Located at the
juncture of several major terrestrial ecosystems (including the tem
perate grasslands of Mesopotamia, the Mediterranean semi-desert
and arid grasslands, the schlerophyllous woodlands and shrublands
of the Lebanese and Turkish coasts, and the deserts of Sinai and
Arabia), the region hosts over 500 species of migrating, wintering
and resident birds (well above 15 species/1000 km2, an order of
magnitude greater than most of Europe) (Leshem 1996).
A desire to better understand the relationship between humans and
nature in an area which has been continuously settled for millenia
inspired us to convene “Transformations of Middle Eastern Natural
Environments: Legacies and Lessons,” a conference which took place
between October 30 and November 1, 1997, at Yale University, spon
sored by the Council on Middle East Studies at the Yale Center for
International and Area Studies. The event included well over 70 partici
pants from the Middle East, Europe, and North America (a list of pan
els and participants can be found at the end of the volume). In
organizing this conference, we sought to focus attention on
the following questions:
•
•
•

•
•

What are the key elements that define Middle Eastern
natural environments?
What are the core issues of environmental change in the
Middle East as the 21st century approaches?
How have the human inhabitants of the Middle East inter
acted with these environments and how have both sides
changed in the process?
How can perceptions of the value of natural resources, as well
as the belief systems reflecting these values, be characterized?
Do our assessments of environmental legacies enable us to
propose lessons to guide future policies? If so, what lessons
can we offer?

  



   

The event’s earnest attempt to answer these questions spawned
the volume you hold in your hands.
Our endeavor first required a definition of the region in ques
tion. What is the “Middle East?” We opted for an exceedingly broad
and inclusive operational definition of the term. The geographic
bounds, which are indicated in Figure 1, encompasses peoples who
are linked by physiography, climate and culture.
The breadth of the central questions articulated above was such
that only an extremely diverse collection of scholars and practitio
ners could be hoped to make progress toward answers. By conse
quence, the conference and the volume drew from a wide spectrum
of disciplines, ranging from climatology and marine ecology on the
one end to cultural studies and art history on the other, with plant
genetics, agronomy, fisheries management, regional planning, geog
raphy, climate change, remote sensing technology, international

Figure 1

 


relations, political science, human ecology, history, demography,
and anthropology all falling somewhere between.1
In this volume, to answer the first question about what key
elements define the environment of the Middle East, Michael Mann
and Raymond Bradley, co-authors of an important recent study
performing historic global climate reconstructions (Mann et al.
1998), provide an assessment of the global climate patterns which
are best correlated with mesoscale variations in the Middle East.
They emphasize (implicitly) that one major element of the environ
ment of the Middle East is the variability of temperature and rainfall.
Variability of the biotic factors (as opposed to abiotic climate
factors) is also investigated in these pages. Keith Cressman, in his
essay, considers modern efforts to understand and defend against
one biotic factor in particular, the plague of biblical antiquity, the
desert locust. Amir Afkhami evaluates a different plague—cholera in
Iran—and demonstrates how its transmission was facilitated, ironi
cally, by the qanat system, an otherwise efficient and environmen
tally benign hydraulic technology.
Additional important elements of the Middle Eastern environ
ment are water scarcity, and as a partial result, conflict. John Water
bury and Dale Whittington investigate both questions in their
assessment of a resource once deemed so vast as to be infinite: the
River Nile. Growing populations make the status quo arrangement,
Egyptian dominance, a far less certain question than in decades past.
Another river basin, the Jordan, is the subject of another set of
studies which focus on the elements of scarcity and conflict. Uri
Shamir provides reflections on recent water agreements between the
Israelis and the Palestinians and Jordanians, respectively, while
Aaron Wolf presents the historical context for Arab and Israeli
hydrostrategies, as well as a proposed refutation of the “hydraulic
imperative” hypothesis. Sharif Elmusa targets his essay on a specific
proposal for regional accommodation, the fabled “Johnston Plan,”
and in investigating its evolution, makes an argument for its
modern application.
Several core issues of environmental change—our second
central question—emerge from the papers in the volume. Onn
Winckler surveys population trends and government responses, with
a focus on the Arab countries of the region. His assessment is a
sobering one. Prominent among the core issues in the region are
food production and the ability to meet the demands of rising popu
lations. A. A. Jaradat, on the other hand, offers an overview of the
historic role the Fertile Crescent has played in modern agriculture
worldwide, as well as the opportunities associated with agricultural
transformations and the reduction of genetic biodiversity.

1



Due to the multiple disciplines represented
and their often distinct jargons, we decided
to allow for a variety of terms in describing
the area we define as the Middle East. The
reader will therefore encounter several
terms, such as Middle East and North
Africa (MENA), Near East, or West Asia
North Africa (WANA). Those terms were
the choice of the authors.

  



   

Kouchoukos et al., in describing the tools available for monitoring
land use and land cover change, provide additional insights into agri
cultural change—principally irrigation and the expansion of cultiva
tion into marginal areas. These changes are sufficiently widespread
and dramatic that they can be understood using images resolved from
satellite platforms. J. A. Allan, in his work on the political economy of
water, considers the water/food nexus and the role of international
trade in the avoidance of violent conflict over water.
Also noteworthy among the core issues in the region is the integ
rity of the marine environment. Pearson et al. present a case study of
oil pollution in the Gulf of Oman, highlighting the sensitivity of
marine resources and the ease with which they can be impaired.
Menakhem Ben-Yami and Izzat Feidi offer discussions of a particu
lar marine resource, the fishery, Ben-Yami focusing on the eastern
Mediterranean and Feidi on the development challenges fisheries
pose to communities throughout the Arab world.
The interaction of humans and nature is the central theme of
many of the papers presented in the volume. Peter Christensen
investigates the history of irrigated agriculture with a critical eye on
its limitations and the damages it wreaks on both human and natu
ral systems. Peter Beaumont considers the massive hydrologic and
agricultural implications of the Turkish Southeast Anatolia Project
(GAP) for Syria and Iraq, the downstream riparians on the Tigris
and Euphrates Rivers. Lois Beck and Susanne Steinmann provide
case studies of nomadic peoples. Beck offers an overview of her
extensive anthropological research among the Qashqa’i in Iran
and their changing relation with the natural environment during
momentous political changes in recent decades. Her discussion
reminds us not to overlook people in any environmental analysis.
Steinmann presents a critical analysis of gender-specific behaviors
among the Beni Guil pastoralists in Morocco and shows how
gendered resource exploitation is changed through sedentariza
tion and urbanization. Behrooz Morvaridi considers the case of
contract farming in Turkey to examine the disconnect between
centralized agricultural planning and local conditions, hypothesizing
that damage to land resources is attributable to the nature of the
relationship between farmers and their government clients. Finally,
in an examination of a profound human interference with a natural
system, Daniel Golani surveys the impacts of the creation of the Suez
Canal, and the subsequent interlinking of the Mediterranean and
Red Seas, on fish population dynamics.
Four contributions on nature and culture offer insights into the
interplay between cultural norms and the environment, with par
ticular emphasis on the idea of the garden. Karen Polinger Foster

 





focuses on exotic flora and fauna in ancient times and how they
served as integral components of the idea of the garden. Attilio
Petruccioli examines the idea of the Islamic garden and raises im
portant theoretical and methodological issues which will serve
as useful paradigms in future research. Heidi Walcher’s contribution
is a useful companion to Petruciolli’s, since her work explores sev
eral of his themes within the context of the city of Isfahan in Iran.
Finally, environmental scientist Daniel Hillel utilizes his extensive
knowledge of the natural environments of the Middle East to hy
pothesize about the advent of monotheism in the ancient Middle
East. His hypothesis is one intriguing answer to our question about
how perceptions of nature, and belief systems reflecting those values,
can be characterized.
Finally, there is the question of legacies and lessons. Perhaps
the strongest belief guiding both the conference and the volume is
that good information and good communication, even across en
duringly difficult political and cultural boundaries, will do more to
focus attention on, and move toward solution of, environmental
issues of critical importance to all inhabitants of the region than any
other factors. It is toward that end, and in that spirit, that our en
deavors are undertaken.
We ended our conference after three days of lectures and pre
sentations with an open discussion, from which two wonderful
memories emerged. First, Youssef Barkoudah elected not to deliver
an academic address, but instead to present a heartfelt account of
the landscape changes he has witnessed in the Syrian village of his
childhood. His description of “the day the qanat dried up” as a
result of the construction of mechanized deep wells miles away was
both powerful and moving, and placed much of what was discussed
during the prior three days in a very human context. Second, Daniel
Hillel ended the conference with an inspiring etymological discourse
on the expressions describing the natural world, inspiring shouts in
Arabic, Persian, Hebrew, and English from participants in the
audience. Although Yale anthropologist Frank Hole pronounced
Professor Hillel’s address to have provided “closure” to our event,
we are hopeful that this volume instead will open readers’ minds to
the complex and varied environmental changes which have charac
terized the Middle East since antiquity and the importance of con
tinuing to work in cooperation toward successfully functioning
human and natural environments in the region.
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Section I: Agriculture and Pastoralism
Middle Eastern Irrigation: Legacies and Lessons
Peter Christensen
University of Copenhagen
ABSTRACT
This article argues that the pre-modern Middle East suffered a long period of political and economic decline after
achieving a remarkable fluorescence centered on the Sassanian Empire (ca. 500 CE). Building on the works of various
predecessors, the Sassanians managed to construct irrigation works on the Mesopotamian floodplain which provided
them with an immensely wealthy material base. This base, however, had been built in a natural environment that was
relatively fragile and susceptible to disruption. When new and properly maintained, Sassanian dams and canals enabled
their owners to attain great riches. With time, however, thorough upkeep of these systems exceeded the ability of the
Sassanians and their Muslim successors. Canals silted up and agricultural lands without adequate drainage suffered from
salination. By themselves, these problems contributed to the decline of the region’s agro-ecological productivity. Other
factors, however, exacerbated the decline. Epidemic disease, especially plague, and wars prevented the region’s inhabit
ants from remedying problems such as siltation and salination. The result of this combination of systemic fragility and
regular visitations by war and disease was the decline that had become so evident by the early nineteenth century.
Beginning in the nineteenth century, under the influence of European technological advances, a movement began which
proposed to reverse the environmental (and therefore political-economic) decline of the Middle East through the
application of modern irrigation technologies. Although the final outcome of this attempted revitalization remains to be
determined, the author argues that preliminary indications thus far do not provide much hope for long-term productivity
and sustainability.

In 1471, the Venetian merchant Josafat Barbaro, traveling with
his companions along the road to Isfahan, marveled at how people
had managed to cultivate this arid and stony land by means of
underground canals, i.e., qanats. Without these, he said, “there
could be no dwelling there” (Barbaro 1873). Almost two thousand
years earlier, Greek invaders of the Iranian plateau had admired
these same ingenious devices (Polybios 1922 edition). Indeed, qanats
have played a crucial role over the millennia in the resilience of the
small oases of the Iranian plateau.
Of course, some settlements on the plateau declined or were
even abandoned. The famous cities of Ray and Nishapur are perhaps
the most striking examples of decline. The small Parthian and
Sassanian-era towns of southern Fars had comparable histories.
Nevertheless, in most cases, derelict and abandoned settlements
were replaced by successor settlements (e.g., Mashhad took the place
of Nishapur). In the long-term perspective, the resiliency of human
habitation on the plateau, linked to the use of qanats, is remarkable.
Other irrigated settlements in the Middle East have, however,
proven to be less stable. At the beginning of the early modern

  



   

period, when Barbaro visited Isfahan, desertification and recession
had already occurred on a large scale, perhaps most notably in the
alluvial plains of Mesopotamia (including Khuzistan), which in
antiquity and the early Middle Ages had held the largest population
cluster in Southwest Asia, and had formed the basis of successive
empires. In this region settled agriculture and urbanization had
declined steeply after the early Middle Ages. A comparable decline
had overtaken the Sistan Basin and the delta of the Murghab, where
the great Marv oasis was largely abandoned by 1400. Further east,
in the country of the Yeti-su, “The Land of the Seven Streams” (or
Semirechie), a marked contraction of settlement and urban life had also
occurred by the 14th and 15th centuries. Even Egypt, where irrigation
was practiced under more favourable conditions than in most other
places, suffered decline, though certainly on a less severe scale.1
Long-term fluctuations in population size, settlement numbers,
cultivated area, economic diversity, and trade volume, can, of
course, be seen in all societies, including Europe. Moreover, many
irrigated settlements in the Middle East and Central Asia have
proved remarkably resilient, in particular the oases of the Iranian
plateau and of Transoxania (the Zarafshan Valley). But even allowing for these fluctuations, and for the fact that ruins sometimes
represent successive settlements, and thus may not be evidence of
decline, and allowing finally for the fact that our image of vanished
centers of civilization may be unduly exaggerated, it remains indis
putable that the Middle East as a whole suffered marked, cumulative
decline in pre-industrial times.2
Western scholars have suggested a number of explanations for
this decline. Some argue that the need for irrigation and flood control caused the rise of Oriental Despotism, regarded as a particularly
nasty form of centralized government that eventually stifled society
(Wittfogel 1960). Others point to the wartime destruction caused by
the barbarian invasions of the Middle Ages, in particular the
Mongols (13th century) and Timur-é Lenk/Tamerlane (14th cen
tury). This explanation largely paraphrases medieval chroniclers’
horror stories and rests more or less explicitly on the assumption
that the nomadism of the invaders and the settled agriculture of the
invaded were antagonistic methods of subsistence.
For a variety of reasons, these two explanations are unsatisfac
tory. The concept of Oriental Despotism was more or less discredited
in the course of the debate on Karl Wittfogel’s thesis; today “the
Oriental Despot reigns with foremost authority in the realms of
fiction” (Steadman 1969). The chronology of the barbarian inva
sions, on the other hand, does not correspond to the process of
decline. There are, fortunately, more creditable explanations.

 

1
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More recently, scholars have begun to investigate the inherent
environmental constraints, such as salination, destructive flooding,
and drifting sands, that typify the Middle East. According to the
hypothesis suggested by Thorkild Jacobsen and other participants in
the Diyala Basin Project, Mesopotamia in particular was predisposed
to these dangers owing to high water-tables and poor natural drain
age: the salination of once-fertile soils and siltation of crucial water
courses made irrigation unsustainable over the long run.3
Although the idea of environmental limits, with its obvious links
to present-day concerns (i.e., modern environmentalism), is in
many ways a convincing explanation for the decline of the Middle
East, it nevertheless has inherent problems. Based as it is on such
concepts and models as the ecosystem, the idea tends to become
overly functionalist and reductionist: in the final analysis, Middle
Eastern decline is simply the outcome of humankind’s misreading of
the environment’s limits. Although the notion of environmental
limits offers a powerful tool for understanding Middle Eastern de
cline, it does not tell the whole story. Indeed, it conveys a false sense
of inevitability. The idea of environmental limits may suggest a way
of looking at the larger patterns in history, but historical explanation
is also about contingency: no universal agent or condition can give
an adequate causal explanation of historical change in the oases and
irrigated regions of the Middle East.
MESOPOTAMIA
Irrigation in the Mesopotamian floodplain goes back at least to
5,000 BCE.4 For the first several thousand years, the region’s inhabit
ants diverted irrigation waters via canals that roughly paralleled
the course of the Euphrates. Settlement and cultivation was there
fore concentrated in narrow strips along the river and canals. Begin
ning around the middle of the first millennium BCE, new irrigation
practices were adopted in Mesopotamia that drastically manipulated
and coerced the floodplain’s environment. Key elements in the new
large-scale irrigation system included, first, the construction of five
huge feeder canals diverting the waters of the Euphrates across the
central floodplain into the Tigris; and second, the tapping of the
Tigris as a major source of irrigation water by the construction of
two huge, interconnected parallel diversions known as the Katul alKisrawi and the Nahrawan Canal. In the process, the political and
economic center of the floodplain moved from ancient Babylon on
the Euphrates to successive metropolitan complexes on the Tigris:
Seleucia, Ctesiphon, and Baghdad.
Precisely when the various components of the new system were
constructed is difficult to say. It is fairly certain, however, that a
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major reshaping of the floodplain occurred under Persian rule,
especially in Parthian and Sassanian times (2nd century BCE to CE
651). According to the traditions recorded by Muslim historians of
the ninth and tenth centuries, the Sassanian kings in particular made
a spectacular effort to extend settlement and cultivation between 226
and 651 CE. Although the Muslim historians were paraphrasing
official and highly tendentious histories composed by the Sassanians
themselves for legitimating purposes, the account of the great colo
nizing drive is essentially credible. Independent sources confirm
this. The Sassanian kings established numerous cities and settle
ments, forcibly transplanted thousands of prisoners from Roman
territory to Mesopotamia (and other places), and constructed great
irrigation and flood control works such as the Nahrawan complex.
Moreover, their efforts were not confined to Mesopotamia. In the
adjacent plain of Khuzistan, watered by the Karun River and its
tributaries, the Sassanians constructed similar works, including five
large dams combined with canal systems. Their settlements and
irrigation works also spread out over large parts of the Iranian
plateau. It would seem that by the late Sassanian times irrigation,
settlement, and cultivation in the Mesopotamian floodplain and
Khuzistan had reached their pre-industrial maximum extent. All
available water resources had been exploited in an effort to extend as
well as to intensify agricultural production. Thus summer cultiva
tion involving various exotic plants (rice, sugar, cotton) had prob
ably become widespread by this time.
We know few details about how this impressive reshaping of the
Mesopotamian landscape was achieved. The kings employed corps
of engineers as well as groups of specialist workers. Later in the
Muslim period the army was occasionally used for emergency re
pairs. But, as very scattered references indicate, the hard and ex
hausting work involved in the construction and maintenance of the
great feeder canals must largely have been performed by corvée
labour. But how the work force was mobilized and organized is not
known. It seems that the digging and upkeep of the smaller canals
that actually brought water to the fields was often done on a local,
communal basis. In any case, the purpose of the whole enterprise
seems clear enough: it was to enlarge the tax base. As the Mesopo
tamian floodplain constituted the largest potentially irrigable spot in
southwest Asia, it was of crucial importance to the successive em
pires of that region; consequently, the kings determinedly attempted
to maximize its agricultural and fiscal potential. There is no reason
to believe that some sort of population pressure constituted the real
“prime mover.” Population certainly increased in the process, but
that was more likely a consequence than a cause of the expansion.
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By the late Sassanian period (sixth century CE), when the
Mesopotamia-centered empire really was a great power, the flood
plain contributed more than half of the imperial income from the
land tax (which was by far the most important source of revenue).
Understandably, the Sassanian kings used to refer to the floodplain
as “the heart” of their dominions (Dil-Iranshahr).
For all its great size and impressive engineering, however, the
system created by the Sassanians and their predecessors proved
short-lived. As early as the sixth and seventh centuries, the low-lying
south was ravaged by recurrent flooding and hydrological changes.
By the end of the ninth century the whole system was clearly in
decay. By mid-twelfth century the great Nahrawan complex had
definitively broken down, and sometime between 1350 and 1550 the
last of the transverse canals stopped working. In part, this was a
result of coercing a fragile environment: the cutting of the natural
drainage pattern and the introduction of summer cultivation must
have increased soil salinity (this we may confidently infer from
modern attempts to intensify agricultural production); and the
increasing diversions from the rivers certainly caused an increase in
the rate of siltation. In the south the riverbeds became unstable until
the Tigris in the early seventh century broke through all embank
ments, seeking a new channel. In the process some agricultural lands
were literally drowned while others were left without adequate water
supplies. Further north, siltation threatened to choke the canals, weirs,
and floodgates unless these were regularly cleaned and dredged.
Changes in the micro-environment were equally important. For
two hundred years, from 542 CE to the late eighth century, the
floodplain was ravaged by recurrent outbreaks of plague. By all
accounts the mortality was staggering (as it was in the Mediterra
nean Basin), and a conservative estimate would be that
Mesopotamia cumulatively lost 40 to 50% of its population. An
inevitable consequence of this demographic crash was that irrigation
works fell into disrepair and agriculture contracted. The labour
force necessary for maintaining and operating the system no longer
existed.The successors of the Sassanians made only limited attempts
at repairing the damage and were quite unable to restore the system.
Plague can be seen, therefore, as a key factor in the decline of the
early Middle Ages. But it cannot be an exhaustive explanation for
the entire period up to the 19th century. As already stated, the great
Nahrawan system that supplied the east bank of the Tigris defini
tively stopped working around 1150 CE when there was no plague.
In this case, political impotence, continuous internal fighting, and
excessive taxation may have been the direct causes. The last element
of the large-scale system, the transverse canals of the central plain,



For all its great size and impressive
engineering, however, the system
created by the Sassanians and their
predecessors proved short-lived…in this
case, political impotence, continuous
internal fighting , and excessive taxation
may have been the direct causes….
Factors such as plague (and epidemic
disease in general) and political unrest
are, I also believe, the direct causes of
the destruction of Mesopotamian
irrigation. Yet their impact can only be
understood in the context of environ
mental instability.

  



   

stopped operating between 1350 and 1550, the chronology suggest
ing that plague may again have been decisive (the Black Death
struck Baghdad in 1347, and plague kept recurring until 1840).
Factors such as plague (and epidemic disease in general) and
political unrest are, I also believe, the direct causes of the destruction
of Mesopotamian irrigation. Yet their impact can only be under
stood in the context of environmental instability: expansion under
Persian rule had created an irrigation system that was, if not selfdestructive, then at least extremely vulnerable to even small distur
bances. In Europe the consequences of the plague epidemics were
very different, partly owing to the resiliency of the European cultural
landscape. Economic activity in Europe rebounded (and, of course,
grew) in a way that the economy of the Middle East could not.
SISTAN
A similar cycle of expansion and recession occurred in the Sistan
basin on the far eastern fringe of the Middle East. Sistan, which is
today divided between Iran and Afghanistan, comprised the land
bordering the lower course of the Hilmand River and the inland
delta of the river. The Hilmand drains the Western Hindu Kush
range. Running for a thousand kilometers across the arid steppes of
Western Afghanistan, it finally empties into a closed basin identical
to the barren kavirs of Iran. However, owing to the large quantities
of water carried by the river, the center of the Sistan basin is covered
by extensive, shallow sweet water lakes (the Hamun-i Hilmand) for
most of the year. The extent of the lakes, of course, fluctuates with
the variability of precipitation in the Hindu Kush.
Written sources and archaeological material show that Sistan was
populous and intensively irrigated and cultivated. The medieval
Muslim geographers and travellers extolled the fertility of the land
and the prosperity of the inhabitants. The local urban center,
Zarandj, was regarded as one of the great cities of the East, famous
for its textiles and centers of learning. By the 19th century, Sistan
had been reduced to a sparsely settled maze of ruins and windblown
dunes. According to conventional wisdom—which bases itself on
the horror stories of the medieval chroniclers—this transformation
was precipitated by the invasion of Timur in 1383. Not satisfied with
razing Zarandj and massacring the inhabitants, the conqueror is said
to have destroyed a vital dam on the Hilmand, thus willfully ruining
the elaborate irrigation system. Other sources point to Shah Rukh,
the son and successor of Timur, as destroyer of the dam. Who did it,
however, is not important for the present argument.
There can be little doubt that Sistan suffered much destruction
in the course of the protracted Timurid wars. A careful analysis of
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the available data shows, however, that the recession of cultivation
and settlement was a much more complex process. In the first place,
it is clear that recession had started long before the advent of the
Timurid armies. Irrigated agriculture, based on diversions from the
Hilmand, had been practiced in the Sistan Basin at least since the
beginning of the third millennium BCE. We need not follow the
early settlements and the fluctuations caused by siltation and
changes in the course of the river. Many phases of Sistani history
remain obscure in any case.
A remarkable expansion of settlement and cultivation began in
Parthian and Sassanian times, however, culminating in the early
Muslim epoch (i.e., in the 9th and 10th centuries). It is evident that
the expansion was based on a vast extension of the diversions from
the Hilmand River. On the east bank the cornerstone was a great
dam across the Hilmand located one day’s march south of the capi
tal city of Zarandj. This is the dam supposedly destroyed by Timur.
The dam diverted water into a huge system of feeder canals reaching
almost 150 kilometers northwards. The system was completed in the
early eighth century, but, as stated above, had been partially constructed in the preceding centuries.
As was the case in Mesopotamia, the construction and maintenance of the irrigation system required large expense and a huge
labour effort. Moreover, the shifting sands, perpetually kept in
motion by the “wind of a 120 days”(a strong northwester blowing
constantly from May to October), constituted a particular danger
that had to be kept under control by groups of expert sandfighters.
Also, the elaborate network of canals was frequently damaged by the
unpredictable floods of the Hilmand. The cleaning of canals added
to the windblown material and, finally, there are fairly clear indications that the increased irrigation caused salinity problems. For all
the efforts expended in maintenance, the first signs of deterioration
followed immediately upon the maximum extent of cultivation. By
the late tenth century, the shifting sands had even temporarily bro
ken into Zarandj itself and declining productivity was observed in
several places. A century later, areas in the northern end of the great
feeder system had been abandoned. Although attempts at repair and
recolonization are recorded, chiefly at the end of the 13th century,
the overall picture is one of irreversible recession. By the early nine
teenth century, settled and irrigated agriculture had contracted to a
small area in the northwestern part of the delta. Yet the Sistanis,
despite demographic decline and political decentralization, still
commanded the technology to construct quite serviceable weirs
across the Hilmand. The British border commission, in 1870, saw
how this was done:
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The dimensions of the ‘Band’ are as follows:
entire length, 720 feet; length across original bed of river,
520 feet; breadth at broadest part, 110 feet; depth 18 feet on
the river side. It is formed of fascines of tamarisk branches
closely interwoven together with stakes driven into them at
intervals: the branches used for this purposes are green and
fresh, but of no great size, while the interlacing of them is
very close. The present ‘Band’ was constructed by 2000 men
in three months, all classes in Sistan giving their aid to a
work on which their own prosperity was so much depen
dent. The great part of the labour was in bringing from a
distance the enormous quantity of tamarisk required; but it
is said that once the branches were collected, the actual
construction was performed in a short time by one man, a
native of Banjár, the sole possessor of this art, and who
refuses to impart his knowledge to any one but his own son.
The ‘Band’ still requires a small yearly repair when the
spring floods are over, and its face towards the river is an
nually increased by a yard or more, but these repairs are
now easily accomplished by fifty or sixty men.5

Tate, who witnessed the rebuilding of the weir in 1904, says that
the work began in the middle of August (i.e., between harvest and
sowing), lasted a month and involved 40,000 people in all. For the
construction itself, no less than 450,000 fascines of tamarisk
branches were used (Tate 1909). But the cultivated area had con
tracted drastically and instead extensive subsistence—herding and
shifting slash-and-burn agriculture—had become widespread.
In Sistan, as in Mesopotamia, the decline of large-scale irrigation
clearly was conditioned by environmental constraints such as cli
mate, topography, soil composition, and hydrology. Constraints,
however, only become constraints in specific historical contexts
(which, of course, is true of assets as well). Low gradients, high
groundwater tables and soil salinity are not major constraints unless
large-scale (and fairly intensive) irrigation is practiced. Extraneous
events, such as recurrent civil wars, invasions, and, possibly, the
outbreaks of epidemic disease are key catalysts for the onset of
marked decline.6 So are the actual means available for coercing and
manipulating the physical world, i.e. technology and energy re
sources. In the last 100 to 150 years, these variables in particular
have been seen by many as the key elements in reversing the decline
of the Middle East.
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THE MAGIC WAND
European engineers arriving in the Middle East in the 19th and
early 20th centuries suggested that technological limitations lay at
the root of the region’s decline: in the past, in their view, irrigation
had failed because of restricted engineering capabilities and un
sound agricultural practices; the engineers of the past had been
unable to construct permanent headworks and, lacking mathemati
cal skills, had not calculated gradients properly. This view was
largely based on observations made by British engineers surveying
remnants of Mughul canals in northern India in the early 19th cen
tury. These canals had served only for limited time partly owing to
technological deficiencies of the sort just mentioned: little use had
been made of masonry structures, and the canals were just contour
canals, i.e., they tended to avoid high ground and follow the river
courses. Thus they were vulnerable to floods and silt deposits.
(Stone 1984; CEHI 1 1982)
The British then proceeded to repair and improve the old canals
and construct new ones all over the Punjab and in the Gangetic
Plains. Gathering experience by trial and error, they eventually
developed the basic hydraulic technologies of modern large-scale
irrigation and water management. Among the important techno
logical innovations were masonry headworks, drainage networks,
the elimination of erosion and silting by calculating optimal gradi
ents, and, of course, barrages or weirs making perennial irrigation
possible.7 In the process, the British, persistent critics of the kind of
oriental despotism and Eastern centralization that supposedly ac
companied hydraulic societies, ended up as the greatest irrigation
system builders of all.
Together with a robust technological optimism, the British later
brought their hydraulic skills to the Middle East. Thus William
Willcocks, in 1894, suggested the construction of a storage dam
across the main channel of the Nile at Aswan. A dam this far up the
river would prove a much more efficient way of raising water and
extending perennial irrigation in Upper Egypt.8 A few years later,
Willcocks, along with other British engineers serving as advisers to
the Ottoman Empire, surveyed the dreary plains of ancient
Mesopotamia, and confidently predicted the reclamation of the
whole country through British efforts: “Modern science,” he wrote,
“will touch this region with her magic wand, and the waste places
shall again become inhabited, and the desert shall blossom as a rose.”9
When the Russians conquered the ancient irrigated enclaves of
Turkestan in Central Asia, they viewed local technology with great
disdain. In 1819, Captain Nicolai Muraviev, the Russian spy, arrived
in Khiva and reported that the inhabitants were cruel, backward,
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and superstitious. He grudgingly admired the flourishing agricul
ture, but added disparagingly that their irrigation was “unscien
tific.”10 Later official Russian reports convey the same picture:
The construction of canals in the Zerafshan province,
though not without some boldness both in design and
execution, is generally defective; the canals are tortuous, too
numerous, and liable to burst and overflow. The intakes of
the canals are simply cuttings in the banks, dammed up
occasionally by very unsubstantial weirs of any fragile mate
rial near at hand. The cleaning and the general maintenance
of the canals is most unsatisfactory, as they are allowed to
be obstructed by rubbish of every kind. The whole system of
irrigation is a very primitive one; all the constructions to
raise, dam, let out, carry, distribute, and gauge the water are
of the most simple description, and are built of materials
close at hand, such as earth, fascines, stakes, branches, sand,
gravel, and sometimes rough stones (Curzon 1889).
A few Russians were genuinely impressed by the sophisticated
irrigation networks around Samarkand in 1870 and thought that
these could not be much improved upon by Russian engineers in
spite of their superior scientific skills (Radlov 1868). Generally,
however, Russians, whether Czarist or later Soviet, believed that they
had a great civilizing task to perform in Turkestan, where they be
lieved that chronic raiding, slavery, and religious fanaticism marked
a society long sunk in decay and barbarism. The Russians believed
that the chief means to achieve progress in Central Asia would be
scientific irrigation and enlightened rule. The Russians managed to
combine this outlook with an unabashedly predatory approach that
sprang from historically conditioned attitudes to Islam; they conse
quently treated Turkestanis as third-rate citizens.
Following the conquest, Russian engineers and officials regularly
advanced more or less fantastic schemes for extending the area
under irrigation. Among the more spectacular ideas were schemes
for diverting the waters of the Amu Darya into the Karakum Desert.
Even the transfer of extra water from the Siberian rivers was
suggested (Micklin 1986). Yet under Czarist rule little was actually
achieved as the Russians lacked both capital and, equally important,
the engineering skills (Pahlen 1908). In fact, Russians in Turkestan
were painfully aware of how much more successful were their Brit
ish adversaries in India in this respect.11
Yet to many Europeans sharing the Russian view of moribund
Turkestan, even the modest efforts of Czarist Russia seemed a great
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step forward on the path of civilization. Curzon, who had travelled
through Transcaspia in 1888, admitted that “Russia has conferred
great and substantial advantages upon the Central Asian regions,”
although drunkenness, gambling and prostitution as always fol
lowed the Russians.12 Some modest irrigation works were under
taken, for instance around Tashkent where the Romanov Canal was
dug (until construction was stopped by the first World War). Some
new concrete dams with iron sluice gates were constructed on the
Zarafshan River (Pahlen 1908). On the whole, however, results were
disappointing. A sustained attempt at transforming Turkestan
through modern irrigation technology had to await the establish
ment of Soviet rule. What the Soviet engineers brought to
Turkestani irrigation was, above all, an increase in scale. Command
of energy, of earth-moving machinery and reinforced concrete,
combined with political command of entire drainage basins led to
gigantic (and destructive) projects such as the Karakum Canal.
LESSONS?
The idea that poverty and other characteristics of “underdevel
opment” can eventually be overcome, in part at least, by education
and transfer of western science and technology remains a key ele
ment in all developmental theorizing. To promote agricultural
production in the arid zone, FAO and UNESCO in the 1950s and
1960s organized several international symposia and conferences and
published papers analyzing the water resources of the arid zone and
their development potential.13 Reading through these papers as well
as the conference reports, one is struck by the pervading optimism.
Of course, the experts were aware that in the past, irrigation societies
had faced severe environmental problems and that present condi
tions were somehow rooted in these problems. But their under
standing of what had occurred in the past was incomplete and
colored by stereotyped ideas about the rise and decline of civiliza
tions. Indeed, little factual knowledge was readily available.14
Because of the obvious and well-known hazards of large-scale
irrigation, chiefly in the shape of salinity build-up, one would think
that irrigation experts had to consider their schemes in an environ
mental context, perhaps even in terms of sustainability (however
this may be defined). Yet most experts firmly believed that whatever
problems might arise from expanding irrigation could be solved by
improved technology including fertilizers, mechanization, new crop
rotating patterns and new crop varieties, i.e., by transfer of advanced
western technologies. More economical approaches and equitable
social arrangements would further advance productivity and thus
living conditions in the arid lands. Similar attitudes may be found
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later in The Report of the World Commission on Environment and
Development (WCED, the so-called Brundtland Report) and diverse
FAO and World Bank reports.
Soviet experts in particular showed great faith in their ability to
overcome salinity and other environmental problems. Thanks to
modern technology, the deserts and steppes of stagnant Turkestan
would be conquered and millions of square kilometers brought
under irrigated cultivation. At the Arid Zone Conferences they even
presented a scheme for turning to the great Siberian rivers to pro
vide extra water for arid Turkestan as if no environmental risks were
involved (Korda 1961). In retrospect this seems extremely naive,
considering how Soviet development projects have brought ecologi
cal disaster to Turkestan.
At the time of these United Nations conferences (in the early
1960s) the transfer of advanced western technologies, including
irrigation technology, to the underdeveloped regions of the world
had in fact been going on for a long time, and modern development
experts and engineers might have drawn some basic lessons from
this process. But they didn’t. And they still don’t. Although debates
about appropriate technologies have been underway since the 1970s, as
the environmental constraints become ever more obvious,15 the pre
vailing attitude remains that modern technologies offer a wider range of
options which, combined with effective policies and institutions, can
make economic growth compatible with improved environment.
Therefore, the World Bank and the WCED can confidently claim
that development is not antithetical to the environment. “Economic
development and sound environmental management are comple
mentary aspects of the same agenda” (World Development Report
1992). Technological optimism, so deeply rooted in the European
world view, has always overruled historical evidence.
Over the last 150 years or so, systematic attempts have been
made to increase productivity and material welfare in the Middle
East by introducing western hydraulic technologies. This transfer
has achieved an impressive expansion of irrigated agriculture: an
cient oases have been expanded, water has been brought to new
areas, and productivity as well as safety have been increased by
extending perennial irrigation. At the same time, production has
been restructured: the traditional subsistence agriculture of the
ancient enclaves and oases has been largely replaced by marketoriented cash crops. In quantitative terms, the decades following World
War II saw the maximum extent of expansion, when mechanization,
chemical fertilizers, pesticides, high-yielding crop varieties, and addi
tional sources of energy were applied on an ever-increasing scale.
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Yet, in the broader perspective, results are disappointing. West
ern technology has brought neither economic nor environmental
stability. On the contrary, per capita availability of water has de
creased, while environmental degradation has escalated. It is not
that modern irrigation should bear the blame exclusively. After all,
western technologies were imported into areas already severely
degraded by centuries of indigenous large-scale irrigation. Surveyed
in the long term, large-scale irrigation systems appear to have lim
ited life-expectancy, i.e. they have not been sustainable. There are
exceptions, of course, but they are few.16 No single reason will ac
count for this. The rise and fall of irrigation systems are historical
processes that involve many specific variables, ranging from political
upheaval to climatic fluctuations. Yet in the arid lands, limiting
environmental conditions have been a decisive obstacle. However
defined, the concept of sustainability essentially refers to mainte
nance, durability, and resiliency in the long term. Western hydraulic
technologies have brought short-term increases, but at the price of
long-term degradation. The Soviet destruction of Turkestan may be
an extreme example, but at present most arid lands are operating
unsustainable agricultural systems which cause rapid resource
depletion and environmental destruction.
If present technologies are inappropriate, what are the alterna
tives? If the results of technology transfer have been disappointing,
could it be that it was not the right kind of technology? Or, as in the
case of the “Green Revolution,” that the implications have not been
thought out properly? It is widely argued, e.g., in the report of the
WCED and by FAO, the World Bank, and other such agencies, that,
given the proper technology, conditions may still be improved. This
view cannot be dismissed by saying that western technology is inher
ently self-destructive. Throughout history humans (and extinct
hominids as well) have relied on technology for survival and we
certainly must go on doing so. The question is: what are the appro
priate technologies in the fragile environments of the arid lands?
In the past, knowledge of the physical processes causing
salination, desertification, etc., was limited if not completely absent,
making the negative consequences of human manipulation of na
ture inevitable for all practical purposes. Today we have greater
insight into the way natural forces work and on this basis we should
be able to take more sustainable courses of action. No doubt there is
room, for instance, for considerable improvement of existing irriga
tion systems by tranferring of super-modern technologies. The
predominant gravity-flow canal irrigation loses at least 50% of the
water through evaporation and seepage. These losses may be drasti
cally cut by lining canals with plastics, concrete or tile or by adopt
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In parts of India the expansion of largescale irrigation has achieved impressive and
apparently sustainable increases, although
the wider environmental consequences
remain to be assessed.

Yet, in the broader perspective, results
are disappointing. Western technology
has brought neither economic nor
environmental stability. On the contrary,
per capita availability of water has
decreased, while environmental
degradation has escalated. It is not that
modern irrigation should bear the blame
exclusively. After all, western technolo
gies were imported into areas already
severely degraded by centuries of
indigenous large-scale irrigation.

  



   

ing new technologies such as sprinkler-, drip-, or trickle irrigation,
and even have these computer-controlled so that water is only
released when necessary. Such highly mechanized and highly
specialized irrigation technologies are employed on a large scale in
the arid southwest of the United States, especially in California, and
have served as models for creating modern, efficient irrigation in,
for instance, Israel and Australia.17 But for most Third World coun
tries these technologies do not present a realistic option. Their de
mand for expertise, energy, and capital place them beyond the reach
of ordinary peasants. Moreover, they are only feasible for highprofit cash crops and can hardly solve the problem of providing
basic crops. For political reasons, moving away from cereal produc
tion seems unacceptable, anyway. Also, the historical record of
irrigated agriculture in developed, industrialized societies is not
altogether comforting: sophisticated, advanced technologies have
brought serious (and steadily increasing) environmental degrada
tion in the United States, Australia and Israel.18
In current debates on development strategies it is frequently
asserted that traditional technologies—displaced by modern western
technology—were in fact much more sustainable and that we should
rediscover these, e.g., the terracing techniques of the ancient Andean
farmers. The failure or, at least, dubious benefits of modern irriga
tion technology is not an argument in favour of “indigenious” (or
“traditional”) technologies, however. Historical inquiry clearly
shows that the belief that Third World societies formerly operated
sustainable agricultural systems (until disturbed by imperialism and
excessive population growth) is quite unwarranted. Technological
pessimism should not make us romanticize ancient practices. The
small-scale qanat of the Iranian highlands was an ingenious and
environmentally fairly neutral device, but large-scale systems, repre
sented by engineering feats such as the Nahrawan Canal in preIslamic Iraq, were usually harmful to the environment and
unsustainable (Christensen 1993). So were the formerly muchadmired agricultural systems of China.
The realization that large-scale irrigation, even when involving
modern technology and massive inputs of energy, is a hazardous
undertaking has brought small-scale, low-cost irrigation technolo
gies in focus (Stern 1982). No doubt these have longer life expectan
cies and are more easily available to ordinary farmers, but it is hard
to see what kind of small-scale technology will help solve the prob
lems of Egypt, for instance. The fact remains that the societies living
in arid lands are, for historical reasons, dependent on large-scale
irrigation systems and these constitute a key factor in the processes
of land degradation. At present no readily available technology can
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Irrigation was brought to California by
Spanish settlers (no indigenous irrigation
agriculture existed), but remained of little
importance until the late 19th century
when growing markets in the east
promoted heavily irrigated and very
efficient garden agriculture.
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E.g., Hays (1982); Worster (1985); D.
Worster, “Thinking like a river,” in W.
Jackson, et al. (eds.): Meeting the expecta
tions of the land : 56-67 (San Francisco,
1984).





overcome this fact and the systems, therefore, have an inherently
limited life expectancy. Thus the prospect of achieving further agri
cultural growth without very serious environmental degradation
appears so slim as to be nonexistent.
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ABSTRACT
The Fertile Crescent is a high biodiversity region where most temperate-zone agricultural species originated and were
first domesticated. A favorable environment, a special plant community, and an adaptive population combined to initiate
the Neolithic—the New Stone Age—in the Fertile Crescent. However, over time, valuable plant genetic resources of
the region are being eroded through degradation of natural habitats, intensification of the cultivation of arable lands,
expansion of cultivation into marginal areas, replacement of diverse and widely adapted landraces by new cultivars based
on a narrow genetic base, and over-exploitation of natural pastures and grazing lands. There is a grave risk that much of
the inherent biodiversity of the Fertile Crescent will be lost unless a holistic approach to the management of ecosys
tems, based on sustainable agriculture and sustainable development, is implemented. Components of the holistic
approach are presented and discussed under the following five themes: (i) assessment of problems, obstacles and needs
(ii) land use management, including soils, water and vegetation (iii) the conservation of agricultural biodiversity and its
utilization in agricultural production systems (iv) social, political and economic factors, including indigenous knowledge
and (v) human resources. It is hypothesized that food security for future generations in the Fertile Crescent will be
strengthened by the conservation and utilization of agricultural biodiversity. This can be achieved through the develop
ment of productive and sustainable resource management strategies in the agroecosystems of the region.

INTRODUCTION
The modern territories Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine,
Syria, western Iran, and southeast Turkey encompass the region
often referred to as the Fertile Crescent. Here, many of the species of
temperate-zone agriculture originated and were first domesticated.
Their wild relatives and landraces are still found in the region
(Harlan 1992; Zohary and Hopf 1993). It is an area of megadiversity
of important food, feed, medicinal, horticultural crops, spices, pas
ture and rangeland species. However, the area under arable, annual
and perennial crops and forests is small, leaving the bulk of the land
as steppe, desert, or semi-desert. Much of the land has steep slopes
and/or shallow, or saline, soils that are unsuitable for cultivation
without extensive and expensive reclamation work. The land resource
is fragile and the conservation and maintenance of its biodiversity and
productivity are of crucial concern (Held 1994).
THE FERTILE CRESCENT: CENTER OF ORIGIN AND
CENTER OF DIVERSITY
The Fertile Crescent is at the core of the West Asia and North
Africa (WANA) region (see Kouchoukos et al., this volume). The
WANA region straddles three important centers of biological diver
sity: the Near Eastern, the Mediterranean and the Central Asian.
Many major crops, including cereals, pulses, spices, oil crops, fiber

  



   

plants, pasture and forage species, and fruit and nut trees trace their
origins to different parts of WANA (Harlan 1975, 1992).
The region is characterized by several major land forms (Zohary
1973). The Afro-Arabian tableland borders the area to the south and
is today largely desert. The Irano-Anatolian folded zone, which
includes the Zagros, Taurus, and Syro-Palestine ranges, forms a
mountainous arc where most of the arboreal vegetation now grows.
Between these two zones is a region of rolling terrain and alluvial
plains. The tremendous variability in topography has a strong influ
ence on climate and vegetation. The coastal regions in the west are
characterized by a Mediterranean regime of hot, dry summers and
cool, wet winters. A lowland area known as the “Syrian Saddle,”
which separates the Anti-Taurus from the Syro-Palestine ranges,
allows the Mediterranean influence to extend inland. The inland
regions, however, have a more continental climate.
Despite a scarcity of water and cultivable land, the Fertile Cres
cent was one of the major food-producing regions of the old world
for many centuries (Harlan 1992; Zohary and Hopf 1993), having
once been termed the granary of the Roman Empire (Held 1994).
Today, it supports a rapidly growing (3-3.6% per annum) popula
tion of some 70 million people. It has become the largest foodimporting region in the developing world due to this rapidly
growing population (and, in some countries, rising income) at a
time of sluggish growth in its agricultural production (FAO 1996a).
THE FIRST GREEN REVOLUTION
Favorable climatic conditions after 9,000 BCE brought steady
improvements in the Fertile Crescent environment, which encour
aged the growth and spread of wild plants and animals that consti
tuted food supply for an increasing human population (Miller
1992). Grasslands with scattered trees became the native habitat of
early wild forms of wheat and barley, which still grow in many loca
tions throughout the Fertile Crescent today.
For many centuries, these wild cereals were harvested by hunt
ers/gatherers but were gradually domesticated and cultivated along
with other major food plants, including vegetables, oil crops, fiber
crops, spices, fruit and nut trees. At about the same time, animals
that still dominate the farm scene were domesticated—sheep, goats,
cattle, pigs, and dogs (Miller 1992; Nesbitt 1995). Thus, a particular
environment, a special plant community and an adaptive popula
tion combined to initiate the Neolithic—the New Stone Age—in the
Fertile Crescent about 10,000 years ago in which the systematic
development of organized settlements occurred. This development
led to a further complex of cultural processes: politics, administra-
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tion, organized religion, trade and writing. It is said that “man was
domesticated by plants” (Willcox 1995).
Around 5,500 BCE the dryland farmers in the Fertile Crescent
took a major step forward by minimizing their dependence on rain
fall: they extended and then gradually shifted farming from dryland
areas to the plains watered by the Tigris and Euphrates. This devel
opment in food production led to cooperative planning, organized
engineering, expanded storage facilities for harvest surpluses, trade
relations, defenses for the protection of food supplies, centralized
administration to apportion water and coordinate activities, the
establishment of the first city-states, and the appearance of great
empires and civilizations (Miller 1992).
The area from the Levantine to Mesopotamia was the most
fitting place for agriculture to begin, not simply because of its soil
fertility (which waned considerably over the millennia) but also
because of its landscape, its climate, its plants, and its animals. The
Mediterranean climate is ideal for early cultivation and the Mediter
ranean region was magnificently well-stocked with cereals that
lended themselves to domestication. Of the world’s 56 species of
large seeded grasses, 32 are found wild in the Mediterranean area. By
contrast, North America and sub-Saharan Africa boast only four
each; East Asia has six. These proto-cereals were abundant enough
to allow hunter-gatherers emphasizing the second of their compe
tencies to settle down, even before they started cultivation (Nesbitt
1995; Wilcox 1995).
The “Fertile Crescent” draws its name from the achievement of a
balance between humans and the natural ecosystems (including
soils, water, crops selected from a rich flora, natural pastures in wellmanaged, productive agricultural systems and livestock). Unfortu
nately, this balance has now largely broken down and is expected to
be further disrupted by increasing population pressures on a dimin
ishing resource base. The solution cannot be simply a rescue mission
for the remains of the flora (i.e., collection and conservation of
germplasm in gene banks) but rather must be grounded in a holistic
approach to the major agroecosystems (and farming systems there
in) in the region. If sustainable land management, in equilibrium
with human societies, can be reinstated in the different farming
systems of the Fertile Crescent, much of what is required for the con
servation of biodiversity will also have been achieved (ICARDA 1995).



The Mediterreanean region was
magnificently well-stocked with cereals
that lended themselves to domestication. Of the world’s 56 species of large
seeded grasses, 32 are found wild in the
Mediterranean area. By contrast, North
America and sub-Saharan Africa boast
only four each; East Asia has six.

INDIGENOUS PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES
It is estimated that the WANA region has a flora of 32,000 spe
cies of higher plants, a high proportion of which are endemic (Table
1) and 10% of which are deemed threatened. The highest plant

  



   

diversity occurs in Turkey (with 163 plant families, 1,225 genera,
9,000 species and 3,000 plant taxa as endemic) and Morocco (with
135 plant families, 940 genera, 4,500 species and 600 plant taxa as
endemic). Oak (Quercus calliprinos Webb, among others) and
Aleppo pine (Pinus halepensis Mill.) predominate the Mediterranean
coastal forest west of the great bend in the Euphrates. In addition to
oak, pistachio (Pistacia spp.) and carob (Ceratonia siliqua L.) are
important trees that have edible fruit and nuts. Lebanon cedar
(Cedrus libani A. Rich.) is found only at higher elevations. The drier
inland regions of the folded zone are dominated by oak (Quercus
brantii Lindl) but pistachio continues to be an important compo
nent. In the more arid regions of southern Iran where it is too dry
for oak, pistachio-almond steppe forest predominates. The forest
grades successively into steppe forest, steppe, and desert in northern
Syria and Iraq. Riverine associations characterized by willow (Salix
sp.), poplar (Populus sp.), and tamarisk (Tamarix sp.) cut across
environmental zones. The wild grasses and legumes are at home in
the open oak forest and steppe forest regions (Harlan 1992; 1995;
Zohary and Hopf 1993).
CROPS ORIGINATING IN THE FERTILE CRESCENT
The majority of crops domesticated in this region as well as their
wild ancestors are of worldwide importance (Harlan 1992). The
following is a short list of those crops having their center of origin
and center of diversity in one or more of the three recognized centers in the WANA region (Harlan 1992).
•
•
•

•

•

Cereals: Avena spp. (wild oats); Hordeum spp. (Wild and
cultivated barley); Secale cereale (wild rye);
Triticum species (wild and cultivated wheat); Aegilops spp.
(Goat grass);
pulses: Cicer spp. (wild and cultivated chickpea); Lens spp.
(wild and cultivated lentils); Pisum spp. (wild and cultivated
peas); Vicia faba (cultivated faba beans);
vegetables: Lactuca sativa (lettuce); Brassica spp. (turnip,
cabbage and their wild relatives); Raphanus sativus (radish);
Allium spp. (wild and cultivated onions and garlic); Daucus
spp. (carrot and wild relatives); Cynara scolymus (artichoke); Sinapis alba (mustards);
spices: Cumminum cyminum (cumin); Mentha piperita
(peppermint); Foeniculum vulgare (fennel); Fiber/jute
crops; Linum usitatissimum (flax, linseed); Sesamum
indicum (Sesame);

Table 1

Country

Native, endemic, and % endemic
vascular plant species in countries of
the WANA region (with Fertile
Crescent countries in italics).
Native Plant
Species

Afghanistan

4000

800

20

Algeria

3160

250

5

Bahrain

250

0

0

Cyprus

1650

90

5

Egypt

2080

70

3

Iran

8000

1400

18

Iraq

3000

190

6

Israel

2200

170

7

Jordan

2100

150

7

Kuwait

282

0

0

Lebanon

2600

300

6

Libya

1800

130

7

Morocco

3800

630

17

Oman

1200

70

6

Pakistan

5100

400

8

Qatar

300

0

0

Saudi Arabia

2000

30

2

Syria

3100

400

13

Tunisia

2200

?

?

Turkey

8700

2700

31

Yemen

>2000

Yemen-Socotra Island 800

 

Endemic % Species
Species Endemism

>100

>6

>230

>28


•

•
•
•
•

forages: Medicago spp. (medics and wild relatives); Vicia
sativa (vetch and wild relatives); Fruit and nut trees; Olea
europea (olives and wild relatives); Ficus carica (figs and
wild relatives); Phoenix dactylifera (date palm); Vitis vinifera
(grapes); Punica granatum (pomegranates); Pistacia spp.
(pistachio and wild relatives); Prunus spp. (plum, pear,
apricot, etc); Amygdalus spp. (almonds and wild relatives);
timber trees: Abies spp., Acacia spp., Castanea sativa, Cedrus
spp., Fagus orientalis, Juglans regia, Pinus spp.;
dyes: Alkanna tinctoria, Anchus italica, Indegofera spp.,
Rubia tinctoria;
essential oils and herbs: Achillea spp., Artemisia spp., Orig
anum spp., Thymus spp.; and
plants of horticultural value: Allium spp., Asparagus spp.,
Colchicum spp., Crocus spp., Lilium spp., Rosa persica,
Tulipa spp.

GLOBAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BIODIVERSITY OF THE
FERTILE CRESCENT
The Fertile Crescent is also an area of crop species megadiversity.
Several of the significant species (wheat, barley, lentil, pea and vetch)
of temperate-zone agriculture originated there 10,000 years ago. These
crops’ wild relatives and landraces of enormous genetic diversity are
still found in the region. Almond, olive, figs, pomegranates, grapes,
and pistachio also originated there and have dominated its traditional
agricultural systems (Harlan 1992; Jaradat 1995). These crops are
present as a diverse range of wild relatives, weedy forms and local
varieties. Olives and almonds, two of the most widely cultivated fruit
trees in the Mediterranean, exist as numerous local clones with dis
tinct variations in fruit and tree characteristics.
Wheat and barley have become two major staple crops upon
which a large proportion (30%) of the world’s population depends.
Wheat currently occupies 16% of the world’s arable land. World
production of wheat averaged 550 million metric tons () between
1992 and 1994, approximately 30% of the global production of all
cereals, exceeding that of both rice and maize. The production of
barley, averaged at 165 million  from over 70 million hectares
(ha) of land, contributes to 20% of the global production of coarse
grains (Dalrymple 1986; Khaldi 1984).
An excellent example of the benefits derived from genetic pas
ture species of the Fertile Crescent is the Australian ley farming
system, developed in the 1930s, using medics and clovers collected
from the Mediterranean basin and introduced into rotation with
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cereals (Carter 1987; Cocks 1995). This system generates harvests
worth hundreds of millions of dollars in terms of meat, milk, wool,
added nitrogen fertility and cereal yield sustainability.
LANDRACES AND PRIMITIVE VARIETIES
Primitive landraces, wild crop relatives and other wild plant
species from the Fertile Crescent continue to provide new sources of
important genetic traits and to improve agricultural production
worldwide as new techniques allow for the use of wider gene pools
(Jana 1995). Primitive landraces have persisted in situ because the
nature of the farming systems in the region has been dynamically
conserved by farmers. By growing mixtures of diversified local
germplasm of crops, farmers have been able to select varieties
adapted to local farming systems and environmental conditions.
However, most of this diversity is threatened by the adoption of
uniform new crop varieties, nitrogenous fertilizers, increased agri
cultural mechanization, urbanization, and habitat destruction by
overgrazing and forest clearing (Dalrymple 1986; Fowler and
Mooney 1990). This has led to the disappearance of traditional
diversity based on local farming systems. The region that gave sed
entary agriculture to the world now experiences deficits in food
production (Khaldi 1984); its population has simply outstripped its
agricultural resources.
Landraces which have been developed over many generations by
farmers’ selection for desirable traits tend to be genetically more
heterogenous and more highly adapted to their specific agro
ecological environment. Conservation of the valuable and highly
diverse genetic resources harbored by these landraces can be
achieved through on-farm conservation and continuous use of these
landraces in traditional farming systems (McNeely 1989; Brush
1995) as well as in-situ strategies, the success of which largely de
pends on community-based management (Brush 1986, 1991; FriisHansen 1994).
AGRICULTURAL BIODIVERSITY AND SUSTAINABILITY
Plant resources contain the genetic material which is the key to
food security and sustainable agricultural production to meet both
biotic and abiotic changes and challenges. Over time, agricultural
production has become dependent on a narrow genetic base, both
among and within species and crops (Harlan 1975). While tradi
tional low-input farming systems in the Fertile Crescent maintain
their diversity in order to preserve stability of production under
climatic, disease and pest risks, they also tend to be less productive
(Cooper et al. 1987; Jaradat 1991).
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National, regional, and international research centers have
already collected and evaluated the genetic makeup of agricultur
ally important species such as wheat, barley, and lentil (ICARDA
1995; Jaradat 1997). Characterization of these genetic resources
was carried out for traits such as temperature and moisture
stresses, resistance to disease pathogens, insect pests, and yield
improvement potential. Although still far from completion, sub
stantial gene banks have been established as a means of ex-situ
conservation (FAO 1996a). Gene banks are especially important
for those species with only scattered and small wild populations
(e.g., wild lentil populations in Syria and Jordan), which can be
more effectively conserved through ex-situ conservation. However,
the richness of many field crops, fruit trees, vegetable crops, pas
ture and forage legume species and their weedy and wild relatives
in the Fertile Crescent is now under threat due to one or more
factors delineated below.
Gene banks are only part of the process of maintaining
biodiversity. For spatially and temporally diverse populations,
obtaining a representative sample is a formidable task (Jaradat
1997). It is increasingly recognized that ex-situ conservation is
limited by the fact that only a small proportion of existing genetic
resources may be sampled. Due to the dynamic nature of plant
populations and their interaction with the environment, collec
tions may not represent the total variation present at a given time.
As a result, naturally occurring and evolving populations (e.g.,
wild emmer wheat in its centre of origin, wild almond, and pista
chio species) must be maintained in-situ within their environ
ments; this aspect of conservation is now receiving more attention
than collection and ex-situ storage (see Engels 1995, for a review).
Comprehensive information about the characteristics and
status of agricultural biodiversity in the ecosystems of the region is
lacking. The diversity of some agriculturally important species has
been covered in detail (e.g., wheat, barley, lentils); for other species
(e.g., horticultural crops, medicinal crops, spices) information is
virtually non-existent (Jaradat 1995).
Sustainable agriculture is defined as the appropriate manage
ment of resources in agricultural production in order to satisfy
current and future human needs while maintaining or enhancing
the productive capacity of the natural resources (Univ. of Califor
nia 1997). Sustainable agriculture depends upon the conservation
of resources (land, water, and genetic resources) upon which
agricultural production is based. Any strategy for the conservation
of natural resources must include efforts at achieving sustainable
agricultural production (Francis et al. 1986).
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Destruction of natural habitats and over-exploitation of native
vegetation inevitably lead to the degradation of biodiversity. How
ever, in the Fertile Crescent, those habitats represent the resource
base for productive agriculture and are often the only livelihood of
farmers and herders (Barham and Mensching 1988; Tully 1989).
Indigenous knowledge about cultivated species and their wild and
weedy relatives, native vegetation, and traditional agricultural prac
tices in land and water management is an invaluable resource in the
search for new and appropriate methods of conserving and using
biodiversity, in general, and plant genetic resources, in particular
(Brush 1992; Daes 1993). Landraces which have been developed
over many generations by farmers in the Fertile Crescent are usually
genetically more heterogeneous and highly adapted to their specific
agroecological environment. Little is known about farmers’ criteria
for selection, and the value of their knowledge has only recently been
recognized for use in breeding programs (Crucible Group 1994).
Indigenous knowledge is critical to retaining the benefits of
centuries of keen human observation, applied in different areas of
the Fertile Crescent, on how agroecosystems function, on the char
acteristics of cultivated crops, and on their multiple uses. These
knowledge systems were the only means to integrate the impact of
long-term climatic and biological changes over many generations
(Brush 1986), and they are quite necessary for developing new
methods of adding value to agricultural products (Hodgkin 1995).
This is particularly true in a region where farming is not only a
marginal economic activity but also a vital social and environmental
enterprise (Cooper et al. 1987; Jaradat 1990).
Still, for many species, especially domesticates and weedy forms,
active management may be required to preserve their diversity.
Here, traditional knowledge must be complemented by methods to
build niches for the maintenance of biodiversity (FAO 1996a, b).
CONSERVATION OF BIODIVERSITY
The loss of the region’s biological diversity from habitat destruc
tion, overgrazing, and pollution has continued despite mounting
national and international efforts to conserve it (ICARDA 1995).
Biological resources constitute a capital asset with great potential for
yielding sustainable benefits. Urgent and decisive action is needed to
conserve and maintain biodiversity at the genes, species, landraces,
and ecosystems levels in the Fertile Crescent, with a view to the
sustainable management and use of biological resources. Capacities
for the assessment, study and systematic observation and evaluation
of biodiversity need to be reinforced at national and regional levels
in the region. Effective national action and regional cooperation are
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required for the in situ conservation and protection of ecosystems,
for the ex situ conservation of biological and genetic resources and
for the enhancement of ecosystem functions. The active participa
tion and support of local communities are essential to the success of
such an approach (Wood 1994; Porceddu 1995).
BACKGROUND: FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO
BIODIVERSITY IN THE FERTILE CRESCENT
Several factors (Jana 1995), both anthropogenic and natural,
have contributed to the rich diversity of crops and wild species in
the Fertile Crescent.
Socio-political Factors
The political climate and interests in agricultural innovation
were important influences throughout most of the agricultural
history in the Fertile Crescent. Each political administration, from
Roman to Byzantine to Islamic rule, enabled agricultural progress
and associated crop evolution (Held 1994). During the medieval
Islamic period, this evolution was facilitated by favorable land ten
ure and taxation systems. There were also considerable royal inter
ests in botanical gardens and other forms of aesthetic activities
which promoted the conservation of plant diversity. The region’s
long history of human movement, for commercial and political
purposes, contributed to the migration and diffusion of crop species
in and out of the region (Harlan 1992).
Agro-climatic Factors
Environmental stresses, especially high temperatures and low
soil moistures, are common during crop growth and development
(Cooper et al. 1987). Crops and wild plant populations evolving
under such stressful environments accumulated higher frequencies
of resistant alleles at individual loci, and also enhanced the assem
blage of desirable allelic combinations at both linked and unlinked loci.
Ecological Factors
Ecological diversity often correlates with genetic diversity. In their
natural habitats in this region, indigenous crops and their wild rela
tives encounter diverse ecological habitats that contribute to adaptive
diversity among populations in different ecological niches. This has
been demonstrated by numerous studies (Jaradat 1996); subjected to
heterogenous biotic pressures, intergenotypic, and interspecific inter
actions, diverse ecosystems were produced which promoted spatial
divergence among local populations of crops and their pests.

  



   

Genetic Factors
Dynamic interaction between natural and human factors have
maintained crop genetic diversity in traditional agroecosystems in
this region for millennia. Evolutionary processes such as geographic
isolation, limited gene migration through germplasm exchange,
occasional introgression between cultivated varieties and their wild
relatives, and natural selection in local populations caused adaptive
divergence and geographical differentiation among primitive variet
ies and landrace populations of crop species (Harlan 1975).
THREATS TO BIODIVERSITY IN THE FERTILE CRESCENT
The major causes of plant genetic erosion and loss of biodiversity
have been summarized in the Report on the State of the World’s Plant
Genetic Resources (FAO 1996a) as follows:
•
replacement of local varieties;
•
land clearing;
•
over-exploitation of species;
•
population pressure;
•
environmental degradation;
•
overgrazing;
•
legislation/policy;
•
changing agricultural systems;
•
pests/weeds/diseases, and
•
reduced fallow land
In an effort to achieve national food self-security, some countries
in the Fertile Crescent have intensified and expanded agricultural
land use, leading to degradation of the limited vegetation, soil, and
water resources (Jaradat 1990). As a result, genetic diversity is being
seriously eroded through the degradation of their natural habitats,
the intensification and expansion of cultivation, and overgrazing in
natural rangelands (ICARDA 1995). Overgrazing is especially threat
ening to annual crops such as wheat, barley and lentils (and their
wild relatives), particularly in marginal areas and where cereallivestock farming systems are practiced (Cocks 1995). Regeneration
of horticultural crops and their wild relatives can be seriously im
paired as a result of overgrazing, uprooting and cutting for fuel
purposes (Barham and Mensching 1984; Cooper et al. 1987). As a
result, wild relatives of crop species grow only in marginal land areas
such as field borders, abandoned fields, and areas with shallow soil
and remnants of natural vegetation. The habitats supporting these
valuable genetic resources are already either patchy or degraded.
During the last four decades, forest cover has continued to decrease
in most countries in the Fertile Crescent despite substantial affores

 





tation efforts (AOAD 1994). Intensive agricultural practices, such as
removing rocks and terracing land to plant horticultural crops, also
lead to serious habitat destruction and fragmentation which are
seriously threatening the populations of wild and weedy relatives of
major crops in the region (ICARDA 1995).
FARMING SYSTEMS IN THE FERTILE CRESCENT
The drylands of the Fertile Crescent are a major source of food
and fiber for millions of people. However, current yields are very
low as compared to yields of the same crops in developed countries.
The main reasons for this are:
•
traditional production practices used by most farmers
(yields are low, as is the rate of adoption of new technology,
for economic reasons, generally);
•
non-implementation of improved soil and water conserva
tion methods;
•
soil erosion, which leads to loss of productivity;
•
low soil fertility and inadequate and improper use of fertilizers;
•
low and erratic rainfall; and
•
loss of biodiversity and valuable plant genetic resources.
The high and growing population pressures on the limited natu
ral resource base in most parts of the Fertile Crescent and the misuse
of the limited land resources has resulted in the expansion of culti
vated agriculture to the marginal areas, overstocking of rangelands,
and destruction of forests. Firmly rooted in the physical environ
ment, these traditional systems are the outcome of centuries of
ecological experimentation and adaptation, and represent the best
efforts of farmers to manage the resources of the arid and semi-arid
environments of the Fertile Crescent (Oram 1979; Gibbon 1981).
Unfortunately, they have encouraged neither tree crops and pasture
planting nor the adoption of soil conservation and range manage
ment practices required in arid and semi-arid parts of this region
(Cocks 1995; FAO 1996b).
Dryland agriculture in this region is characterized by small-to
medium traditional subsistence farms in the hills, mountains, plains
and the drier parts of the region. Farm size, number of parcels, and
ownership are among the important factors in understanding farm
ers’ practices (Tully 1989).
Subsistence agricultural production in the region is significant
due to large family size and small land holdings. Cereal consump
tion, mostly wheat, is approximately 200 kg/person/year, generally
providing over 50% of dietary intake in terms of both protein and
calories (FAO 1996a).

  



   

In traditional village settings over the past 10,000 years, farmers
have been (1) growing wheat and/or barley in the plains and grazing
their sheep and goats on the stubble, (2) growing olives, grapes and
almonds on the lower hills and (3) raising vegetables in small land
holdings around the village (Jaradat 1990). These practices have
sustained plant genetic diversity over the millenia.
By its very nature, agriculture is highly interactive with ecological
factors and cultural traditions, so it differs from one region to an
other, as well as within a particular region. The Fertile Crescent is no
exception. Outside of the intensively irrigated lands, parts of Israel,
and a few other scattered areas, low crop yields still typify regional
agriculture, although yields have increased notably since the 1950s.
Until the 1960s, mechanization was uncommon, but coordinated
programs are increasing the number of machines, especially tractors
(Held 1994).
Improvement in agriculture has been hindered by the persistence
of traditional practices that are inimical to better farming and mar
keting. Agricultural land use has been intensified and expanded in
efforts to meet national aims of food self-sufficiency, placing huge
demands on the natural resources base, and leading to severe degra
dation of vegetation, land and water resources. Despite increases in
the production of crops, in general, and horticultural crops, in
particular, agricultural imports have been rising steadily. They now
account for 25% of the region’s total import bill and more than 40%
of food imports by all developing countries. If current trends con
tinue, the region will experience, by the year 2000, a six-fold increase
in the cost of its food imports (Held 1994).
Agricultural lands in the Fertile Crescent fall into three broad
domains, according to the availability of rainfall:
•

•
•

Sub-humid and moister semiarid areas suitable for dryland
farming of fruit trees in areas of higher rainfall and wheat,
barley, lentils, chickpeas and other minor crops in the drier
parts;
irrigated areas suitable for intensive farming and the pro
duction of crops such as rice, cotton, sugar beets, etc.; and
arid and semiarid lands suitable for grazing by sheep, goats
and camels.

Farming systems in the Fertile Crescent include irrigated systems,
wheat-based systems, barley-based systems, the Ley farming system,
native pasture-based systems, and fallow systems (Jaradat 1990).

 





Irrigated Farming Systems
Irrigated agriculture originated in Mesopotamia (Zohary and
Hopf 1993). Irrigation farming is situated in those areas where
annual rainfall is less than 150-200 mm but which are characterized
by high interannual variability (Gibbon 1981). Improved produc
tion practices are widely adopted in irrigated farming along the
Euphrates, Tigris and Jordan rivers in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Jordan
and Israel (Held 1994), resulting in high and stable crop yields.
However, sustainability of these high yields can only be maintained
by proper management, irrigation scheduling and drainage (Steiner
et al. 1988). Pesticide and fertilizer pollution of soil and water is also
of concern.
Wheat-Based Farming Systems
These systems are largely crop-focused, and many other crops
are grown besides wheat. Additional crops include barley, lentils,
chickpeas, melon, sorghum, cotton, and vegetables (Tully 1988).
Food and feed legumes play an important role in sustaining the
productivity of cereals and livestock in the wheat-based system. The
ability of legumes to fix atmospheric nitrogen and improve soil
structure are key to the systems’ sustainability (Osman et al. 1988;
Cocks 1995). Fruit trees are also a central component of the wheatbased system and play a major role in the economy of most coun
tries of the Fertile Crescent, covering extensive areas in southern
Turkey, northern Iraq, northwestern Iran, western Syria, Lebanon,
northern and central Jordan and Israel (Jaradat 1995). The most
common fruit trees grown under rainfed conditions are grapes,
olives, almonds, pistachios, figs and pomegranates. Apples, pears,
cherries, peaches and plums are found at higher elevations where
rainfall exceeds 400 mm.
Barley-Based Farming Systems
The barley-based system exists in wide areas along the dry
margins (200-300 mm of annual rainfall) of cultivation in most
countries of the Fertile Crescent. Barley is grown mainly as feed for
livestock (Tully 1989). These systems support large numbers of
resource-poor farmers; although they are of subsistence nature,
they have become suppliers of livestock products to expanding urban
centers (Jaradat 1990). However, these systems have contributed to
the degradation of the marginal and fragile environments they occupy
and the sustainability of the system as it is practiced is questionable.

  



   

The Ley Farming System
The Ley farming system involves planting annual forage legumes
in rotation with wheat as a substitute for fallowing, and is being
practiced on a small scale in parts of the Fertile Crescent (Carter
1987; Cocks 1995). Its benefits include (1) improvement of soil struc
ture and fertility, (2) reduced soil erosion, (3) weed control without
chemicals and (4) sustainable livestock and wheat production.
Native Pasture-Based System
This system is integrated with the wheat- and barley-based sys
tems and is based in the steppe and other locations where rainfall
exceeds 250 mm. It utilizes lands that are too steep or stony, or areas
where the soil is too shallow for cultivation (Cooper et al. 1987).
These pasture lands are usually found in foothills and slopes of
mountain ranges in the eastern Mediterranean (Gibbon 1981). The
pastures tend to have a low carrying capacity (1 ewe/ha) and over
grazing and high stocking rates have severely degraded the natural
vegetation in these areas (Oram 1979).
The Fallow System
Fallowing is a common practice in the dryland farming systems
of the Fertile Crescent. It involves leaving the land without a crop
for one or more growing seasons. The benefits of fallow vary with
different soils and climates, but include improved moisture storage,
increased mineralization of soil nitrogen, weed control and better
seedbed conditions (Papendick and Campbell 1974).
A HOLISTIC APPROACH TO SUSTAINABLE
AGRICULTURE AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION
IN THE FERTILE CRESCENT
In order to sustainably conserve the remaining biodiversity in
the Fertile Crescent, and in order for biodiversity to positively
contribute to the establishment of sustainable farming systems in
the region, activities leading to the in-situ, or on-farm conservation
of biodiversity should include (Lowerance et al. 1986):
•
identification of sites with large biodiversity of target
cultivated, wild and weedy species;
•
assessment of the threats to biodiversity of each of culti
vated, wild and weedy species;
•
documentation of the extent of cultivation of landraces and
primitive or old varieties of field crops and horticultural
crops in the region; and
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characterization of wild and weedy species and landraces
and the documentation of the status of landraces and wild
relatives in ex-situ collections, in an effort to fill gaps and
capture maximum diversity in collections.

COMMUNITY-BASED BIODIVERSITY MANAGEMENT
The biodiversity which has been evolving as a part of the Fertile
Crescent landscape over the centuries is of global importance (Table
2; Kloppenberg and Kleiman 1988). Maintaining sufficient heteroge
neity in farming systems and providing the necessary habitats to
sustain this biodiversity is a regional and international responsibility
(IPGRI 1995). Although technology plays a major role in improving
sedentary farming, the role of management is also crucial (McNeely
1988; 1989). The widely-practiced top-down approaches have proved
to be ineffective in regulating land use and allowing sustainable
biodiversity management and conservation within ecosystems
(Lowerance et al. 1986), especially in the WANA region (FAO 1996a).
Community-based management, on the other hand, is expected to
result in a more effective and sustainable management of biodiversity.
The agricultural community should be seen as part of a larger and
more comprehensive ecosystem which provides both goods and
services from nature through well-managed protected systems.
Diversity of crop species and the diversity of varieties within
species have traditionally strengthened the resilience of agriculture
(Harlan 1975). Protected areas can contribute to this effort through
maintaining wild relatives of crops. Agriculture and protected areas
are sometimes seen as opposite ends of a spectrum (McNeely 1995).
However, they can play important complementary roles, especially
when the protected areas are managed in ways explicitly designed to
support agricultural development. Nonetheless, exclusion by means
of protected areas is not necessarily the best means of all species or
Table 2

Examples of important indigenous economic plants in countries of The Fertile Crescent.

Category

Examples

Food plants

Almonds, apricot, barley, beets, carob, chestnut, sweet chestnut, chickpea, cherry, date palm, fig,
sycamore fig, lentil, olive, pistachio, pomegranate, quince, rye, wheat

Fiber plants

Flax

Oil plants

Safflower, flax, olive

Timber trees

Abies spp., Acacia spp., Castanea sativa, Cedrus spp., Fagus orientalis, Juglans, regia, Pinus spp.

Dyes

Alkanna tinctoria, Anchus italica, Indegofera spp., Rubia tinctoria

Essential oils, perfumes, herbs

Achillea spp., Artemisia spp., Origanum spp., Thymus spp.

Plants of horticultural value

Allium spp., Asparagus spp., Colchicum spp., Crocus spp., Lilium spp., Rosa persica, Tulipa spp.

  



   

genetic resource conservation (ICARDA 1995). For many species
and environments, active management is required to conserve their
genetic diversity. This can be achieved through:
•
restoration (or creation), within the farming system, of
special niches or habitats for certain crops and their wild
and weedy relatives;
•
promotion of traditional land management practices,
including the use of traditional land preparation, sowing,
and harvesting of certain crops;
•
promotion of active participation of farmers in surveys,
selection and breeding, and utilization of their indigenous
knowledge (Daes 1993);
•
providing farmers with a broader genetic base (among and
within crops and genotypes) to enhance sustainability; and
•
reform of social and economic policies to encourage adoption,
by farmers, of in situ and on-farm conservation measures.
The Role of Farmers in Maintaining Biodiversity
Farmers, under traditional farming systems, have maintained
biodiversity through the creative handling (use, conservation and im
provement) of landrace and old crop varieties. Farmers’ choices are
usually based on the continued suitability of the traditional varieties
under their prevailing farming systems (Brush 1991; 1995).
Traditional farming has been in long and close contact with a great
range of different ecosystems (Wood 1994); characteristically, tradi
tional farming taps and manages a range of natural resources beyond
the limit of the farm. Farm communities should be recognized as stew
ards in the continued management of biodiversity.
Throughout their history, farmers have maintained diversity in
order to preserve stability of production under biotic and abiotic
stresses. Wild and weedy relatives of many crops (e.g., fruit trees, leafy
vegetables) used to be left growing on field borders to supply food, feed,
seeds or root stocks for grafting. The replacement of the traditional
farming system by modern agricultural practices is endangering these
wild relatives. Food demands and market forces have encouraged the
replacement of adapted landraces and local varieties of field crops,
vegetables and fruit and nut trees with higher-yielding, more uniform
cultivars, thus hampering the gene pools of these crops (Fowler and
Mooney 1990).
Demand, by consumers and farmers alike, for higher-yielding and
more uniform food crops which must also be adapted to ever-changing
biotic and abiotic stresses requires continuous and reliable access to
genetic resources that can be used to impart such qualities. The loss of
traditional agriculture to modern monocultures eliminates associated
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and potentially beneficial biological elements (Waage 1991) as well as
the invaluable traditional knowledge of the distinct qualities, uses, and
growth requirements of wild and weedy relatives of crop plants and
landraces of these crops (Brush 1986; Crucible Group 1994).
There is a need for research strategies that will both increase the
quantity and improve the quality of the genetic diversity being con
served by farmers (Voss 1992). Research objectives should include (1)
the provision of usable variation for farmers to evaluate and incorporate
into their cropping systems, (2) the dynamic on-farm conservation of
germplasm as resources for farmers throughout the region, and (3) the
protection of the environment by continued traditional management of
proven sustainability.
Supporting On-farm Conservation of Biodiversity
Farmers choose to grow new cultivars for many reasons, includ
ing market conditions, family food security and environmental
sustainability. Unfortunately, these choices often result in significant
on-farm genetic erosion. Still, in some countries of the Middle East,
including those in the Fertile Crescent, the overwhelming majority
of farmers, as a matter of choice or necessity, engage in conservation
and development of plant genetic resources as they select and save
seed for the next planting season. These farmers typically practice
low-input farming. Such farmers often lack access to new and di
verse genetic materials which could be integrated into existing crops
to improve production (ICARDA 1995).
Prospects of markedly increasing the productivity of low-input
and low-potential farms through genetic improvement alone, and
without appropriate and creative approaches, would appear limited.
Yet increased productivity is invaluable for food security and the
reduction of pressure on fragile environments (Sobral 1997). Initia
tives focusing on participatory, on-farm management and improve
ment of plant genetic resources may offer the potential to reach large
numbers of farmers and promote further agricultural development
(ICARDA 1995). Rigorous multidisciplinary scientific research is
needed in relation to on farm conservation of biodiversity, including
•
ethnobotanical and socio-economic research to understand
and analyze farmer knowledge, selection/breeding, utiliza
tion, and management of plant genetic resources;
•
population and conservation biology to understand the
structure and dynamics of genetic diversity in local
landraces and farmers’ varieties;
•
crop improvement research, including research on mass
selection and simple breeding as a means of increasing crop
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•

yields and reliability without significant losses of local
biodiversity; and
extension studies of little known crops, including seed
production, marketing and distribution.

In this context, two major issues must be considered. The first
concerns large gaps in knowledge about conservation requirements
and crop diversity loss in traditional farming systems, farmers’
attitudes concerning diversity, and the habitats supporting diversity.
The second concerns yield limitations of traditional plant breeding
systems by local farmers (which are constrained by the limited avail
ability of germplasm) (Henne 1995).
Promoting in situ Conservation
Natural ecosystems hold important plant genetic resources,
including endemic and threatened wild and weedy relatives of crop
plants. This genetic diversity is an economically important compo
nent of natural ecosystems and cannot be maintained ex situ
(Shands 1991). Unique and particularly diverse populations of these
genetic resources must be protected in situ when they are under
threat. Two reasons can be cited (ICARDA 1995) in favor of in situ
and on-farm conservation of biodiversity. First, it promotes the
evolutionary process, allowing germplasm to be kept in tune with
the changing environment (biotic and abiotic elements). Second, it
assures greater genetic diversity conservation than ex situ systems.
Underutilized Species
Many species typically regarded as marginal contribute substan
tially to household food and livelihood security (IPGRI 1995). They
are often managed or harvested by women. Many medicinal plants,
herbs (Oran 1996; Steinmann, this volume), and even fruit trees and
some field crops in the Fertile Crescent can be considered as un
derutilized. Knowledge concerning the uses and management of
these species is often localized and specialized. Many of these species
have the potential for more widespread use, and their promotion
could contribute to food security, agricultural diversification, and
income generation, particularly in areas where the cultivation of
major crops is economically constrained.
Seed Production and Distribution
Farmers benefit from having a wide range of seed varieties and
other planting materials (Kloppenburg and Kleiman 1988). Avail
ability can be constrained by (1) poor harvests, inadequate on-farm

 





storage facilities, and insufficient means to multiply quality seed,
and (2) poor seed distribution systems.
There is a need to strengthen local capacity to produce and
distribute seed of many crops and local varieties, especially landraces
and minor crops with specific adaptations, which can promote
diverse and resilient farming systems.
NEW MARKETS FOR LOCAL VARIETIES
Increasingly, diversity is being replaced by uniformity in the
agricultural market place. Changes in traditional cultures and in
consumer preferences are one explanation. Concentration on pro
ductivity, the effects of advertising, the rise of global consumer
markets leading to stringent requirements being imposed on farm
ers, and the often inadvertent disincentives arising from legislation,
policies, programs and other institutional activities offer additional
explanations (Fowler and Mooney 1990). Economic and social
incentives could be offered to encourage farmers who continue to
grow distinct, local varieties and produce “diversity-rich” agricul
tural products.
LAND USE MANAGEMENT
Land use management and planning of areas to be used for onfarm and in situ conservation is essential to:
•
provide buffers, corridors or habitat strips for the target species;
•
provide both water catchment and habitat for wild and
weedy relatives of crop species;
•
provide niches for diversified plant production and alterna
tive income generation (weedy vegetables, spices and herbs);
•
develop community-level water harvesting techniques
where necessary;
•
help protect target tree species as a genetic resource along
with their use as rootstocks for grafting (e.g., wild Olea
species in parts of southern Turkey, and wild Pistachia in
Syria, Lebanon and Jordan);
•
promote biodiversity-maintaining agronomic practices
(e.g., sowing mixtures of cereal landraces in rotation with
forage legumes to maintain soil fertility and production in
rainfed cropping areas to avoid poor management);
•
provide seed of locally-adapted pasture legumes for rejuve
nation of degraded common grazing lands; and
•
establish sustainable grazing management and monitor
pasture and range condition and animal nutrition and
health with the objective of preserving germplasm while
maintaining animal production.

  



   

SPECIES MANAGEMENT
Species management can be achieved through in situ conserva
tion to protect wild species of a particular crop gene pool in their
original habitats. These habitats may be modified when necessary to
ensure sufficient population size and gene flow. Different target
species will require different management. For example, populations
of wild progenitors of wheat, barley and lentils, growing on field
borders of the respective crops, constitute a special case of in situ
conservation. These three crops and their wild progenitors develop
hybridizing complexes, allowing introgression and gene flow be
tween the wild and domesticated species (ICARDA 1995). The hy
bridizing complexes may be enhanced by frequent planting of
cultivated species in fields adjacent to the wild populations. A simi
lar situation can be envisaged for vegetables, fruit trees and their
wild relatives throughout the Fertile Crescent (Bromberg 1995).
On the other hand, farmers can be encouraged to practice onfarm conservation of landraces and old varieties through awareness
building and incentives in the form of alternative livelihood. The
latter may include (1) introducing apiculture into farming systems,
especially where mixed farming is being practiced, (2) supply of
locally adapted rootstocks and seeds, and (3) technical assistance in
soil management and water harvesting.
Establishment of field gene banks to grow vulnerable crop spe
cies for replanting in field margins and improved habitats as native
trees or as adapted rootstocks will promote on-farm conservation.
These field gene banks can be utilized to promote public awareness
as well (Du Puy and Jackson 1995).
Finally, wild relatives and landraces, capable of withstanding
particular biotic and abiotic stresses, can be utilized in breeding
programs to make use of specific adaptation and thereby maintain
genetic diversity within a crop (ICARDA 1995). Farmers’ active
participation is essential (McNeely 1989; ICARDA 1995) in the
selection of lines in breeding programs to ensure that new genotypes
are specifically adapted not only to the ecological conditions but also
to the intended end-use and farmers’ preferences.
SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS
Governments in the Fertile Crescent are preoccupied with sup
porting and improving agricultural production, since the region has
some of the highest population growth rates in the world and a
widening trade gap in food and agricultural products (Held 1994).
Unfortunately, those policies directed at enhancing agricultural
productivity also tend to negatively impact genetic biodiversity.
Although there are limited biodiversity conservation policies in a
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few of these countries, there is no holistic plan for their implementa
tion (ICARDA 1995).
Technologies appropriate for better management of biodiversity,
water, soil, land and cropping systems are available but their adop
tion has been inhibited by disincentives to sustainable use of these
natural resources (Altieri and Merrick 1987; Voss 1992; Sobral
1997). Also, uncertainties over property rights among users of the
natural grazing and water catchments can become obstacles to
proper management of land and other natural resources. Some
tribal institutions which once regulated grazing or water rights have
broken down (e.g., in Jordan) or been undermined by government
nationalization of land (e.g., Syria). Some rangelands are being
privately appropriated through new settlement and conversion to
cropping (e.g., Jordan) while many (including the Hammad region
bordering Syria, Jordan and Iraq) are open access areas where users
have incentive neither to improve productivity nor to conserve
biodiversity.
In the barley-based, and to some extent the wheat-based, farm
ing systems, livestock is becoming increasingly dependent on
supplementary feed, forage supplies and crop residues from
biodiversity-rich areas in Syria, Jordan and Iraq (Jaradat and
Haddad 1994). This is causing significant competition over re
sources which must be taken into account in any policy changes.
Although planners and policymakers are convinced that changes
are needed, they posit that they will take time to implement. A
strong emphasis on the communities and local land managers as
well as the modification of current government incentives for the
benefit of biodiversity conservation can bring about these changes in
a relatively short time (ICARDA 1995).
In Syria, Jordan and Iraq, governments buy strategic crops (wheat,
barley, cotton, sugar beet) at attractive prices; feed concentrates are
distributed at cost through farmers’ cooperatives, and governments
control the price of many agricultural products (e.g., meat). Some of
these policies may be modified after the demonstration of feasible
policy alternatives conducive to biodiversity conservation.
Agricultural and land use policies, legislation related to bio
diversity, and resource management which include indigenous
knowledge and property rights are well-acknowledged policy areas
(Kloppenburg and Kleiman 1988; Doren-Adzobu 1997). It is vital to
promote policies which favor biodiversity conservation without
jeopardizing agricultural production. Such initiatives can be defined
and tested and can be country- or region-specific. They must ad
dress current incentive practices of land clearing for fruit tree
plantations in hilly areas, herbicide and pesticide use in intensive



Although planners and policymakers are
convinced that changes are needed, they
posit that they will take time to imple
ment. A strong emphasis on the
communities and local land managers
as well as the modification of current
government incentives for the benefit of
biodiversity conservation can bring about
these changes in a relatively short time
(ICARDA 1995).…In Syria, Jordan and
Iraq, governments buy strategic crops
(wheat, barley, cotton, sugar beet) at
attractive prices; feed concentrates are
distributed at cost through farmers’
cooperatives, and governments control
the price of many agricultural products
(e.g., meat). Some of these policies may
be modified after the demonstration of
feasible policy alternatives conducive to
biodiversity conservation.

  



   

farming (e.g., the Jordan, the Beqa’a and the Ghab valleys, in Jordan,
Lebanon and Syria, respectively), and land ownership and agricul
tural expansion in marginal and government-owned lands.
HUMAN RESOURCES
Human and institutional resources play a decisive role in the
sustainability of agricultural production and biodiversity conserva
tion. Long-term national plant genetic resources programs, comple
mented by coordinated regional activities, will provide the frame
work for sustainable biodiversity conservation (ICARDA 1995;
IPGRI 1995). However, skilled personnel educated in biodiversity
conservation and plant genetic resources are lacking in the region
(Adham et al. 1995). Training needs of most countries range over a
number of disciplines and involve both short and long term training
(IPGRI 1995). They include specialized training in plant identifica
tion of wild relatives and landraces, in situ and on-farm conserva
tion, agro-ecosystem ecology, population genetics, and agricultural
socio-economics. Administrators and technicians in this field re
quire specially adapted in-country training courses.
OPERATIONAL NEEDS TO PROMOTE ON-FARM
MANAGEMENT OF BIODIVERSITY
The range of options for intervention in on-farm germplasm
conservation and management (Henne 1995) in the Fertile Crescent
is great. The often conflicting objectives of conservation, agricultural
development, social equity, appropriate seed production and deliv
ery systems, and the provision of samples for breeding work, all
overlain with donors’ changing interests, has in the past led to much
confusion. In this context, it is important to address a variety of
needs and priorities. More technical investigation is needed on
genetic and agronomic aspects of on-farm conservation in order to
quantify, improve and transfer both the genetic resources and tradi
tional management technology, so as to supplement information
generated by sociological and anthropological studies. Priority at
tention should be given to farming (and cropping) systems rich in
species and varietal diversity. Information on farming communities
with a history of crop and varietal experimentation should be used
in planning on-farm conservation. Information on varietal move
ment in and out of cropping systems is vital to understanding the
dynamic nature of on-farm management of germplasm. It is highly
recommended that intervention start with farming systems with a
history of traditional management, in regions of varietal diversifica
tion which are not yet targeted for agricultural development.

 

The often conflicting objectives of
conservation, agricultural development,
social equity, appropriate seed produc
tion and delivery systems, and the
provision of samples for breeding work,
all overlain with donors’ changing
interests, has in the past led to much
confusion.





CONCLUSIONS
The holistic approach to sustainable agricultural development
and biodiversity conservation in the Fertile Crescent is hypothesized to:
•
reduce risks to productivity under highly variable environ
ments by utilizing the specific adaptation of landraces, the
highly diverse wild relatives and other biodiversity assets in
different farming systems in the region;
•
allow for sound management of natural resources, includ
ing biological, water, and soil resources, for present and
future agricultural development;
•
build and strengthen human resources to cope with agricul
tural and environmental challenges, and
•
create public awareness in environmental and biodiversity
issues, especially those influencing agricultural production
and its sustainability.
Promoting sustainable agriculture through diversification of
crop production and broader diversity in crops in the Fertile Cres
cent calls for (Francis et al. 1988; Henne 1995):
•
incorporation of a broader range of crops including inter alia
crops which produce raw material or are sources of energy;
•
use of more diversity in breeding programs and in varieties
and species used on farms;
•
implementation of innovative approaches in plant breeding
for the purposes of domesticating new crops; the develop
ment of new plant varieties and the promotion of higher
levels of genetic diversity in crops and on farms, such as
planting mixtures of adapted varieties, are recognized as
means for adding stability in agricultural systems and pro
moting agricultural production and food security; and
•
support of efforts to identify those activities used in plant
breeding, plant research and farming systems that foster onfarm diversity. Such research might include a review of
non-homogenous farming systems, such as those based on
intercropping, polycropping, integrated pest management
and integrated nutrient management, for their possible
wider applicability.
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Use of Land by Nomadic Pastoralists in Iran: 1970–1998
Lois Beck
Washington University, St. Louis
ABSTRACT
This paper describes and analyzes changes in natural resource use by the Qashqa’i nomadic pastoralists of southwestern
Iran between the early 1970s and the present. Drawing upon the author’s anthropological fieldwork, including eight visits
since the overthrow of the shah in 1979, the paper demonstrates how Qashqa’i land use strategies, which evolved over
centuries as a means for survival in often marginal natural environments, have adapted to the pressures of an increasingly
intrusive society with urban and technological biases. Despite these pressures, the Qashqa’i have used customary and
new means to wrest a living from their remaining lands and have thereby preserved a measure of autonomy.

In this paper, I examine how some nomadic pastoralists in Iran
changed their use of the physical environment over the past thirty
years and how these changes related to their economic practices. I
base this paper on my anthropological research among Qashqa’i
nomadic pastoralists in southwestern Iran in the 1970s and 1990s,
including eight visits since the revolution in 1978-1979 and the
Islamic Republic’s formation. I draw on my observations of the
varying ecological adaptations and diversifying economic strategies
of these tribal people as they exploited a vast section of the southern
Zagros Mountains. Their practices included use and protection of
pastureland, investment in arable land and agricultural techniques,
construction of water-control systems, hunting, gathering, construc
tion of shelters for people and animals, increased reliance on roads
and motorized transportation, and closer ties with the national
government and the market. Although much of the land these no
madic pastoralists used was not suitable for productive activities
other than seasonal pastoralism, hunting, and gathering, they were
increasingly forced to compete with settled agrarian communities for
the available cultivable land and for access to water and rights of
passage. They, did enjoy, however, the competitive advantage of a
continuing reliance on migration, and the primary products of pasto
ralism (meat, dairy goods, wool, weavings) were in market demand.
This paper may inspire other scholars to take fuller consider
ation of the people actually making use of a specific territory. How
ever land is used, it is obviously more than just physical features.
Studies of the environment too often ignore or neglect the people
who make a livelihood there and whose use of land is a major part of
their vital social and cultural systems. People have developed strategies
of land use through a process of trial and error over long periods—
decades, centuries, and even millennia. Such strategies and the
people who devise them deserve at least our respect and at most our
support and possible protection.

 

However land is used, it is obviously
more than just physical features. Studies
of the environment too often ignore or
neglect the people who make a
livelihood there and whose use of land is
a major part of their vital social and
cultural systems.





Mobile residents of the plateaus and valleys of the Zagros Moun
tains of southwestern Iran, the Qashqa’i are members of a tribal
confederacy of some 800,000 individuals. They speak a CentralAsian-derived Turkish and constitute one of Iran’s many ethnic and
national minorities. Until the 1960s most Qashqa’i were nomadic
pastoralists who migrated semiannually hundreds of kilometers
between winter pastures at low altitudes near the Persian Gulf and
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Figure 1 Qashqa’i territory (Beck 1991).
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Figure 2 Qashqa’i winter pastures, summer pastures, and migration routes (Beck 1991).

summer pastures high in the mountains to the north and east
(Figures 1 and 2).
Since the 1960s many Qashqa’i have settled in villages and
towns, although often retaining pastoralism as one of several means
of livelihood. Despite the new places and patterns of residence for
many of these settlers, most remained attached to their customary
seasonal pastures, visited their kin there, and continued to exploit
the resources, often in cooperation with these kin.

 





This paper focuses on the contemporary ecological, economic,
and social conditions in southwestern Iran as I have directly ob
served them during eight periods since the revolution in 1978-1979
and the Islamic Republic’s formation, most recently in 1998.
Because of research I also conducted there in the 1970s, I am able to
follow precisely the changes that individuals, families, and tribal
groups have made over the past thirty years.1 My publications draw
ing on this earlier research provide comparative information about
previous periods (e.g., Beck 1980, 1981a, 1981b, 1991). Other
aspects of post-revolutionary conditions are covered in existing
and forthcoming work (Beck 1992).
I ask the following key questions:
•

•

•
•

How have the Qashqa’i people made the best of the inher
ent environmental constraints of these rugged, mountainous, and semi-arid lands?
How and why do many of them continue with pastoralism
and nomadism, despite pressures to change their livelihoods and lifestyles?
How have these pressures changed over the years?
Why does the current Islamic government, unlike previous
Iranian governments in this century, support nomads and
their livelihoods?

1

I conducted anthropological research
among Qashqa’i nomadic pastoralists in
Iran in 1969-1971, 1977 (two visits), 1979,
1991, 1992, 1995 (two visits), 1996,1997
and 1998. Research in the 1990s was
supported in part by grants from the
National Endowment for the Humanities,
the Social Science Research Council, the
American Philosophical Society, and
Washington University.

Despite the many changes that all Qashqa’i have undergone in the
past thirty years, I am still impressed by the remarkable continuities in
their society and culture. In examining my photographs to find details
to add to this paper, I was struck by how many of them could have
been taken at any time during the past three decades, as long ago as
1969 or as recently as 1998.
A TYPICAL CAMP: 1970 AND 1998
Several brief descriptions will help to demonstrate the kinds of
changes that have occurred for Qashqa’i nomadic pastoralists and to
establish a context for this paper’s discussion. Their winter and
summer pastures are located in the valleys and on the slopes and
plateaus of the southern Zagros Mountains. Mountain peaks rise
above nomads’ camps, each of which is usually secluded by the
rugged terrain. The ecological differences between winter and sum
mer pastures will be apparent here and in the rest of the paper.
A typical campsite in winter pastures in 1970 contained three
woven goat-hair tents with slanted roofs to deflect rain and snow.
Each dwelling held an extended family of seven or so people. The
black tents were pitched on flat areas on the slopes of gullies to

  



   

protect the occupants and their possessions from flash floods while
also still providing some shelter from wind. Several nearby huts built
of stones, tree branches, and bundled reeds were used for cooking,
storage, and refuge in inclement weather. A simple, roughly circular,
open-air enclosure made of rocks heaped with dried thorny bushes
protected the animals at night and helped to discourage predators.
Each household owned its own sheep and goats, which were tended
together in herds of from one hundred to three hundred animals.
Small trees and shrubs and low-lying plants grew in the terrain
surrounding the camp. Green leafy shoots appeared as the weather
warmed after the winter’s rains. Several nearby shallow depressions,
sometimes fortified along the sides with rocks and dried mud, held
rainfall and runoff for the animals to drink. Accompanied by don
keys to carry the load, the camp’s women and children spent many
hours a day traveling to and from a well in the valley below, the
nearest source of clean drinking water. Newborn lambs and kids
were held in reed pens inside the tents and released several times a
day to be reunited with their mothers for nursing. Before dawn
shepherds took the herds to graze different parts of the surrounding
hills and mountainsides, while a camel herder tended his animals and
collected firewood for the camp’s use. Men and boys kept periodic
watch over several small fields of sown barley protected by rock walls,
the crop to be used as supplemental animal feed if sufficient rain
germinated the seeds and grew the plants to maturity. Birds seemed to
eat as much grain as was eventually harvested.
By contrast, in terms of both time and space, a typical residential
site in summer pastures in 1998 contained several simple one-room
houses constructed from stones gathered nearby and mortared with
cement and dirt. They stood on the very spots where tents used to be
erected only a few years previously. A small kitchen area walled in by
cement blocks and roofed with old tent fabric stood to the side of
each house, and just beyond that lay heaps of firewood and
miscellaneous equipment that had not found a place in these new
dwellings. Gunny sacks filled with barley, dried alfalfa, and straw
leaned against the houses’ outer walls. A black goat-hair tent was
pitched by one house, where a newly married son and his bride
resided and where guests were entertained, as if to celebrate the past
nostalgically. Holding the herds at night, pens made of metal mesh
supported by wooden stakes stood behind the houses at the edge of
the mountain slope. The mouth of the nearest spring had been
cemented to form a small pool from which people drew water, and a
cement channel led water to another pool where the animals drank.
A decrepit Land Rover was parked beside one of the houses. The dirt
track used by the vehicle’s owner to reach the camp was also traveled
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by Persian and Lur cultivators in the area. The dust-raising traffic
annoyed everyone, especially mothers trying to watch young chil
dren. These trespassers demonstrated no concern for the campsite’s
borders; they did not care that the camp was a defined territory to be
used exclusively by its inhabitants. Down the hill near another water
channel was a toilet, a small, open-air, cement-block structure con
taining a ceramic platform precariously balanced over a pit. The
stumps of shade trees, planted along the channel but cut down by
irate Persian cultivators who resented the nomads’ presence, stood
as stark evidence of the conflict. Their trunks lay on the ground,
stripped of branches. The surrounding terrain was bare compared
with winter pastures. No trees or large shrubs grew here naturally,
only small bushes and low-lying vegetation. The valley below, its
streams blocked against the pastoralists’ animals since the 1980s, was
green with walled orchards and cultivated fields. Hostile encounters
between the Persian and Lur cultivators there and the pastoralists
occurred almost daily.
Various topics mentioned in these two passages are discussed in
the following eight sections. I focus on the post-revolutionary period
(1979-1998) with comparative information provided for earlier
periods. The wider context, in which many individuals and groups
other than the Qashqa’i competed for the same resources, cannot be
discussed in detail here.



Problems over land caused great
uncertainty among Qashqa’i nomadic
pastoralists and significantly affected
the ongoing decisions they made
concerning their livelihoods and
lifestyles. No single government agency
held all the information about land use
and deeds for any given territory, and
some offices possessed conflicting
information.

LAND
Problems over land caused great uncertainty among Qashqa’i
nomadic pastoralists and significantly affected the ongoing decisions
they made concerning their livelihoods and lifestyles. No single
government agency held all the information about land use and
deeds for any given territory, and some offices possessed conflicting
information. Such bureaucratic chaos offered the potential for great
abuse. In part because the nomads were especially vulnerable due to
their mobility and their only seasonal residence in winter and sum
mer pastures, settled non-Qashqa’i individuals with influential
government connections and sufficient wealth to bribe officials
could determine their own land use. To support their own interests,
Qashqa’i individuals held onto any documents pertaining to land.
Even papers concerning disputes on other issues contained a record
of people’s location at the time, necessary for proof of residence.
School records also provided evidence for the presence of certain
families in specific places.
The status of nationalized pastureland, a broad policy intro
duced by Mohammad Reza Shah in 1962 as part of his “bloodless”
revolution, was unclear after his ouster in 1979 and still remained so

  



   

in 1998, in part because his programs, even exemplary ones, were
tainted by their association with him. Since 1962, natural water
courses, following the pull of gravity and the contours of the often
hilly if not mountainous terrain, were generally recognized by gov
ernment officials as the legal division between pasture and “culti
vable” land. Land above the channels was nationalized to be used as
pasture; land below was subject to land reform and opened up for
cultivation if not already cultivated. Most nomads were not eligible
then for distribution of cultivable land. By the 1990s the dividing
line between these two types of land was increasingly unclear be
cause of the expansion of irrigation systems and new land brought
under cultivation. Some changes did occur in the mid-1990s, such as
new legal rights to rent, transfer, and sell pasture leases to others.
Rights over collectively used land were locally negotiated but not
always formalized by legal documentation. The issue of land consid
ered as privately owned with or without supporting legal documents
was still under discussion in the national parliament in 1998, in part
because of problems created by the many thousands of wealthy
landowners who had fled into exile during or after the revolution
and who later attempted to return and/or claim their (former) land.
Although some influential members of the ruling Shi’i Muslim
clergy supported a land reform that would give legal title to the
cultivators who actually worked the land, others were themselves
major landholders and resisted any new comprehensive reform that
would jeopardize their own interests and those of their political and
economic backers.
NOMADISM AND PASTORALISM
Qashqa’i nomadic pastoralists herded their sheep and goats
seasonally between lowlands and highlands, distances as much as
600 km each way, and exploited the pastoral resources along the
routes. They spent approximately four months in lowland winter
pastures, two months migrating in the spring to highland summer
pastures, three to four months residing there, and two to three
months migrating in the autumn back to lowland winter pastures.
These migrations were not merely passages between two regions, for
the vegetation along the way, especially in spring, was a vital part of
the animals’ sustenance. Also, seasonal pastures did not provide
sufficient natural grazing and water to support the nomads and their
animals for long periods. Once arriving in winter or summer pas
tures, the nomads did not stay in one location for the season.
Rather, they moved periodically from place to place within these
areas seeking fresh grazing, better access to water and other natural

 

Rights over collectively used land were
locally negotiated but not always
formalized by legal documentation. The
issue of land considered as privately
owned with or without supporting legal
documents was still under discussion in
the national parliament in 1998, in part
because of problems created by the
many thousands of wealthy landowners
who had fled into exile during or after the
revolution and who later attempted to
return and/or claim their (former) land.


resources, clean campsites, and new neighbors.
Most Qashqa’i people spent the year traveling in these ways and
residing in goat-hair tents wherever they set up camp. Diverse and
flexible patterns had always emerged, however, as people made
ongoing individual and group decisions to continue or to change
their current modes of livelihood, residence, and lifestyle. For
example, even by the 1970s some Qashqa’i lived in huts or small,
rudimentary houses in winter or summer pastures and migrated in
the spring and autumn. Some resided in tents and did not migrate at
all. Others lived in villages in the winter and in tents at higher alti
tudes in the summer. Some Qashqa’i resided in tents and practiced
only agriculture, while others lived in houses and practiced only
pastoralism. Some families were divided into nomadic and settled
parts and into pastoral and agricultural parts. And some Qashqa’i
migrated without having any sheep and goats. All these patterns and
the more standard ones could change on a yearly and even a sea
sonal basis. For any single local group, the specific patterns its mem
bers created during a year were never to be replicated.
By 1979 many nomads found the autumn’s trek lasting two to
three months to be too strenuous and troublesome for their animals
because of the increasing shortage of pasture and water along the
route and the detours caused by expanding human settlements and
agrarian activity. Most began to hire trucks and transport their
animals in a single day, a change that put new stress on the pastoral
resources of their summer and winter territories, on which they
were now dependent for longer periods than before. Remaining in
summer pastures longer than in the past, beyond the time when
natural vegetation was nearly depleted, they became increasingly
reliant on growing, buying, storing, and transporting supplemental
animal feed. They also entered winter pastures well before they had
gone there in the past, exploited natural vegetation that they had
formerly conserved until later in the season, and grew, bought, and
stored quantities of fodder there as well.
The newly growing natural vegetation along the migratory route
in the spring was too lush and beneficial to bypass, and so almost all
pastoralists continued to send their animals by hoof during that
season. As they traveled from one point on the route to the next,
each new one usually at a slightly higher altitude, they found fresh
vegetation. On a slightly accelerated schedule, they entered summer
pastures several weeks sooner than in the past, but natural vegeta
tion there was usually adequate for their herds then. Their early use
of this vegetation did decrease the pasturage available later in the
season, when they also needed it. They enhanced methods they had
used in the past to protect specific areas and to conserve vegetation,
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by careful scheduling and rotation, removing rocks to encourage plant
growth, creating physical barriers, and guarding against encroachers
in protected areas.
Before 1979 most nomads had relied on camels and other pack
animals (mules, donkeys, horses) to carry their goat-hair tents and
other household possessions between winter and summer pastures.
Since then, many people have sold their camels and many of their
pack animals because of their new reliance on motorized transporta
tion. Although increasingly expensive, the use of such vehicles did
offer many obvious benefits. Also, tending the camels during winter
and summer, when the animals’ services were not in much demand,
had become burdensome and expensive even for those able to hire
specialized herders. Twice a year families contracted with truck
owners from nearby towns and cities to carry their goods to the
other seasonal pastures. Formerly, herds, pack animals, and house
holds had followed the same schedules and routes, but now animals
were usually separated from households for part of the spring.
Changes in dairy production were one result, for the women and
girls previously present to milk and process the products did not
accompany the herds. To the detriment of people’s diets and needs
for income, dairy production was delayed until people and animals
were reunited in summer pastures. Care of lambs and kids during
the spring migration was another problem, for they could not ac
company the adult animals without special supervision. Now com
mitted to formal education, the children who had formerly tended
the young animals during the spring migration no longer migrated
with the herds.
The increasing availability of rapid transportation facilitated the
nomads’ further economic diversification. A family could engage in
a variety of activities simultaneously, as long as at least one person
could travel from one location to another quickly. For example, a
man could irrigate his newly planted apple orchard for the stipu
lated twelve-hour period and then return to camp by motorcycle
in time to select sheep to be driven to market by a hired truck.
Another man could transport recently harvested fodder from sum
mer pastures to winter ones, in anticipation of the herds’ early
arrival, while his son managed the animals during his brief absence.
Trips to town for errands and government business were no longer
as onerous and time-consuming.
The absence of camels and the decrease of other pack animals
freed up some kinds of natural pasturage for sheep and goats,
although camels had usually consumed plants that were too tall,
thorny, or tough for the other animals, especially sheep. One singlestemmed thorny plant in particular was no longer grazed by any
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animals, and it grew to apparently unprecedented heights, two or
more meters, and appeared to be taking over some areas of summer
pastures to the detriment of other vegetation. With no camels to
graze them, thorny bushes also proliferated, but in this case they
supported the opportunistic growth of the surrounding low-lying
vegetation that the sheep and goats preferred. Their populations
expanding, small animals such as birds, rodents, rabbits, weasels,
lizards, toads, and snakes found shelter in and around these bushes.
Slow-burning dried camel dung used to provide an important
fuel for all pastoralists but was no longer available when they sold
these animals. They eventually bought propane-gas cookers and
lanterns and kerosene heaters when they saw that natural fuels (wood,
charcoal, brush) were not nearly sufficient for their many needs
(cooking, baking, milk processing, wool dyeing, lighting, heating).
In the 1960s and 1970s the shah’s government had tried by
various means to impede the nomads’ migrations. After 1979, by
contrast, the new Islamic government adopted supportive policies. Its
Ministries of Natural Resources and Rural Reconstruction seeded
many areas along major migratory routes and posted signs explaining
their intentions. Officials chose locations where many pastoralists
camped overnight during the migration, so that herd and pack ani
mals could fortify themselves for the next day’s journey without tres
passing on anyone’s grazing lands. According to local reports, the
apparently successful program resulted in decreased pressure on other
pastoral resources and fewer conflicts along the routes.
Also offered by the new government at low or no cost to the no
mads, modern veterinary medicine played a major role in the
pastoralists’ ability to keep their animals alive and healthy and less
subject to the catastrophic diseases that used to wipe out entire herds.
Regional veterinary clinics were established, and government-paid
specialists toured seasonal pastures to dispense drugs and treatments.
One apparent result of the increasingly widespread use of modern
veterinary care was the pastoralists’ decreased use of ritual and symbolic
acts to attain these same ends. Until the 1980s most people had con
ducted rituals and prayers and employed amulets (always in combina
tion with other, supposedly more practical efforts) to protect and care
for their animals. In the 1990s many of these rituals were not practiced
at all or only by a limited number of individuals who still believed in
their efficacy. Many prized rams in 1998 were still outfitted with carved
wooden talismans decorated by braided tassels, but the nomads some
times stated that these charms simply reminded them of old Qashqa’i
customs and did not offer any real protection to the animals. Almost all
pastoralists continued to abide by their notions of auspicious and inaus
picious days of the week in order to avoid jeopardizing acts central to
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their livelihood such as shearing the wool and transporting the sheep to
market. People still talked about the rain ceremonies they used to per
form and the rituals they conducted to mark and safeguard the critical
stages of the seasonal round, but by 1998 most people did not actually
engage in them, and children rarely knew anything about them.2
Since 1979 the new government paid special attention to build
ing new roads and improving existing ones in Qashqa’i territory—
especially in remote places—and in surrounding areas. A mixed
blessing for the pastoralists, these roads assisted them in their new
or increased reliance on motorized transportation and their efforts
to carry products to and from markets (including supplies for con
struction—see below). But the roads also brought outsiders into
their territories more frequently, thereby increasing the competition
over pastoral and agricultural land and other resources. New and
improved roads opened previously unexploited areas to outsiders
wanting to plant orchards or engage in mechanized agriculture.
Urban, middle-class, Persian tourists also took advantage of the new
roads—and the greater security—to invade seasonal pastures for
picnics and outings on Fridays and other holidays. Anxious to flee
the city’s heat, dirt, and crowds, they presumed upon the customar
ily offered hospitality of reluctant Qashqa’i hosts (Beck 1982).
Commercial herds and animal contracts were a significant
feature of pastoralism in southwestern Iran in the 1960s and 1970s.
By the early 1980s many commercial herds, owned by non-Quashqa’i
urban entrepreneurs and tended by hired and often non-tribal herd
ers, had virtually disappeared from the landscape because of newly
enforced government regulations about the illegal use of national
ized pastures and because of changes in the economics of this kind
of animal husbandry. Also, the Qashqa’i, disarmed by the shah but
re-armed during the revolution, were now better able to guard and
defend their own pastoral resources. Commercial animal contracts,
under which urban moneylenders and merchants became part own
ers of the nomads’ herds because of the nomads’ unpaid and deep
ening debts, also decreased and by the 1990s were rare. This change
resulted in part because new government regulations covering
moneylending and interest-taking forced at least a temporary refig
uring of debts according to what were said to be Islamic principles.
The most abusive of the moneylenders were publicly flogged by the
government’s revolutionary guards. Pastoralists were able to renego
tiate their existing debts, and they took on new loans under
revised terms. (They were now also eligible for loans for specific
projects from government-run banks.) Interest rates declined, and
debts did not escalate in the way they had done before the revolu
tion. The absence of or significant decrease in herds belonging to
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outsiders significantly improved the quantity and quality of pastoral
resources for the Qashqa’i users.3 The numbers of herd animals
owned by the Qashqa’i as a whole did not increase and in fact may
have decreased as part of the process of settlement and the adoption
of new livelihoods (see below).
AGRICULTURE
The legal status of land classified as “cultivable” was not yet
settled in many areas of Qashqa’i territory and the periphery in
1998. Disputes were common, and many pastoralists were insecure
about their own and others’ rights and claims.
Agricultural production in Qashqa’i territory had rapidly
increased since the 1960s, both by outsiders able to appropriate
land in the area and by the Qashqa’i themselves. Sections of winter
and summer pastures and many areas along migratory routes
became cultivated. In the uplands above water courses, crops de
pended on moisture from seasonal rain and snow. Below water
courses, crops were often irrigated. Pastoral land, never plowed
before, was transformed into agricultural land and was off-limits
during the growing and harvest seasons to the pastoralists’ herd and
pack animals. Even where the pastoralists themselves added or en
larged their own areas of cultivation, the land became lost or dimin
ished as a viable pastoral resource. Villagers who expanded the land
they cultivated in and near seasonal pastures and along migratory
routes were often aided by mechanized equipment, such as tractors
and combines, and they improved their own supply of water by
digging wells, installing motorized pumps, and constructing irrigation
works. As villages expanded in population size and land use, the sur
rounding areas became denuded of viable pastoral resources. The
nomads found that they increasingly had to travel circuitous or indi
rect routes to avoid these growing settlements and to find adequate
grazing and water.4
The creation and expansion of fruit orchards was a major part of
these changes. Trees planted in summer pastures were mostly apple,
apricot, walnut, almond, and pistachio, while in winter pastures, an
area of high summer heat and dryness, they were primarily date,
lime, lemon, orange, and pomegranate. Many villagers also grew
grapes and figs, especially in areas between winter and summer
pastures. People with claims to land and access to sufficient water
planted saplings and vines, constructed irrigation systems, erected
containing walls, and committed themselves to a dependence on
chemical fertilizers and pesticides. The sources of water they walled
in, often natural springs or the mouths of qanats (man-made under
ground water channels; see English, Afkhami, this volume), were
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thereby now off-limits to pastoralists, either traveling through the
area or resident in nearby seasonal pastures. When I asked
pastoralists in the 1990s to tell me the single most troubling diffi
culty threatening their main livelihood, many answered, “orchards.”
Most pastoralists tried to increase the production of fodder crops
for their animals and wheat for household use—flat bread remained
the people’s staple food. During times of inadequate rain and snow,
naturally growing vegetation was insufficient for the herd and pack
animals, and quantities of supplemental feed were needed. This feed
included barley, straw, and fresh and dried alfalfa, clover, and hay. The
prices of these commodities rose rapidly during times of low moisture,
because crops grew poorly under such conditions and the regional
demand for them was great, especially from settled people who also
owned animals and did not have much if any natural pasturage. Hence
pastoralists with available land, water, labor, and time tried to produce
as much fodder as possible, to avoid high and often escalating market
prices, without jeopardizing other aspects of their livelihood. In record
ing household budgets, I noted that barley and alfalfa comprised the
single largest annual expense for many pastoralists. Dried sugar-beet
pulp, a by-product of sugar factories in the province and used widely in
the area in the 1970s, was no longer much used by the 1980s because of
its apparent lack of adequate nutrients.
The main advantage for the pastoralists in the expansion of their
own and others’ cultivation was their ability to graze animals on the
stubble and other crop residues after the harvests were completed.
Because of the mountainous terrain and the different altitudes
where cultivation was practiced, the pastoralists herded their ani
mals from one elevation to another in order to exploit sequential
harvests. Remaining in their summer territories beyond the point
when natural pasturage was depleted, the pastoralists came to rely
heavily on the remnants in these fields. Mechanized combines,
increasingly used in wide flat areas free of large stones, left the stalks
of harvested crops standing as high as fifteen centimeters, which the
pastoralists used for grazing. (By contrast, cultivators who harvested
grain by hand sickles cut the crop close to the ground and left little
for ruminants.)
Another new advantageous factor—one related to expanded
irrigation—was the lush, wild, and opportunistic vegetation growing
at the edges of cultivated fields, between trees in orchards, and along
water channels. Pastoralists grazed their animals on the live vegeta
tion, cut armfuls and filled gunny sacks to bring to the animals, and
dried and stored quantities for use later on. They competed for this
resource with the cultivators, who also needed animal fodder or who
wanted to sell it for a profit. Some crops, such as dry-farmed barley
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and irrigated pulses, had spaces between plants where pastoralists
could gingerly walk to collect wild vegetation.
In the 1970s and 1980s, some far-sighted pastoralists had
planted poplar trees in summer pastures in order to use the trunks
as roof beams and other supportive structures for the houses they
expected they would ultimately build. During late autumn and
early spring, unhampered by the heavy snows of winter, trespassers
sometimes cut down these unguarded trees for their own use or just
out of spite.
MANAGEMENT OF WATER
Many changes also occurred in the management of water. Until
the 1960s and early 1970s most pastoralists in this large stretch of
the southern Zagros Mountains had relied, without much human
intervention, on the natural sources of water available. In winter
pastures they sometimes deepened or fortified naturally occurring
shallow basins to collect seasonal rainfall and runoff for the ani
mals, while in summer pastures they dug shallow trenches to direct
the flow of water from natural springs to the small pools they
excavated. They always tried to find fresh spring or well water for
drinking, food preparing, milk processing, and wool dyeing.
Women and children aided by pack animals and goat-skin bags
spent time and effort traveling to and from the nearest sources. An
area of seasonal and unpredictable water, winter pastures were more
troublesome than summer pastures, an area of many natural springs.
Since the early 1980s, the management of water has become
more controlled and government-assisted. Through officials of the
Organization for Nomadic Affairs, the Ministry of Rural Recon
struction was instrumental in transforming water use for Qashqa’i
pastoralists. With aid from the Ministry of Agriculture, these offi
cials helped some people to secure low-interest bank loans and
low-cost or subsidized construction supplies (such as cement) and
assisted them in acquiring land-use permits from the Ministry of
Natural Resources. In many areas, pastoralists together with hired
professionals and workers dug wells, repaired or improved access
to qanats, and constructed cement channels and catchment basins,
all of which delivered clean, reliable water. In winter pastures,
where springs are not common, the government dug many wells in
convenient locations and also constructed or set up large, covered
or enclosed, holding tanks and periodically filled them with clean
water from tankers, at either low or no cost to the pastoralists.
Some of these recent efforts to manage water caused at least a
temporary and possibly a longer-term or even a permanent de
crease in water in the vicinity. In some areas of summer pastures,
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many natural springs dried up in the summer of 1997 following the
winter’s sparse snow and rain. Whether winter snows and rains in
1997-1998 will replenish the ground water and restore the flow of
these springs is not yet known, although the seasonal residents in
some areas did say that they expected the water to return, perhaps at
decreased levels. More pessimistic, other residents blamed the
nearby non-Qashqa’i cultivators and their over-exploitation of
groundwater for the death of the springs. Where orchard owners
and other large-scale cultivators, mostly non-Qashqa’i outsiders,
dug deep wells and installed motorized pumps, a lowered water
table resulted. According to residents and observers, once the pumps
began to operate, water in the vicinity never returned to its previous
levels and quantities. In the summer of 1997 many orchards held
dead, dying, stunted, or fruitless trees due to insufficient irrigation
water, although whether this condition came about primarily be
cause of the year’s poor supply of rain and snow or from a more
long-term lowering of the water table is not yet clear.5
CONSTRUCTION OF SHELTERS
Human dwellings, accompanying structures, and animal pens
and shelters also altered the landscape of areas formerly inhabited
only by the seasonal, mobile tents of nomads. These developments
are explained by the processes of modernization and the nomads’
insecurity about their claims to land.
The building of dwellings accompanied a general rise in the
standard of living for most Qashqa’i, who also wanted to protect and
shelter the new possessions they now owned. Many pastoralists,
even those who were fully nomadic, chose to construct huts and
houses for themselves and pens and shelters for their animals in
winter and/or summer pastures. When they saw that these dwellings
were likely to be vandalized during the seasons when they were
absent, they cut back on their efforts and investments. For example,
they bought previously used, inexpensive wooden and metal doors
and window frames when the new ones they had purchased and
installed were roughly pried away from the walls and stolen by tres
passers. Even though they always stored miscellaneous equipment in
these dwellings when they departed for their other seasonal pastures,
they learned not to lock the doors, for the cost to repair the damage
that thieves caused by breaking locks, doors, and windows was
greater than the cost of replacing any stolen items.
Using locally available rocks for the foundations and tree
branches, long reeds, and woven-reed mats for the walls and roofs,
many men built simple one-room huts for their families in winter
pastures, which helped to protect them from the winter’s rain, snow,

 

5

Many authors, including Paul English (this
volume), note that deep wells in arid and
semi-arid areas, which extract water
beyond replacement levels, fail to increase
agricultural production and are in fact an
ecological threat.


mud, wind, and cold. Some men built more substantial huts by also
using cement mixed with dirt for mortar and flooring, cement and
plaster for the walls, and wooden beams for the roofs. They often talked
about how miserable life had been in past winters when only goat-hair
tents sheltered them. Their perception of the nomadic life’s rigors
seemed to have changed, especially when they compared their physical
comfort in the winter with that of their house-dwelling relatives.
Many nomads also built more substantial one-room or tworoom houses in summer pastures. They did not need physical
shelter as much in the summer, when the weather is dry and usually
mild, but because they have recently chosen to arrive there earlier in
the spring and to stay later in the summer, they did want more
protective shelter during these two often cold and windy periods.
People with increased agricultural activities, more prevalent in
summer pastures than in winter ones, occupied the land for a longer
duration than in the past. Those owning trees or vines bearing fruit
needed to collect or oversee the autumn’s harvest.
People who improved their access to water also wanted to live
nearby on a more permanent basis. Until the late 1970s the nomads
had moved periodically from place to place in seasonal pastures to
find fresh grazing and clean campsites, but more recently they have
remained in specific locations, often to exploit the water over which
they have now claimed greater rights. Needing to travel farther and
farther away from camp every day to locate adequate grazing,
shepherds and animals were burdened by these more stationary
residential practices.
The pastoralists’ decreased reliance on hired shepherds figured
in their decisions to construct animal pens and shelters, where they
could temporarily leave their animals unsupervised. Herd animals in
summer pastures and sometimes in winter ones used to sleep or rest
in the open and were subject to predator attacks and stampeding if
the owners and shepherds were not vigilant enough. Since the late
1970s, many households were forced to devise new ways of handling
the actual herding and daily animal care, largely because of the
scarcity of hired shepherds in the region. Reflecting the shortage,
shepherds’ salaries rapidly escalated, making the hiring of herders
even more problematic and forcing the nomads to rely on more
protective pens and shelters.
Use of animal pens facilitated the accumulation of dung, which
all pastoralists periodically collected for use as fertilizer in their
orchards or to sell to other orchard owners. Mounds of dung stood
beside the pens to await transport.
Many pastoralists also built huts, houses, and animal shelters in
their seasonal pastures because of their insecurity about land rights.
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By 1998 the government had still not passed the land-reform legisla
tion that was promised soon after the revolution, and pastoralists
claimed that the existence of permanent structures would help them
to fortify their rights to the land in any eventuality. Dwellings
offered “hard facts” to touring government agents assigned to
handle disputes over land.
HUNTING AND GATHERING
Patterns of hunting and gathering continued in the 1990s in many
of the same ways as in the 1960s and before. The major changes were in
the use of firearms and the decreased exploitation of natural resources
along the migratory routes.
The shah had forcibly disarmed the Qashqa’i in the 1960s
because of his fear about their military threat to him. With his
ouster in 1979, many Qashqa’i men immediately rearmed them
selves and resumed game hunting in their territories. The climate
of freedom also affected other Iranians who were enthusiastic about
hunting. Within a year or two of the revolution, the most prized
game animals in southwestern Iran were said to be exterminated.
The game included wild sheep and goats, ibex, gazelles and other
antelopes, and deer—in fact, any animals with horns to be displayed
as trophies. Several wildlife preserves created by the shah in the
southern Zagros were rapidly decimated, the few game wardens still
coming to work profiting from bribes and even partaking in the
slaughter themselves. Many Qashqa’i men claimed to have practiced
wildlife conservation in the past, but their efforts after the revolu
tion were pointless, given the many outsiders eager to shoot any and
all wildlife. Qashqa’i men had grown up learning the mountaineer
ing skills necessary to collect the game after they had pursued and
shot it, skills many urbanites and other outsiders lacked. These
outsiders often shot animals that they left dead or dying where they
fell, and hence the activity was simply sport and not, as in the
Qashqa’i case, also an important source of food. Qashqa’i hunters
continued to track wild boars, bears, mountain lions, wolves, hy
enas, and other predators preying on their flocks, and, as before,
they avidly sought wild game birds (partridges, quail) to consume as
food. Those living near lakes and rivers hunted water fowl and
fished. At least a few men found the use of dynamite to be an effec
tive way to capture quantities of fish with little effort.
Gathering of many natural resources was still a major part of the
Qashqa’i subsistence and economy in 1998. In fact, reliance on these
items allowed some families to continue with migratory pastoralism
when they would not otherwise have had adequate food or income.
Dairy products for home consumption were available only in the
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spring and part of the summer (except for limited quantities of
dried milk solids saved for the winter), and hence all pastoralists
enjoyed, if not depended on, the many foods they gathered through
out the year. The seasonal residents of winter and summer pastures,
and their settled kin who came to visit, continued to exploit their
own and surrounding territories for many kinds of human foods
(wild fruits, nuts, vegetables, herbs, mushrooms, truffles, bird eggs),
animal fodder, medicines, salt, dyes, fuels, and raw materials (wood,
reeds) for tools and other constructed objects. Most of the items
were seasonal in nature, and the pastoralists sought them according
to the schedules and techniques they knew in detail.
Because most people now traveled by truck between winter and
summer pastures, they were no longer able to gather resources along
the migratory routes. The paved roads they followed bypassed the
valleys and mountainsides where most resources were located.
Those who had acquaintances in villages along the migratory routes
were eventually able to barter for some items, and itinerant peddlers
brought others. People who visited these areas always collected the
resources that were unique or special there and later shared them
with others. The men who accompanied the herds on the spring
migration gathered what they could, but their time was occupied by
herding and safeguarding the animals, and they lacked the means to
process or to transport quantities of gathered resources.6
The non-Qashqa’i people who used to gather natural resources
before the 1970s in Qashqa’i territory, primarily for sale but also for
their own consumption, came less frequently or not at all in the
1990s. The resources included wood (for firewood, making charcoal,
and construction), wild fruits and nuts, herbs and many other green
plants including wild artichokes, mushrooms, truffles, garlic, and
tree and shrub saps including the exported gum tragacanth. Guided
by western-inspired notions of environmental protection, the Min
istry of Natural Resources was supposed to control or eliminate
these activities on what was usually nationalized pastureland, but it
did not do so successfully under the shah’s regime. Under the Is
lamic government, the ministry was more effective in preventing
outsiders from exploiting Qashqa’i pastures in these ways or in
limiting their numbers. Collectors of gum tragacanth, for example,
could buy permits from the ministry enabling them to exploit cer
tain territories if they also obtained the approval of the resident
pastoralists. Qashqa’i people, many of whom relied on selling and
consuming these same resources, collected them on their own lands,
especially if they held title or usufructuary deeds.
Because of the increasingly widespread use of electricity and
propane and natural gas by many people in southwestern Iran, the
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demand for firewood and charcoal decreased. Agents of the Ministry
of Natural Resources tried to protect the environment from further
deforestation and depletion of other natural resources. Until the
revolution, the ministry’s forest rangers used to patrol sections of
Qashqa’i territory but were susceptible to bribery and appeared to
cause little change in how people actually exploited the land. Since
the early 1980s their activities have focused instead on pursuing the
claims that residents brought against trespassers engaged in destruc
tive acts. Aided now by motorized vehicles, many Qashqa’i pastor
alists transported quantities of firewood from winter pastures to
summer ones, where wood was scarce and where camel dung, for
merly used as fuel, was no longer found.
THE GOVERNMENT
The government continued to play a major role in the 1990s in
determining who resided on and worked which parcels of land, but in
some different ways from the government in the 1960s and 1970s. The
Islamic government supported people it classified as “nomads”
(ashayer) and offered them services and support that the previous two
shahs (1925-1979) had not. Short-term and long-term leases for land
still classified as “pastures,” as well as leases and ownership deeds for
land still considered as “cultivable,” were obtained by many people
through various government ministries. People who chose to settle in
villages and especially in towns found it difficult to hold onto pastoral
and agricultural land in their customary seasonal territories. Some
families chose to divide their labor force in order to retain rights to
land. As an example of an increasingly prevalent pattern found within
extended families, one man migrated between winter and summer
pastures with the sheep and goats and maintained the family’s pas
ture-use deeds, while his brother lived in a village to cultivate grain
and fodder crops on land he rented or purchased, and a third brother
resided in a town to work for wages in a factory or government office.
As previously indicated, governmental ministries and agencies
also aided the pastoralists in many other aspects of their lives by
building roads and bathhouses in remote areas and by offering
veterinary care, pasture seeding, water management, bank loans,
commodity pricing, economic cooperatives, and formal education.
Some high-level officials of the Islamic government were fasci
nated by people in Iran whom they considered to be exotic or pic
turesque. While the last two shahs had feared many of these same
people for the military and political threat they were believed to
pose, the current government appeared to be less concerned. While
providing such people with many services, the Islamic government
also developed programs to use them for its own purposes and by
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various means, including the media. For example, from the 1980s
until 1995 a national, annual Day of the Nomad was officially cel
ebrated in different regions by provincial dignitaries and spectators
to mark the nomads’ many contributions to Iran’s history, econ
omy, and cultural diversity. The Ayatollah Khomeini had declared
that nomads were the “treasures of the revolution.” Governmentsponsored or-supported publications, films, and television programs
about nomads were designed to provide appealing images for a
national and sometimes international audience.
Apparently unintentionally, and perhaps ironically, such official
attention helped the Qashqa’i (and other similar groups) to pursue
their chosen lifestyles, which for many remained a combination of
pastoralism and nomadism, and to engage in customary practices
that these officials considered colorful or quaint. For example, many
Qashqa’i women were allowed to maintain their customary dress
and head gear, despite the attire’s violating the requirements of
modest “Islamic” dress imposed on almost all other Iranian women,
especially in urban areas.
Many agents of the Islamic government, especially in ministries
having special interests in nomads and pastoralists, were of ethnic,
tribal, pastoral, and nomadic backgrounds and had often been born
and raised as nomadic pastoralists themselves. They had benefited
from the government’s expansion of formal education into tribal
areas and had continued their education in towns and cities. They
tended to be supportive of and sympathetic to the needs of people
who perpetuated nomadic and pastoral lifestyles despite difficulties.
When I asked Qashqa’i people about the changes in their relationship
with the government after the revolution, many responded by noting
that people with identities similar to their own were now government
officials who supported rather than hindered or oppressed them.



Some high-level officials of the Islamic
government were fascinated by people
in Iran whom they considered to be
exotic or picturesque….From the
1980s until 1995 a national, annual
Day of the Nomad was officially
celebrated in different regions by
provincial dignitaries and spectators to
mark the nomads’ many contributions
to Iran’s history, economy, and cultural
diversity. The Ayatollah Khomeini had
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THE MARKET ECONOMY
The impact of the market economy is another important factor in
understanding the ways the Qashqa’i used land. They had always
directed their productive activities toward market demands and not
just toward household consumption. When the price of sheep and
goats was considered good, they placed more attention on animal
husbandry. When regional needs for agricultural products were great,
they tried to produce their own and relied on the market for the pur
chase of more. Market demands for the pastoralists’ dairy products,
other pastoral produce (woven goods, sheep wool, goat hair, skins),
and gathered resources also played a role in determining the eco
nomic decisions that households made on a seasonal and yearly basis.
Since the revolution, especially during and since the Iraq-Iran

  



   

war (1980-1988), national inflation was high and rising, and all
Iranians, not just Qashqa’i pastoralists, were forced to change their
patterns of production and consumption. Qashqa’i and other pro
ducers of essential market commodities were especially affected by
volatile and unpredictable economic trends. The pastoralists com
plained that the prices they received for live sheep and goats did not
rise as rapidly as the costs of the goods they needed to buy. They
were especially disturbed by the high mark-up in meat prices, from
the amount they received per kilogram at government slaughter
houses to the amount customers paid in urban butcher shops. The
government and a series of middlemen, and not the actual produc
ers, derived the most profit from the pastoralists’ enterprise. In
some years the pastoralists incurred more expenses for tending the
animals than they received for their sale. Because of rapidly escalat
ing prices in general, by 1996 most Qashqa’i people were financially
unable to make major changes in the ways they exploited the land,
such as adopting new mechanized agricultural equipment and in
stalling irrigation works. Even commonplace construction materials
such as bricks and cement became prohibitively expensive. The
election of a new, moderate president of Iran in 1997 brought hopes
that the national economy would be brought under greater control.
CONCLUSION
In this paper I have outlined a variety of factors that have influ
enced the ways that many Qashqa’i nomadic pastoralists used land
during the past thirty years and how and why these patterns have
changed. Although the subject is beyond this paper’s discussion, I
will mention that certain new patterns of local social organization
were in large part explained by changes in the productive activities
of people during this period. Groups of families could better exploit a
larger territory, engage in diversifying economic activities, and interact
with the market more successfully if they cooperated with one another.
At a time when we see that some locally managed and controlled
subsistence strategies appear to be more viable, sustainable, and
protective of the environment than, for example, large-scale agro
pastoral corporations, the case provided by the Qashqa’i may be
informative. The Qashqa’i make the best of the inherent environ
mental constraints of their rugged, mountainous, and semi-arid
lands, in ways that have served them, their ancestors, and those who
preceded them for hundreds if not thousands of years. They have
also made frequent adjustments in the ways they related to the land.
They do not blindly follow patterns that they had practiced in the
past, nor do they ignore the consequences of the actions they do take.
Outsiders can at least try not to impede them as they continue to find
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solutions to the many constraints that confront them. One prevalent
theme in the recent literature on the natural environment is the
concern about depletion and destruction, and the solution often
proposed is the removal of people. But when we compare, for ex
ample, Qashqa’i land-use strategies with the whole-scale destruction
wrecked upon the environment by multinational corporations, na
tion-states eager for “development,” and warfare, it seems ridiculous
to try to prevent people such as the Qashqa’i from living in the ways
they have deemed productive for themselves and their society.
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Gender, Pastoralism, and Intensification:
Changing Environmental Resource Use in Morocco
Susanne H. Steinmann
Clark University
ABSTRACT
Through a study of the sedentarization of the Beni Guil pastoral nomads of eastern Morocco, this paper examines how
gender interacts with environmental and socio-economic change. Based on extensive fieldwork with the Beni Guil, this
paper demonstrates how gendered resource exploitation–in particular, the collection of mushrooms, medicinal plants,
and fuelwood–is recast through sedentarization, urbanization, and commercialization. The case of the Beni Guil suggests
that certain accepted theories of the consequences of settlement for nomad women and their local environments
should be re-examined in order to understand better the past and present, and to plan for the future.

INTRODUCTION
Nomadic pastoralism was once a dominant feature on the North
African landscape. Since the end of World War II, however, exten
sive nomadic herding has steadily shifted toward more intensive
agro-pastoral production on marginal grazing lands (Bencherifa and
Johnson 1990). This trend raises concerns about the social conse
quences of cumulative land-cover change, particularly land-use
intensification, land degradation and declining species diversity, and
challenges researchers and policy makers to address the complexities
of local scale land-use systems (Turner et al. 1990). Studies that
explore the interaction between cultural change, economic develop
ment and environmental sustainability have generally recognized
the importance of understanding the socio-political contexts within
which land-users make resource decisions (Blaikie 1985). Yet, ques
tions about how gender relations affect intra-household environ
mental management remain unclear, particularly in the Middle East
and North Africa.1 Identifying the constraints and opportunities
that shape gendered land-use behavior assures a more accurate assessment of environmental change at the scale where decisions are made.
Understanding the human dynamics of environmental change is
important in semi-arid rangelands of North Africa, which cover
approximately 385,000 square kilometers and represent 25% of the
region’s productive food raising area (Abbab 1994). More than 15
million people, or one quarter of the region’s population, derive
their livelihoods directly from land-based activities of mixed farm
ing and herding (Abbab 1994; Le Houerou 1993). Such an under
standing is particularly important to Morocco, where 64% of the
land area is classified as rangeland, pasture, woodland or forest and
where almost half of the working population derives its livelihood
from agriculture or livestock raising (UNEP 1993).
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Despite the prolific literature on gender,
resources and sustainable development, in
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geographical literature on women and the
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1987; Momsen and Kinnaird 1993;
Rocheleau, Thomas-Slayter and Wangari,
eds. 1996).

  



   

Central to the broad discourse on sustainable natural resource
use in developing countries is whether change results in positive or
negative social and ecological outcomes (Blaikie and Brookfield
1987). In North Africa, as elsewhere, more intensive herding and
farming practices help sustain a growing human population. But
overgrazing, soil erosion, expansion of cultivation, and irrigated
agriculture threaten the long-term productivity of these rangelands
and the livelihoods that depend on them (Swearingen 1994). These
problems persist in part because the perceptions and interests of
land users are neglected in environmental change analysis and con
servation planning (Blaikie 1985).
In the Middle East, and in Morocco specifically, researchers have
generally addressed the causes of nomadic sedentarization and
associated environmental consequences at the community or re
gional scales. Their literature generally approaches the problem of
landscape change through an analysis of demographic, historical
and political economic factors, or transformations of regulatory
institutions and land tenure systems (Abbab 1994; Artz, Norton and
O’Rourke 1986; Bencherifa 1996; Bencherifa andJohnson 1991;
Mendes and Nargisse 1992; Tozy 1994; Trautmann 1989). However,
these analyses obscure the changing production decisions at the
household level where broader economic and environmental conse
quences are felt.
The paucity of intra-household environmental research in the
region also results from cultural values that limit contact between
male researchers and local women. With few exceptions, male re
searchers have predominated field work in pastoral and agro-pasto
ral communities in North Africa. Furthermore, conservation and
development projects in Morocco are generally implemented and
managed by men who work with male, but not female, land users.
However, women are quite visible across the rural landscape collect
ing water, fuelwood and other plant resources, herding animals and
working in fields.
Using gender as the entry point for understanding household
natural resource management could lead to more accurate informa
tion about how gender-specific tasks shift in response to ecological
and socio-economic changes. The research and findings of this
article are, therefore, gender-based. This article hopes to contribute
to more effective range conservation projects that solicit input from
the appropriate land-user groups while, at the same time, challeng
ing assumptions and myths about who manages what resources.
This article addresses these concerns by studying the settlement
of the Beni Guil pastoral nomads in eastern Morocco. Two inter
related questions will be raised: How do gender-specific natural
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resource uses respond to ecological and socio-economic change?
And, how do shifting gendered land-use patterns affect environmen
tal change at the local scale?
Based on data collected during 10 months of field research2
among the Beni Guil pastoral nomads, findings suggest that:
•
in mobile tents, women and men operate with separate sets
of resource management tasks, but these tasks are increas
ingly shared as households become settled;
•
sedentarization and female seclusion reduce women’s op
portunities to collect natural rangeland resources and is
most acute in villages where (unlike larger towns) few alter
native points of access exist; therefore,
•
the gender ratio for who collects wild mushrooms, truffles,
medicinal plants and fuelwood is most equal in villages and
suggests that control shifts from women to men; and truck
transportation and the weekly market (souk) in towns pro
vide alternative opportunities that women use to regain
control over resources that contribute to their household
responsibilities.

2



Field research was conducted in eastern
Morocco from September 1996 to June
1997. The project was sponsored by the
Social Science Research Council’s Near and
Middle East Program and the National
Science Foundation. The research
contributes to the completion of a doctoral
degree in geography at Clark University.

GENDER THEORIES AND RELEVANCE TO THE BENI
GUIL CASE
The rationale for a gender analysis of land-use practices is that
women and men have different, vested sets of interests in the natural
resources they manage depending on their responsibilities in main
taining the household (Fortmann 1996; Rocheleau 1991). Men and
women, particularly in sex-segregated societies, face different con
straints and opportunities in meeting rapidly changing livelihood
responsibilities. In contrast to the scanty research on women and the
environment in the Middle East and North Africa, a large literature
exists in anthropology, sociology, and history analyzing how urban
Muslim women’s status and political power change in response to
development (e.g. Ahmed 1992; Keddie and Baron 1991; Lazreg
1994; Saadawi 1986; Tucker 1993). The literature on “la condition
Feminine” in rural Morocco is also dominated by anthropological
(e.g. Hilse-Dwyer, Maher and Rosen, in Beck and Keddie 1978;
Schaefer-Davis 1993) and sociological research (e.g. Belarbi 1995;
Mernissi 1984; 1997). These studies attempt to understand how
development affects womens’ economic, social or political gains and
losses and provide useful insights for development projects that
target women’s needs. But, their research agenda does not address
the flexibility of household gender roles and the implication, if any,
for environmental change if those roles shift. Although largely
absent from the Muslim Arab regions, the importance of gender

  



   

analysis in explaining environmental change is demonstrated in the
case-study literature from rural communities in Asia (Agarwal 1994;
Joekes 1995), Sub-Saharan Africa (Carney and Watts 1991; Fortmann
1996; Jackson 1993; Schroeder 1997; Thomas-Slayter and Rocheleau
1995), and Latin America (Rocheleau et al. 1996; Townsend 1993).
The literature on gender, environment and sustainable develop
ment is inspired to varying degrees by two dominant approaches:
(1) gender and environment and, (2) ecofeminism. The first grew
out of the WID (women in development) approach to project and
development planning interventions. This perspective emphasized
the importance of women as managers of environmental resources,
their vulnerability to diminishing natural resources, and the need to
direct conservation programs toward assisting women (parallel or
separately from men).3 The practice of adding women on without
considering fundamental inequities in class and gender relations
eventually led some socialist-feminists to adopt alternative gender and
development (GAD) or genger and environment (GED) approaches.
The ecofeminist approach is ideologically driven. It rests on the
philosophy that women have an inherent affinity with nature, as
opposed to men’s desire to control and dominate nature through
science, technology and development (see Merchant 1989; Mies and
Shiva 1993; Plumwood 1993; Shiva 1987). Although both of these
approaches draw attention to women’s interests in environmental
resources they often have rigid conceptualizations of gender rela
tions (Agarwal 1995; Jackson 1995; Joekes et al. 1994) I agree with
those who propose an alternative approach that analyzes the flexibil
ity of social, economic and ecological contexts that either maintain
or transform traditionally male and female resource management
tasks (Braidotti et al. 1994; Rocheleau, Thomas-Slayter and Wangari
1996; Jackson 1993).
These theoretical advances in gender and environment studies
have been supported primarily by case studies in agricultural com
munities and still need to be examined within livestock-based liveli
hood systems. To date, gender-based research among pastoral
nomads has examined the links between economic development,
commercialization, sedentarization, over-exploitation of nature and
women’s poverty (see Horowitz and Jowkar 1992).
One such study has assessed the role of technology in encourag
ing settlement and the consequent gender-based resource losses or
gains. Dawn Chatty’s work among nomads in Syria (1976) analyzed
the gender-specific consequences of the introduction and rapid
adoption of trucks. Chatty found that trucks deepened gender-based
inequalities over household resources. More recent research in
Oman showed that women utilized a variety of informal institutions
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The currently on-going range conservation
project in eastern Morocco is an example
of this approach.


and networks to reclaim their interests within the realm of male
decisions, including adoption and use of new technologies (Chatty
1996). Similarly, in her detailed ethnography of pastoral nomads in
Iran, Lois Beck argues that women acknowledged the benefits of new
technologies and encouraged their adoption (Beck 1991; 1997). These
anthropological studies, however, do not address the environmental
outcomes of gendered interests and control of new technologies.
For example, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Moroc
can government installed motor-driven deep wells in drought-prone
rangelands. These technologies secured permanent water resources
and encouraged more intensive land use (Bartel 1985). Greater
availability of truck transportation today also facilitates access to
commercial town markets where animal feed is sold. Beni Guil men
use trucks to haul water and fodder to remote tent sites and villages,
a practice that allows rural households to support more animals on
smaller parcels of land. This practice has encouraged sedentarization
and over-exploitation of rangeland resources. Moreover, since men
spend more time in town securing feed resources, women increas
ingly assume men’s herding responsibilities. But women herd only
close to home, a practice that further denudes vegetation cover near
fixed settlements (Steinmann, in press).
Among the Beni Guil, trucks facilitate access to commercial oppor
tunities in towns and increase women’s dependency on male income
earners. Women, however, are not passive agents. Older women, par
ticularly those in tents and villages, find ways to access truck transporta
tion into town where they take advantage of commercial opportunities.
The author often observed older women—who are less constrained by
the cultural norm of seclusion— successfully negotiate rides with male
truck drivers. This observation points to a weakness in feminist devel
opment theories that ignore the diversity in women’s abilities to secure
their interests within broader structural constraints.
Throughout the Middle East and Africa, case studies from live
stock-dependent households suggest that pastoral women lose eco
nomic and political power as a consequence of economic develop
ment and environmental degradation (Abu-Lughod 1993; Carr
1977; Horowitz and Jowkar 1992). This literature argues that in
geographically isolated mobile tents pastoral women’s roles as pro
viders of subsistence foods, medical resources and fuelwood gave
them status and power. But, as nomadic households become inte
grated into a cash economy women lose control over those resources
thereby becoming more dependent on male income earners
(Horowitz and Jowkar 1992; Talle 1988). These approaches address
the social implications of settlement and commercialization,
but they do not consider the environmental consequences.
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The Beni Guil case suggests that the effect of settlement on
women’s access to natural rangeland resources is more nuanced. For
example, with the exception of poor women in towns, Beni Guil
women’s collection of natural resources declined linearly and sig
nificantly from mobile tent to village to town households. Corre
sponding to this change, men’s collection activities increased.
However, access to rangeland products (such as wild mushrooms,
truffles and medicinal plants) and knowledge about them declined
only for women in villages and not among women living in town.
Furthermore, many Beni Guil households divided their liveli
hood activities between two locations: mobile tents and fixed homes.
In this way they took advantage of diverse commercial and natural
resources. This represents a strategy that alleviates pressure on those
resources and requires flexible intra-household labor roles. The Beni
Guil example therefore suggests that theories that do not question
the simplistic dualism of nomadic versus settled households need
reassessment.
The differences in gendered resource management across loca
tions from tent to village and larger commercial towns also demand
moving beyond static gender analyses to more complex analysis of
flexible gender roles. Both a ‘developmentalist’ view (see Joekes
1994) and feminist political ecology (see Rocheleau, Thomas-Slayter
and Wangar 1996) provide alternative and corrective approaches.
While acknowledging gender differentiated resource control and
management tasks, these perspectives argue that gender roles are not
ascribed but are “merely part of general entitlements and capabili
ties” (Joekes 1994). They posit that understanding local-scale envi
ronmental change requires attention to class, ethnic and gender
relations among land managers (Carney and Watts 1991; Rocheleau
1991; Schroeder 1993). These approaches address both the social
and environmental consequences of changing livelihood systems.
In an attempt to better understand the complexity of household
land-use decision making, academics and development practitioners
have also recognized the value of incorporating indigenous environ
mental knowledge systems and gender analysis into conservation
planning (Bebbington 1990; Carney and Watts 1991; Chambers
1983; Davis 1995; McCorkle 1989; Richards 1985; Rocheleau 1991;
Thrupp 1989). In eastern Morocco, growing concern about land
degradation in the 1970s led to a series of studies, including one on
traditional range management institutions and indigenous knowl
edge systems.
These land-user perspectives provided guidelines for the imple
mentation of one of Morocco’s most costly and extensive range
conservation projects (hereon after referred to as the PDPEO

 

Furthermore, many Beni Guil house
holds divided their livelihood activities
between two locations: mobile tents and
fixed homes. In this way they took
advantage of diverse commercial and
natural resources. This represents a
strategy that alleviates pressure on
those resources and requires flexible
intra-household labor roles. The Beni
Guil example therefore suggests that
theories that do not question the
simplistic dualism of nomadic versus
settled households need reassessment.


Project).4 Project extension workers solicited input from local herd
ers concerning their use and knowledge about rangelands. The
project’s gender component, however, focused only on women’s
income generating opportunities - not on their resource use.5 The
project design also conceptualizes women’s and men’s activities as
operating in entirely separate spheres. This WID approach of “add
ing women on” obscures the ways gender relations within house
holds meet changing livelihood responsibilities.
Settlement and commercialization’s impact on gendered man
agement of range resources remains unclear. This fieldwork is par
ticularly problematic in more conservative pastoral societies, such as
the Beni Guil and other bedouin, where female seclusion and gender
segregation has prevented male researchers from gathering genderspecific information.6 Only a few recent studies in Morocco (e.g.
Alaoui 1995; Davis 1996; Steinmann 1993) and one edited volume
(Belarbi 1995) have analyzed how socio-economic and environmen
tal change affect gendered management of natural resources. The
Beni Guil case provides a new empirical study that focuses specifi
cally on flexible intra-household resource strategies and how these
adjust to and shape environmental change.
BACKGROUND AND ECOLOGY OF THE BENI GUIL
STUDY AREA
Much like other pastoral nomads across the region, the Beni Guil
represent a large community whose livelihoods are rapidly shifting
from extensive large-scale animal herding to intensive and sedentary
agro-pastoral activities (Bencherifa 1996). Although the Beni Guil’s
population is small (54,000 based on the 1994 CENSUS) their terri
tory covers 25,000 km2 of the semi-arid steppe of Morocco’s Eastern
High Plateau region. This represents a significant portion of
Morocco’s rangeland resources. And while large scale nomadic
movements of the past represented a sustainable adaptation to the
ecology of arid environments, demographic, social and economic
pressure has resulted in more intensive land-use practices. Some
evidence suggests that the long-term sustainability of agricultural
and pastoral livelihoods in this region are threatened (Le Houerou
1993; Sidahmed 1992). Others have found that the social and human
benefits outweigh the environmental costs (Bencherifa 1996). Findings
here suggest that these environmental and socio-economic changes also
carry different implications for gendered land-use practices.
Until the middle of this century, Beni Guil livelihoods depended
on raising their livestock by utilizing seasonally available grazing and
water resources throughout their territory. Seasonal climate change
prompted the Beni Guil to move their tents on camels and herd
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The “Project de Developpement des
Parcours et de L’Elevage dans L’Oriental”
(PDPEO Project) is a State and interna
tionally funded range conservation project
at a cost of $10 million (Department of
Agriculture, Bouarfa 1996). The 10-year
project began in 1990 and covers some 3.2
million hectares of Morocco’s eastern High
Plateau region. The objectives of the
project are to curb land degradation and
increase living standards for the 76,000
inhabitants in the project zone. The project
goals are met through: (1) diversification of
fodder resources through government
subsidized feed supplements, veterinary
services, and transportation services; (2)
placing 750,000 hectares of key rangeland
into grazing fallow; (3) restoration of range
cover through planting of fruit, fuelwood
trees and fodder shrubs; (4) setting up
wind barriers to curb dune accumulation;
(5) better management of water points; (6)
establishment of local pastoral cooperatives
to manage distribution of new inputs and
assume range-management responsibility,
and; (7) income generating projects for
women. The PDPEO Project is funded by
the African Development Bank, Interna
tional Fund for Agricultural Development,
and the Moroccan Government.

5

BenJelloun (1996) conducted an extensive
study among Beni Guil women evaluating
their constraints in accessing natural and
commercial resources. The results of the
research identified appropriate income
generating activities for women. Three
female extension workers currently
manage women’s extension services. These
include: wool and rug weaving coopera
tives; chicken and rabbit raising; health care
education, and; sewing lessons for girls.
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As a foreign and formally educated woman,
I was able to engage in participant obser
vation and conduct research among both
men and women.
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their sheep and goats over distances of some 250 km to take advan
tage of resources in diverse ecological zones. Although there are
several ecological niches within this area, two dominant environ
ments define the territory: the northern high plateau (Dahara) and
the more arid southern pre-saharan environment (Sahara). These
two landscapes are separated by a small mountain chain with eleva
tions of up to 1,800 meters.
Rainfall diminishes from north to south with a maximum of 450
mm in the Dahara and 150 mm in the Sahara. Corresponding to the
aridity index, vegetation cover varies between the two regions. In the
Dahara, perennial grass (Stipa tenacissma) and the woody shrub
(Artemisia herba alba) dominate. In more arid conditions of the
Sahara, a greater variety of woody shrubs and succulents (Arthro
phytum scoparium, Festuca algeriensis, Retama retam, Ziziphus lotus)
replace perennial grasses. Annual plants (valued for their fodder and
human medicinal properties) thrive in moist ecological niches such
as low lying depressions (dayas) where rainfall run-off water col
lects, and at higher elevations in the mountains that divide the
Dahara and Sahara. Wild mushrooms (Agaricaceae) and large
ground truffles (Terfezia, Tirmania) are found in areas where soils
maintain moisture, such as in the daya Chott Tigri.
Large-scale migrations were well adapted to these ecological and
climatic variations (Bencherifa 1996; Johnson 1993). Threat of winter
snowfall encouraged the tribes on the Dahara’s high plateau (1600 m)
to move their herds to lower elevations and warmer climates in the
Sahara. On their migration, the Beni Guil crossed alluvial plains, the
Chott Tigri daya and several small mountains (Jabel El Ourark; Jabel
Lakdar; Jabel Dakh). Along the way, men herded animals to diverse
grazing resources and women stopped to collect a variety of wild
foods, medicinal plants and fuelwood. Similar reverse migrations
from the Sahara to the Dahara occurred in the spring.
Until the late 1960s almost all Beni Guil households were fully
mobile tent units. But, over the last thirty years, 35% of the Beni
Guil families have settled permanently, and almost 80% of the
households have shifted production to mixed farming, herding and
other commercial activities (Bencherifa 1996). This change has
discouraged large scale migrations between the Dahara and Sahara.
Only wealthy households that own trucks still move animals across
these diverse ecological zones. The increased use of trucks or the
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interruption of long-distance migrations for settled households has
had variable effects on intra-household resource uses.
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND DISCUSSION
OF FINDINGS
Gender analysis, as an entry point to this research, sheds light on
hidden male–female power dynamics that affect access to and man
agement of natural resources. It uncovers complexities of land-use
decisions at the household scale and helps explain emerging landcover patterns associated with pastoral settlement. Identifying gen
der-specific resource management roles has important implications
for development and range conservation programs, particularly
where culturally prescribed gender roles influence the range of
acceptable strategies for dealing with changing social, economic and
natural environments.
Both quantitative and qualitative methods were used to examine
the two research questions:
•
How does gendered access to and management of natural
rangeland resources change in response to sedentarization
and commercialization of pastoral livelihoods in eastern
Morocco?
•
How does gendered resource use affect the environment?
This discussion presents data concerning three types of vegeta
tion resources: wild mushrooms and truffles, medicinal plants and
fuelwood. The author selected these resources because they repre
sent important food and health resources to the household and
because their collection has variable environmental consequences.
As stated earlier, primary data was collected during ten months of
participant observation in 159 Beni Guil households. These house
holds represented various points on the continuum from mobile to
settled (tent, village, town). Because Beni Guil migration patterns
have essentially ceased between the ecologically distinct areas of the
Sahara and Dahara, research was carried out in three geographic
locations of the Beni Guil territory:
•
among fully nomadic mobile tent households in the Dahara
and Sahara areas;
•
in two small rural villages (Maatarka and Mengoub Gare); and
•
in the two larger commercial towns: Tendrara and
Bouarfa.7
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According to the 1994 national census,
human population numbers in villages were
286 in Mengoub Gare; 520 in Maatarka.
As for towns, the population of Tendrara
was 5,633 and Bouarfa 19,616.





PRELIMINARY RESEARCH AND QUESTIONNAIRE
SURVEY DESIGN
After a two month period of preliminary research and partici
pant observation, the author confirmed that the degree of household
mobility and socio-economic class constituted important variables
determining gendered resource collection patterns. Since household
wealth is culturally specific, five local informants from a crosssection of the settled Beni Guil communities helped define the class
categories and compiled a list of households within each strata. This
participatory wealth ranking exercise provided the author with local
definitions of class (Grandin 1988).
Long distances between tent households prevented gathering a
group of informants for the wealth ranking exercise. Instead, the
author asked local Beni Guil political representatives (Sheiks and
Mukkadems) from each tribal lineage to rank tent households. The
author then re-confirmed the classifications with key indicators
including: tent size; approximate number of animals; types of ani
mals owned; transportation resources (e.g. mule-drawn carts or
trucks); and, the number of non-pastoral wage earners contributing
to the household. Households were then randomly selected for
formal interviews. In the selected households, 159 women and 70
men answered formal survey questions about mushroom, truffle,
medicinal plant and fuelwood collection.
In order to identify gender-specific management of these re
sources, the survey asked male and female interviewees to:
•
indicate what rangeland resources they collect for the
household;
•
identify locations and distances to these resources;
•
identify other household members who provide this re
source to the household;
•
note whether the quantity and quality of the resource had
gone up or down;
•
identify the number of medicinal plants they knew; and
•
indicate whether they bought or sold any of these resources
at town markets.
Data gathered in formal survey questionnaires was analyzed
using the SPSS 6.1 statistical program. The author analyzed categori
cal variables using chi-square tests and logistical regressions. For
interval data, t-tests and multi-variate regression tests were em
ployed. However, formal questionnaires failed to capture the full
range of insights needed for the study; therefore, several qualitative
methods supplemented survey data.

  



   

QUALITATIVE AND PARTICIPATORY METHODS
In order to understand how settlement affected resource man
agement and landscape change, men, women, boys and girls from
each research site were asked to participate in gender resource
mapping.8 This technique helped elicit input from women and men
about their land-use practices, degrees of accessibility to the
resource and knowledge about the diversity of plant species and
their locations in the landscape.
The maps revealed that men and women have very different
ideas about the relative importance of natural resources. These
differences were related to gender-based responsibilities for provid
ing the resource to the household. While men’s maps identified and
located almost all of the dayas and water wells (sites where men take
animals to graze and water), women’s maps included many moun
tains (where medicinal plants grow) and sites where they collect
fuelwood and mushrooms. The scale of the maps also varied signifi
cantly by age and gender, reflecting mobility constraints associated
with settlement and female seclusion. Strict surveillance of women
and their infrequent interaction with outsiders sometimes led
women to answer survey questions that matched culturally pre
scribed gender myths9 rather than current activities. Consequently,
participant observation verified that more flexible gender roles ex
isted than revealed by the formal survey.
In order to measure environmental changes associated with
changing gendered collection patterns the author measured land
cover and species diversity rates using 100 meter intercepts. These
land cover intercepts were carried out in several key locations: on
remote portions of uninhabited rangelands, near mobile tent sites,
near villages, and near larger towns. The author measured the height
and the width of each plant along the intercept line and catalogued
its name for information about species diversity in a given area.
Several 10 meter by 10 meter square transects were laid out to mea
sure the frequency and diversity of plant species at given locations.
The author also solicited local input in these exercises in order to
catalogue land user’s knowledge about various plant species.
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
KNOWLEDGE ABOUT AND LOCATION OF MUSHROOMS
AND TRUFFLES
The disappearance of large-scale migrations in the Beni Guil
territory has had a disparate impact on households settled in the
Dahara and Sahara. Only 46% of interviewees in Dahara households
said they collected mushrooms, compared to 85% in the Sahara.
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For further information about this methodological tool, see Rocheleau 1987; 1995;
Slocum et al. 1995.

9

Gender myths are powerful stereotypes or
ideas about appropriate roles and activities
for men and women. A gender myth can
be a legend or an interpretation of religious
scripture that defines gender-specific
characteristics and behavior. Often these
exist in theory rather than in practice, but
will be resorted to when confronted
directly, such as in an interview. For more
information about gender myths and
methods for revealing the differences
between myth and reality see Fortmann
and Rocheleau 1985; Slocum and Kindon
1995.


Wild mushrooms and truffles do not grow on the Dahara plateau,
and since few Dahara households still move their animals and tents
across the Chott Tigri to the dayas in the Sahara, most have lost
access to these resources. A closer analysis of those Dahara house
holds still collecting mushrooms showed that they all had fixed
homes and owned tents which they moved to the Sahara. The loss of
access to these food resources, therefore, affects primarily fully
settled Dahara households.
Diminishing access to wild mushrooms also corresponded to a
loss in knowledge about the locations of these resources. Respon
dents in the Dahara knew, on average, 5.5 mushroom locations,
compared to 10 known by Sahara respondents. Further loss of this
environmental knowledge may eliminate opportunities for mush
room and truffle collection in the Dahara’s younger generation,
especially if more households become permanently settled.
The recently established commercial value of mushrooms and
truffles ($4 per kilo for mushrooms and $7-10 per kilo for truffles)
provided women with a new income generating opportunity. Moreover, 85% of land-users who collected mushrooms were women (see
Figure 2). The commercial and food value of wild mushrooms and
truffles explains why almost 70% of all surveyed households collected these resources. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate that for mushroom
and truffle collecting class and location were key variables that de
termined gendered mushroom and truffle collection.
Figures 2 and 3 show that compared to men, women in all loca
tions and class categories assumed primary roles for providing the
resource to the household. This represents the continuation of a
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traditionally female activity. Data revealed, however, that among
women, class and location influenced access. The most significant
finding was the rapid decline of women collecting these resources
from tents to villages and towns. This suggests that the mobility of
the household to various locations on the rangelands was a key
variable that determined access.
Another interesting pattern emerged from the data: the percent
age of households that collected mushrooms was lowest in villages,
not in towns. In villages the gender ratio of mushroom and truffle
collection was almost equal, although rates were low for both
groups. As mentioned earlier, land users in villages (particularly
those in the Dahara) have lost access to wild mushrooms and truffles
that grow in the Sahara. Furthermore, truck transportation to towns
or to the sites where mushrooms and truffles grow was sporadic.
Villagers therefore could not easily transport these goods home or to
the town souks.
Truck transportation was more readily available in town, par
ticularly around weekly market days. This explains why a greater
percentage of poor women in town, not in villages, collected mush
rooms and truffles. Poor women in town took advantage of this
transport in order to secure these resources for home consumption
or to sell at the market. The significant increase of mushroom and
truffle collection among poor town women suggests that their
husband’s income was insufficient to cover food costs, so they col
lected free range resources to meet livelihood needs.
In town households, class and mushroom/truffle collection
showed a linear correlation for both men and women, though this
was not immediately apparent among the women. The likelihood of

 

All respondents in this class category
who said they collected wild foods lived
in households that were both nomadic
and settled and said that they collected
only when spending time out at the tent.
This important finding suggests the
need to move beyond a dualistic
conceptual model of the household as
either nomadic or settled.


collecting mushrooms decreased as wealth increased. For example,
only 8% of men in wealthy households collected mushrooms or
truffles, compared to 13% in middle class and 16% in poor house
holds. In town, 32% of women in wealthy households collected
these fungi, compared to 30% in the middle class and 63 in poor
households. The surprisingly high percentage of wealthy town
women who collected mushrooms and truffles was explained by the
fact that most wealthy Beni Guil have two households: a home in
town and a tent on the rangeland. All respondents in this class cat
egory who said they collected wild foods lived in households that
were both nomadic and settled and said that they collected only
when spending time out at the tent. This important finding suggests
the need to move beyond a dualistic conceptual model of the house
hold as either nomadic or settled.
Class can also be an important variable depending on location of
the household. For example, collection rates were universally high
for women in tents. But class became an important variable in town,
where mostly poor women collected mushrooms and truffles. The
data suggest that the economic importance of mushrooms and
truffles was linked to family food needs and the degree to which
women could rely on male income earners. This case challenges
conclusions which posit that commercialization and settlement
diminish women’s control over natural resources and increase their
dependence on male income earners (Horowitz and Jowkar 1992;
Talle 1988) Among the Beni Guil, economic development, commer
cialization, and settlement did not uniformly diminish women’s
control over resources. In fact, commercial opportunities and avail
ability of truck transportation in town created opportunities for the
poor to access locations for collecting mushrooms and to generate
income by selling them. The settlement of households in towns and
greater integration into a commercial economy did not create a
homogeneous class of female dependents.
The Beni Guil case also suggests consequences for future genera
tions. Data revealed that while only 10% of older women sold mush
rooms they collected, 45% of women aged 20 to 45 and 70% of
women under the age of 19 sold them. Older women were less ac
customed to the cash economy and collected mushrooms and
truffles primarily for consumption. But younger women, especially
those not yet married or in female headed households, took advan
tage of commercial opportunities. Young men were also increasingly
involved in the collection of these resources while their older coun
terparts rarely participated.
More research is needed to confirm these trends in the future,
but the data suggest that increased dependency on cash incomes has



The data suggest that the economic
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was linked to family food needs and the
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male income earners. This case
challenges conclusions which posit that
commercialization and settlement
diminish women’s control over natural
resources and increase their dependence
on male income earners.

  



   

intensified searches for and extraction of these resources. The data
presented here identifies which land users were most involved in the
collection activity that could help target appropriate groups for
participation in conservation efforts.
The impact of these activities on the environment, particularly
soil and wind erosion, warrants further research. Observations in
the field suggested that truffle collection (which creates a hole of up
to six inches in diameter) loosened soil and contributed to wind
erosion. Increased demand for and use of trucks to access collection
sites has resulted in the rapid expansion of a network of dirt roads
throughout the Beni Guil territory. The roads have degraded large
tracts of vegetation and have encouraged rain run-off and gully
erosion during the rainy season.
This example illustrates that both men and women have vested
interests in commercial and technological change, regardless of
negative environmental consequences. Findings also suggest the
importance of moving beyond essentialist ideals of ecofeminism to
more contextual analyses of gender roles and environmental man
agement in relation to social and economic change.
CHANGING MEDICINAL PLANT COLLECTING ACTIVITIES
AND SPECIES KNOWLEDGE
Medicinal plant collection patterns share both similarities and
differences with the findings discussed above. One major difference
is that the overall percentage of households that still collect medici
nal plants (48%) was relatively low compared to households collect
ing mushrooms (70%). The decline in the collection of traditional
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medicinal plants suggests that land-users rely on alternative re
sources to meet family health needs: they either buy medicinal
plants at the town souk or use modern medical services.
As noted with mushroom and truffle collection, the interruption
of nomadic migrations from Dahara and Sahara reduced access to
medicinal plants. In households that still collected medicinal plants
women accounted for approximately 80% and men for 20% of
individuals who collected. Primarily women performed the task.
The survey results show, however, that men also collected medicinal
plants and that class and degree of settlement influenced gendered
patterns of collection.
While overall collection rates were low, Figures 4 and 5 indicate
that percentages were much higher for tent households than for
those in villages or towns. Holding class constant, the percentage of
women who collected medicinal plants declined as families became
more settled. The exception, however, were wealthy women in town.
As with mushrooms and truffles, these women came from house
holds that had both house and tent and maintained access to range
land resources while at the tent.
For men, class more than location influenced collection patterns.
For households in town, and to a lesser degree in villages, a higher
percentage of poor men collected medicinal plants than middle class
men, who collected more than wealthy men. The reverse was true
for men in tents where a larger percentage of wealthy men collected
medicinal plants compared to men in moderate and poor house
holds. This pattern among men in tent households complemented
the trend in women’s collection activities which were inversely
related to class (40%). In tents, more poor women collected medici
nal plants (70%) compared to moderate (53%) wealthy women.

  



   

The data suggests that medicinal plant collection is still important in
tent households compared to villages and towns. Cultural values of
female seclusion explain why men take over this activity as house
hold wealth increases. However, because tent households move to
diverse locations on range lands, women in these households retain
proximity and access to medicinal plant resources. Class did not
influence women’s collecting activities in villages and towns and
suggests that location was the key obstacle for accessing the plants.
Access to (and knowledge about) medicinal plants declined most
significantly for village households due to several reasons. Reduced
household mobility was the primary factor. According to older
women, the interruption of migrations and changing environmental
factors discouraged younger women from collecting and learning
about medicinal plants. The women argued that the landscape was
not as green as it once was, particularly around villages. Opportuni
ties for teaching younger generations about these plants therefore
became limited. Drought severely affected the region in the 1980’s
and early 1990’s so many of these annual plants did not grow during
these years. Among respondents who did not collect medicinal
plants, most gave one of the following reasons: “The plants are too
far away;” “ They grow in the mountains;” “I don’t know them;” “I
buy them at the souk” or, “I see the doctor in town.”
Collection rates suggest that medicinal plants represented a
valuable resource to women in mobile tent households and among
the poor settled in town. Although rangelands were also denuded
around larger towns of Bouarfa and Tendrara, the souk provided an
alternative access to medicinal plants and constituted a new space
for learning about medicinal plants. Younger generation women in
towns knew more about medicinal plants than their village counter
parts. Since herbalists at the town souks were not necessarily from
the local area and often imported plants from other parts of Mo
rocco, women may have increased their knowledge about a greater
variety of medicinal plants. Moreover, town women, who were
generally dependent on male income earners, used this opportunity
to maintain control over their role as family healers. These data
caution against assuming that all women who used traditional me
dicinal plants for healing relied on local or indigenous knowledge.
This case supports some but not all the findings of the indig
enous knowledge literature.10 These theories generally posit that
commercialization and integration of subsistence economies into a
cash market reduces access to and knowledge about traditional
medicines. Among the Beni Guil, declining collection of rangeland
medicinal plants didn’t necessarily imply reduced access nor dimin
ishing knowledge about medicinal plant species. The Beni Guil

 

This case supports the need for
employing integrated approaches to
evaluate local knowledge and resource
use. These perspectives challenge the
orthodox theoretical dualism that pits
“local knowledge and indigenous,
sustainable systems” against “external,
Western, non-sustainable systems”
(Agrawal 1995; Batterbury 1997).
Indeed, research suggests that more
than half of all Beni Guil households
surveyed said they bought traditional
medicinal plants at the weekly souk.
This demonstrates that at least for now,
people benefit from commercial
markets that allow them to combine
traditional medicinal practices with
modern alternatives.
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living in towns used souk herbalists as a way to access and learn
about medicinal plants, although it is doubtful that future genera
tions will be able to identify where these diverse plant species grow
on their landscape.
This case supports the need for employing integrated approaches
to evaluate local knowledge and resource use. These perspectives
challenge the orthodox theoretical dualism that pits “local knowl
edge and indigenous, sustainable systems” against “external, West
ern, non-sustainable systems” (Agrawal 1995; Batterbury 1997;
Bebbington 1997). Indeed, research suggests that more than half of
all Beni Guil households surveyed said they bought traditional me
dicinal plants at the weekly souk. This demonstrates that at least for
now, people benefit from commercial markets that allow them to
combine traditional medicinal practices with modern alternatives.
The fact that medicinal plants have become commercially avail
able raises questions about environmental change and the availabil
ity and rejuvenation potential of these diverse plant species. Further
research is necessary to understand where souk herbalists collect
plants and how their commercial activities affect plant diversity and
availability in specific rangeland locations.
MANAGEMENT OF FUELWOOD RESOURCES AND
LAND-COVER IMPLICATIONS
Compared to medicinal plants and wild mushrooms, it is easier
to measure the environmental impact of changing fuelwood collec
tion patterns. Based on dry wood weights, PDPEO project research
found that average household fuelwood consumption ranged from 5
Kg/day in the summer to 10 Kg/day in the winter (Bruck 1996).
There were only slight variations of this consumption pattern be
tween mobile tent households and settled village households al
though the impact of fuelwood collection was most severe around
villages (Maatarka and Mengoub).
Primary data using land-cover intercepts indicated 10% vegeta
tion cover near Maatarka, compared to averages of 25 to 40% near
tents, and up to 50% coverage in uninhabited areas of the Dahara.
Differences in regional vegetation ecology also represented impor
tant factors affecting the impact of fuelwood collection. For ex
ample, a large variety of woody shrubs make up the dominant
vegetation cover in the Sahara, whereas quick-burning perennial
halfa grass (Stipa tenacissma) dominates in the Dahara. Conse
quently, households settled in the Dahara concentrate fuelwood
collection on the halfa grass. It burns quickly, so women remove the
grasses by the roots because this part of the plant burns longest.
This practice removes vegetation cover and interferes with the

  



   

rejuvenation potential of the perennial grass. Pressure on fuelwood
resources was also heavy in the Sahara. But, the relative demand on
woody shrubs was lower since these are slow-burning fuel resources.
Although land users also up-rooted some of these shrubs, they often
cut species above the roots (e.g. Retama retam). This practice en
courages plant rejuvenation.
Village women also over-exploited fuelwood resources close to
home because they preferred not to walk far from the surveillance of
others, in accordance with the value of female seclusion. Fuelwood
collection was concentrated around settlements diminishing both
ground cover and species diversity.
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Preferences and access to various fuelwood species depended on
whether households were mobile tents or fixed in villages or towns.
For example, in tents, land users collected on average 3.6 different
fuelwood species, villagers used only 2.3 varieties, and in town only
1.5 different plants were used. Research revealed that the best
fuelwood species diminished relatively quickly compared to fastburning resources. The best hardwood species (e.g. Retama retam
and Arthrophytum scoparium) were rarely found around villages, but
were re-generating around larger towns. Range extension workers at
the Agriculture and Development office in Bouarfa noted that
around Bouarfa vegetation cover had actually improved due to the
increased use of commercial fuel sources such as natural gas.
The degree to which households relied on fuelwood resources de
pended on class and location variables. And, as illustrated in Figures 6
and 7, these variables shaped gendered fuelwood collection activities.
Considering the differences in the scale, Figures 6 and 7 demonstrate that women bore the burden of fuelwood collection, particu
larly in tent households. In villages and towns, both class and gender
variables came into play. In the villages, most women (between 75
and 85%) collected fuelwood. But, some 18 to 35% of the men also
participated in this activity. In villages, natural resources provided
cooking and heating fuel for most households. But, compared to
women in tents, villagers travelled much farther (up to 12 miles one
way) to collect wood. Since the cultural value of female seclusion
discouraged women from travelling long distances alone, they en
gaged in concentrated and less cautious extraction methods. This
degraded not only vegetation cover but also species diversity around
villages. Distances to fuelwood collection sites gradually increased so
men more commonly accompanied women or were needed to drive
mule-drawn carts or trucks in order to haul wood back home.
The same pattern existed in towns, with some variation: only
men and women in poor households collected fuelwood. As with the
patterns for mushroom and medicinal plant collecting, the trends
suggest that as households become more settled gender roles shifted
from sex-specific activities to increasingly shared resource collection
and management strategies.
These data point toward several important findings. First, that
access to some fuelwood species declined with settlement, threaten
ing over-exploitation of particular species at some but not all settled
locations. Range cover had actually improved around larger com
mercial towns where alternative fuel resources were used. Second,
concentrated fuelwood collection activities around villages and
sedentary tents resulted in significant range cover loss and increased
distances to fuelwood collection sites. Third, longer distances to



Many household resource responsibili
ties such as collecting wild foods,
medicinal plants and fuelwood are
increasingly shared by women and men
as households adapt to economic and
environmental changes associated with
sedentarization.

  



   

abundant fuelwood resources shifted the gendered nature of
fuelwood collection and more men participated. Yet, interviews with
PDPEO conservation project managers indicated a continuation of
the perception or “gender myth” that fuelwood collection was
women’s work. Men had not been identified as a ‘user group’ and
were not included in educational efforts that encouraged cutting
fuelwood resources above the roots. Understanding that these roles
have begun to shift provides important information for targeting
both men and women in conservation programs.
CONCLUSION
The Beni Guil case study in eastern Morocco demonstrates that
gender-based resource management patterns shift in response to
settlement, commercialization, and more intensive land-use prac
tices. Many household resource responsibilities such as collecting
wild foods, medicinal plants and fuelwood are increasingly shared
by women and men as households adapt to economic and environ
mental changes associated with sedentarization.
Structural theories on women, environment and development
posit that women lose control over resources as pastoral nomads
settle and become integrated into a cash economy. The Beni Guil
case suggests, however, that important nuances exist which cannot
be reduced to class variables, gender stereotypes, or simple house
hold mobility categories. In mobile tents men and women maintain
easy access to a variety of range resources from different ecological
niches. These households continue to move in order to take advan
tage of seasonally available resources and assure women of close
proximity to natural resources. Despite the integration of tent
households into a commercial economy, most tasks remain sexsegregated according to traditional roles.
As households become more fixed in villages and towns, how
ever, collection activities shift from women to men. According to
the gender and environment literature, women’s loss of access to
natural resources increases their dependency on male income earn
ers. A more complex gendered adaptation occurs among the Beni
Guil. Women often find alternative ways to access resources they
need to fulfill their household responsibilities. However, this is more
difficult in villages where access to natural rangeland resources or
markets is limited. In villages, gender roles become most flexible.
Weekly commercial market in towns also provide Beni Guil
women settled there with new opportunities to maintain control
over resources. Lower collection activities among women in town
does not necessarily imply a corresponding loss of access to re
sources nor a loss of knowledge about them. In towns, women take

 

Contrary to the various theories, the
weekly commercial market in towns
provide Beni Guil women settled there
with new opportunities to maintain
control over resources. Lower collection
activities among women in town does
not necessarily imply a corresponding
loss of access to resources nor a loss of
knowledge about them. In towns,
women take advantage of the market.


advantage of the market. Depending on class characteristics, women
use the market in various ways. Wealthy and moderate town settlers
no longer collect rangeland resources themselves but buy them at
the market instead. Women in poor households use truck transpor
tation available on market days to collect and then sell wild mush
rooms and truffles. The weekly market provides poor women with
an opportunity to generate income.
The market also represents a new space for learning about me
dicinal plants. Some research suggests that commercialization
erodes indigenous knowledge systems and devalues women’s roles as
family healers (Mehta 1996). The Beni Guil case suggests otherwise.
Findings from this case support recent critiques of the orthodox
dualism of indigenous/local/traditional versus external/commercial/
modern (Bebbington 1997; Batterburg 1997). Instead, a new approach necessarily recognizes hybrid livelihood systems as complex
strategies that rural households utilize to preserve tradition while adapting to social, demographic, economic and environmental change.
Further, the Beni Guil example also points to a theoretical weakness in studies among pastoralists that view households as either
mobile or settled. Among the Beni Guil, some households are split
and represent units that are both fully mobile and settled. The
reconceptualization of household mobility as well as careful atten
tion to the type of settlement (rural village or commercial town)
provides more accurate insight into the gendered aspects of social
adaptations to sedentarization and environmental change.
Examining how gender is embedded in ecological, cultural and
economic structures at a given point in time also proves more useful
than ecofeminist views that essentialize women with nature. The Beni
Guil case demonstrates that women take advantage of new truck tech
nology to reach more remote sites where they collect commercially
valuable wild mushrooms and truffles. This strategy helps them main
tain control over their roles as providers of food and fuel to the house
hold even though this activity carries with it negative environmental
consequences. Women also respect the cultural norm of female seclu
sion, which encourages over exploitation of fuelwood resources close to
home, suggesting a greater affinity with culture than with nature.
By addressing the gendered responses to the environment as well
as considering potential environmental impacts, this case study fills a
gap in the geographic literature in North Africa and the Middle East
that has looked at the environmental impacts of nomadic settlement
and land-use intensification through larger-scale processes including:
historical, political and economic contexts; erosion of local resource
management institutions; land tenure changes; and demographic or
technological change. By shifting the focus to intra-household dynam
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ics, new insight is gained concerning environmental change and the
future potential for sustainable livelihoods in North Africa’s arid lands.
Promoting sustainable environmental management of Morocco’s
rangelands requires adding intra-household analyses of constraints
and opportunities in meeting livelihood needs. More information
about gendered land-use practices will promote development policies
and conservation programs that target appropriate land-user groups.
Identifying how men and women’s resource interests intersect with
class, location, and household variables suggests more accurate trajec
tories of local scale land-cover change in the future.
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Environmental Degradation in Eastern Turkey: The Case of Contract Farming
Behrooz Morvaridi
Development and Project Planning Centre, University of Bradford
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the integral links between a region’s economy and its natural resource degradation. Through a case
study of the commercialization of agriculture in Igdir, Turkey, the paper seeks to show that natural resource degradation
in particular and environmental change in general must be seen within the context of prevailing social and economic
relations. Although it is, of course, impossible to examine resource change in isolation from the wider economy, it can
also be difficult to appreciate fully the complex interaction of socio-economic and environmental processes.

CONTEXT: THE SOCIETY-ENVIRONMENT
RELATIONSHIP IN RURAL AREAS
The “environment” in a relatively narrow sense is associated
with the biophysical world. Environmental problems are, therefore,
considered simply to be negative impacts on the natural world, such
as the degradation of air and water resources and the loss of biologi
cal diversity. The dichotomy between natural science as the appro
priate discipline for the assessment of nature and social science as
the discipline for the assessment of social relations sometimes
tempts us to consider environmental problems as biophysical
changes somehow separate from their social and economic impacts.
After all, natural scientists and social scientists draw on distinct
epistemologies and therefore have different ideas of what constitutes
evidence or proof. One cannot ignore the fact that natural “science
has… a central role since it is key to the identification and interpre
tation of environmental problems,” but analysis in the social context
remains essential (Yeardly 1992). The fact that much of the available
data on environmental problems in rural areas tends to be exclu
sively quantitative and biophysical means that the available facts are
not always sufficient for understanding the anthropogenic processes
behind environmental change.
Humanity’s increasing capacity to manipulate nature has been a
cornerstone of the development process. Human action has trans
formed nature through technology and labor to the extent that we
have mixed “our forces with its (nature’s) forces too deeply to be
able to draw back and separate either out” (Williams 1980). Thus, it
does not make sense to analyze “society” as the domain of human
action which operates in the “environment,” the domain of natural
cycles and processes. Conceptualizing environment as merely the
material setting for social action implies that the two operate inde
pendently of each other, which is simply not the case.

 


Nature can no longer be said to exist independently of human
intervention nor to structure social activity (Giddens 1994). Since
without some form of human agency environmental issues do not
exist, it is essential that our understanding and application of the
concept “environment” be based on the interaction of society and
nature (Dicken 1992; Blaikie 1987). The ability of human beings to
manipulate nearly every aspect of the natural world challenges the
notion that nature is somehow separate or autonomous from
human culture.
In rural areas, including those of the Middle East, environmental
problems reflect the interrelationships among resource change, human
productive activities, and the accompanying transformations of people’s
lives. An environmental problem is therefore logically understood to be
a situation in which human action affects natural resources in such a
way as to place people’s welfare, income or livelihood at risk. In this
sense environmental problems are social problems.1
The interrelationship of society and environment has been
largely neglected in academic literature on the Middle East in gen
eral and on Turkey in particular, insofar as little attention has been
paid to the subject of environmental problems at all at the policy
level. In the Middle East, governments’ principal objective has been
economic growth. In this context, programs aimed at intensifying
agriculture have brought about significant social change in rural
areas, in particular the restructuring of production relations through
the integration of small subsistence farmers into the market. What
governments have tended to ignore are the patterns of environmen
tal degradation associated with the intensification of farming at the
microlevel. Intensification (that is, increased yield) has become
dependent on rising use of external inputs and mechanization.
Many of the practices which are the manifestation of this policy,
including excessive use of fertilizers, poor irrigation management,
ignorance of fallow periods, and improper use of heavy machinery,
seem to have driven environmental degradation in rural areas.
Although land and water resources are not intentionally de
graded, many forms of intervention which increase yields in the
short-term pose risks for resource quality in the long-term. Unsus
tainable practices are not only associated with poor farmers desper
ate to increase productivity and unable to afford the correct balance
of external inputs or capital investments; richer farmers also use
fertilizers inappropriately at times. In an attempt to understand why
farmers implement such practices, this paper examines production
relations and underlying social tensions in the context of agricul
tural commercialization in Turkey.

1



This is not to deny the fact that natural
processes cause biophysical changes which
affect people. At the same time, I am of
the position that natural disasters such as
floods and volcanic eruptions are distinctly
not environmental problems because
although such events may impact negatively
on people’s lives, they are a result of
natural processes and not human action.

What governments have tended to ignore
are the patterns of environmental
degradation associated with the intensifi
cation of farming at the microlevel.
Intensification (that is, increased yield)
has become dependent on rising use of
external inputs and mechanization.

  



   

I first studied the process of commercialization of agriculture in
the Igdir region in 1982-83 and returned to it in 1995-96, with the
intention of analyzing the continued process of macro- and micro
level changes and the relationship between the two. Commercializa
tion has involved the restructuring of production relations: contract
farming, which ties growers to larger markets, has become the new
norm, although the exact nature of contractual conditions has
changed in line with government strategy. My examination of the
data from two decades of commercialized agriculture focuses on the
longer-term effects of continued cash cropping at both the regional
and village levels. (The case study material is drawn from Ak village
in Igdir province2 of eastern Turkey.)
The processes of commoditization and intensification can put
natural resources under pressure, often creating a need for greater
“landesque capital,” i.e., investments in the long term maintenance
of land quality and strategic decisions geared toward securing future
continuity of production (Blaikie 1997). In this case study of sugar
beet production in Igdir province, production expansion encour
aged by government policy has led to the over-exploitation of land
and water, amounting to the depletion of landesque capital. The
government’s encouragement of farmers to increase crop yields
without policies aimed at conserving the underlying resource base
has resulted in numerous instances of environmental degradation.
GOVERNMENT POLICY AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PROBLEMS IN RURAL TURKEY
Since the 1980s, the Turkish government has moved toward
liberalization and export-oriented economic reforms and away from
the macroeconomic policies of the 1960s and 1970s (in which there
was a growing role for state intervention in the economy through
import substitution and industrialization). Moreover, since the
demise of the Soviet Union, Turkey has been in a position to initiate
new policies with regard to Central Asia, leading to growth in trade
and thereby furthering its integration into the global network.
How has agrarian development been affected by changes in
macrolevel government policy? Since the 1960s the Turkish govern
ment has attempted to transform the structure of agricultural pro
duction by integrating family farms into the commercial market
with the assistance of a price support policy, subsidies, and credit
facilities provided by government agencies (Aksit 1993). The “liber
alization” of domestic trade and investment and the privatization of
state-owned enterprises in the late 1980s and 1990s have resulted in
cutbacks to reduce farmers’ dependence on the state and to fully
integrate them into the market. However, the extent to which this
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In 1992 Igdir was upgraded from a
“district” to a “province” under the
government’s Eastern Regional Develop
ment Program to reinforce the area’s
improved economic status and to
encourage trading with Central Asia.

The government’s encouragement of
farmers to increase crop yields without
policies aimed at conserving the
underlying resource base has resulted in
numerous instances of environmental
degradation.


has been successful has yet to be fully examined, particularly at the
microlevel. There is some evidence that farmers’ real incomes have
declined and that even when state agencies continue to support
farmers to some degree, delays in payments for crops to farmers and
high inflation have added pressure to farmers’ incomes (Turel 1991).
It is estimated that the Turkish population will double to 120
million by the year 2050. The government therefore faces the prob
lem of increasing agricultural productivity to meet the needs of a
growing population. Greater than one third of the total land area in
Turkey is used for arable farming (see Table 1).
Given the constraints of land availability, climate, and topogra
phy, the Turkish government has sought to intensify existing agri
culture. Several environmental problems have become increasingly
apparent since the intensification of agriculture on arable land,
although there is little data available identifying direct links between
intensification and environmental problems. These problems include both soil erosion and reductions in soil quality (see Table 2).
Because intensification has coincided with economic liberalization and a growing demand not only for exports from rural areas,
but also for the products of industry, there has been a shift of
investment to urban areas. This has undermined the subsidies and
support made available to rural areas during a time of agrarian
change. What effect has this had on resource use? Are practices that
result in environmental degradation a response to changes in
macrolevel government policy?
The impact of government policies is offered here as a case study
in a sugar-growing region of eastern Turkey. Igdir, bordered by Kars
to the northwest, Agri to the south, and Armenia, Iran, and
Azerbeijan to the east, is located in a valley with fertile land. Cereal
(wheat and barley) and cash crops (sugar beet and cotton) are the
principal crops cultivated. The case study of Igdir illustrates how
macrolevel policy that links farmers with a state agency through
cropping contracts affects production, farmers’ livelihoods, and
natural resource degradation.

Table 1



Land Use in Turkey

Type of Land Use

Area
(million ha)

% Total

Agriculture

27.8

35.8

Pasture

21.7

27.9

Forest/shrub

23.5

30.2

Urban

0.6

0.8

Other

3.2

4.1

Inland Water

1.1

1.4

TOTAL

77.8

100

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey 1994.

CONTRACT FARMING AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PROBLEMS: THE CASE OF IGDIR
Turkey is striving to be self-sufficient in sugar production. Given
current population figures and an average annual consumption of
28 kg/capita, it is estimated that approximately 1.8 million tons of
sugar are consumed each year. The Turkish Sugar Corporation, the
state agency responsible for sugar cultivation, has planned for in
creased cultivation by establishing sufficient infrastructure to cope
with the increasing demand associated with population growth. As

  



   

part of the drive for self-sufficiency, increased sugar beet cultivation
has been encouraged since the 1960s under government regional
development programs aimed at bringing about the commercializa
tion of agriculture. Igdir is typical of an area where sugar has been
the dominant commercialized crop, made possible through expan
sion of the cultivated area, the adoption of new technology, and
improved infrastructure such as irrigation and roads.
State support for sugar cultivation, which has been essential in
regions such as Igdir to achieve the commercialization of farming
households, is coordinated by the Turkish Sugar Corporation, which
has a complete monopoly over the purchase and sale of sugar beet at
fixed prices. Other crops such as cereals are bought and sold by both
private merchants and government agencies. The Turkish Sugar
Corporation has established vertical integration in local production
through legal contracts with individual growers. Contract farming
enables the Corporation to control both supply and demand for
sugar beet. Contracts detail future purchase agreements, which
include grade and quality standards and methods of cultivation
including the application of inputs such as fertilizers.
Contract farming can put farmers in a position to achieve greater
access to credit, inputs (in particular, new technologies), and the
market than their peers who are not operating under contractual
arrangements. However, the grower is tied to the Corporation by
market dependence and by credit for the purchase of capital inputs.
The farmer’s loss of autonomy is particularly pronounced when
debts to the Corporation are incurred, since the Turkish Sugar
Corporation is the only external agency involved in sugar cultivation.
Contracts tend to cover land management measures intended to
optimize crop growth, crop quality, and production levels in the
short-term agricultural cycle. The objective of maintaining resource
quality over the long-term is not mentioned. Thus, the grower, and
not the Corporation, is responsible for decisions about investment
in the long-term maintenance of land quality and productive capac
ity—landesque capital—under conditions in which the Sugar Cor
poration encourages production growth. Environmental problems,
such as deterioration in soil quality, waterlogging, and salinization
have been identified in Igdir villages by the World Bank and by the
State Hydraulic Authorities (DSA). Unfortunately, investments to
mitigate environmental problems are not always undertaken, nor
are they even possible for small farmers. At the same time, it appears
that farmers adopt a variety of measures, such as the improper
application of fertilizers or reduction of fallow periods, which pro
duce high short-term yields but do lasting environmental
damage. Why?

 

Table 2

Types of Environmental
Degradation in Rural Areas

Environmental Problem
Medium Soil Erosion
Severe Soil Erosion
Salinization
Urban Encroachment

Area
(million ha)
14
2
1.5
3

Waterlogging

2.8

Total Affected Area

23.3

Source: General Directory of Rural Services,
1995.


ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS AND SUGAR CULTIVA
TION: THE FARMER VERSUS THE CORPORATION
Any analysis of the links between crop cultivation and environ
mental degradation in Igdir involves analysis of the Sugar
Corporation’s policy in the region since the 1980s, because produc
tion relations are centered on sugar cultivation and contracts be
tween the farmer and the Corporation. Following liberalization in
Turkey, the Sugar Corporation has cut back on support to farmers
and is more wary of its dealings with them.
Since the 1980s, the number of sugar beet contracts in Igdir prov
ince has increased substantially, and the area under sugar beet cultiva
tion has risen from around 1,500 ha in 1970 to 6,500 ha in 1995,
while cotton cultivation has decreased from approximately 7,200 ha
to 1,400 ha over the same period (see Figure 1). With the support of
a recent World Bank-funded irrigation program, the Sugar Corpora
tion intends to cultivate a further 6,000 ha of sugar beet.
The number of sugar beet factories in the area has facilitated
increases in cultivation by making processing more accessible. The
Erzurum Sugar factory was the only plant in the area in the early
1980s, but now over 220,000 tons of beet is processed annually by
four factories (see Table 3).
Increases in cultivation have been achieved through several
changes to contractual conditions. The Sugar Corporation has lifted
many of the former restrictions on cultivation. In the 1980s each
farmer was given a strict quota for the cultivation of sugar beet,
which was not often more than two ha. This often meant that farm
ers would register other members of their families–spouses, chil
dren–in order to increase production (Morvaridi 1990). In the
1990s, such restrictions were lifted and farmers could cultivate as
much as they wanted. During the 1980s, the Corporation refused to
contract with sharecroppers, believing that the risks were too high,
but it does so today with the names of both the landowner and the
tenant entered in the contract. The landowner provides land and
plowing, the sharecropper provides labor, and the cost of water and
fertilizer is shared. The sharecropper receives cash from the corporation for crops, in contrast with traditional sharecropping arrangements in which he received a portion of the crop.
Interviewed farmers said that the cultivation and rotation of
crops on each plot of farmland is determined by sugar beet since it is
the crop that produces the highest income per unit area. By reducing
production rotation from once every four years to once every three
years, under the instructions from the Corporation, farmers have
been intensifying their resource use increase yields. The rotation in
1982 was sugar beet /wheat/cotton/fallow or sugar beet/wheat/
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Area under sugar beet and cotton
cultivation in Idgar as a function of
time.

Table 3

Amount of Sugar beet processed
in Igdir.

Factory location

Tons processed

Agri

166,000

Kars

42,000

Erci

11,000

Erzurum

3,500

TOTAL

222,500

  



   

fallow/wheat. In 1995 the rotation, shortened from four years to
three, was sugar beet/wheat/wheat, or sugar beet/wheat/water
melon. There has been a considerable reduction in, and even elimi
nation of, fallow periods. For example, as Table 4 shows, in 1995 no
land was left fallow.
The Sugar Corporation deliberately targeted cotton as the crop
to be substituted for by sugar beet, because the two products were in
direct competition over resources, such as labor, land and water.
When any product is increased at the expense of another, the mar
ginal rate of substitution is always negative. When both sugar beet
and cotton were cultivated, farmers needed to ensure that they had
sufficient labor to manage both crops during hoeing and harvesting,
since these tasks were carried out during the same period. A major
managerial problem resulted for many farmers who found the crops
competing over limited available labor (Morvaridi 1992, 1993).
Sugar beet is purchased by weight according to sugar content. If
the sugar content is below 16%, the purchasing price is 15% lower
than the original set price. If sugar content is higher than 17%,
farmers are paid 15% more. This is assessed by the scales (kantar) or
weigh-bridge at one of four delivery locations—Igdir, Akyumak,
Kikoynco, Yayci—not on individual farms. The price paid is based
on an average of the total crop delivered to the weigh station, not on
Table 4

Cropping patterns in Ak village, 1982 and 1995, area in ha.

Crop

Cultivated
area (1992)

Proportion
of total

Cultivated
area (1995)

Proportion
of total

wheat

156

27%

270

46%

sugar beet*

187

32%

210

35%

cotton

81

14%

32

5%

barley

73

12%

31

5%

fallow

58

10%

13

2%

clover

13

2%

15

2%

fruit

10

2%

10

2%

trees

4

1%

1

0.2%

other**

7

1%

0

0%

degraded land***

-

-

10

2%

TOTAL

589

592

Source: Turkish Government Water Authority. *Sugar Corporation, Igdir 1982/1995;
**includes corn, vegetables, watermelon, etc.; ***field data.

 


the crop presented by each individual farmer. This system encour
ages farmers to increase their income through tonnage rather than
content. The Corporation is aware of the drawback of not being able
to monitor weight and sugar content of crops raised by individual
farmers, and the head of the Corporation admitted “we know all the
farmers. We know the best farmers and the worst ones.” The Corpo
ration plans to weigh and purchase from the farmers individually,
but has yet to do so as a result of their own cost considerations.
Farmers harvest their sugar crop on the instructions of the Sugar
Corporation. The Corporation argues that it is logistically difficult
to manage all farmers’ harvests concurrently because the sugar
factory does not have the capacity to cope with the high volumes
that would result. The Corporation therefore staggers the harvest
time, and farmers complain that as a result of prolonging the harvest
period they lose out. The later a farmer harvests, the more his cane
gains in weight. This would appear to be to his benefit. However,
farmers protest that when the sugar beet is weighed at the weighbridge and the Corporation washes and cuts soil away from the beet
they deliberately cut away too much of the skin. As a result the
farmers lose revenue because the crop weighs less.
The price of sugar beet is determined in relation to other crops,
such as wheat and sunflowers. The Ministry determines the price of
all crops in consultation with state agencies and the State Planning
Organization, which advise on prices annually. The Corporation
purchases sugar beet for 4,500 Turkish Lira (TL)/kg. This price takes
into account the interest-free advance payments of 35% of their
crop money (calculated as the cost of production) that the Sugar
Corporation gives to the farmers. The real price for sugar beet would
be 6000 TL/kg (1996 prices). The Corporation knows that the farm
ers would not cultivate sugar beet if they were charged interest on
loans or advances and that if they were operating in the private
sector they would not be paid advance money for cultivation. It
deliberately pays the remainder of the price six months late. It ar
gues that this allows for the necessary time to process and sell the
sugar beet crop so that it can afford to pay the farmers the cash owed
them. The Corporation believes that farmers are fortunate to be
advanced money interest-free, in any event.
Many farmers complain that it is unfair that they receive crop
payment up to six months late and that they continually lose out
because inflation is high (up to 70% according to government and
up to 100% by some unofficial estimates). Farmers assert that the
sugar beet price is low in relation to the cost of fertilizer inputs.
Additionally, over the past few years, the Corporation has offered
farmers consumer goods such as stoves, televisions, refrigerators,



The later a farmer harvests, the more
his cane gains in weight. This would
appear to be to his benefit. However,
farmers protest that when the sugar
beet is weighed at the weigh-bridge and
the Corporation washes and cuts soil
away from the beet they deliberately
cut away too much of the skin. As a
result the farmers lose revenue because
the crop weighs less.

  



   

heating fuel, cooking oil, and even sugar itself, instead of paying
them for their crops. One farmer told me, “They say that it is not
compulsory to accept, but at the end of the day you have to accept
some payments in kind.”
The head of the Corporation justifies its payment policy stating
that: “Instead of their sugar beet money, we give them consumer
goods…and then reduce them from their crop money. We purchase
them cheap because we buy in bulk and then we exchange them
cheaply with sugar beet. That is why they all have televisions. They
couldn’t purchase all these goods otherwise with their own income.
That would be impossible. They are happy and we are happy be
cause we need to save money.”
The reality of contract farming is that farmers and the Corpora
tion have an adversarial relationship based on mutual mistrust.
Farmers in Igdir are dissatisfied with the Sugar Corporation, com
plaining that its policy is geared to expanding production, but not to
helping them. The Corporation complains that farmers refuse to
accept their advice or appreciate the conditions under which the
Corporation operates. This tension, centered on the constraints and
limitations of contractual conditions, is manifested in approaches to
land management. The dynamics between commercialization based
on contract farming, social relations, and environmental problems
become apparent at the local level.
AK VILLAGE
Ak is a village with household patterns, land distribution, and
cropping patterns typical of Igdir province (see Table 4). To reduce
costs, the Sugar Corporation concentrates sugar beet growing in
designated areas in the village. The Sugar Corporation has selected
the most fertile areas of the village for sugar beet growing on the
basis of rotation. Land is fragmented in the village, and the major
landowners who possess parcels of land in various locations are
more likely to secure contracts to cultivate sugar beet every year.
Table 5 shows the partitioning of land in parcels as a function of
land holdings in Ak village.
Households may cultivate sugar beet once every three years, but
only if their land is in the selected area. The larger farmers are thus
in an advantageous position to gain contracts and earn the high
returns that sugar beet cultivation generates.
The contract requires the formation of a group of between five
and 30 farmers able to guarantee repayment of benefits received to
protect the Corporation against any loss. Article Eight of the Growth
of Sugar Beet Contract makes clear the joint responsibility of the
group. Individual contracts are possible, but generally, only select
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Table 5



Land Fragmentation in the Village, 1995.

Cultivated
Area (ha)

No. of
Households

No. of
Land Parcels

No. of
Sites

Avg. No.
of parcels

Avg. No.
of Sites

0-1

28

34

28

1.2

1

1.1-5

41

125

79

3.1

1.9

5.1-10

24

189

93

7.9

3.9

10.1+

11

169

58

15

5.4

TOTAL

104

517

258

5.5

2.5

Source: author’s field data, 1995, 1996

wealthy farmers maintain individual contracts and in Ak village all
belong to a group. The groups have direct contact with the Sugar
Corporation through a local manager who supervises the implemen
tation of the contract, the distribution of inputs, cash and other
supports to the farmers in order to insure proper growth and the
production of quality beet. Table 6 shows the distribution of cash
and subsidies by the Corporation to the contracted farmers by
groups (1982 and 1995).
Farmers receive cultivation income—that is, payment for the
crop—and they are advanced wage money in two stages with which
they are to employ wage labor during hoeing periods (Table 6: col
umn 1). Farmers also receive fertilizers and seeds from the Sugar
Corporation. The Corporation currently provides more and better
quality seed varieties than it did previously—2500 to 3000 kg/ha
seeds in 1995 as compared with 1500 kg/ha seeds provided 15 years
ago. Yields have improved substantially, from 25 tons/ha in 1972 to 35
in 1982 to 54 in 1995, well above the Turkish national average of 40
tons/ha. This increase in yield is attributable to higher fertilizer inputs.
Yield is one benchmark for land productivity: degraded land can
be identified by lower yield characteristics. At the same time, land
sustaining high yield may nonetheless be degraded, especially if
increasing fertilizer inputs are required to sustain steady yield. In
this case study, yield declines are not detected, but it is evident from
fertilizer use patterns that soil degradation is occurring.

The Sugar Corporation attempts to
monitor inputs and yields of sugar beet,
but the farmers often deliberately ignore
the Corporation’s advice in order to
secure increases in their beet weight, the
basis on which they are compensated.

INPUTS AND LAND QUALITY
The intensification of agriculture in Ak relies on the greater use
of external inputs to achieve good yields. The Sugar Corporation
distributes two types of commercial fertilizers: “nitrogen-based”
fertilizers (Azotlu Gubreler) consisting of (NH4)2SO4 (ammonium

  



   

Table 6

Group
#

Distribution of cash and advances by the Corporation to the farmers of Ak Village, 1982 and 1995.

No.
of Members

Area
(ha)

Output
(tons)

Cultivation
income
(x 1000 TL*)

Wages for
hoeing
(x 1000 TL)

Fertilizers
(x 100 kg)

Yield
(tons/ha)

1982
130

39

1370

59000

1220

238

35

43

2

30

48

1700

65300

1440

276

35

3

30

42

1360

58700

1240

261

33

4

30

52

1690

73500

1380

334

32

5

8

6

250

5510

150

23

39

128

187

6370

262000

5430

1132

34

’82 TOTAL

1995
1

30

43

2170

21500

720

295

50

2

30

45

2560

22700

740

334

57

3

30

40

2230

20600

670

277

56

4

30

40

2120

20400

660

289

53

5

30

38

2100

20300

640

363

55

150

207

11180

105500

3430

1556

54

’95 TOTAL

Source: Local Sugar Corporation Office 1983 and 1996. *In 1983, US$1=TL186; in 1996, US$1=TL42000 (source: IMF International Financial
Statistics, April 1995).

sulfate, 20-21% N), NH4NO3 (ammonium nitrate, 33% N),
NH4NO3-CaCO3(ammonium nitrate limestone, 26% N) and
(NH2)2CO (urea, 46% N); and “composed” fertilizers (Kompoze
Gubeler), 8-24-8 NPK (Sugar Corporation 1996).
According to Corporation field technicians, Ak soils have be
come acidic because of the incorrect application of fertilizers. The
distribution and use of fertilizer is often an issue of contention
between the Corporation and the farmers. The Sugar Corporation
attempts to monitor inputs and yields of sugar beet, but the farmers
often deliberately ignore the Corporation’s advice in order to secure
increases in their beet weight, the basis on which they are compen
sated. In 1994 the Corporation gave the farmers 500 kg/ha of com
posed fertilizer and 150 kg/ha of nitrogenous fertilizer. The majority of
farmers believe these amounts to be inadequate since they have only
managed to produce yields of 25 tons/ha. If a combined total of 2000
kg/ha were applied, they argue that yields could surpass 45 tons/ha.

 


The Corporation’s distribution of fertilizers varies from farmer
to farmer. Poorer farmers generally receive more generous fertilizer
applications than their wealthier counterparts, since the Corpora
tion is aware that some wealthier farmers who complain that the
Corporation does not give them adequate fertilizer will buy addi
tional supply from other sources. For this reason they deliberately
offer rich farmers less fertilizer out of the knowledge that these
farmers have the financial resources to purchase extra on their own.
However, poorer farmers tend to sell their fertilizers to the wealthier
farmers because they need the immediate cash and the Sugar Corpo
ration is late in providing crop payments. To compensate, they often
apply high levels of the nitrogenous fertilizer to increase tonnage,
guided by desire for the greatest yield in any one agricultural cycle,
rather than by the desire to maintain soil quality over the longer term.
The application of nitrogenous fertilizer alone (without com
posed fertilizer) results in growth of the sugar beet root (that is,
increased tonnage) at the expense of sugar content. Low sugar con
tent becomes apparent in the factories and raises the costs of pro
duction. Since this affects its accounts, the Sugar Corporation
attempts to strictly monitor fertilizer application. The Corporation
manager complained that “the farmers do not listen to us when we
tell them to apply fertilizers in the following periods; for instance in
the case of phosphorous we tell them to apply 10 kg during cultiva
tion, 10 kg in the first hoeing, and 15 kg in the first irrigation, but
the farmers apply fertilizers all in one go in March.”
Some farmers complain about delays in harvesting the sugar crops
brought about by the Corporation’s timetable. They argue that they are
given little time to prepare land for the next sowing and end up having
to plow wheat straight after sugar beet is harvested. They are also con
cerned about residual fertilizers. The Corporation tests soil under con
tract to analyze the amount of fertilizer required during the cultivation
process, but once the sugar beet is harvested the soil is not re-tested so
that farmers can judge the next application of fertilizer for the rotation
crop to follow. The farmers argue that the Corporation shows no con
cern for resource quality and production beyond the current crop cycle.
Another farmer admitted: “If we leave our land fallow, produc
tivity will increase. However, we no longer leave our land fallow
because we cannot afford not to cultivate. In the old days we used
to, but not nowadays. We need to keep applying more and more
fertilizer because when we use the same amount of fertilizers as
before we do not get the same yield. We have to apply more fertiliz
ers in order to guarantee productivity even though we know that
this has damaged our land.”



Another farmer admitted: “If we leave
our land fallow, productivity will
increase. However, we no longer leave
our land fallow because we cannot
afford not to cultivate. In the old days
we used to, but not nowadays. We need
to keep applying more and more
fertilizer because when we use the
same amount of fertilizers as before we
do not get the same yield. We have to
apply more fertilizers in order to
guarantee productivity even though we
know that this has damaged our land.”

  



   

Generally, Ak farmers rely on chemical fertilizers rather than
organic nutrient inputs such as manure. One interviewed farmer
combines manure with fertilizer he receives from the Corporation
and enjoys high yields, but he is in the minority. Before sugar beet
was cultivated in the village, manure was used for organic fertilizer
and to make tezek, used for fuel or to build houses. In recent years
many farmers, in particular wealthier farmers, have decided not to
keep livestock. Poorer households have continued to keep animals,
but tend to use manure exclusively to make tezek for their own use
and for sale to richer farmers. Rather than using manure on their
own land for the benefit of their land, poorer farmers opt for imme
diate cash.
As well as impacting land quality, fertilizer application also
constitutes a threat to surface and drinking water through NO3(nitrate) pollution. There are also human consumption threats: a
poor household in the village remarked that cucumbers, watermel
ons, and other produce have acquired a strange taste from fertilizer
residues since the application of fertilizers for sugar beet began.
IRRIGATION AND SALINIZATION
Waterlogging and salinization have been identified in several areas
of the village. The long-term impacts of salinization are deteriorating
land quality and lower yield. In recognition of the potential extent of
the salinization problem, a land rehabilitation and on-farm irrigation
improvement project was funded by a substantial loan from the
World Bank, in collaboration with DSA.3 The project, partially com
pleted in 1996, aimed at mitigating the adverse affects of waterlogging,
salinity, siltation and soil-plant-water reactions under irrigation. Both
salinity and sodicity have affected parts of the area.
Ak and other villages in Igdir are irrigated by the Aras river via a
joint Turko-Soviet dam project completed in 1963. The State Hy
draulic Works (DSI) controls and coordinates water distribution. In
the case of Ak, traditional methods of on-farm irrigation have been
used in the village because of irregular terrain which makes even
water distribution difficult. On-farm irrigation involves dividing
fields into 4-6 strips, separated from each other by a ridge. Water is
released from the top of the field and each strip is irrigated sepa
rately under strict control to ensure sufficient infiltration. The ridges
are constantly maintained by a farmworker running up and down
the field adding more soil with a spade to prevent seepage into ad
joining strips of land. Control of water application is difficult and
waterlogging and salinization have resulted.
Some farmers, especially the poorer ones, deliberately apply
more water than is necessary for sugar beets. There is no incentive

 

3

Although the project was due to be com
pleted in 1997 it is expected the DSA will
continue implementation. Cost was estima
ted at $100 million, of which a third is
financed by the World Bank and the
remainder by the Turkish government.
The irrigated area addressed by the project
reached 63,570 ha in 1996.





for efficiency since water charges are based on acreage and crop-type
rather than on volume. They also underestimate the area of their
land to the DSA so that they may pay lower water charges. One
farmer explained the motivation: “Those who irrigate the field many
times are not concerned with their land but with the size of the root
of the crop. The bigger the root, the heavier it is and therefore the
more it is worth. It’s another way of earning more money. The more
water and fertilizer you use the heavier the root will be. Because we
apply too much water and too much fertilizer our land has de
graded. We are aware of the consequences.”
Waterlogging and salinity can be prevented, both by reducing the
application of water in excess of crop needs and by augmenting drain
age, each of which has been an objective of the World Bank project.
CONCLUSION
In an examination of the dynamics of contract farming in sugar
beet cultivation, this paper illustrates the links between social rela
tions and environment. It demonstrates how farming contracts
between a farmer and a state corporation are concerned with pro
duction methods and levels, detailing land management measures
which ensure crop growth and quality. However, the majority of
contracts are incomplete in that they do not specify every eventual
ity. The sugar beet grower is responsible for all costs of production
and it is the farmer, not the Corporation, who bears risks related to
labor and resource quality. Landesque capital and other environ
mental costs are externalized from production contracts, allowing
the Corporation to avoid any long-term responsibility for resources
beyond the immediate short-term agricultural cycle.
It is the peculiar construction of the “independence” of farmers’
contracts that is of value to large corporations, but this also leads to
complex and tense social relations at the local level. It seems clear
that the Corporation strives to gain high yields from farmers in
return for little commitment. Farmers are aware of this and in turn
attempt to beat the Corporation to gain as much income as possible
through land management practices which in the long-run cause
environmental problems on their own land.
Analysis of environmental problems must go further than the
quantitative natural scientific analysis, since quantifying resource
change alone will not provide the whole picture. Qualitative data
and longitudinal studies at the local level will enable us to better
understand the complexity of environmental issues. As this paper
demonstrates, declines in resource quality and availability are closely
linked to the production process and accompanying social relations.
To separate the two would result in superficial dualism.
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Monitoring Desert Locusts in the Middle East: An Overview
Keith Cressman
FAO, AGP Division
ABSTRACT
Desert Locusts, Schistocerca gregaria (Forskal), are the most dangerous of locust species. Under favorable environmental
conditions, a few solitary individuals can dramatically multiply, form large swarms able to migrate great distances, and
threaten agriculture over a large part of Africa, the Middle East1 and Southwest Asia. There have been six plagues of
Desert Locusts this century, one of which lasted almost 13 years. Initial Desert Locust control efforts were largely
curative; the trend in the twentieth century has been toward preventing such plagues from occurring. Affected countries
have assumed ever more responsibility for monitoring locust breeding areas and treating infestations before they
increase in size and number. Five of the 18 countries which currently undertake comprensive surveys for, and control
efforts against locusts, are in the Middle East. Most recently, Saudi Arabia completed large scale control operations to
prevent a sudden outbreak of locusts from becoming a plague. Over the years, our knowledge of the Desert Locust has
evolved along with our ability to manage locust plagues. The challenge in the future lies in the implementation of control
strategies that insure food security with minimal environmental consequences.

INTRODUCTION
Locusts are part of a large group of insects commonly called
grasshoppers belonging to the family Acrididae. The Desert Locust,
Schistocerca gregaria (Forskal), is one of about a dozen species of
short-horned grasshoppers (Acridoidea) that are known to change
their behavior and physiology in response to changes in population
density by forming swarms of adults or bands of wingless nymphs
called hoppers. Swarms may contain billions of individuals behaving
in unison; they can migrate over hundreds or even thousands of
kilometers. Bands can contain a similar number of non-flying
nymphs which also act as a cohesive unit. True grasshoppers form
neither bands nor proper swarms. However, the distinction between
locusts and grasshoppers is not entirely clear-cut. There are some
species, such as Oedaleus senegalensis, which occasionally form small
loose swarms. Locusts such as the Tree Locust (Anacridium sp.)
rarely form bands. Some locust species, such as the Australian
Plague Locust (Chortoicetes terminifera), do not change shape and
color in response to changes in density.

1

For the purposes of this paper, the Middle
East is defined as those countries that
extend from Egypt to Turkey eastwards to
Iran, including the entire Arabian Peninsula.

DESERT LOCUST LIFE CYCLE
The Desert Locust poses the greatest threat of all locusts to hu
mans because hopper bands and adult swarms can rapidly arise and
migrate, potentially threatening food security in some 60 countries
in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. A desert locust lives three to five
months although this is extremely variable and depends on weather
and ecological conditions. The life cycle comprises three stages: egg,
hopper, and adult (Figure 1).
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The life cycle of the Desert Locust.

Females lay egg pods containing 80 to 158 eggs in bare ground
and often, but not exclusively, in moist sandy soil. They usually lay
about three times. The eggs hatch in about two weeks although this
can vary from 10 to 65 days (Ashall and Ellis 1962; Roffey and
Popov 1968). The emerging hoppers develop in five to six stages
over a period of about 30-40 days, depending on temperature. At
the final molt, the young adult (or fledgling) emerges. Under opti
mal conditions (lush vegetation, maximum day temperatures of
30°C or more, and sufficient rain for vegetation growth), adults
generally mature in about three weeks, although this process can
take as along as eight weeks. If conditions are cool or dry, and there
fore unfavorable for final maturation, immature adults can survive
for six months or more.
The great majority of the eggs that are laid survive and hatch. On
the other hand, very few of the hoppers which emerge from the egg
survive to fledge. Most die during the first instar stage due to inad
equate water reserves, cannibalism and predation by ants. Cannibal
ism, parasitism, and predation continue to take a toll during the rest
of the life cycle. Nevertheless, between 5 and 10 viable adults result
from a single female (Greathead 1966; Roffey and Popov 1968).
PHASE CHANGE
A Desert Locust has different states called phases: solitarious,
when individuals are at low population densities; gregarious, when
they are at high densities; and a transition from the solitarious phase
to the gregarious and vice-versa known as transiens.
The behavioral change depends on micro-scale environmental
factors such as the spatial distributions of food plants, and macroscale factors such as convergent wind fields that force locusts to
become concentrated in relatively small areas. This change can
rapidly take place, often within a few hours of crowding (Roessingh

 





and Simpson 1994). The capacity to behave gregariously is passed
from parents to their offspring and increases over several genera
tions of crowding (Islam et al. 1994ab). The color of the locust also
changes from brown in solitary adults to pink and yellow in imma
ture and mature gregarious adults, respectively. Morphological
changes (i.e. in color and shape) occur after the change in locust
behavior. The full gregarious color takes one crowded generation to
develop and shape takes two or more. The pronounced differences
between gregarious and solitarious adults (their ambi-morphism if
you will) meant that until 1921, scientists believed that gregarious
and solitarious locusts were actually two different species.
MIGRATION
Temperature and wind influence the migration of both solitary
adults and swarms. Solitary adults fly for only a few hours at night.
Swarms generally take off several hours after sunrise in warm
weather and fly throughout the day until just before or just after
sunset. On especially hot days, swarms may settle around midday
and take off again in the afternoon. Temperature limits the height of
a flight. Swarms are thought to fly between 1,500 and 1,800 meters
above the surface of the ground (Rainey 1963; Schaefer 1976). All
major swarms travel downwind. In sunny warm weather, swarms
tend to fly about 10 hours, but they have the ability to fly continu
ously for 13-20 hours. A swarm is displaced at some fraction of the
wind speed because many of the adults spend some time on the
ground. The ground speed of a swarm is usually about 20-50% of
the wind speed. The average daily rate of net displacement of
swarms varies from 5 km in cool weather to 200 km in warm
weather with a consistent wind direction.
Desert Locust adults and swarms can migrate great distances in a
short amount of time. They can stay in the air for long periods, for
example, they regularly cross the Red Sea, a distance of more than
300 km, and sometimes move across the Sahara from Sudan to
Mauritania to Morocco, a distance of nearly 5,000 km (Figure 2).
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Figure 2
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Some examples of long distance Desert Locust migration.

  



   

There have been some exceptionally impressive swarm migra
tions, for example from Northwest Africa to the British Isles in 1954.
Over ten days in October, 1988, in the most spectacular migration in
recent history, Desert Locusts crossed the Atlantic Ocean from West
Africa to the Caribbean, a distance of about 6,000 km.
DESERT LOCUST RECESSIONS AND PLAGUES
In most years, Desert Locusts are usually restricted to the semi
arid and arid deserts of Africa, the Middle East and Southwest Asia
that receive less than 200 mm of rain annually. This is an area of
nearly 16 million km2 covering 30 countries (Figure 3).

There have been some exceptionally
impressive swarm migrations, for
example from Northwest Africa to the
British Isles in 1954. Over ten days in
October 1988, in the most spectacular
migration in recent history, Desert
Locusts crossed the Atlantic Ocean
from West Africa to the Caribbean,
a distance of about 6,000 km.

Figure 3

The Desert Locust recession area (dotted outline) in relation to the size of the
continental United States.

Within this area, low densities of solitarious locusts are perma
nently present and breeding on a small scale in favorable habitats.
The numbers are so low that hopper bands and swarms rarely form,
and the threat to crops or food security of the host country is insig
nificant. Scientists have labeled these relatively quiet periods as
recessions. In the past, recessions have lasted from less than a year to
seven years.
When a favorable combination of conditions occurs, locust
numbers and densities markedly increase, which leads to
gregarization. This occurs in desert areas after rain falls in sufficient
amounts and duration to allow locusts to concentrate and multiply
which, unless checked, can lead to the formation of hopper bands
and swarms. This is commonly referred to as an outbreak. After two
or more successive seasons of solitarious-to-gregarious breeding
occur in the same or neighboring regions, a dramatic increase in
locust numbers and simultaneous outbreaks may follow; this is
commonly referred to as an upsurge. During this period, both the

 





size of the total gregarious population and the size of the bands and
swarms that make up that population increase and can lead to a plague.
Outbreaks occur often but they do not necessarily lead to upsurges.
Similarly, most upsurges die out before leading to a major plague.
During plagues, Desert Locusts may spread over an enormous
area of some 30 million km2, extending over all or part of 60 coun
tries, which encompass more than 20% of the total land surface of
the world. The Desert Locust thereby threatens the livelihood of a
tenth of the world’s population. There have been nine major plagues
between 1860 and 1997. Plagues occurred in 75% of the years be
tween 1860 and 1963, but in only 12% of the years since then. They
have varied in length from one to 22 years. The last plague occurred
in 1987-89.

No. Territories infested with swarms

PLAGUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
During this century, Desert Locust plagues have occurred in the
Middle East on seven different occasions: 1901–1908, 1912–1917,
1926–1933, 1941–47, 1949–1962, 1968 and 1987–89 (Waloff 1976)
(Figure 4).
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Figure 4 Plagues and recessions of the Desert Locust in the Middle East and elsewhere, 1860-1997.

These plagues lasted between one and 14 years; they were sepa
rated from each other by one to 19 years of calm (recession) in
between. After the 1941-47 plague, there was a brief recession the
following year, broken by an upsurge that led to a major plague that
lasted 13 years, the longest continuous plague in the Desert Locust
area this century (Waloff 1966). This plague was believed to have
started in the Empty Quarter of Saudi Arabia following unusually
high rainfall (Lean 1965). During 1949, it spread into the Arabian
Peninsula and Iran as well as further east and west. Egypt reported
swarms from 1950 onwards, Iraq, Israel, and Jordan in 1951, and
Syria in 1953. By 1962, the plague was declining in the Middle East
and a long recession period persisted from 1963 to 1985, occasion

  



   

ally interrupted by a small outbreak or upsurge and one short-lived
plague (1968) until the next major plague of 1987-89. There was an
upsurge in 1993-96 which did not lead to a plague. Most recently,
there was an outbreak in Saudi Arabia in 1997 which was controlled.
Since 1860, swarms have been reported more frequently in
southwestern Arabia than in other parts of the Middle East. There
were a total of 72 years in which at least one swarm was sighted in
this area (Table 1).
Table 1

Swarms in the Middle East between 1860 and 1997.

No. yrs
No. yrs
% yrs
w/swarms % plague yrs
w/swarms w/swarms
during
w/swarms
1860-1997 1860-1997
plagues
S. Arabian peninsula
(south of 20N)

72

52.2

41

56.9

N. Arabian peninsula
(north of 20N)

69

50.0

39

56.5

Arabia (east of 55E)

54

39.1

33

61.1

Iran (south of 30N)

51

37.0

34

66.7

Egypt & Sinai

44

31.9

36

81.8

Israel & Jordan

39

28.3

30

76.9

Iran, other areas

31

22.5

28

90.3

Iraq

27

19.6

25

92.6

Syria & Lebanon

25

18.1

19

76.0

Turkey

13

9.4

13

100

Swarms occurred more often in territories adjacent to southwest
ern Arabia and in southern Iran than in northern areas of the Middle
East. In these northern regions, swarm reports tended to coincide
with plague periods. (These frequencies do not indicate the number of
swarms, only whether any swarms occurred in a given year.)
During the winter and spring of most years, relatively few
solitarious locusts are present along the coastal plains of both sides
of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Occasionally, similar numbers
of locusts are present on the coast and in the interior areas of north
ern Oman as well as in southeastern Iran. Only after locusts in these
places substantially increase in numbers under unusually favorable
conditions and form swarms do they threaten other countries in the
Middle East. This is rare, however; Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon and Syria
last reported swarms in 1962. Swarms may also invade the Middle
East from Southwest Asia or Africa, but such swarms mostly affect
the Arabian Peninsula.

 

The Desert Locust threatens the
livelihood of a tenth of the world’s
population.





DESERT LOCUST MONITORING IN THE MIDDLE EAST
HISTORICAL SURVEYS
Desert Locust monitoring and control was first the responsibility
of farmers as they struggled to defend their crops. During the twen
tieth century, governments have accepted the responsibility for
organizing country surveys and control campaigns (Lean 1965).
Although locust experts discussed the establishment of an interna
tional anti-locust organization at a number of conferences (includ
ing Rome 1931; Paris 1932; London 1934; Cairo 1936; Brussels
1938), early international cooperation remained confined to re
search activities rather than operational monitoring and control
(Lean 1965). During World War II, the British established the well
organized Middle East Anti-Locust Unit (MEALU), which com
menced operations in Saudi Arabia in 1943, and in Yemen, Kuwait
and Oman shortly thereafter. MEALU hired the explorer Wilfred
Thesiger after WWII to undertake Desert Locust surveys in the
Arabian Peninsula (Thesiger 1959). Experts from Egypt and India
and workers from Sudan and Palestine assisted MEALU. In Egypt, a
similar unit existed and operated as well in northwestern Saudi
Arabia. In Iran, MEALU worked with Iranian, Russian, Indian and,
later, American specialists (Lean 1947). MEALU was disbanded in
1947 and replaced by the East African Desert Locust Survey (DLS)
in 1948.
DLS was responsible for monitoring known outbreak areas and
making regular surveys of solitarious locust populations in Ethiopia,
Iran, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Its headquarters was in
Nairobi with field bases in Asmara, Hargeisa, Jeddah and Aden
(Uvarov 1949).
In the 1950s, there was a growing interest in international coop
eration in monitoring locust populations. This led to United Na
tions Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) coordination of
international locust control efforts in the Arabian Peninsula begin
ning in 1956, at which point the British units disbanded (Lean
1965). In that same year, DLS merged into the DLCO-EA (Desert
Locust Control Organization for Eastern Africa) which was based in
Addis Ababa. In 1958, FAO and other UN agencies began ecological
surveys in desert regions and marginal lands where Desert Locust
outbreaks most often occur. During the ten year project, they sur
veyed more than 110,000 km2, half of which were in Egypt, Iran,
Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Equipment was provided to affected coun
tries to allow regular monitoring and forecasting. International
experts and field workers assisted in those countries where areas
requiring regular surveys were too large for the national government.

  



   

In 1965, three long distance surveys were undertaken in Algeria,
Saudi Arabia and Iran as part of the FAO ecological surveys. These
surveys are thought to be the precursor to the system of national and
international surveying and monitoring which now operates in
locust affected countries.
Monitoring and control efforts in the field before and after WW II
were supplemented by the efforts of the Anti-Locust Research Cen
ter in London (UK) which established a centralized system of re
porting, mapping, and data analysis on the changing distribution of
the Desert Locust in 1929. This organization provided monthly
bulletins and forecasts to affected countries. Its work continued
under the International Desert Locust Information Service (IDLIS)
at the center from 1958 onwards, funded by the UK and FAO
(Uvarov 1958). In 1979, FAO assumed this responsibility as part of
its mandate and as a result IDLIS was replaced by the Desert Locust
Information Service (DLIS) at FAO Headquarters in Rome. The DLIS
is now part of the Locust and Other Migratory Pests Group at FAO.
CURRENT SURVEY METHODOLOGY
Over the years, strategies of Desert Locust control have evolved
from curative efforts to an emphasis on prevention, that is, finding
and treating infestations before they form large hopper bands and
swarms. This requires regular monitoring of locust breeding areas and
the ability to quickly mount small scale control operations in many of
the 60 countries affected by the Desert Locust. Currently, about 18
countries in Africa, the Middle East and southwest Asia maintain a
regular survey program for monitoring the Desert Locust (Cressman
1996). These are countries that are frequently infested and have there
fore established specialized anti-locust units responsible for survey
and control. These units are usually part of the Ministries of Agricul
ture under the supervision of the Plant Protection Departments. Some
units are autonomous while others are incorporated into the national
plant protection or agricultural extension programs.
Of the sixteen Middle Eastern countries considered in this paper,
five have well established National Locust Units with nearly regular
monitoring programs (Egypt, Iran, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Yemen),
four have smaller and less active programs as part of the general Plant
Protection Department (Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, UAE), and seven do
not have specialized units nor do they maintain programs (Bahrain,
Israel, Lebanon, Palestinian Territories, Qatar, Syria, Turkey).
There are two basic types of surveys. Assessment surveys are
conducted in areas that have a history of locust breeding or pres
ence, or where rain has been recently reported or is thought to have
occurred, or where reports of locusts have been received from local

 

Over the years, strategies of Desert
Locust control have evolved from
curative efforts to an emphasis on
prevention, that is, finding and treating
infestations before they form large
hopper bands and swarms. This requires
regular monitoring of locust breeding
areas and the ability to quickly mount
small scale control operations in many
of the 60 countries affected by the
Desert Locust.





inhabitants, scouts, or agriculture extension agents. The purpose of
an assessment survey is to monitor locust populations and assess the
suitability of the habitat for breeding, and to determine whether
significant populations are present that may require control. Search
surveys are conducted in areas known to contain significant popula
tions in order to estimate the total infested areas, and to delimit the
areas that require control. Results from searching permit decisions
on if, when, and how control should be conducted.
Assessment surveys are generally the first type of survey to be
undertaken in order to determine if locusts are present in an area or
to identify areas of green vegetation where locusts are likely to
gather. Estimates of densities made at each survey stop can be used
to identify those areas where significant numbers of locusts (i.e.
gregarious locusts, groups, or high numbers of solitary locusts) may
be present. Once these areas are identified, a search survey in the
identified areas determines the geographical extent and size of the
infestations. From this information, the scale of risk and level of
required control can be estimated. Information from both types
of survey provides a more complete picture of the overall locust
situation (Figure 5).
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Figure 5

Schematic of Desert Locust monitoring and related decision-making.

  



   

Assessment surveys are regularly carried out in those countries
with National Locust Units. Specialized staff from these units con
duct ground surveys in four-wheel drive vehicles in desert areas.
Survey itineraries usually include those areas where locusts or green
vegetation were previously seen, areas that are known to be favorite
locust habitats and areas in which there is no information. Surveys
concentrate primarily on areas of natural vegetation, often in re
mote, hard to access areas, rather than crop lands. Survey officers
also gather information about locust sightings, green vegetation
blossoming, and recent rainfall from agricultural extension agents,
villagers, truck drivers, travelers, and nomads.
At each survey stop, survey officers will walk several hundred
meters, depending on the extent of the vegetation, and count the
number of adult locusts that they disturb. Officers will also stop and
closely inspect the ground or small bushes for hoppers. The results
including the date, location, and notes on the vegetation and soil
moisture are written on a standardized reporting form. More and
more survey officers are using a hand-held geographic positioning
system (GPS) to determine the latitude/longitude coordinates of
their position. Surveys are generally conducted early in the morning
and late in the afternoon when locusts are most active.
Based on the results of a survey, the need for further assessment
or search surveys can be determined. During search surveys, control
targets may be identified which allow decisions to be made on the
most suitable control method.
Aerial surveys are sometimes undertaken at the beginning of the
rainy season to identify areas of green vegetation for later inspection
by ground teams. Another aerial survey may be conducted midway
through the season and perhaps a final one at the end to provide
updated information on the habitat. Most affected countries do not
have the resources to carry out such surveys, with the exception of
Pakistan which has its own fleet of aircraft. The DLCO-EA uses its
aircraft to provide survey services to its member countries.
Remote sensing imagery can assist in the detection of green
vegetation and thereby help to guide ground survey teams. Since the
late 1980s, imagery has been used in parts of West Africa and more
recently (1997), in the Red Sea area. The imagery is captured and
processed within the region of interest, in this case, Niamey (Niger)
for West Africa and Asmara (Eritrea) for the Red Sea area. Remote
sensing imagery currently has several limitations that must be over
come before it can be used on a regular and operational basis. The
primary limitation is the need for ground validation which is a time
consuming and expensive exercise that must be carried out in
several areas within a region since it is not possible to extrapolate
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results from one area to another. Such validation is required to
calibrate imagery and reduce the difficulty in interpretation.
Furthermore, a procedure must be developed to deliver processed
and calibrated imagery to users in locust-affected countries in a
timely manner. Several research institutes and FAO are currently
investigating these issues.
ANALYSIS AND FORECASTING
Ground and aerial survey teams transmit their findings to the
National Plant Protection Headquarters for collation and analysis as
well as to FAO Headquarters where analysis and forecasting at the
international level is performed. In the case of a highly mobile pest
such as the Desert Locust, a centralized system offers several advan
tages over national or regional systems in terms of a global view of
the locust, habitat and weather situation, access to data not easily
available at other levels, objective interpretation of data, and the
ability to provide affected countries with information that they
themselves would not readily produce or otherwise obtain
(Cressman 1997a).
Until recently, data analysis was undertaken manually by plot
ting survey results, rainfall reports, and habitat conditions on a
series of maps of differing scales. These data were compared to
historical data including locust frequencies and long-term average
rainfall. In 1996, FAO introduced a geographic information system
(GIS), SWARMS (Schistocerca Warning Management System). The
system allows for storage of data in several databases, display of
current data on maps consisting of various thematic overlays, and
comparison to historical data (Cressman 1997a). In this way, the
forecaster can better visualize the spatial and temporal relationships
between the various data types and query the data in order to gain a
good understanding of the current situation and how it may develop.
At present, a smaller national GIS has been developed and is
being evaluated for operational use in one of the affected countries
(Cherlet, personal communication). The purpose of the system is to
allow a National Locust Unit to better manage and analyze data
collected in its country. There are strong links between the national
GIS and SWARMS to allow sharing of data. In this way, it is antici
pated that Desert Locust monitoring will become more of a coop
erative effort and partnerships will develop among countries and
with FAO in terms of data collection, transmission and analysis.

  



   

THE LOCUST OUTBREAK IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA,
1996-1997
OVERVIEW
An outbreak of Desert Locust during the 1996-97 winter was a
classic example of a situation that could have led to an upsurge or a
plague. Successive rainfalls made conditions extremely favorable for
breeding along 900 km of the Red Sea coastal plain in Saudi Arabia
(Figure 6).

Figure 6

Overview of the origins and development of a Desert Locust outbreak in the
Arabian Peninsula, 1996-97.

Good conditions persisted for nearly six months which led to a
dramatic increase in locust numbers, most notably during March
and April when hoppers and adults changed phase from solitary to
transiens (Cressman 1997b). Large scale control operations involved
more than 70 teams and four aircraft and used 340,000 L of pesti
cide. (Saudi Arabia 1997). This effort prevented significant swarm
formation and migration as well as any major loss to crops.
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
Solitarious Desert Locust adults were first reported on the Red
Sea coastal plains of Saudi Arabia in November 1996. These adults
probably originated from locusts from the Yemeni interior which
had themselves appeared after a cyclone in June. Some of the

 





Yemeni locusts perished in control operations but others were prob
ably drawn into the Red Sea Trench on southerly winds associated
with an unusually strong and persistent depression over the north
ern Red Sea in mid-November 1996. This depression also resulted in
light to moderate rainfall over a large portion of the coastal plains
along both sides of the northern Red Sea from 15-25 November. In
Saudi Arabia, rains were reported on the coast from Al-Lith to Khulais
but were estimated to have extended to Al-Wajh in the north.
The majority of the incoming adults landed on the coastal plains
of Saudi Arabia and most likely dispersed over a wide area from AlLith in the south to Al-Wajh in the north, making it difficult to find
them. Small scale breeding first occurred shortly after the rains,
primarily near Al-Lith and Badr, producing a new generation of
solitarious adults that appeared from late January onwards. Densi
ties were still relatively low, mostly from 1-3 per ha with a few loca
tions reporting up to 100 per ha.
In mid-January, widespread light to moderate rains fell on the
coast north of Jeddah to Yenbu. Adults are thought to have concen
trated in this area during the following weeks, increasing in density
to nearly 1-2 adults/m2 (10,000-20,000/ha) which was probably
enough to induce a partial phase change from solitarious to
transiens. Egg laying occurred shortly after the rains on the coastal
plains near Khulais and Badr.
Heavier laying by solitarious adults and groups of transiens
occurred in late February in Al-Lith, Usfan-Tuwwal, Khulais,
Rabigh, and during the first half of March in Usfan-Tuwwal,
Masturah, Badr, Yenbu, and Umm Lajj. Breeding during the latter
period was supplemented by several low density mature swarms
reportedly coming from the western shore of the Red Sea on 8-15
March. The swarms, which also laid eggs upon arrival, were esti
mated to vary in size from 5-50 km2 with densities of 5-20 adults/m2.
Other laying adult densities were estimated to be about 2-5/m2.
Consequently, locust numbers rapidly increased during this period.
High density hatching commenced about mid-March and in
creased over the next few weeks in all areas. This led to large num
bers of hoppers and, in some cases, grouping and small band
formation during April. By the end of April, hoppers were fledging
and new adults started to appear.
Another period of laying occurred in early April that coincided
with more rainfall. The breeding was primarily concentrated on the
northern coast near Yenbu, Umm Lajj and Al-Wajh as well as fur
ther south near Khulais. It consisted of late maturing adults from
the incoming swarms combined with adults produced locally earlier
in the year. Those in the north were not reported by locals who

  



   

collect them for both personal consumption and for sale in local
markets. Densities of laying adult groups were probably higher in
northern areas than near Khulais and were estimated to be about 5
20/m2. Hatching occurred in late April and new adults started to
appear by late May. Fourth and fifth instar gregarious hopper
groups were present near Al-Wajh at the end of May in densities of
up to 50 hoppers per m2 (Cressman 1997b).
Vegetation rapidly dried on the coastal plains in early May. As a
result, most of the immature adults and a few small groups and
swarmlets that had survived the control operations moved off the
coastal plains and migrated across the Red Sea to Sudan where they
arrived on 15 May and in Eritrea at the end of the month. By the
end of the month, hopper groups and only low numbers of adults
remained on the Red Sea coastal plains of Saudi Arabia. Most of
these became concentrated in the few remaining green areas along
the base of the foothills and some of the adults moved up the valleys
of the foothills east of Khulais and Al-Wajh. By mid-June, vegetation
was completely dry and the few remaining adults had left the coastal
plains. On 21 June, one small swarm was reported in northern
Yemen which later dispersed.
CONTROL
The National Locust Unit (Locust Control Center, Jeddah) of
Saudi Arabia mobilized its resources, which are significantly greater
than those of most affected countries. It began ground control op
erations in mid-February against mature adult groups at Al-Lith,
Khulais and Rabigh, treating a total of 1,000 ha. During March, the
Saudis extended operations to all other areas with the assistance of a
helicopter; they were able to spray more than 25,000 ha of laying
adults, hopper groups, bands, and fledglings, including incoming
swarms. During April, two fixed-wing aircraft joined the on-going
operations and more than 81,000 ha of hopper bands and immature
adults were treated. In May, an additional fixed-wing aircraft was
added and 140,000 ha of mostly immature adults and some hopper
bands were treated. In June, more than 28,000 ha were treated.
During the entire campaign, more than 70 ground teams and four
aircraft from the Saudi National Locust Unit applied more than
340,000 litters of pesticide to approximately 3,500 km2.
ASSESSMENT
During the outbreak, average infestation levels (the percent of
green vegetation in which locusts are present) were about 8% but
varied from 1-30%. The initial buildup of locust numbers was

 


missed during the first four months (November - March) because
adults were scattered along the coastal plains and foothills and often
were not reported by locals. Such a large area is not only extremely
difficult to monitor effectively but impossible to treat because of the
wide dispersion and low density of the locusts involved. This prob
lem was compounded by the fact that large expanses of green veg
etation encouraged a general increase in locust numbers rather than
concentrating the infestations at particular points. Hence, good
control targets in which high numbers of locusts could be treated in
small compact areas did not exist until the end of the season when
vegetation began to dry up. This was after several periods of breed
ing had occurred.
Nevertheless, the Government of Saudi Arabia was able to mobi
lize a large amount of resources to undertake a ground and aerial
campaign that, given the difficult circumstances, significantly re
duced locust infestation levels and effectively prevented the forma
tion of large and numerous swarms. As a result, only groups of
adults and a few small swarms formed and migrated from the
coastal plains to the west, south and perhaps east. There were no
reports of significant crop damage.



The Desert Locust has adapted to one
of the harshest environments on Earth.
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temperatures, low rainfall, strong winds
and sparse vegetation.

DISCUSSION
The Desert Locust has adapted to one of the harshest environ
ments on Earth. It has developed a variety of mechanisms to survive
in conditions of high temperatures, low rainfall, strong winds and
sparse vegetation. Its ability to migrate long distances gives it access
to vegetation over a huge area while at the same time decreasing
threats to the species by natural predators. It quickly capitalizes on
favorable conditions by rapid maturation and reproduction. As
conditions become less favorable, it changes its behavior to that of
an individual organism, which is more likely to survive in situations
of diminished habitat.
During the twentieth century, our understanding of the Desert
Locust has evolved. It was originally thought that the Desert Locust
was two different species, one solitarious and one gregarious. Dr.
Boris Uvarov first demonstrated that it was indeed one single species
with the ability to change its behavior in response to environmental
changes. Since then, its biology, behavior, and population dynamics
have been extensively studied in the field and the laboratory. Locusts
and grasshoppers in general have often been the focus of research
due to their conveniently large size and their relative ease of captive
rearing. The remarkable ability of this species to survive during
times of drought and vegetation scarcity, and also to capitalize in
more humid times on relatively brief flowerings of vegetation has

  



   

meant that it poses a particular challenge to the human beings with
whom it shares a habitat.
Control techniques have also evolved from simply burying hop
per bands and collecting adults to more complicated methods of
chemical treatment. Most of this development occurred during this
century and coincided with the advent and use of synthetic com
pounds after WW II. The types of pesticides commonly used in
locust control have changed from strong organochlorides to safer
organophosphates as humans have become more aware of the effect
of pesticides on the environment. For example, the organochloride
dieldrin was the pesticide of choice from the 1950s onward because
it persisted for months in the desert. However, such persistence also
appeared to have detrimental effects on human health and the envi
ronment and dieldrin was banned in the late 1980s. The concept of
using a different formulation and applying pesticides at a lower dose
rate in overlapping swaths was first tried out against locusts. This is
commonly referred to as ultra-low volume (ULV) spraying and is
the basis of current locust control. Today, the evolution of control
agents continues as scientists develop and test alternative products
such as insect growth regulators and mycopesticides, which are
more target specific and environmentally friendly.
Application methods have changed over the years from the
spreading of arsenic by hand in the late 19th century to manual
baiting and dusting, to the present day use of hand, vehiclemounted, and aerial ULV sprayers. Although the latter methods
require a higher level of skill and expertise, they are much safer for
the user.
Finally, the strategies of managing Desert Locusts have advanced.
Historically, farmers tried to control locust infestations using any
available means when their crops were attacked. This rather unsys
tematic approach, comparable to putting out brush fires as they flare
up, often led to poor results and did not stop plagues from develop
ing or spreading. WW II marked a turning point for locust survey
and control. International cooperation was strengthened, specialized
field units were established, systematic survey and control opera
tions were undertaken, and new pesticides were developed and
became available. Based on these advances as well as knowledge
gained in the previous 50 years about the Desert Locust and its
environment, alternative strategies were developed.
The current strategy used by national and regional locust units
focuses on the need to keep locust numbers at a sufficiently low level
to prevent swarm formation and the development of plagues. Con
trol decisions are based on information gathered by and exchanged
with national agencies and international organizations that have
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developed programs to regularly monitor locusts and the weather in
the desert before they reach agricultural areas. This strategy is quite
effective because countries have come to accept that international
cooperation is critical in the fight against the Desert Locust. Never
theless, plagues are not always prevented and often substantial con
trol operations are required to reduce locust numbers and try to
bring a halt to an upsurge or plague. It has become apparent that
such operations could be strategically applied at certain times or in
specific areas. One example is the delaying of control operations
until locusts become concentrated into a relatively small area, which
would allow more locusts to be treated using a lower quantity of
pesticides applied over a smaller area.
CONCLUSION
Desert Locusts have threatened agricultural crops for the past
5,000 years or more. It has only been during this century that our
understanding of the Desert Locust and its relationship with the
environment has increased to a point that allows for better manage
ment of this pest through improved strategies of monitoring and
control. The use of modern technology has been of some help in
reducing the large desert areas that must be surveyed and treated.
Undoubtedly, the fragile environment of the deserts in Africa and
the Middle East will continue to change in the future, partially as a
function of human activity. It is likely that the Desert Locust will
adopt itself to these changes in order to continue to survive as it has
done in the past. Therefore, the challenge in coming years will be to
adopt Desert Locust management strategies accordingly and apply
them in a manner that continues to insure food security while mini
mizing any detrimental effects on the environment.
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Section II: Water
“Virtual Water:” An Essential Element in Stabilizing the Political Economies of the Middle East
J. A. Allan
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ABSTRACT
Why has there been no war over water despite the fact that many economies in arid regions have only half the water
they need? This paper posits that the Middle East region has been able to access water in the global system via trade,
enabling economic systems to solve the water supply problem for the region. Water in the global trading system is
known as “virtual water”– the water embedded in key water-intensive commodities such as wheat. The international
wheat trade is a very effective and highly subsidized global system which operates to the advantage of countries
experiencing water and food deficits.

MIDDLE EAST AND GLOBAL WATER RESOURCES:
THE LINK
Whether there will be enough water for a future global popula
tion double its present size is the subject of considerable controversy. The answer to the question is of particular importance to the
peoples and political leaders of the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA). The region’s economies are already as dependent on
imported water as they are on the renewable waters of the region,
and that dependence is likely to increase over the coming decades.
Freshwater needs are driven by rising populations. The range of
the estimates of future global population vary by over 50%. In this
uncertain information domain there is the opportunity for pessi
mists and optimists to offer opposing interpretations. Whether to
believe the optimists, including the author and most economists
(Islam 1995; IFPRI 1995 and 1997; Dyson 1994), or the pessimists
(Brown 1995 and 1996; Brown and Kane 1996; Postel 1995) de
pends upon the assumptions used.
Mega-questions tend either to be ignored or to attract difficultto-test ideological interpretations of religious intensity. Whether
there will be enough freshwater for future populations is a megaquestion which is not given a fraction of the attention it deserves by
scientists. In the 1960s and 1970s there were attempts in the former
Soviet Union to review the world’s water balance (L’vovich 1969
and 1974) and in the years since there have been further efforts to
address global water availability and use (Shiklamanov 1985, 1986;
Shiklamanov and Sokolov 1983; Shiklamanov and Markova 1987;
and Gleick 1994).

Whether there will be enough fresh
water for future populations is a
mega-question which is not given a
fraction of the attention it deserves by
scientists.

  



   

Meanwhile international funding agencies are prepared to de
vote millions of dollars annually to the provision of advice on water
management and lending for water projects without offering a view
on the status of global water. The World Bank has produced shelves
of reports on water allocation and management for the interested
professional and general reader (World Bank 1993a; Serageldin 1994
and 1995) and for the specialist focused on local and regional issues
(World Bank 1991, 1993a, and 1997). It has not, however, situated
the debate in the global resource context. Only since 1994 has there
been an attempt to address the subjects of water availability for the
Middle East and North African region (FAO 1995a and 1997a) and
water use by irrigation, the major water-using sector (FAO 1995b and
1997b). These publications provide first approximations whose reli
ability should continue to be tested.
The upper and lower bounds of the above projections are quite
high, but about Middle East water there is far less uncertainty.
Although it is generally not publicized, the Middle East as a
region actually ran out of water in the 1970s (Rogers 1994; Allan
1994). In politics, facts which are judged to have costly political
consequences can easily be ignored or de-emphasized. For leaders in
the region, political imperatives are more compelling than scientific
facts. On water, these imperatives have led to denials of the scope of
domestic and regional water scarcity. An ex-Prime Minister of Egypt
(Higazi 1994) and mid-1990s Egyptian ministers of water resources,
agriculture and planning have all publicly asserted that Egypt has
sufficient water (Arab Research Centre 1995). The discrepancy
between the views of scientists and politicians in the assessment of
acute scarcity generally stems from the politicians’ failure to account
for the water required for increasing food production. Politicians
limit their analysis to municipal, industrial, and agricultural job
sustenance, and in doing so, claim water sufficiency despite the
absence of large water volumes needed to grow crops to feed their
populations. For politicians in almost all countries in the region the
food gap caused by the insufficiency of water has to be ignored,
because to draw attention to the food gap is politically suicidal.
The reason the Middle East is important with regard to water is
because it is the first major region to run out of water. The TigrisEuphrates riparians have not yet fully utilized their water resources
but will do so in the coming decades. Similar problems are envi
sioned among the upper riparians of the Nile.
The major indicator of the scale of the water deficit of an
economy is the level of its food imports, since water used in the
agricultural sector exceeds by ten times the water used by the indus
trial and municipal sectors combined.

 

Although it is generally not publicized,
the Middle East as a region actually ran
out of water in the 1970s….For leaders
in the region, political imperatives are
more compelling than scientific facts.
On water, these imperatives have led to
denials of the scope of domestic and
regional water scarcity.
Table 1

World population in the year
2100 (IFPRI 1995).

Low scenario:

7.7 billion

Mid scenario:

9.4 billion

High scenario:

11 billion


In the humid temperate latitudes, attention is rarely drawn to the
relative demands of the agricultural and the municipal/industrial
sectors, since crops can generally be grown in those regions without
irrigation. In the arid and semi-arid Middle East, however, the
dominance of the agricultural water demand is stark. There is little
or no naturally occurring soil moisture there even during the winter
rainy season.
In the semi-arid and arid Middle East and North African region,
water for irrigation is expensively won because of the costs of stor
age and distribution. Moreover, that water which is diverted for the
purposes of irrigation is lost to the industrial sector, putting waterstressed riparians at a competitive disadvantage in terms of eco
nomic (non-agricultural) production. The effective allocation of
water between sectors to gain high returns and high levels of em
ployment is fundamental to economic and political stability.
THE REGIONAL WATER GAP AND THE GLOBAL
WATER SURPLUS
The production of every metric ton (1000 kg) of a food com
modity such as wheat requires an input of about 1000 metric tons of
water (equivalent to 1000 m3). The interannual trend in cereal im
ports reflects a reasonable approximation of the capacity of an
economy to meet its strategic food needs. Figure 1 illustrates the
trend in cereal and flour imports in the Middle East and North
Africa since the 1960s.

Table 2



Per-capita annual water consumption.

Drinking water:

1 m3

Municipal and industrial uses:

100 m3

Food production:

1000 m3
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Figure 1 Wheat and cereal flour imports to the MENA region, 1961-1992.

  



   

The leveling off in the trend in 1986 reflects changes in particular
agricultural and food production policies by Egypt and Saudi
Arabia, the two biggest players in both cereal and flour production
and consumption in the region. Egypt introduced wheat subsidies
(to begin a shift away from cotton) and Saudi Arabia’s irrigation
projects began to produce sufficient wheat for most of its needs (as
it became a significant wheat exporter in the world market). Saudi
Arabia has subsequently reduced its wheat production because it
was palpably an unrealistic way to use its fossil water.
Although the region has suffered fairly acute water scarcity since
the 1970s, the peoples and their leaders refuse to recognize these
resource and economic realities. Their interpretations of Middle
East hydrological and economic contexts are at best underinformed
and at worst dangerous. Figure 2 provides the estimated status and
utilization of MENA water resources.
Scientists cannot provide truly reliable information on either the
supply side (the availability of water) or on the demand side (the
current and future consumption of freshwater driven by future
populations). In any event, the capability of the region’s hydrological
system to meet the rising demands being placed upon it is in question.
At the same time, however, the global hydrological system is
expected to be able to meet the most significant element of global
water demand, the global consumption of food. Assuming a
medium water consumption scenario of 1500 m3/capita/yr, global
freshwater needs are about 8.25 billion m3 (BCM) annually. Con
sumption of this magnitude is well within the estimates of global
freshwater availability (Rodda 1996), but there are differing inter
pretations of the position vìs-a-vìs future demands driven by higher
world population (Brown 1996; Postel 1997; IFPRI 1996).
At this stage in history the Middle East’s water deficit is not
serious because global systems (i.e. trade) balance the Middle East’s
deficit (Allan 1994). It is economic systems and not hydrological
and water engineering systems which achieve water security for the
economies of the region. At the regional level there can only be
degrees of pessimism about the future availability of water, at least
for irrigated food production. On the other hand, optimism about
the capacity to use the region’s water more productively is sound. It
is on this aspect of water management that politicians and regional
optimists focus. At the global level there is certainty neither about
volumes of freshwater available nor about the capacity to use the
water effectively. In these circumstances there is evidence to support
the arguments of both optimists and pessimists. Because of the
mighty error bars on the statistics produced by the as yet inadequate
models of global change (Conway 1993; Conway and Hulme 1993
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Figure 2

Uncertain MENA scenarios: population and water consumption.

and 1996; Conway et al. 1996) very different views emerge concern
ing the capacity of the world’s agricultural systems to raise food.
The pessimistic global freshwater scenario is persuasive if we assume:
·
static patterns of food and water consumption by individuals;
·
high estimates of the demographic transition;
·
static technology;
·
inflexible political and international institutions; and
·
ineffective trading systems.
If, however, we assume:
·
increasing food and water consumption efficiencies;
·
lower range population projections (7-9 billion people); and
·
continued open trade,
then we can conclude that the world’s water and food futures are
uncertain but not seriously insecure.
The specific deficits of the MENA region arise not from poor
local resource endowment, which is significant, but from the inabil
ity of agricultural sectors, governments, and international institu
tions to adapt to the resource scarcity and take measures to find and
mobilize substitutes. It must be recalled that human consumption
should not be assumed to remain in the 1000-2000 m3/capita/yr
range. Consumption rates in the vast semi-arid tracts of Africa south
of the Sahara have been measured at as low as a mere 3.5 m3/capita/yr.
Anxiety over municipal and industrial needs – even in the
MENA region – is misplaced. The genuine tension over water in the
region has been and will continue to be in the agricultural sector.
Food production requires about 90% of a community’s water;
should there be insufficient water for local food needs (the predica

  



   

ment of the Middle East since 1970) then “virtual water” has to be im
ported. Domestic water is likely also to be augmented by desalination.
While the underlying message in this paper is optimistic, it must
be very strongly emphasized that the types of adjustment anticipated
by the optimists cannot be achieved quickly. Thirty years is a rather
short transitional period for the necessary major adjustments in
water policies to be developed in response to limited water availabil
ity. Adjustments such as the changes in the public perception of the
value of water take time. The associated political discourses enabling
fundamental changes in water policies may take decades. So deep are
the belief systems and so challenging any proposal that beliefs should
change that politicians are loathe to contradict them, even though the
measures are essential for the stabilization of the political economy.
How is it that the two camps, pessimists and optimists, can exist
simultaneously and dispense such confusing contradictory interpreta
tions? The central reasons are analytical uncertainty in the areas of
freshwater availability and the impacts of various climate change sce
narios on the supply side and of consumption rates on the demand side.
VIRTUAL WATER AND THE PROBLEMSHED
Watershed-based water budgets do not provide a complete source
of explanation because they are not determinant of the options avail
able to those managing a national economy. If national hydrological
systems restrict economic options then politicians have to find rem
edies in systems that do provide solutions. United States water re
source specialists have coined the term “problemshed,” to make the
idea of the “system” in which solutions can be found more accessible.
National economies operate in international political economic
systems – in problemsheds – and not just in hydrological systems –
or watersheds. The political economy of the global trade in staple
cereals is the relevant analytical catchment for water deficit econo
mies. Access to, and management of, the problemshed is not re
stricted to environmental systems; it necessarily includes extremely
powerful and flexible economic systems as well.
The shared and limiting watershed-based water budgets, with all
their troublesome international relations, are dangerously misleading
frameworks of analysis. The existence of solutions in “problemsheds”
enables politicians to avoid the stresses of inter-riparian relations in
the “watershed.” In brief, if half of the water needed to feed the
MENA region’s people in the 1990s lies in the soil profiles of temper
ate humid environments in North America, South America and
Europe, it would be scientifically derelict to ignore that water. It
would also be neglectful of scientists in general and the governments
of water-short economies in particular to ignore predictable future
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competition for this water. The scientific neglect is just as serious as
the predictable devious and selective hydropolitics engaged in by
political interests.
The coming fifty year transformation of the perceptions of the
value of water (Allan and Radwan 1998) will be a tough environment
for those looking for quick solutions. There is no reliable checklist
with which to change the perceptions of large groups of people
quickly. And people “convinced against their will (tend) to be of the
same opinion still.” Even when perceptions have transformed and
shifted, the implementation of new water policies, especially water re
allocation policies, must be gradual. These processes will all be slow,
sometimes painfully slow, for anxious agency officials and for econo
mists and engineers because of limited funding and career horizons.
As noted above, the foundation scientific concepts for economi
cally and environmentally sound water policies require reforms and
adjustments with high political prices (World Bank 1997). Politicians
will defer for as long as possible paying these political prices, which
can be so extreme as to involve loss of power. It requires a nearly
inhuman level of courage for a political leader of a country that for
five thousand years has enjoyed water security to announce that water
resources are no longer adequate.
Those innovators purveying economic and environmental facts of
life which contradict the deeply held belief systems of whole popula
tions will be ignored if they do not shape their message and pace its
delivery to accord with political realities. The authors of the 1997
World Development Report (World Bank 1997) put it another way,
quoting Machiavelli:
The innovator makes enemies of all those who prospered
under the old order, and only lukewarm support is forthcom
ing from those who would prosper under the new.
The Prince, Machiavelli, N., 1513.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately the water pessimists are wrong, but their pessimism is a
very useful political tool, enabling the innovator to shift the eternally
interdependent belief systems of the public and their politicians. The
water optimists are right, but their optimism is dangerous because it
enables politicians to treat water as a low policy priority, to delay
innovation, and to thereby please those who perceive that they are
prospering under the old order. Pessimists also bring more sensa
tional stories to the media. Optimists bring a version of good news
which is complicated and indigestible, as well as unsensational.
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Playing Chicken on the Nile? The Implications of Microdam Development in the Ethiopian
Highlands and Egypt’s New Valley Project1
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ABSTRACT
How Egypt and Ethiopia will defend or promote their interests in the Nile basin has recently become clearer. Egypt will
again seek to create “facts on the ground,” this time a large new land reclamation and settlement scheme called the
New Valley Project. Ethiopia too will create facts by proceeding with water resources development in the Blue Nile
basin, including the construction of low-cost microdams. If Egypt and Ethiopia pursue these two unilateral initiatives, they
may find themselves on a collision course that both may have difficulty changing. The challenge facing the Nile riparian
countries is to find a balance between the upstream countries’ support for the principle of “equitable use,” and Egypt’s
and Sudan’s support for the principle of “no appreciable harm.” Of all the riparian states Egypt has the most to gain
from the establishment of a basin-wide framework for water resources development. It can ill-afford a future in which
upstream riparians take unilateral actions with respect to water development projects. If Egypt would reduce its existing
water use by 5–10 billion m3 and scale back or abandon the plans for the New Valley Project, there would be enough
water available to strike a deal that would bring Ethiopia into the framework of a comprehensive Nile Waters Agreement.

It is clear that the next century, if not the next millennium, will
witness rising international tensions over natural resources. What is
not at all clear is the way in which those tensions will be expressed
and, one hopes, resolved. The issue facing nation states will be how
best to conduct and manage the arduous, time-consuming search for
cooperative solutions to resource utilization challenges. This search is
underway for the most efficient ways to use transboundary waters, but
it has so far yielded meager results. Without greater success in the
future, the daunting challenges of satisfying the demands of growing,
and, one hopes, better-off, populations will not be met.
The problem is that the search for cooperation and the search for
economic efficiency do not always complement each other. Coun
tries, states, or communities like the European Union, cannot fully
control the economic benefits arising from their own investments.
Reducing power plant emissions may mitigate rain acidity and glo
bal warming, but also allow other countries to avoid undertaking
similar investments. When the threat of such “free-riding” is large,
no one has much incentive to invest at home, nor is the situation
right for a search for binding cooperative undertakings.
International rivers provide striking examples of these problems,
none more so than the Nile Basin. The authors have spent decades
studying and writing about issues of water development and coordi
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nated resource use among the ten countries that share the Nile.1
This article does not propose to cover all or even most of the com
plex issues facing the Nile riparians, but rather to focus on one set of
bilateral relations, and arguably the most important, that between
Egypt and Ethiopia.
The Nile is a very long river but not one with much water. Its
discharge is dwarfed by those of the Congo/Zaire, the Amazon, the
Mississippi, and the Mekong. Its annual discharge is now pretty much
used in its entirety by Egypt and Sudan, except in years of exceptional
floods. In fact, by the terms of a 1959 agreement, significantly called
the “Treaty for the Full Utilization of the Nile,” Egypt and Sudan
divided the annual flow between them with 66% going to Egypt, 22%
to Sudan, and the remaining 12% allocated to surface evaporation
and seepage at the Aswan High Dam (AHD) reservoir. It was on the
basis of this treaty that construction of the AHD went forward.
No other riparians were party to this accord, nor was any share
in the annual flow prudentially set aside for them. The treaty did
anticipate future demands from the excluded riparians, but merely
stipulated that Egypt and Sudan should deal with those demands
jointly. Predictably, the upstream riparians, many at the time still
under British control, were not pleased. However, Cold War rival
ries, their own political instability combined with bouts of civil war,
and their feeble economies did not allow upstream riparians to press
any realistic claims to Nile water arising in or traversing their terri
tories. The economic weakness has endured until today, although
there are signs of recovery in Uganda, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Tanza
nia. Some political stability has been secured in the last decade in
Eritrea (independent in 1993), Ethiopia, and Uganda.2 The time has
come when a few upper basin riparians may test the EgyptoSudanese status quo (Waterbury 1997).
None of the projected demand scenarios involve truly large
amounts of water. Many potential projects are hydroelectric power
stations, which do entail reservoirs and attendant storage losses. But,
even though the upper basin states have relatively abundant rainfall,
it is erratic, seasonally concentrated, and not often in the regions
where the soils are best for agriculture. Capturing river water for
irrigation is an option that few upper riparians have exercised, but,
with increasing demand for food from growing populations, they
inevitably will in the near future. Because the flow of the Nile, so
Egypt and Sudan claim, is fully used today, reductions in flow
caused by an upstream state could disrupt existing patterns of agri
cultural production in the downstream states.
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They are roughly from north to south:
Egypt, Sudan (Main Nile), Eritrea, Ethiopia
(the Blue Nile watershed), Kenya, Tanzania,
Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zaire
(Kagera Basin, Lake Victoria Basin, Lake
Albert, and the White Nile).
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The fact that Sudan is still locked in civil
war, Rwanda and Burundi trying to deal
with the aftermath of or to avoid genocide,
and Zaire (now the Congo), under the asyet untested grip of Lauren Kabila, means
that any coordinated stance among the
upper basin riparians will be nearly
impossible to achieve.

  



   

Egypt in particular has insisted that sunk costs in harnessing the
Nile within its national boundaries give it a kind of property right to
the resource. This right is all the more vital to Egypt in that it does
not add a single drop to the Nile’s flow through its territory. There
fore, Egypt will probably not relinquish any part of its “right” except
under duress.
Ethiopia, by contrast, on average provides 80-85% of the annual
discharge of the Nile (through the Akabo-Baro, Blue Nile, and
Atbara/Teccaze tributaries) yet to date uses virtually none of it.
International law and the guidelines of international financial bodies
such as the World Bank make it extremely difficult for an upstream
riparian to undertake unilateral development of its portion of the
river in the absence of consultation with and the consent of the
downstream states. In this sense the downstream states hold veto
power over third-party financing of upstream development. Ethio
pia does not yet have the financial strength to undertake more than
a few large-scale water resources development projects on its own
and thus finds itself in a box.
Egyptian and Ethiopian interests are thus in potential conflict.3
How they will defend or promote their interests has recently become
clearer. Egypt will seek, once again, to create “facts on the ground,”
this time a grandiose scheme of land reclamation and settlement
called the New Valley Project (Figure 1). Ethiopia too will create
facts by proceeding with low-cost construction of microdams. As
the two strategies unfold, we expect to see a game of “chicken” on
the Nile.4
MICRODAMS IN THE ETHIOPIAN HIGHLANDS
In Tigray province alone, Ethiopia has plans to build 500 microdams over the next decade.5 These are small-scale projects that
typically provide water for irrigating a few hundred hectares. They
can be built without foreign technical assistance or financing, largely
with local labor. They are simple to design and can be constructed
quite rapidly. Ethiopian farmers already possess many of the skills
necessary to proceed with a microdam strategy. A tradition of smallscale irrigation is well-established; there are many small-scale irrigation schemes along streams and tributaries throughout the
Ethiopian highlands. If peace and economic growth continue, these
farmers will almost certainly pursue further efforts at small-scale
irrigation and microdam development. It is unclear how many sites
exist in the highlands for these microdams, but there are probably
thousands (although many potential sites are not in the Blue Nile water
shed, and thus their development would not affect Blue Nile flows).
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Although Egypt’s and Ethiopia’s interests do
conflict, there are important opportunities
for cooperation and sharing of joint gains
(Whittington and McClelland 1992).
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This image has already been invoked with
respect to the Nile by Wolf (1996). The
game of “chicken” is played in various
forms in different cultures, but the essence
of the game is to set in motion a course of
action that will lead to a collision for both
parties unless one party takes action to
prevent the calamity. But then the party
that takes action, instead of being
rewarded for averting disaster, loses the
game because he is thrown off course. For
example, a game of chicken is sometimes
played by automobile drivers who start at
different places on a road, and start driving
straight at each other. If they continue on
course they will crash and both be killed.
The driver who veers off course first
prevents the crash, but ends up off the
road, and is termed the “chicken” because
his fear of death overcame his desire to
“win” the game.
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Tigray has historically been drought- and
famine prone. It is also the province from
which several of Ethiopia’s most powerful
leaders, including Prime Minister Meles
Zenawi, hail.

  

Figure 1



Nile Drainage Basin. Source: Cartographic Section, DPI, United Nations.

  



   

These microdams have numerous potential problems. Many
sites appear likely to silt up rapidly, and thus lose water storage
capacity. Malaria may spread through the highlands as sites for the
mosquito vector increase (Cropper et al. 1998). Moreover, it is not
clear how much water such schemes will use and what the effect of
this use will be on downstream flows. However, if Ethiopia is to
undertake, through micro-dams, anything that would have a signifi
cant effect on downstream flows, it would have to build thousands
of microdams.
There is currently little literature on microdam development in
Ethiopia, but the storage capacity of approximately 500 microdams
planned for North Gondar appears to be in the range of 100,000 to
500,000 m3 each. However, for purposes of illustration let us assume
microdams with larger storage capacities than these. Assume that
5,000 microdam schemes were developed in the Nile drainage sys
tem in Ethiopia, each with sufficient storage capacity to supply water
to an associated irrigated area of 200 hectares each. This would
involve a total irrigated area of one million hectares. If each hectare
of irrigated land used 5,000 m3 annually, the total water use would
be 5 billion m3 per year. Again, for purposes of illustration, let us
assume that 5 billion m3 of water use in the Ethiopian highlands
resulted in a net reduction at Aswan of 4 billion m3. This is over
twice Egypt’s anticipated increase in long-term yield from the
Jonglei Canal, should it ever be finished.6
There is evidence from other parts of Africa that microdams can
indeed affect downstream flows. For example, in his study, “The
Impact of Small Farm Reservoirs on Urban Water Supplies in
Botswana,” Jeremy Meigh (1995) concludes:
These results…show clearly that development of small
dams upstream of major reservoirs should never be allowed
to proceed unplanned. Small dams can have significant
effects on the runoff into and the yield from the large reser
voirs, and therefore it is necessary to assess these effects and
weigh the benefits of rural developments against the adverse
effects of urban water users.…The development of fewer,
somewhat larger dams, which minimizes evaporation losses,
should be preferred to numerous smaller dams of the same
total capacity, if it is found that this reduces the down
stream impact.
Thus, if one takes a long term view, the effect of thousands of
microdam projects on water use in the Blue Nile basin and down
stream flows should not be dismissed lightly.
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The Jonglei Canal project, begun in the late
1970s and suspended in 1983, is designed
to reduce spillage of the Albert Nile into
the swamps of the southern Sudan, and to
channel water that would otherwise be lost
to evaporation downstream to northern
Sudan and to Egypt.

  
There are at least three important features of the microdam
projects that would appear to make them especially attractive to
Ethiopia. First, such microdam projects do not require international
financing. Second, it will be difficult to estimate accurately how
much such projects reduce downstream flows of the Nile. Third, the
microdam projects are militarily invulnerable. In the past Egypt has
periodically threatened to intervene militarily if any upstream ripar
ians interfered with its water supply. If Ethiopia’s use of water was
based on thousands of small-scale irrigation schemes and microdams,
Egypt would have few military options other than an attempt to oc
cupy Ethiopia. It does not seem that this would be a credible threat.
One can hardly imagine a worse place for Egypt to conduct a military
campaign than the heavily-populated Ethiopian highlands.
If Ethiopia continues to liberalize its economy and is politically
stable, it may be anticipated that funds will be available from a vari
ety of sources to finance microdams and other, larger water re
sources development projects in the Blue Nile watershed. Because
Ethiopia is now a major recipient of donor funds, it has considerable
flexibility with its development budget. Local finances can be shifted
away from projects that donors will fund to projects that they will
not support.7 Donors can be played off against one another in the
competition to finance attractive projects.8 Moreover, international
capital markets will be an increasingly attractive option for financing
many infrastructure investments. One must remember that poten
tial hydroelectric projects in the Blue Nile basin, first described in
the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation’s 1964 study, have some of the
highest economic rates of returns of any hydroelectric projects in the
world, assuming the power generated could be marketed regionally
(Guariso and Whittington 1987). Investment opportunities such as
these have a certain inevitability about them, particularly in a world
awash with private capital.
There is a linkage between the development of hydroelectric
projects in the Blue Nile drainage area and a microdam strategy.
Very little of the Ethiopian highlands is now served with electricity.
Thus, many microdam projects will have to rely on diesel pumps to
lift water to fields (some can be gravity-fed). This will be expensive
and often unreliable. Electricity from hydropower projects is thus
needed to supply households in towns and villages throughout the
highlands, and also to run pumps for microdam schemes. One of
the problems associated with hydroelectric development in the Blue
Nile basin is the lumpiness of most investment opportunities and
the inability to use all of the hydropower generated quickly. The
pumping necessitated by thousands of microdams might ameliorate
this difficulty somewhat.
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Consider, for example, the Finchaa Dam,
currently the only water storage facility in
the Ethiopian Blue Nile Basin. This project
was commissioned ca. 1970 exclusively as a
hydropower scheme (to our knowledge,
the only project identified by the U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation to have been
implemented). However, with some
assistance from the United States Agency
for International Development, construc
tion of a sugar cane refinery was initiated in
1995. The Ethiopian government intends to
finance an irrigated cane sugar scheme of
some 6000 hectares downstream of
Finchaa.
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Also, the World Bank has fewer restrictions
on funding projects which improve or
expand existing projects—so microdams
are a kind of foot in the third-party funding
door.

  



   

It is sometimes argued that Ethiopia does not really need irri
gated agriculture because it has the alternative of rain-fed agricul
ture, while Egypt has no alternative except increasing its irrigated
area. Two points need to be made about this argument. First, many
parts of the Ethiopian highlands are quite arid during the dry sea
son, and farmers in such areas would clearly benefit from irrigation.
Second, both Egypt and Ethiopia have the option of pursuing
economic development strategies that will enable them to pay for
imported food rather than expanding irrigated agriculture, and if
their populations increase at current rates, both will have to do this.
In the long term irrigated agriculture is not a feasible alternative for
achieving food security for either Egypt or Ethiopia.
There is precedent throughout the semi-arid regions of the
world for what Ethiopia intends to do. A fairly dramatic example lies
in Syria’s development of its watershed in the Yarmouk river basin.
This river, whose annual discharge is only 380-400 million m3,
serves as the border between Syria and Jordan, before emptying into
Lake Tiberias (or Kinneret as it is known in Israel). For decades
Jordan and Syria proposed the construction of a dam on the
Yarmouk to capture winter flood waters and to generate hydroelec
tricity. Part of the stored flood water was to be diverted into Jordan’s
East Ghor Canal and used in the Jordan-Dead Sea valley for agricul
ture. The hydropower was destined exclusively for Syria. The dam,
first known as the Maqarin project and later as the Unity Dam, has
never been realized because of initial objections by Israel (the down
stream state).
What is important for our story is that in the intervening years
Syria proceeded quietly and unilaterally to construct dozens of small
dams in its portion of the watershed. These dams store on the order
of 155 million m3 of water. Since 1975 alone, 19 dams have been
constructed with an aggregate storage of nearly 100 million m3 and
five more are on the drawing boards (Soffer and Kliot 1991; Garber
and Elias Salameh 1992). Even if Israeli acquiescence to the Unity
Dam were obtained, it is now doubtful that the dam would make
good economic sense, at least on the scale that it was originally
conceived. Syrian action has reduced the average annual flow by
roughly a third.
Ethiopia’s microdam strategy does not preclude the development
of larger water resources development projects in the Blue Nile
basin. Indeed, Ethiopia is proceeding with both types of projects. In
the fall of 1997 the Government of Ethiopia issued tenders for the
construction and supervision phases of the first major hydroelectric
power project on the Tekeze River. Located on the Upper Tekeze
southwest of Mekelle, the final project is likely to have a total storage

 

  



capacity of about 8 billion m3 and an installed capacity of 200 MW.
Ethiopia is financing this project itself, and, importantly, has not
formally notified Egypt or Sudan of its plans.
EGYPT’S NEW VALLEY PROJECT
Information about this project available to the authors is limited
to reports in the international and Egyptian press, and these news
stories have often contained self-contradictions and obvious mis
takes. However, the general scope of the project seems clear. Egypt
plans to pump 5–10 billion m3 of water per year from the Aswan
High Dam Reservoir, and put it in a new canal that will transport it
to a series of new land reclamation projects in the Western Desert.
When the plan is finished, perhaps 25 years from now, between
300,000–500,000 additional hectares will be irrigated.9
The interesting question, of course, is: where does Egypt imag
ine that it will get this much additional water? There was some
confusion in the initial press reports that this would be surplus
water from the Tushka canal spillway. The Tushka canal spillway
was built to discharge excess flood waters from the Aswan High Dam
Reservoir when it reached extremely high levels (Whittington and
Guariso 1983). Discharges into the Tushka canal spillway have been
and will be very rare; indeed if the New Valley Project is finished as
now envisaged, and its water demands factored into the operation of
the Aswan High Dam Reservoir, the Tushka canal spillway will prob
ably never be used again. So it is important to be clear that water for
the New Valley reclamation efforts will be needed every year and thus
must come from Egypt’s long term water allocation.
Egypt contends that it will find the water supplies needed for the
New Valley Project by using existing irrigation water supplies more
efficiently, fostering water conservation efforts, abstracting ground
water, using reclaimed wastewater, and shifting out of sugar cane
and rice to less water-intensive crops.10 These measures, particularly
conservation efforts and shifts in crop mix, could have a significant
effect on Egypt’s water use. Egypt thus argues that it will not withdraw
more than its share specified in the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement.
The international press has consistently reported that Egypt’s
allocation of Nile waters is 55.5 billion m3. This misses the real
story.11 As all the Nile basin riparians are well aware, Egypt’s alloca
tion under the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement is best understood as a
deal with Sudan. Egypt’s allocation of 55.5 billion m3 is contingent
upon zero water use by upstream riparians. At the time the 1959
Agreement was signed, both Egypt and Sudan recognized that this
assumption of zero water use by upstream riparians was not realistic
in the long run, and they made provision for how the 1959
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The costs of the canal, the pumping
stations, and ancillary projects in the New
Valley, have been estimated at LE 300-500
billion over the next twenty years, or about
US$90 to $150 billion at the 1997
exchange rate. Projected investments of
that magnitude will attract many multi
national firms. The Arab Fund for Social
and Economic Development, representing
the member states of the League of Arab
States, has in principle agreed to finance
some of these investments. Private
investors, such as Prince Al-Walid Bin
Talal of Saudi Arabia, intend to reclaim
over 162,000 hectares in the New Valley.
(see al-Ahram Weekly, July 24-30, 1997: 8).
By contrast, Ethiopia cannot contemplate
projects even fractionally as large or nearly
as attractive to international contractors,
purveyors of equipment, and agri
businesses.
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It is important to note here that ground
water in the old Nile Valley is not a
different water source, i.e. it is replenished
by Nile river water. In the New Valley,
groundwater supplies are nonrenewable,
and the groundwater level will likely fall
rapidly as intensive pumping begins.
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For an exception, see “Water fight: Egypt
faces problem it has long dreaded, less
control of the Nile.” The Wall Street Journal,
Friday, August 22, 1997.

  



   

Agreement would be revised as upstream riparians started to claim
rights to use Nile waters. Specifically, Egypt and Sudan agreed to
reduce their water allocations equally to accommodate increased use
by upstream riparians.
In 1994 the authors proposed that the 1959 Nile Waters Agree
ment should be revised soon to include Ethiopia (Whittington,
Waterbury, and McClelland 1994). At the time, the authors argued
that a reasonable reallocation of Nile water should give Ethiopia
something on the order of 12 billion m3; and that Egypt and Sudan
would need to reduce their water allocations by approximately 3
billion m3 each—assuming Jonglei I and II and other “water conser
vation projects” in the White Nile basin (Machar Marshes and Bahr
el Ghazal) are not undertaken. The difference of 6 billion m3 could
probably be made up by more efficient operation of an expanded
system of reservoirs, including new dams on the Blue Nile, and
reduced evaporation losses from the Aswan High Dam Reservoir.12
Even if the upstream riparians did not use any Nile water in the
future, Egypt would still need to find water savings on the order of
5–10 billion m3 per year to complete the New Valley Project. While
Egyptian policymakers’ willingness to take on the task of using
Egypt’s existing water supplies more efficiently is laudable—this is
without question the right thing to do—it is not clear, however,
what it will cost to achieve water savings of this magnitude, nor how
long it will take. It will clearly be an expensive undertaking that will
require not only substantial capital investments, but changes in the
institutional arrangements for farm-level irrigation management.
As water becomes increasingly valuable in the Nile basin in
economic terms, all riparians—not just Egypt—will need to use
water more efficiently. However, since Egypt is by far the largest user
of Nile water, its efforts in this regard will have the largest effect on
the availability of basin-wide supplies. It is useful to separate two
issues: (1) the extent to which Egypt can use its existing water sup
plies more efficiently, and (2) whether these water savings should be
applied, or allocated, to the New Valley Project.
For example, if Egypt really does have the ability to save 5–10
billion m3 of water annually, these savings could conceptually be
allocated in a variety of ways. For example, they could be used to
(i) achieve a revised Nile Waters Agreement;
(ii) accommodate future industrial, municipal, and tourism
growth in Egypt;
(iii) undertake the New Valley land reclamation projects.
Stated most simply, the New Valley Project requires water that
could be used to reach a new Nile Waters Agreement that accommo
dated the upstream riparians.
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Reservoirs upstream on the Blue Nile
would reduce evaporation losses from the
Aswan High Dam Reservoir because the
surface-to-volume relationships are more
favorable than at Aswan, and evaporation
rates are lower.

  



IMPLICATIONS FOR NILE BASIN DEVELOPMENT
The New Valley Project and the microdam strategy would ap
pear to carry significant risks for Egypt and Ethiopia. If Egypt and
Ethiopia pursue these two unilateral initiatives, they may find them
selves on a collision course that both may have difficulty changing.
To better understand the nature of the problem, assume that
Egypt is indeed committed to proceeding with the New Valley
Project, and that it is as yet unclear (1) whether Egypt will succeed
with its efforts to save 10 billion m3; and (2) whether Ethiopia will
proceed with a microdam strategy. Table 1 presents the four possible
outcomes; the numbers are not meant to be precise. In Case A Egypt
succeeds in saving 10 billion m3 and Ethiopia pursues the microdam
strategy. There is still a 4 billion m3 water deficit (measured at
Aswan). In Case D Egypt fails to achieve its water savings and Ethiopia
does not pursue a microdam strategy: there is a 10 billion m3 deficit.
Case B is the worst scenario. Here Egypt fails to achieve the
promised water savings, but still pursues the New Valley Project.
Ethiopia proceeds with a microdam strategy, and the riparian coun
tries are faced with a 14 billion m3 deficit. Only in Case C are serious
problems avoided. Even in this case it is still assumed that the eco
nomics of both the water savings and land reclamation work in
Egypt’s favor.
Because there is no comprehensive agreement on the Nile basin,
any deficits will fall on Egypt and Sudan. The economically rational
solution to the economic problem caused by water deficits is to
import more grain (Allan 1996). Egypt is in a much better position
to pursue this option than the other riparian states because of its
stronger, more diversified economy and better infrastructure. But
water deficits create not only economic problems but political diffi
culties as well. Farmers and communities that run short of water
Table 1 Four hypothetical scenarios for Nile basin development.

Egypt proceeds with the New
Valley Project and succeeds in
achieving 10 BCM in water
savings at acceptable cost

Egypt proceeds with the New
Valley Project and does not
succeed in achieving 10 BCM in
water savings at acceptable cost

Ethiopia proceeds with a microdam
strategy that uses 4 BCM
(measured at Aswan)

CASE A:
Egypt has sufficient water supplies

CASE B:
Egypt is short 14 BCM annually

Ethiopia does not proceed with a
microdam strategy that uses 4 BCM
(measured at Aswan)

CASE C:
Egypt has sufficient water supplies

CASE D:
Egypt is short 10 BCM annually

  



   

may have difficulty perceiving that the best solution is to import
more grain; such parties may feel that their water has been stolen
from them and seek noneconomic (diplomatic or military) solutions
to their problems.
In light of this analysis, let us examine the basic character of the
“game” that appears to have developed between Egypt and Ethiopia.
We will simplify greatly in hopes of capturing the essence of the
problem and look at just three “moves.” In the first move, the Egyp
tian leadership must decide whether to proceed with the New Valley
Project; this has already been decided in the affirmative, but let us
try to better understand this decision.
Assume that Egypt has two choices: to pursue the New Valley
Project or not (ignoring the question of the scale of the New Valley
Project). If Egypt pursues the New Valley Project, Ethiopia can react
in two ways: it can pursue its own water development options, or it
can abandon (or delay) them. Consider each outcome from Egypt’s
point of view. If Egypt proceeds with the New Valley project and
then Ethiopia proceeds with its water development options (e.g. a
microdam strategy), Egypt confronts a major water deficit. The
Egyptian leadership can either deal with this deficit by importing
food or pursuing a noneconomic strategy to force Ethiopia to re
duce its water use. By this we mean that Egypt will use the political,
diplomatic, or military powers at its disposal to pressure Ethiopia to
reduce its water use.
If Egypt reasons that it can easily deal with such a deficit by im
porting food, this outcome is perhaps not too bad. On the other hand,
if Egypt proceeds with the New Valley Project, and Ethiopia does not
pursue its water development options (in order to avoid a confronta
tion with Egypt), then Egypt wins the game: pursuing the New Valley
Project has forced Ethiopia to back off of its water development plans.
Now consider Egypt’s option not to pursue the New Valley
Project. If Egypt decided not to proceed with the New Valley Project
and Ethiopia proceeds with its water development options, Egypt
faces a modest water deficit that it can choose to deal with either by
importing food or by noneconomic means. If Egypt does not pro
ceed with the New Valley Project and Ethiopia does not proceed
with its water development options, the status quo is preserved.
The difficult calculation from Egypt’s point of view is whether
pursuing the New Valley Project will change the probability that
Ethiopia will pursue its water development options. It is possible
that Egypt hopes the New Valley Project will deter Ethiopia (and
perhaps international lenders) from proceeding with water re
sources development in Ethiopia because the latter parties can fore
see where this collision course might lead (i.e., to Egypt pursuing

 

  



noneconomic alternatives for dealing with a water deficit). Seen
from this perspective, the Egyptian decision to proceed with the
New Valley Project has a certain strategic rationality because it
provides Egypt the possibility of achieving the best outcome without
major risks.
In the second move, the Ethiopian leadership must decide how
to respond to Egypt’s decision to proceed with the New Valley
Project. Assume Ethiopia’s choice is whether or not to proceed with
a water resources development option. If Ethiopia proceeds with
water resources development, the most severe of the water deficits
will occur (Table 1). The Ethiopian leadership must attempt to
forecast how Egypt will respond in move three to this water deficit.
If Egypt were to respond to Ethiopian water resources development
by reducing water use and importing more food, this is the best
outcome for Ethiopia: in effect Ethiopia wins the game. On the
other hand, if Egypt responds by noneconomic means, Ethiopia has
much to lose. Although this could be a very poor outcome for Ethio
pia, it is by no means clear that it is the worst. Failure to develop its
water resources may leave Ethiopia with increasingly complex politi
cal and economic problems, as population growth, soil erosion, and
deforestation contribute to a downward spiral of environmental
degradation, decreasing food supplies, and famine.
If the Ethiopian leadership responds in move two by not pursu
ing a water development option, they avoid a possible collision with
Egypt, but pay a high cost: an inability to develop irrigated agricul
ture. Also, it may be the case that the Ethiopian leadership would
not be able to prevent microdams and small-scale irrigation devel
opment in the highlands even if it wanted to. If millions of peasants
come to believe that small-scale irrigation will lead to a better life for
them, it is questionable whether any government would have the
political capital to stop them.
We do not know, of course, which option the Ethiopian leader
ship will choose. Let us assume that they decide to proceed with the
water resources development option. We then turn to move three:
how will Egypt respond to an Ethiopian decision to proceed with its
water resources development option? From a rational perspective,
Egypt’s choice should almost certainly be to deal with the resulting
water deficit by importing more food and scaling back the New
Valley Scheme. However, the Egyptian leadership may not be able to
contain popular opinion in Egypt in favor of a confrontational
response to Ethiopian water development.
It is should now be clear why Egypt’s first move of proceeding
with the New Valley Project carries such large risks. Under some
plausible scenarios, the Egyptian and Ethiopian leadership could

  



   

lose their ability to control events. Just as it is important to recog
nize that there are win-win situations for the Nile riparian countries
(e.g., moving long-term storage upstream could provide water sav
ings that can be shared), it is equally important to understand that
there are lose-lose scenarios.
We believe that, of all the riparian states, Egypt has the most to
gain from the establishment of a basin-wide framework for water
resources development. It can ill afford a future in which upstream
riparians take unilateral action with respect to water development
projects. Yet that is the precedent that Egypt has established by
proceeding with the New Valley Project. If Egypt would reduce its
existing water use by 5–10 billion m3—as it says it can do—and
abandon the New Valley Project, there would be more than enough
water available to strike a deal that would bring Ethiopia into the
framework of a comprehensive Nile Waters Agreement.
There is another conceivable option for Egypt to find the water
necessary to do a deal with Ethiopia: water could possibly be saved
from the White Nile swamps of Sudan. The White Nile water con
servation projects (Jonglei I, Jonglei II, Machar Marshes, and Bahr el
Ghazal) are estimated to yield a total of 18 billion m3 in water sav
ings. Given their environmental repercussions, it seems unlikely that
all of these projects will be built within any meaningful planning
horizon. But Jonglei I and II alone would result in water savings of
about 8 billion m3, roughly what is needed to bring Ethiopia into a
new Nile Waters Agreement (in combination with water savings
from resulted evaporation losses from the Aswan High Dam Reser
voir). At some point in the future, Sudan might conceivably find
itself in a pincer movement, in which Egypt and Ethiopia both want
Jonglei I and II water savings for their joint purposes. Sudan could
thus come under strong pressure from both Egypt and Ethiopia to
press ahead with Jonglei I and II, but not share substantially in the
projects’ benefits.13
However, in the medium to long term, Sudan needs these water
savings from the White Nile projects itself. Indeed, increased
Sudanese water use may pose a greater problem for Egypt than water
use in Ethiopia. Sudan has at least 8 million cultivable hectares
between the Blue and White Niles; it currently irrigates only about
10% of this area. It is hard to imagine a Sudanese future that is not
based on intensive agricultural production. The day will come when
Sudan may push ahead with this development option, even though
it will be reluctant to confront Egypt. The development of Sudan’s
potential would be best realized through cooperative development
with Ethiopia, i.e. water storage sites in Ethiopia for transborder
irrigation projects and the export of hydropower from Ethiopia to
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Khartoum-Omdurman. In the long run, a strategic alliance between
Sudan and Ethiopia is thus a possibility, and is an outcome that
Egypt would try to avoid at all cost.
DISCUSSION: THE OPPORTUNITY COST OF WATER
It would seem appropriate for the Egyptian people to have a
serious discussion about the water requirements of the New Valley
Project, because the decision to proceed with the existing plans will
have profound economic and security implications for their coun
try. Central to this discussion should be an examination of the op
portunity cost of water in different uses and locations. Thoughts on
this issue are shared in this concluding section of the paper.
The Nile Basin is water-scarce not because of too many people
but because of too much agriculture relative to water supply. Agri
culture here, as just about everywhere else in the world, accounts for
upwards of 80% of all water use. Moreover, water is in most in
stances used inefficiently, above all in agricultural systems like Egypt’s,
where farmers are not made to pay anything for the water itself.
In proposing the New Valley Scheme, Egypt, in a back-handed
way, has acknowledged just how much waste and misallocation
exists in the current system. By shifting cultivation from more to less
water-intensive crops, by recycling more water, and by improving
irrigation practices (from open surface delivery systems relying on
gravity to pressurized drip or sprinkler irrigation), the 5-10 billion
m3 that the New Valley Project will require can be found. Egypt had
heretofore been at pains to assert that it had very little slack in its
system, thereby defending the absolute necessity of retaining its full
share as stipulated in the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement.
However, this leads to the question whether or not there might
be a better way to achieve the goals of the New Valley Scheme with
out using anywhere near the same amount of water. This is not to
contest the goals in themselves. It is a fact that Egypt’s 60 million
people are crammed into only 19,000 square miles, or a territory
roughly the size of Switzerland. Over 90% of Egypt’s surface is unin
habited. The New Valley project aims to move population out of the
crowded Nile valley and into a sparsely inhabited set of oases lying
to the west of the Nile valley. These oases are separated from the
valley and major markets by several hundred miles of desert, and they
are equally far from the Mediterranean coast and Egypt’s major ports.
We should not lose sight of the fact that in the last one hundred
years, Egypt’s densely inhabited areas have expanded significantly
and in a manner that seems more logical than what is now being
proposed. At the same time that the Suez Canal was excavated so,
too, was the Ismailia Canal (named after Khedive Ismail, Egypt’s

  



   

governor at the time) to bring fresh water from the Nile to the new
cities in the canal zone. From the 1870s on, the Ismailia canal has
supplied irrigation water to what eventually became Sharqia Prov
ince, an agricultural zone that today is a region virtually indistin
guishable from much more ancient areas of settlement. The
governorate of Sharqia, which directly benefited from the new canal,
witnessed major population influx and growth. The census of 1907
recorded Sharqia’s population as 876,000. By 1976, it had grown to
2.6 million, and in 1986 reached 3.4 million. It boasts several large
towns and cities, and it is fully integrated into the road and power
grid of the Delta downstream of Cairo.
More recently, beginning in the mid-1950s, a similar expansion
took place along the western fringe of the Nile Delta, fed by the
Western Nubaria canal. However, the process of settlement is rela
tively new, and at present farming in the western zone is not in the
hands of peasant smallholders but rather in those of commercial,
mainly urban-based farmers. The point is, that Egypt has expanded
its settled areas, and it has done so in a way that minimizes transport
costs and disruption of existing patterns of settlement. If new settle
ment is to be a function of expanded areas of cultivation and atten
dant use of water for irrigation, it is suggested here that it is best to
build out from the Delta and the valley lying to its south. Rather
than distant and costly satellite colonies scattered across Egypt’s
desert hinterland, the authors envisage new contiguous layers adja
cent to the zones of traditional settlement.14
However, there is a further question. We are not convinced that
such settlement expansion need be dependent on agriculture. Presi
dent Anwar Sadat launched, in much the same way as has President
Mubarrak, his own scheme for breaking out of the old Nile valley.
He proposed and launched a series of new cities in the desert, but
not far from the settled areas. Although the schemes were seen at the
time as a kind of publicity stunt, real money was invested and, in
some instances, such as 10th of Ramadan City, a real boom in me
dium and light manufacturing, all in the private sector, has taken
place. Real, as opposed to fictitious, residency in these cities has
been slow in coming, but it will doubtless come if their economic
bases are sound.15
It is suggested here that it is in this vein that the real opportunity
cost for the water to be used in the New Valley Scheme, and for the
capital that will be required to deliver it, should be seen. A simple bit
of arithmetic will show what is at stake. Assuming that the New
Valley will bring 500,000 new hectares under cultivation, and that
reclamation and initial cultivation of those lands will require 20,000
m3/ha per year for at least twenty years after the water is first deliv
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avoid the risks associate with sea level rise
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ered.16 That would mean a water duty driven by agriculture of 10
billion m3/yr or 18% of Egypt’s 1959 allotment.
Supposing, on the other hand, that Egypt decides to develop a
new city of 200,000 inhabitants over the same twenty-year period.
Assuming also that each inhabitant uses 140 liters a day (a kind of
mid-range average for households with private water connections in
low and middle income countries). Households in this new city
would use about 10 million m3/yr. If one increases this by 50% to
allow for commercial and industrial use, then the city would use 15
million m3/yr. The agricultural water use for the New Valley project
(10 billion m3/yr), would be sufficient to support over 650 new cities
of this size (with a total population of over 130 million people).
Would food security be sacrificed by pursuing an urban, indus
trial economic development strategy instead of expansion of irri
gated agriculture? Not really. As Egypt’s population grows, albeit at
slower rates, it will have little choice but to import at least half of its
food and food-product needs. Increasing its cultivated surface by
15% will not make much of a dent in that reality. Egypt’s future has
to lie in the non-agricultural sector and the exports of manufactured
goods and of services. New cities can be platforms for both.
Why then is Egypt pursuing the New Valley Scheme? In part
President Mubarrak is surely emulating both predecessors and con
temporaries. In the 1950s, Egypt’s President, Gamal Abd al-Nasser,
captured the country’s imagination with the Aswan High Dam
project, and, in the last decade, Mo’ammar Qaddafi certainly cap
tured attention — if not admiration — for his Great Man-Made
River scheme in Libya. Engineering projects on this scale spin off
billions of dollars in contracts, which is politically attractive (but
alternative projects, such as new cities, would yield similar benefits).
There may be a strategic consideration: to wit, that Egypt would like
to create a buffer center of population in its hitherto mainly empty
western desert.
Finally, if the New Valley Scheme is brought to completion, it
will be a major bargaining chip when and if Egypt is obliged to enter
into negotiations with the other Nile riparians over reallocation of
shares in the river. Established facts, based on actual water use and
sunk costs, have always weighed heavily in establishing legitimate
claims to shares in transboundary rivers. If the New Valley Scheme
proceeds as planned, Egypt will have created a huge “fact.” In that
sense, and even though Egypt may not use any water beyond the
share allotted in the 1959 Agreement, it will have effectively
precluded accommodation of the growing needs for water of its
upstream neighbors, especially those of Ethiopia.
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Note that in this illustrative calculation, we
have used much higher water use per
hectare estimates than we did for irrigation
in the highlands of Ethiopia. This is because:
(1) evapotranspiration is higher in the
western desert of Egypt, (2) the Egyptian
estimates assume year-round irrigation,
while Ethiopian farmers may need irrigation
only part of the year, and (3) the Ethiopian
microdams may not have the storage
capacity to supply higher amounts of water
for irrigation.

  



   

CONCLUSION
To summarize the above discussion: the challenge facing the Nile
riparian countries is to change the existing property rights regime to
the waters of the Nile without running the risks of the collision
course described. This will require that the Nile riparians find a
balance between the upstream countries’ support for the principle of
“equitable use,” and Egypt’s and Sudan’s support for the principle of
“no appreciable harm.” These two principles are in conflict, and
their balancing will require accommodation and compromise on the
part of all parties.
Albeit in fits and starts, the Nile riparian countries now seem to
be committing themselves to a process of dialogue, and interna
tional donors are apparently ready to underwrite this effort with a
major infusion of funds. However, both Egypt’s New Valley Project
and Ethiopia’s microdam strategy create serious problems for this
long-term strategy of dialogue and consensus building because they
offer Egypt and Ethiopia unilateral water resources development
options that both will find difficult to resist. The possibility of cred
ible unilateral investments and rising populations means that time is
not necessarily on the side the riparian countries and the donor
agencies as they embark on a process of consensus building and
dialogue. It may be easier to negotiate a revised Nile Waters Agree
ment sooner rather than later.
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Restructuring of Water Usage in the Tigris-Euphrates Basin: The Impact of Modern Water
Management Policies
Peter Beaumont
University of Wales, Lampeter

ABSTRACT
This paper examines the ramifications of late twentieth century water management schemes–especially those initiated
by the Republic of Turkey–for the riparians of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. The Turks’ geographical position, and their
ability to construct large water storage systems, has essentially given them command of the headwaters of the Euphrates
and, to a lesser degree, the Tigris. The recent changes in water management of the Tigris-Euphrates basin have had, and
will continue to have, profound consequences for the agricultural sectors of the economies of the riparian nations. By
unilaterally decreasing the water available for irrigation in Syria and Iraq, Turkey has presented these nations with an
aqueous conundrum that remains to be solved.

INTRODUCTION
The Tigris-Euphrates basin reveals evidence of water manage
ment projects dating back over six millennia. Throughout this pe
riod empires have waxed and waned. However, their power base has
consistently been constructed on the wealth generated by irrigated
agriculture (Beaumont, Blake, and Wagstaff 1988). The historical
location of this activity has always been in the lower part of the basin
in what is now the country of Iraq. The scales of development have
varied from small diversion works to major engineering feats such as
the Nahrawan canal built during the sixth century CE. Since the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, however, widespread land aban
donment has occurred, associated with a breakdown of the strong
central government necessary for sustained widespread irrigation.
It was only in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth cen
tury that major irrigation development began to appear once more
in the lower part of the Tigris-Euphrates basin.
During this whole period, water management had been confined
to the manipulation of the snow-melt flood waves of the two rivers
in the lower part of the basin in the period from April to June. In
low flood conditions there would be insufficient water available to
irrigate all the crops which were planted and crop failures would
occur in those highest areas of the flood plain at some distance from
the river. In contrast, high flood conditions could not be easily
controlled by the prevailing irrigation systems and so crop failure
through excess amounts of standing water occurred. Besides these
vagaries of the annual flood there were also problems associated
with the high salinity of the soils. Given these difficulties, the drain
age of saline irrigation waters from the fields was always a prime
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concern. The system of water management which grew up was one
which attempted to minimize the risks to crop growth. Another
characteristic feature of this era was that only a small proportion of
the total water in the river was being utilized for human activity. The
vast majority of the water flowed unused into the Persian Gulf.
HYDROLOGY OF THE TIGRIS-EUPHRATES BASIN
Understanding the hydrology of the basin is crucial to under
standing the effects water management projects have on the rivers.
The topography is such that all the highland regions are located in
the north and eastern parts of the basin in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran.
These mountains reach heights of almost 3,500 m to the south of
Erzincan and of around 4,500 m in the upper part of the Euphrates
catchment near Lake Van. In the Tigris basin heights of up to 4,200 m
are recorded in southeast Turkey in the catchment of the Greater
Zab. It is in these highlands that almost all of the flows of the two
rivers are generated as annual precipitation totals commonly ex
ceeding 1,000 mm. Precipitation in the basin is largely confined to
the winter months from October through to April. This means that
a large proportion of the total falls as snow on the uplands and
consequently the water is locked in the solid state on the mountain
slopes until temperatures begin to rise in spring and early summer.
Both the Tigris and the Euphrates are characterized by river
regimes which exhibit strong snow-melt peaks. On the Tigris the
month of peak discharge is April, while on the Euphrates it is a
month later in May. Measured in Iraq, the months of March, April
and May account for 53% of the mean annual flow of the Tigris. The
period of maximum flow on the Euphrates in Iraq is shorter and
later than that of the Tigris and is usually confined to the months of
April and May. Discharge during these two months accounts for
approximately 42% of the annual total.
There still remains controversy over the actual annual flows of
the two rivers, with different authors quoting different totals. How
ever, these values tend to reflect differing observation periods, rather
than fundamental disagreements as to how much water is present
within the two river systems. The total flow of the Euphrates at Hit
in northern Iraq is given as 31,820 MCM by Beaumont (1985). How
ever, Kolars (1994) quotes a figure of 32,720 MCM. On the Tigris the
overall discharge from the catchment is much greater and attains a
value of around 52,665 MCM (Beaumont 1978). Kolars in 1994, how
ever, quotes a value of 49,200 MCM.
The main difference between the Euphrates and Tigris in terms
of how their discharge is generated is that the Tigris receives water
from a series of major tributaries in the mid-portion of its course.
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The mainstream of the Tigris has a flow of 23,210 MCM annually at
Mosul in northern Iraq (Kolars quotes 20,500 MCM), while the tribu
taries contribute a further 29,455 MCM each year (Kolars quotes
28,700 MCM). The largest tributary is the Greater Zab, which pro
duces almost half the flow of all the tributaries.
In contrast, on the Euphrates, all of the major tributaries are in
the extreme upper part of the basin. This has important ramifica
tions for the control of the two rivers. With the Euphrates it means
that a single dam in the upper part of the catchment is capable of
controlling a very large proportion of the flow of the river. The
Ataturk Dam in Turkey achieves this level of control. On the Tigris,
however, the fact that it receives water from the Greater Zab, the
Lesser Zab, the Adhaim and the Diyala means that overall water
management is more complex and requires the construction of a
series of major dam projects on the individual tributaries to provide
a comparable control of the flow.
One of the problems in the Tigris-Euphrates system has been the
variability of flow from year to year. Long-term records on the
upper Euphrates before the construction of major dams (1937-1964)
have revealed that minimum discharge can fall to 16,871 MCM/y
(1961), while a maximum value of 43,457 MCM/y was recorded (1963).
An even wetter year was recorded in 1969 when the flow just north
of the Turkish border registered an annual discharge of 53,548 MCM.
Such large variations in discharge have always made it difficult to
plan irrigation schedules efficiently in the lower part of the basin
when no water storage capacity has been available. On the Tigris River a
similar pattern of flow variation can be observed. The observation
period is 1946 to 1985 for the Cizre gauging station, Turkey. The aver
age annual flow here is 16,800 MCM. In 1961 the flow fell to a minimum
value of only 7,891 MCM, while in 1969 it peaked at 34,340 MCM.
On the Euphrates, approximately 88% of the total flow of the
main stream of the river is generated in Turkey, and a further 12% is
added in Syria from the Sajur, the Balikh, and the Khabur. A sub
stantial amount of precipitation which feeds these rivers falls over
Turkey and enters them directly as runoff or as groundwater dis
charge. It is very difficult to estimate just how much of the flow of
these rivers is contributed from Turkish precipitation. However, it
does seem likely that precipitation falling over Turkey accounts for
at least 95% of the total flow of the Euphrates. Along the Tigris
River, Turkey provides approximately 32% of the river’s discharge
in terms of the mainstream. A large, although unknown, amount of
the flow of the Greater Zab River also originates in Turkey. This
discharge, together with that of the mainstream, probably raises the
Turkish contribution to around 44% of the total flow of the Tigris.
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Of the combined flow of the two rivers, approximately 63.2% is
generated on Turkish territory. With so much of the water of the
two rivers coming from precipitation falling over Turkey, it is not
surprising that the Turkish government feels that it has a strong
claim to make use of what it considers to be its own waters.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
The most important change in the twentieth century has been in
the location of water management activity and the type of water
controls introduced. In the Tigris-Euphrates basin it is only in the
post-World War II period that the emphasis switches from down
stream diversion schemes to upstream water storage projects. This
represents a fundamental change in river management activity
within the basin, brought about largely by the growing human ability to manipulate the environment through fossil fuel subsidies and
technological change. This restructuring in the patterns of water
usage has had a profound effect on all aspects of development within
the basin. This is especially the case as the population distribution
within the basin up to the 1960s reflected the traditional patterns of
water management and agricultural production.
Besides technological change there has also been an important
political change. Prior to the twentieth century the whole of the
Tigris-Euphrates basin was under the control of a unified, although
sometime weak, government. This situation lasted through World
War I with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. After the War different political units controlled the upper, middle and lower parts of
the basin. As a result the chance for unified development of the
waters of the basin using twentieth century technology became
increasingly remote.
After World War II, water management focused on the construc
tion of water storage facilities in the highland parts of the basin in
Turkey on the Euphrates and in both Turkey and Iraq on the Tigris
River. This form of water management usually had two objectives:
generation of hydro-electricity and provision of large quantities of
water for irrigation purposes. As this development activity and
planning took place in the 1960s and early 1970s, it soon became
evident that there was not going to be enough water available in the
two rivers to satisfy the planned needs of the three major countries
located in the basin (Beaumont 1978). Negotiations to reach a settle
ment to the dispute over water volumes available to each of the
riparian states have been attempted on a number of occasions, but
have never been able to produce an agreement. Consequently, the
three nations (Turkey, Iraq and Syria) all went ahead with their own
development schemes with little consideration of the impact their
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projects would have on the other states in the basin.
Without doubt Turkey is in the strongest position with regard to
its potential control of a large part of the water resources of the
Tigris-Euphrates basin. It can develop its water management
schemes, and the two downstream countries of Syria and Iraq will
have to suffer the consequences of lower flow conditions. Initially
Turkey constructed the Keban Dam in the 1960s on the upper
Euphrates. However, it built this dam largely for the generation of
hydro-electricity, and therefore, the volumes of water flowing down
the river remained constant. What did change, however, was the
pattern of discharge along the Euphrates. With the volume of water
in the reservoir behind the Keban Dam, which amounted to 30,700
MCM of gross storage and 17,000 MCM of active storage, it was now
possible for the Turkish government to exercise a large measure of
control over the flow of the river. It did this to achieve a more uni
form flow pattern, attempting to limit minimum flows to 400 m3/s
and maximum flows to 1000 m3/s. As a result, major floods or ex
tremely low flow conditions were effectively eliminated from the
Euphrates River. With the opening of the Keban dam a new chapter
in the water management of the Euphrates River began. Greater
control of flow was now possible, but as yet there was little need to
use the water within Turkey for any productive purposes. The first
stage of the restructuring of water usage had begun.
To utilize more of the water in the Tigris and Euphrates, Turkey
has embarked upon an ambitious series of schemes which are now
usually referred to as the South-East Anatolia Project (Bagis 1989;
Bilen 1994a and b; Altinbilek 1997). This project consists of 13
individual, but related, schemes on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.
Seven of these schemes are located on the Euphrates River. When
fully implemented in the early years of the twenty-first century, they
will permit the irrigation of 1,083,000 ha and will utilise up to 9,000
MCM of water each year. On the Tigris River, the six planned schemes
will irrigate 558,000 ha and use 3,700 MCM each year. These figures
for water use come from official Turkish sources presented in the
main planning documents for the scheme. However, field evidence
suggests that water usage will be around 10,000 m3/ha. This indicates
that actual water use figures could be in excess of 10,000 MCM/y on
the Euphrates and over 5,580 MCM on the Tigris. The second stage of
water restructuring in the Euphrates basin can be said to have begun
with the first delivery of irrigation waters through the Urfa Tunnels
in 1995.
Of particular interest with the South-eastern Anatolia Project is
the high level of commitment the government of Turkey has shown
toward it. The financial provision for such projects from interna-
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tional organizations such as the World Bank is always dependent
upon an agreement as to water use by all the states within the river
basin. From an early stage in the planning process, Turkey realized
that it would not be able to gain the agreement of Syria and Iraq for
the use of the water volumes it proposed. Consequently, it was
forced to finance the project entirely from funds generated within
Turkey. This was a substantial drain on the finances of the nation,
but indicates just how important the project was to the economic
development of the nation.
On the Euphrates in Turkey, the key structure is the Ataturk
Dam, which is located approximately 80 km upstream from the
Syrian border. Its two main purposes are to produce hydro-electric
ity and to provide water for the irrigation projects being developed
along the Syrian border. The reservoir has a gross storage capacity of
48,700 MCM and an active storage capacity of 19,300 MCM. As a result
of the construction of the Ataturk Dam, Turkey has now stated that
in the future (since 1990) it would only guarantee a flow downstream from the dam of 500 m3/sec. This represents about 50% of
the natural flow of the Euphrates River at the Turkish border. Both
Syria and Iraq have disputed this figure and have stated that the
minimum flow should average at least 700 m3/sec. Turkey has so far
rejected this claim.
The pattern of water release from the Ataturk Dam is further
complicated by the fact that there are eight turbines in the dam
which are capable of generating electricity. When running at full
power, each of these turbines has a water throughput of 225 m3/sec.
This means that if all eight were running at the same time at full
capacity, the water discharge from the dam would be 1800 m3/sec. It
would seem likely that maximum electricity generation from the
Ataturk Dam will take place during the winter months, but actual
amounts are difficult to predict. As far as water discharge is con
cerned, what seems likely to happen is that during winter the release
of water from the dam may be well in excess of the 500 m3/sec guar
anteed by the Turkish government. In effect, this might mean a
major change in the discharge pattern of the river, with maximum
flow conditions in future occurring during the winter months in
stead of in April and May. Downstream states are, therefore, likely
to receive more water than they perhaps expected, but it will arrive
at a time of year when it is not very convenient in terms of their
likely water needs.
In the future, Turkey may well face a choice between irrigation
and hydro-electricity generation. Irrigation has such a large demand
for water that the use of the generators in the Ataturk Dam will have
to be severely limited in terms of their operating times if the maxi
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mum irrigation program is to be attained. At the current time this
might not be a problem for the Turkish government. However, as
demands for electric power increase in the next century it is possible
that Turkey might be willing to sacrifice some of its newly irrigated
land so that more power can be produced. In the final analysis,
everything will depend on whether the highest monetary value can
be obtained from a cubic meter of water used for irrigation or for
power production.
When all the reservoirs on the Tigris-Euphrates system have
been completed in the early years of the next century, the Turkish
government will have substantial control over the flows of the two
rivers. On the Euphrates, the active, or usable, storage of all the
reservoirs which have been built or planned is 42,000 MCM. This
compares with an annual flow of the Euphrates at the Syrian border
of 30,377 MCM. Effectively, therefore, the storage capacity of the
system is 1.38 times the annual discharge of the river, which means
that the flow of the river can be easily regulated except during long
drought periods, or a run of very wet years. On the Tigris, Turkey’s
degree of control over the flow of the river is less marked. The
planned active storage of the reservoirs on the upper Tigris is expected
to be 15,246 MCM. This compares with an average annual flow of
16,718 MCM for the river at the Cizre gauging station, which indicates
that total water storage is less than the discharge of an average year.
What is quite clear from this analysis is that Turkey really does
have a stranglehold on the waters of the Euphrates River. At least
88% of the river’s flow is generated within the country, and it has
the ability to store a water volume equivalent to 1.38 times the aver
age annual flow of the river at the Syrian border. However, Turkey
has claimed that it will maintain a flow of 500 m3/sec of water across
the border into Syria (15,768 MCM). Given the high storage capacity
which Turkey now possesses along the river it seems likely that it
would be able to achieve this objective without cutting back on its
own irrigation needs. The expected irrigation demand in Turkey is
thought likely to be at least 10,000 MCM each year, while the down
stream flow requirement is 15,768 MCM. This gives a total annual
demand of 25,768 MCM. To cause serious problems, the flow of the
river would have to fall below 20,000 MCM/y for a number of years.
The available long-term records reveal that the flow of the River
Euphrates has only fallen below 20,000 MCM on three occasions in
the 40 year period prior to 1980.
On the Euphrates, the key to the downstream states of Syria and
Iraq making the best use of the waters of the river lies in their stor
age of as much of the water made available to them from Turkey
during the winter period as possible. Both states already have storage
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facilities available, but their combined capacity is low. In Syria the
Tabqa Dam, built by the Russians in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
has a storage capacity of 11,900 MCM. In Iraq, the Haditha Dam,
another project constructed by the Russians, has a storage capacity
of 6,400 MCM. Taken together, these two facilities are capable of
holding only about 58% of the original annual flow of the river at
Hit, Iraq. Given Turkey’s need for hydro electricity, the water re
leases from the Ataturk Dam in winter may well exceed the 500 m3/sec
guaranteed by the Turkish government. The strategy of the two
downstream countries must be to ensure that their reservoirs are full
at the end of the winter period so that the water can be utilized for
irrigation as soon as the agricultural season begins. Iraq will find
itself in a very difficult position. With only 6,400 MCM of storage it is
possible that a proportion of the winter flow of the river will flow
into the Shatt al-Arab and effectively be wasted. The only other
possibility might be early season watering of the fields to build up
soil moisture concentrations.
Syria is in the unusual position of being a downstream country
with regard to Turkey and an upstream one in comparison with
Iraq. Like Turkey, Syria had not made much use of the waters of the
river prior to the 1960s. With the construction of the Tabqa Dam in
the 1970s, there had been ambitious plans for major irrigation
projects along the Euphrates, particularly in the lower reaches of the
Rivers Balikh and Khabour (Manners and Sagafi-Nejad 1985). How
ever, owing largely to a lack of funding, these projects did not com
mence large-scale development until the late 1980s. In the
mid-1980s it is claimed that no more than 208,000 ha were being
irrigated (Kolar and Mitchell 1991). Over the last few years, how
ever, the pace of development of irrigation networks has been con
siderable. Associated with this trend has been a marked increase in
water use. There is still uncertainty as to just how much irrigated
land will be developed adjacent to the Euphrates River, but estimates
suggest that it will be at least 475,000 ha by the early years of the
twenty-first century. The expected water demand will be on the
order of 4,750 MCM each year. However, certain government sources
have suggested that the total irrigated area along the River Euphrates
may eventually rise to close to one million ha. This does appear to
be rather optimistic, but if achieved it would raise the water need to
around 10,000 MCM/y. The greatest potential for this extra irrigation
development would seem to be located in the lower part of the
Khabour basin.
The actual amounts of land which are cultivated in Syria are
crucial as far as Iraq is concerned. If the lower figure proves to be the
correct one, then Iraq should receive slightly more than 10,000 MCM
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of water each year. If the Syrian irrigated area grows to around 1
million ha, then the volume of water Iraq will receive will fall to
about 5,000 MCM. It should be remembered that these figures prob
ably represent minimum values and that Turkey is likely to release
larger quantities of water than it has guaranteed as a result of power
generation during the winter months. It is worth noting that during
the 1960s Iraq was claimed to be using at least 16,368 MCM of water
each year for irrigation in the region between Hit and Hindiyah
(Ubell 1971).
Syria also has a border on the Tigris River in the extreme north
east of the country with Turkey on the opposite bank. Over the last
few years Syria has approached Turkey about the possibility of ex
tracting water from the Tigris and releasing it into the upper part of
the Khabour basin. From an engineering point of view this would be
a fairly straight forward project. Iraq, however, is not keen to lose
water from the Tigris which it considers to belong to itself, even
though in the long term it might well benefit from greater flows
along the Euphrates.
Since the early 1980s and the beginnings of the war with Iran, it
has been extremely difficult to obtain accurate statistics on agricul
tural activity within Iraq. Although Iraq has known for almost 20
years that it would face smaller water amounts once the South
eastern Anatolia and the Syrian irrigation schemes were completed,
there is little evidence to suggest that Iraq has planned any formal
adjustments to its own irrigated areas. Indeed, it is only in the 1990s
with the opening of new Syrian projects and the completion of the
Ataturk Dam that Iraq has had to face up to the issue of smaller
water amounts. Its response seems to have been to leave it to the
local districts to cope as best they can with the smaller water vol
umes. This seems to imply that the more difficult areas to irrigate in
any region will be abandoned first, thereby causing the total irri
gated crop area to contract.
The position in the Tigris watershed is at the moment less critical
than in the Euphrates. In the first place, Turkey controls a much
smaller part of the total flow, namely 16,800 MCM out of a total of
52,665 MCM each year. This represents only 31.9% of the average
flow. Turkey also theoretically could control the upper part of the
Greater Zab, but topographic conditions make this highly unlikely.
Of the total volume of water in the Tigris, Turkey, at the moment,
has plans to utilize up to 5,500 MCM for irrigation schemes, although
many of these projects will not be complete until the early years of
the twenty-first century. As yet, Turkey has not made any statement
as to a particular value of flow level which it will guarantee on the
Tigris. Equally, in terms of the total active water storage capacity

 

Over the last few years Syria has
approached Turkey about the possibil
ity of extracting water from the Tigris
and releasing it into the upper part of
the Khabour basin. From an engineer
ing point of view this would be a fairly
straight forward project. Iraq, however,
is not keen to lose water from the Tigris
which it considers to belong to itself,
even though in the long term it might
well benefit from greater flows along
the Euphrates.


which it controls, Turkey will have only 15,246 MCM located within
its borders. This represents only 29.4% of the mean annual flow for
the basin as a whole.
From the above, it can be seen that Iraq has much greater control
of the waters of the Tigris than it has of the Euphrates. Once Turkey’s
needs have been met, this will leave about 47,165 MCM for Iraq. This is
an enormous quantity of water and should, theoretically, permit the
irrigation of up to 3,628,000 ha with a water rate of 13,000 CM/ha or
up to 4,716,500 ha with an irrigation rate of 10,000 m3/ha.
The fact that Iraq has so much water available in the Tigris basin
may go some way to explaining why its criticism of Turkey’s stance
on the Euphrates River has been so restrained. It is true that com
plaints have been made about the release of only 500 m3/sec by
Turkey on the Euphrates, but they have not been pursued with the
vigor that might have been expected if Iraq’s vital interests were
indeed being threatened.
With all the water to which it has access on the Tigris, it is con
ceivable that Iraq might well decide to divert part of this water over
to the irrigated areas along the Euphrates. This could be achieved via
the Tharthar Depression, but experiments have shown that this is
likely to increase the salinity of the water considerably and so is
unlikely to be a practical proposition. Another suggestion is a tun
nel/canal following for the most part the 500 m contour between the
Tigris and the Euphrates. This would be a large scale project, as the
canal would be over 200 km in length. However, if built, it would be
able to deliver water to the Euphrates downstream from the Haditha
Dam. The flow of water into the canal could easily be controlled
from the Mosul Dam on the Tigris. Such a scheme would permit the
continued cultivation of much of the land on the Euphrates in Iraq
which will soon be going out of cultivation as the result of the re
duced water supply along the river following the expansion of the
Turkish irrigated area. This obviously has considerable attraction to
the Iraqi government, since it would mean that the social disruption
in the villages along the river would be minimized.
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FUTURE WATER DEMANDS
The demand for water can be thought of in two principal ways:
first, a demand which can be satisfied because water is available, and
second, a demand which cannot be met owing to water scarcity.
Until the 1960s the water demands of all three countries in the basin
could be satisfied with water to spare. Since then, as water demands
in the upper part of the basin have increased, the situation has
changed and will continue to do so for the next two decades until all
the planned irrigation projects are fully commissioned.

  



   

Several scholars have addressed the problem of demand for
water over the years and all have reached the same conclusion,
namely, that there is not sufficient water in the Euphrates River to
meet the needs of the three countries with interests in the watershed
(Beaumont 1978; Kliot 1994; Kolars 1994; Altinbilek 1997). On the
Tigris, the situation is less serious, but even here the most optimistic
scenarios only register a flow into the Shatt al-Arab of about 9,500 to
10,500 MCM when all the irrigation schemes are in operation (Kolars
1994; Altinbilek 1997).
On the Euphrates, both Kolars and Kliot suggest a maximum
water demand in Turkey of around 21,500 MCM each year when all
the irrigation projects are commissioned (Table 1).
This seems a very high figure when it is remembered that the
planned irrigation area on the Euphrates only amounts to 1,083,000
ha. With the water volume quoted this would seem to imply a water
usage rate of 19,853 cubic m per hectare or a much larger area under
irrigation. A more realistic calculation would seem to be a figure of
about 10,000 m3/ha, giving a total water demand figure of 10,830
MCM. Even if an irrigation tariff of 12,000 m3/ha was used, a maxi
mum demand of only 12,996 MCM is reached. On top of this there
are, of course, evaporation losses from the major dams along the
Euphrates which amount to 1083 MCM. This gives a total of between
11,913 and 14,079 MCM, which is reasonably close to the figure
quoted by Altinbilek (Table 2).
For Syria, Kolars quotes a water demand of 11,995 MCM and
Kliot, 13,400 MCM, while Altinbilek gives a total of only 5,500 MCM.
Here the situation is much more difficult to assess, because every
thing depends on the size of the irrigated area which is eventually
developed by Syria. It would seem that the total figure will be be
tween 475,000 and 1,000,000 ha when all projects are completed.
However, at the moment, it is difficult to be any more precise than
this as the Syrian government has been extremely slow to begin the
schemes which were planned more than 20 years ago. Annual water
demands for these irrigated regions would be 4,750 MCM (for the
lower value of 10,000 m3/ha) to 12,000 MCM (for the higher value of
12,000 m3/ha). On top of this evaporation from the reservoirs along
the Euphrates is 630 MCM each year (Table 2).
The question of water demand in Iraq becomes something of a
theoretical concept. If Turkey and Syria extract the maximum ex
pected volumes of water from the Euphrates, the discharge into Iraq
will be reduced to around 5,000 MCM each year. Evidence suggests
that even in the 1960s Iraq was extracting 16,368 MCM between Hit
and Hindiyah to irrigate around 1,230,000 ha (Ubell 1971). It is also
known that considerable irrigation was taking place downstream

 

Table 1

Potential water demand on the
Euphrates after the year 2020 in
MCM/y.

Country

Kolars

Kliot

Altinbilek

Turkey

21,600

21,500

14,500

Syria

11,995

13,400

5,500

Iraq

17,000

16,000

15,500

Total demand

50,595

50,900

35,500

Available water

32,720

31,000

31,680

Balance

-17,875

-19,900

-3,820

(Kolars 1994; Kliot 1994; Altinbeck 1997)


Table 2



Revised water demand estimates for the Euphrates basin for the period after the
year 2020 in MCM/y (author’s estimates). (Note: for Syria and Turkey the
minimum irrigated area values are calculated using a minimum water tariff of 10,000
m3/ha and the maximum area values with a tariff of 12,000 m3/ha. For Iraq the
water tariffs used are 13,300 m3/ha and 15,000 m3/ha respectively.)

Country

Irrigation Water Use

Evaporation

Total

Turkey

10,830-13,000

1,100

12,000 -14,000

Syria

4,750-12,500

630

5,400 -12,600

Iraq

24,400-27,500

600

25,000 - 28,100

Total demand

42,300 - 54,800

Available water

31,800

Balance

-10,500 to 23,000

from Hindiyah at this time, though exact amounts are unknown.
Altinbilek (1997) states that in 1970 only 400,000 ha were being
irrigated along the Euphrates and 800,000 ha along the Tigris. How
ever, these figures would seem to be incorrect. McLachlan (1985)
states that the irrigated area in Iraq in 1970 was 3,680,000 ha. The
vast majority of this would be located in the Tigris-Euphrates basin.
Kliot quotes figures from the late 1980s and early 1990s which esti
mate the actual irrigated area along the Euphrates River in Iraq as
1.0 to 1.29 million ha. It is, however, acknowledged that at this time
the irrigated area had been reduced as a result of the Iran-Iraq war
of the 1980s. The total area on the Euphrates which can be irrigated
is thought to be 1,833,000 ha (Kliot 1994). If this is a realistic figure
it means that total water demand at some time in the future could
rise to 24,379 MCM/y with an irrigation rate of 13,300 cubic metre/
hectare. For a rate of 15,000 cubic m per hectare the total demand
would rise to 27,495 MCM (Table 2). Table 2 clearly shows that the po
tential water deficit on the Euphrates River after the year 2020 might be
as high as from 10,500 to 23,000 MCM each year. Since there will be
enough water in the river to satisfy the full needs of both Turkey and
Syria, it will be Iraq which will be least able to satisfy its potential needs.
On the Tigris the overall situation is similar. There is general
agreement that water demand for Turkey will be between 6,700 and
8,000 MCM each year (Table 3). The calculations of the present au
thor suggest that the likely water demand for the planned irrigation
of 558,000 ha will be between 5,580 and 6,696 MCM/y (Table 4).
Evaporation from a total of nine proposed reservoirs, with a total
surface area of 693 km2 is likely to add a further 624 MCM to the
demand. This is based on an evaporation rate in these upland valleys
of 900 mm/y.
Syria’s use of water from the Tigris remains something of an
enigma. It would be possible to divert water from the Tigris and

  



   

pump it into the upper Khabur. However, without the active support
of Turkey it would only be possible to obtain significant quantities of
water during the high flow period. What is certain, though, is that
Syria’s demand for water to be used within the catchment of the River
Tigris itself will be small as it does not have access to suitable land.
Potential water demand in Iraq is high with estimates from
29,200 to 40,000 MCM/y (Table 3). As with the Euphrates, it is ex
ceedingly difficult to obtain accurate statistics as to the area of irri
gated land. Kliot quotes a figure of 2 million ha being irrigated in
the Tigris basin in the late 1980s and a total irrigable area of between
2.8 and 4 million ha (Kliot 1994). If these figures are correct, poten
tial water demand could rise to values of between 37,240 and 60,000
MCM/y based on water tariff figures of 13,300 to 15,000 m3/ha (Table
4). Prediction of maximum evaporation losses for all the reservoirs in
Iraq is difficult to calculate owing to the lack of data, but will be at
least 1,000 MCM/y. Taking these figures for the Tigris as a whole sug
gests a surplus of around 8,000 MCM/y for the lowest figures, but a
deficit of over 15,500 MCM/y if the higher values are utilized (Table 4).
If the newly calculated water demand data for the Euphrates and
Tigris Rivers are summed, they provide an estimate of the overall
balance for the basin in the period after 2020 (Tables 2 and 4). The
minimum data estimates point to a possible water deficit of 2,233 MCM /y.
However, the maximum values reveal a huge potential deficit of
38,641 MCM. This, it will be noted, is greater than the average flow of
the Euphrates River.
WATER QUALITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL /
RESOURCE ISSUES
In all the water management projects which have been planned
to date for the Tigris-Euphrates basin, the emphasis has been on
water volumes, with relatively little consideration being given to
water quality. In general, the natural water quality of the TigrisEuphrates basin is high, especially during the spring/early summer
snow-melt period. Within the next decade or so it is possible that
water quality along the mainstreams of the Tigris and the Euphrates
might change significantly for the worse. The main problem is that,
with most of the diverted water being used for irrigation, there is a
potentially serious problem with regard to the quality of the irrigation
return waters. In general about 20% of the water which is applied in
irrigation drains off the fields and makes its way into adjacent water
courses or percolates downwards to the water table. From here this
water will eventually drain back into stream and river systems.
This water will carry with it a wide range of dissolved chemicals.
Some of these will be naturally occurring, including various salts

 


Table 3

Water demand and water availability on the Tigris in the period after 2020.
annum. (Kolars 1994; Kliot 1994; Altinbilek 1997).



MCM/

Country

Kolars

Kliot

Altinbilek

Turkey

6,700

7,200

8,000

Syria

0

500

0

Iraq

29,200

40,000

31,900

Total demand

38,700

47,700

39,900

Available water

49,200

48,000-52,600

49,570

Balance

10,500

300-4,900

9,670

which are present in dryland soils. However, these waters will also
pick up a wide range of chemicals, including pesticides, herbicides
and petroleum products which are associated with modern agricul
tural practices. The net result is that the quality of any receiving
waters can be severely affected by these irrigation return waters.
What is difficult, however, is to be able to predict just how severe an
effect will be generated, as this depends so much on local environ
mental conditions and the actual agricultural practices which are
being utilised. On the Euphrates it is possible to identify two rivers
which will carry most of the return waters from the Turkish irriga
tion projects. These are the Rivers Balikh and Khabur. On these
rivers, estimates suggest that flows are likely to increase significantly
as a result of the addition of irrigation return waters. This will be of
especial significance on the Balikh River, which has a low annual
discharge. Estimates here suggest that when all the Turkish and
Syrian irrigation projects are in operation, the flow of the river
might increase up to 3.5 times its normal flow as a result of the
impact of irrigation return waters (Beaumont 1996). Just what the
impact of these waters will be on the quality of the mainstream of
the Euphrates is unknown, but it might well be considerable during
the low summer flow period.
Water management projects, wherever they are located, will also
have an impact on the overall ecology of the river. The most impor
tant changes will be in terms of the regime of the river as well as on
water volume. With all the storage facilities now located in the up
per part of the basin of the two rivers, the snowmelt peaks, which
were such characteristic features of the two rivers, have been greatly
reduced. This is particularly the case on the Euphrates River. The
effect of this will probably be greatest in the lower part of the basin
in the wetlands of the Shatt el-Arab, where the whole ecology of the
marshes has evolved in response to these snow-melt peaks. With the
attenuation of these peaks, together with the much lower overall
flows which the marshes will be receiving, the impact on the natural

In all the water management projects
which have been planned to date for the
Tigris-Euphrates basin, the emphasis
has been on water volumes, with
relatively little consideration being given
to water quality.

  



   

Table 4

Revised water demand figures for the Tigris River for the period after the year
2020 in MCM/year (author’s estimates). (Note: For Turkey the minimum irrigated
area values are calculated using a minimum water tariff of 10,000 m3/ha and the
maximum area values with a tariff of 12,000 m3/ha. For Iraq the water tariffs used
are 13,300 m3/ha and 15,000 m3/ha respectively.)

Country

Irrigation Water Use

Evaporation

Total

Turkey

5,600-6,700

630

6,200-7,300

Syria

0

0

0

Iraq

37,200-60,000

1,000

38,200-61,000

Total demand

44,400-68,300

Available water

52,700

Balance

+8,200 to -15,700

environment will be considerable. The future survival of the
marshes must, therefore, be put in question merely as a result of the
changes which have occurred, or are likely to occur, in the upper
parts of the basin in Turkey, Syria and Iraq. However, there are
other more local pressures which the marshes have to face as well.
These concern the large drainage canals which the Iraqi government
has decided to build through the marshlands of southern Iraq.
When fully completed these channels will carry the water from the
two rivers through the marsh regions much more rapidly and lead
to further dewatering of these wetland regions.
Given the political standing of Saddam Hussein in the West it is
not surprising that many Western commentators have placed all the
blame on Iraq for the potential disruption of the ecology of the
marshes of the Shatt al-Arab. This is, however, a rather extreme view
of the situation as the future of the marshes has already been threat
ened by the major new irrigation works in the upper part of the
basin. In reality, the Iraqi actions have merely exacerbated what was
already a critical situation. It also has to be recognized that attitudes
to the draining of wetlands have changed markedly in the relatively
recent past. When the Israelis drained the Huleh Marshes in the
1950s, it was regarded at the time as a great feat of human ingenuity
in converting a marshy “wasteland” into productive agricultural
land. When the Iraqis undertook the same operation in the 1990s
current convention wisdom accuses them of ecological devastation.
There is no doubt that the marshes of the Shatt el-Arab represent
one of the world’s great wetlands and that the drainage of this eco
system will destroy a rare environment. However, the Iraqis will
claim that valuable agricultural land can be produced from the
marshes. While it is likely that high quality agricultural land can be
created, the question has to be posed as to where the water to irri-
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gate this new land will come from. There is also concern that at least
part of the Iraqi government’s reason for draining the marshes is to
exercise greater political control over the inhabitants of this highly
inaccessible landscape rather than to produce more food for its people.
All three countries of the basin are suffering from the effects of
continued population growth, which will greatly increase the pres
sure on available resources (see Winkler, this volume). Although it is
true that the populations of the three countries do not all dwell
within the basins of the Tigris-Euphrates, there can be no doubt that
the impact of this growth will be felt there. The population growth
rates experienced by all three countries during this century have
been remarkable (Table 5). From the 1940s to the present day their
populations have increased by between three to five-fold, and be
tween 1995 and 2025, in the cases of Iraq and Syria, they look likely
to more than double again. Even in Turkey a more than fifty percent
growth rate is postulated.
Besides population increases, there are also increases in the
standards of living of the populations. In turn this means that water
usage in an urban/industrial context is likely to go up also. Although
the increases are high in percentage terms, the actual water volumes
remain low when compared with the predicted irrigation demands.
Even so, obtaining sufficient water for some of the rapidly growing
cities may begin to cause problems.
This leads us to the question of whether water in the twenty-first
century can continue to be used for irrigation purposes in dryland
regions (Beaumont 1994; 1997). The issues are water availability and
maximum economic productivity. There is no doubt that if water is
available at zero cost, as is the case with water in most rivers in the
Middle East, then it will be used by local farmers for irrigation pur
poses. This is, indeed, the basis of traditional agriculture throughout
the region and it is often the only way available for the peoples of the
area to farm. In the future, however, with continued increases of
pressure on available water resources, many governments will be
forced to cut back the volumes of water allocated to irrigated agri
culture in an attempt to ensure that the urban/industrial regions
receive all the water they need for continued growth. It is important
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agricultural land can be created, the
question has to be posed as to where
the water to irrigate this new land will
come from. There is also concern that at
least part of the Iraqi government’s
reason for draining the marshes is to
exercise greater political control over
the inhabitants of this highly inaccessible landscape rather than to produce
more food for its people.

Table 5 Populations in millions. (Population Reference Bureau, 1995)

Country

1940s

1960s

1972

1995

2025

Turkey

17.8

27.7

37.6

61.4

95.6

Syria

2.5

4.4

6.6

14.7

33.5

Iraq

4.1

6.7

10.4

20.6

52.6

  



   

to realize that this urban/industrial demand is relatively small when
compared with irrigation needs and should be able to be easily met
from available resources (Beaumont 1997).
CONCLUSION: THE QUEST FOR MAXIMUM WATER
PRODUCTIVITY
It is possible to recognize in the Tigris-Euphrates basins evidence
of water management strategies stretching over more than six mil
lennia. However, the length of time of operation of the different
systems varies enormously. The system which lasted the longest was
one which can be described as manipulation of the flood waves of
the two rivers. With this method, the water volumes provided by the
rivers were accepted as fixed and the management strategy consisted
of utilizing a relatively small proportion of the spring and early
summer flood-melt waves for irrigation purposes in the lower part
of the basin. In some years, the diversion works were overwhelmed
by the sheer magnitude of the floods, while in other years there was
insufficient water to irrigate all the land that it had been intended to
cultivate. This strategy was utilized from about six thousand years
ago when irrigation first began in the Tigris-Euphrates lowlands up
to the opening of the Keban Dam in the 1960s.
The second stage began in the 1960s with the creation of signifi
cant water storage capacity behind dams in the upland parts of the
two catchments. For the first time, there was an attempt to store
water from the time it was generated by nature to the time it was
needed by human societies. At first the storage capacity was small,
but with time, as more dams were completed, the total volume of
water in storage has grown. By the time the South-eastern Anatolia
project in Turkey is completed in the early years of the twenty-first
century, total water storage capacity in Turkey alone will be in ex
cess of the annual flow of the two rivers within its boundaries.
Through the forty year period, from 1960 to the end of the twen
tieth century, there has also been a change from excess water avail
ability to a situation in which there may not be enough water to
meet the planned requirements of the riparian countries. From the
year 2000 onwards we can foresee a new phase in water manage
ment, characterized by growing water shortages. This pressure on
the available water resources will be compounded by major declines
in water quality along the mainstreams of the Tigris and Euphrates
Rivers as more and more irrigation projects are opened in the upper
parts of the basin. Just how severe this decline in water quality will
be and its impact on other water users is impossible to estimate at
the present time.

 

This leads us to the question of whether
water in the twenty-first century can
continue to be used for irrigation
purposes in dryland regions.... There is
no doubt that if water is available at
zero cost, as is the case with water in
most rivers in the Middle East, then it
will be used by local farmers for
irrigation purposes.


With continued population growth, increasing attention will be
focused on the feasibility of using irrigation water to produce food
crops. It is certainly possible that during the early decades of the
twenty-first century there might well be a decrease in irrigated agri
culture throughout the basin as increasing volumes of water are
transferred to economically more productive uses in urban/indus
trial environments.
In effect, the twentieth century has seen a restructuring of water
use in the basin of the Tigris-Euphrates. Although the main ele
ments of the new management strategy are already in place, in terms
of the major dams and reservoirs, the full impact of these changes
will not be realized for at least another decade. Inevitably the re
structuring of water usage will have economic and social impacts as
well, which will be painful for the local inhabitants. In the lower part
of the basin, rural areas will not be able to sustain the same high
level of population that has been the case in the past. This might
suggest that rural depopulation will increase, putting further pres
sures on the already crowded urban centers. By contrast, both rural
and urban populations seem bound to increase in the upper part of
the basin in Turkey, as economic opportunities grow hand in hand
with the expansion of irrigated areas which have previously not been
cultivated in any widespread manner.
The next stage in water management in the Tigris-Euphrates
basin is likely to concern adjustments with a new emphasis on the
value of water. The critical factor is likely to be the maximum eco
nomic productivity which can be achieved from the utilization of a
cubic meter of water. Just how quickly this approach will permeate
the basin will depend on the pressure put on the water resource base
and how individual governments will react. In Turkey, considerable
political and financial resources have already been committed to
agricultural development. However, it will be interesting to see if
there is a change in cropping patterns within the basin with less
emphasis being placed on the lower value crops such as wheat and
barley. Under the proposed irrigation schedules for the South
eastern Anatolia Project, wheat is planned to account for 25% of the
irrigated area, and barley and other feed grains a further 15%
(Altinbilek 1997). A relatively small cut-back in these figures would
release large quantities of water which could be utilized for other
purposes, including hydroelectric power.
A similar change will probably also occur in Iraq. In the shortterm it seems inevitable that there will be land abandonment along
the Euphrates as Turkey’s use of the Euphrates increases. 1995 was
the year when the first water for irrigation purposes was sent
through the Urfa tunnels in Turkey from the lake behind the



In effect, the twentieth century has seen
a restructuring of water use in the basin
of the Tigris-Euphrates. Although the
main elements of the new management
strategy are already in place, in terms of
the major dams and reservoirs, the full
impact of these changes will not be
realized for at least another decade.

  



   

Ataturk Dam, and over the next decade the volume of water utilized
for such purposes seems set to increase rapidly. Iraq will, therefore,
have to come to terms quickly with a changing situation in which
available water amounts along the Euphrates will steadily decline.
However, Iraq is fortunate in possessing large oil reserves, which
means that it should be able to substitute money for water and so
obtain the food it needs by the purchase of crops on the world market
(see Allan, this volume).
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Qanats and Lifeworlds in Iranian Plateau Villages
Paul Ward English
University of Texas, Austin
ABSTRACT
Through a review of the literature on qanat history, this article provides an overview of one of the most significant
hydraulic technologies of the pre-modern Middle East. The article covers qanat origins, diffusion and construction
techniques, then compares the productivity and sustainability of qanats with modern deep well systems powered by
motorized pumps. The replacement of qanats with deep wells has serious implications for the ground water resources
of much of the Middle East. The profound importance of qanats in shaping the lifeworlds of villagers in pre-modern
Iranian plateau settlements has meant that the shift towards reliance on deep well systems has had ramifications for
plateau society that go far beyond water resource exploitation.

INTRODUCTION
Throughout the arid Middle East and North Africa, water short
ages have become increasingly acute. Population growth combined
with agricultural expansion and intensification have heightened
demand for domestic, industrial, and agricultural (especially irriga
tion) water use. Local surface and subsurface water resources are no
longer sufficient to meet these burgeoning needs throughout the
region. Domestic water is in such short supply that it is rationed in a
number of Middle Eastern cities, and, as the region’s cities continue
to grow, it is likely that urban water demand will also grow. In rural
areas, irrigation water is increasingly scarce. A scarcity of irrigation
water will force small farmers off the land and increase food imports
across the Middle East.
To meet growing demands for water, governments and other
investors in the Middle East have abandoned traditional, sustainable
(but less productive) water supply systems in favor of modern, less
sustainable (but more productive) hydraulic systems. In river val
leys, modern dams have been constructed to trap surface water.
Where surface water is not available, modern pumping technologies
that provide access to previously unknown or inaccessible ground
water reservoirs are coming into widespread use.
One of the most striking example of this shift in water technolo
gies has been the case of qanats. These ancient, gravity-flow water
supply systems, which have provided dependable, renewable sup
plies of water to Middle Eastern towns and villages for millennia, are
being rapidly replaced by a more productive but less sustainable
water technology, deep wells. On the Iranian plateau, an important
heartland of qanat-watered settlement, this change in water technol
ogy is draining aquifers, altering the distribution of towns and vil
lages, and transforming the lifeworlds of Iranian villagers.

Domestic water is in such short supply
that it is rationed in a number of Middle
Eastern cities, and, as the region’s cities
continue to grow, it is likely that urban
water demand will also grow.

  



   

QANATS AND SETTLEMENT IN THE OLD WORLD
THE NATURE OF QANATS
Qanats are gently sloping subterranean tunnels dug far enough
into alluvium or water-bearing sedimentary rock to pierce the un
derground water table and penetrate the aquifer beneath. Water
from the aquifer filters into the upper reaches of these channels,
flows down their gentle slope, and emerges as a surface stream of
water at or near a settlement. Qanats are generally constructed on
the slopes of piedmont alluvial fans, in intermontane basins, and
along alluvial valleys. In these locations, this groundwater collection
system has long brought water to the surface and supported settlement
in regions where no other traditional water technology would work.
Most of these gravity-flow tunnel-wells are relatively short, some
five kilometers or less in length (Beaumont l989). The longest, how
ever, extend 40 or 50 kilometers beneath ground level before surfac
ing at a settlement (English l966). The cross section of a qanat
tunnel is roughly one-and-one-half meters high and one meter wide,
large enough to accommodate men working. Every 50 to 100 meters
or so on the surface, vertical shafts are dug down to a depth of any
where from 10 to 100 meters to the water-bearing tunnels. These
shafts provide air to qanat diggers working beneath the surface and
also enable excavated soil to be removed from the tunnel and lifted
to the surface. The shafts provide repair teams with relatively easy
access to tunnels when blockages occur. The donut-shaped spoil
heaps around the tops of these vertical shafts appear on the surface
as a chain-of-wells, a distinctive feature of landscapes in qanat
watered regions. These markers chart the subterranean pathways of
the qanat tunnels (English 1968; Beaumont 1971; Goblot 1979).
ORIGINS AND DIFFUSION
Qanats first appeared in the mountains of Kurdistan in western
Iran, eastern Turkey, and northern Iraq more than 2,500 years ago
in association with early mining in that region. Several factors ex
plain this origin. Most importantly, perhaps, this region is one of the
oldest mining and metallurgical centers in the Middle East. The
need to dig tunnels in the search for minerals meant that the inhab
itants of the region had mastered the basic technology necessary for
qanat construction. Qanats differ little from the horizontal adits dug
into hillsides by early miners. Indeed, these adits may well have been
sloped to drain unwanted seepage as they are today. Additionally,
and somewhat ironically, the earliest report of a qanat system is
chronicled on a tablet narrating the destruction of the qanats which
provided water to the city of Ulhu (modern Ula), located at the

 

The need to dig tunnels in the search for
minerals meant that the inhabitants of
the region had mastered the basic
technology necessary for qanat
construction.





DIAGRAM OF A TYPICAL QANAT

Figure 1

Cross Section and Aerial View of a Qanat. Qanats are ancient water supply systems constructed using a simple technology. The vertical
shafts are not “wells,” despite the term “chain-of-wells” often used to describe their appearance on the landscape.

northwestern end of Lake Urmia by Sargon II in 714 BC (Laessøe
1951). Soon thereafter, Assyrian cities, particularly those located on
the upper Tigris River, relied on qanats for drinking water. Some
what later, the capital city of the Medes, Ecbatana (modern
Hamadan) was watered by qanats as was Darius’s capital city of
Persepolis (Forbes 1955; Goblot 1963).
Under the Achaemenids (550–331 BC), when Persian rule ex
tended from the Indus to the Nile, qanat technology spread well
beyond the confines of the Iranian Plateau. The Achaemenid rulers
provided a major incentive for qanat construction by allowing
qanat builders and their heirs to retain profits from newly-built
qanats for five generations. As a result, thousands of new settle
ments were established and others expanded. To the west, qanats
were constructed from Mesopotamia to the shores of the Mediter
ranean as well as southward into parts of Egypt and Arabia. They
were particularly important sources of water in the foothills of
eastern Iraq, the Syrian Desert, and the Hadhramaut. In the Yemen
and in Oman, qanats are locally called falaj (plural: aflaj).

  



   

To the east of Iran, where they are generally known by the Persian
term kariz, qanats came into use in Afghanistan, the Silk Road oases
settlements of Central Asia, and the Chinese province of Sinkiang
(now Xinjiang), although whether this diffusion occurred under the
Achaemenids or some later Persian dynasty is uncertain. Strangely, in
the Turfan Basin, which has one of the most extensive qanat systems
in the world, it is possible that many of the qanats were built by im
ported Turki laborers in the 1700s (Stein 1933).
The expansion of Islam initiated a second major diffusion of
qanat technology. The early Arab invasions spread qanats across
North Africa into Spain, Cyprus, and the Canary Islands. In most of
North Africa, they were called fughara, and were built and main
tained by a specialized caste of black slaves. In Morocco, qanats were
referred to as khittara (or rhettara).
Qanat use was especially intense in three areas of the Maghrib:
on the borders of the Tademait Plateau just south of the Great West
ern Erg in central Algeria; on the northern slopes of the Atlas Moun
tains of Morocco, particularly near the city of Marrakech; and south
of the Atlas in the Tafilalt of Morocco (Fenelon 1941; Lo 1953;
Margat 1958). Interestingly, qanat technology may have been intro
duced into the central Sahara and later into Western Sahara by Jews
or Judaized Berbers fleeing Cyrenaica during Trajan’s persecution in
AD 118 (Briggs 1960).
In Spain, qanats were used marginally in the province of Catalonia
and at Madrid where they were called gálerias (Asin 1959: Plate XVII).
They are important sources of water in Cyprus and on Gran Canaria
and Tenerife in the Canary islands (Humlum 1965).
New World qanats are found in Mexico at Parrás, Canyon
Huasteca, Tecamenchalco, and Tehuacán and in the Atacama re
gions of Peru and Chile at Nazca and Pica. The qanat systems of
Mexico came into use after the Spanish conquest; those of the
Atacama, however, may predate the Spanish entry into the New
World (Kaeger 2, 1901; Troll 1963).
QANAT CONSTRUCTION
The spread of qanats throughout the arid lands of the northern
hemisphere during the pre-modern period may be explained by the
fact that they use an efficient mix of available capital and technology
to supply critically scarce water. Because qanats could provide reli
able and sustainable access to previously unavailable supplies of
groundwater, people throughout the arid zone embraced their use,
despite the cost in money and time to build and maintain them.
During much of the pre-modern period, many qanat systems
were built by powerful political leaders, whose rule was often

 

Because qanats could provide reliable
and sustainable access to previously
unavailable supplies of groundwater,
populations throughout the arid zone
embraced their use, despite the cost in
money and time to build and maintain
them.



Figure 2



A Qanat-fed Alluvial Fan Village. A detailed understanding of subtle variations in
topography, landscape, and subsurface water conditions is required in the siting of
a qanat. Only well-known and respected muqannis are entrusted with site
decisions. (Illustration by Ann Coffin Delano)

appraised by the number of qanats constructed during their reign.
For example, slaves and captives were trained to construct qanats
under the Achaemenid and Sassanian kings. Maintenance and re
pairs were accomplished by corvée (forced labor).
THE MUQANNIS
More recently in Iran, a hereditary class of professional qanat
diggers called muqannis build and repair these systems. These spe
cialists travel from place to place on the Iranian plateau, for ex
ample, working at one settlement where a flash flood has damaged a
qanat, and then moving on to another where a lowered water table
requires that a qanat tunnel be extended deeper into the alluvium.
The most famous muqannis come from the desert city of Yazd.
They are paid high wages, and command respect. The hazardous
nature of their work has inspired a body of folk custom and belief. A
muqanni will not work on a day he considers to be unlucky, or if he
sneezes on that day. Floods and cave-ins in the qanat tunnels are
frequent, and deaths among muqannis occur. Older muqannis are
considered blessed or at the very least lucky. Prayers are said over a
muqanni each time he descends into a qanat, a ceremony that makes
a deep impression on Iranian villagers.

  



   

SITE, GRADE, AND ALIGNMENT
The construction of a new qanat (which is quite rare at present)
is a sophisticated engineering feat accomplished with simple tools.
The success of the undertaking is determined by two decisions made
by a muqanni before the actual construction of the qanat begins. The
first of these is to determine the site of the “mother well” (madari
chah) which marks the furthest extent of the qanat from the settle
ment; the second is to establish the alignment and grade between the
qanat’s origin and destination.
When the muqanni decides on a potential site for the madari
chah, one or more trial shafts (gamaneh) are dug deeply enough to
penetrate the water table. A variety of geographical factors are
weighed in the muqanni’s decision as to where these shafts are lo
cated. Among these factors are local slope conditions, the surround
ing topography, subtle changes in vegetation, available groundwater,
and the proposed destination of the water.
Favorable site conditions for relatively short qanats often occur
near the mouths of dry alluvial valleys. For long qanats, the general
topographic setting is more indicative of the likelihood of accessible
sources of groundwater. Once a trial shaft has struck water, the
muqanni must be certain that this well has pierced the water table or
alternatively has penetrated a relatively constant source of ground
water perched on an impermeable stratum. If so, this shaft becomes
the “mother well” of the qanat whose length will be measured from
this point to the place where water surfaces (mazhar).
Next, the muqanni must measure the precise alignment and
grade of the qanat tunnel, the most difficult engineering task in the
entire construction process. The alignment of the qanat must con
nect the water-filled base of the “mother well” with a point on the
surface immediately above the settlement by means of a gently slop
ing tunnel. If the alignment is miscalculated and the qanat emerges
some distance away from the settlement, water will have to flow in
an open channel from this point to the houses and fields below,
increasing both evaporation and seepage. If the gradient of the tun
nel is too steep, water rushing down its course will erode the walls
and collapse the qanat. If the gradient is too shallow, water will pond
and stagnate in the tunnel. In many cases, the qanat tunnel follows
an indirect, looping pathway to its destination, curving to maintain
proper grade on steep slopes.
The maximum gradient for a short qanat is roughly 1:1,000 or
1:1,500. In a long qanat tunnel, the grade is close to horizontal.
These calculations are made using a spirit level suspended between
two pieces of twine each about 10 meters long (Beckett 1953: 48).
Using only these tools, a skilled muqanni is able to determine both

 

The many hazards that attend qanat
construction have, not surprisingly,
endowed the profession of muqanni
with a certain notoriety.





the proper alignment and grade of the qanat tunnel even when it
runs for kilometers beneath rugged terrain.
EXCAVATION
The excavation of the tunnel starts in the dry, downslope section
of the qanat at the mazhar and works back toward the “mother
well.” Vertical shafts connect the tunnel with the surface every 50 to
100 meters or so, as noted above. In some cases, these shafts are dug
first, and the tunnel is constructed to connect their bases.
A team headed by a muqanni works together in the construction
of a qanat. The muqanni excavates the tunnel with a small pick and
shovel, while his apprentice packs the loose dirt into a rubber bucket
(in earlier times a skin bucket). Two laborers at the surface haul the
dirt up the shaft using a windlass (charkh). If the qanat tunnel
reaches depths of 75 to 100 meters, a second windlass is set in a
niche halfway down the vertical shaft and the dirt is transferred
from one bucket to another at this point in order to facilitate the
excavation process.
The greatest dangers in qanat construction occur when the tun
nel reaches the wet, water-bearing section. Here, the muqanni and
his apprentice work with water flowing around them, in poor venti
lation, and with the constant threat of cave-ins. In some cases,
vertical shafts fill with water before reaching tunnel depth. The
muqanni must then dig upward from the tunnel to the pooled water
in the shaft, and try to avoid the rush of water when the break
through is made. Where the tunnel passes through a deposit of soft
sand and the tunnel is likely to collapse, baked clay hoops (nays) are
inserted in the tunnel to provide extra support.
Below ground, muqannis carry a castor oil lamp for both illumination and testing the quality of the air in the tunnel. If the flame
dies for want of oxygen, the diggers know to leave the tunnel and dig
another vertical shaft to provide more air. Where the qanat’s tunnels
are very deep and ventilation is particularly poor, vertical shafts are
dug on either side of the tunnel. A fire is lit to make the stale air rise
up one shaft and draw fresh air down the other (Noel 1944). In
some areas, notably Yazd, twin qanats are built side-by-side, en
abling muqannis to move from one tunnel to the other. The many
hazards that attend qanat construction have, not surprisingly,
endowed the profession of muqanni with a certain notoriety.

Figure 3

Muqannis Excavating Soil from a
Qanat Shaft. Spoil lifted by windlass
encircles the vertical shafts that link
the qanat tunnel with the surface.
Clearing blockage from qanat
tunnels is usually required every
few years.
(Illustration by Ann Coffin Delano)

TIME AND COST
The time required to construct a qanat varies with the capital of
the owner, the stability of ownership, underground soil and water
conditions, the length of the qanat, the amount of water desired, the

  



   

skill of the muqanni, and a variety of other social, economic, and
environmental factors. In an alluvial fan village in Kirman, a qanat
one kilometer in length with a mother well 45 meters deep was in
construction for twenty-seven years, largely due to three changes in
ownership. By contrast, a qanat in a similar location some three
kilometers in length with a bifurcated tunnel and two mother wells
50 and 55 m in depth began to flow after seventeen years. The re
spective costs of these short, alluvial fan qanats were approximately
$10,000 to $11,000 per km in the late 1960s (English 1966).
The cost of constructing a 40 km long qanat to the basin city of
Kirman with a mother well 90 m deep was approximately $213,000
when completed in 1950. Given inflation, higher wages, the dwin
dling number of muqannis, and the political instability of modern
Iran, the costs of building such a qanat today would likely be pro
hibitive. Confidence in future political and economic stability would
have to be considerable to induce an investor to finance new qanat
construction today.
QANAT TECHNOLOGY AND DEEP WELLS
Qanats were in wide use throughout the dry lands of the Old
World until recently for several reasons. First, qanats are made of
local materials. Second, they tap aquifers using no source of power
other than gravity. Third, water is transported for substantial dis
tances in these subterranean conduits with minimal loss of water
through evaporation and with little risk of pollution. Water loss
through percolation is reduced by lining the tunnels with clay hoops
when they pass through loose sand, and by infusing their beds with
layers of impermeable clay.
QANATS: WATER AS A RENEWABLE RESOURCE
The rate of flow of water in a qanat is controlled by the level of
the underground water table. Thus a qanat cannot drain an aquifer,
because its flow varies directly with the subsurface water supply.
When properly maintained, a qanat is a sustainable system that
provides water to settlements indefinitely. Qanats exploit ground
water as a renewable resource.
The self-limiting features of qanats that make them a sustainable
technology can, however, be their biggest drawback, particularly when
they are compared with the range of technologies available today.
First, the flow of water in qanats varies from year to year depending
on the recharge rate of the aquifer. In the Middle East, where drought
hits on average once every four years, this uncertainty often results in
conservative cropping strategies geared to the cultivation of low-risk,
low water-consuming, low value crops like wheat and barley.

 

The rate of flow of water in a qanat is
controlled by the level of the under
ground water table. Thus a qanat
cannot drain an aquifer, because its
flow varies directly with the subsurface
water supply. When properly main
tained, a qanat is a sustainable system
that provides water to settlements
indefinitely.


Second, water flows continuously in a qanat, and although some
winter water is used for domestic use, much larger amounts of irri
gation water are needed during the daylight hours of the spring and
summer growing seasons in Middle Eastern villages. Although this
continuous flow is frequently viewed as wasteful, it can, in fact, be
controlled to a large degree. During periods of low water use in fall
and winter, water-tight gates can seal off the qanat opening
(mazhar) damming up and conserving groundwater for periods of
high use. In spring and summer, night flow may be stored in small
reservoirs (ambar) at the mouth of the qanat and held there for
daytime use (Beaumont 1989). Moreover, much perceived seasonal
water loss infiltrates the soil beneath the qanat tunnel and thus
recharges the aquifer.
Third, the body of custom and law (shari’a) relating to qanats
codified in the Kitab-i Qani (Book of Qanats) in the ninth century
strives to protect the investment of qanat owners in permanent
agricultural settlement. The law of harim (borders), for example,
prohibits the sinking of new mother wells within one kilometer of
existing qanats. As a result, large areas of land in the vicinity of cities
like Tehran, Sulamaniyah, Yazd, Kirman, Herat, and Qandahar,
where the density of tunnel wells is high, are closed to new settle
ment. This, in effect, stabilizes agricultural acreage in regions with
growing populations (English 1966).
Again, the major limitation (and paradoxically the major advan
tage) of qanats is that their rate of flow is limited by the aquifer
height. Should the water table fall during a drought, so will the
amount of water filtering into the water-bearing section of the
qanat. If the aquifer rises, the flow of water increases. This makes
qanats a sustainable, renewable source of water, but it also makes
them inadequate water producers vis-à-vis modern demands. The
rapidly increasing demand for water generated by population
growth and agricultural expansion in the modern Middle East can
not be accommodated by qanats.



By far the major disadvantage (and
advantage) of deep wells, however,
involves their success in meeting the
growing need for water in the Middle
East. Deep wells can draw water from
permanent aquifers on demand without
regard to rates of recharge. The
technology, therefore, enables people to
exploit their water resources in an
unsustainable fashion.

DEEP WELLS: WATER AS A NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCE
By contrast, deep wells have several putative advantages over
qanats. First, deep wells are not limited by slope or soil conditions
and can be located at sites convenient to transportation networks,
populations centers, and markets. Second, they draw water from
deep in the aquifer where seasonal variations in flow do not occur.
Third, because deep wells can be turned on or off at will, they are,
theoretically, conducive to water conservation.
But deep wells also have disadvantages. The construction, main
tenance, and fuel costs (for motorized pumps) of deep wells are high

  



   

(Overseas Consultants 1949). Moreover, deep wells cannot be built
using local materials and local labor. By far the major disadvantage
(and advantage) of deep wells, however, involves their success in
meeting the growing need for water in the Middle East. Deep wells
can draw water from permanent aquifers on demand without regard
to rates of recharge. The technology, therefore, enables people to
exploit their water resources in an unsustainable fashion. The ability
of deep wells, and motorized pumps, to withdraw water in excess of
an aquifer’s recharge rate makes this modern technology very attrac
tive in the short term. As a result, however, water is fast becoming a
non-renewable resource in areas where deep wells are used.
QANATS AND VILLAGE LIFEWORLDS
Like all water technologies, qanats require a nexus of environ
mental and social conditions in order to be effective over time. On
the Iranian plateau, reliance on qanats promoted high levels of social
and ecological adaptation. They inspired a need for social cohesion
that permeated virtually all areas of village life.
Qanats defined village lifeworlds on the plateau by (1) determin
ing settlement location; (2) structuring built environments within
settlements; and (3) requiring social cohesion in water allocation,
water distribution, water use, and system maintenance. These
lifeworlds framed the horizons of everyday life in plateau settle
ments, encompassing people’s firsthand involvement with the prac
tical world, the world of values, and the world of goods (Buttimer
1976; Seamon 1979). With the shift from qanats to deep wells, wa
ter-based social patterns are in flux.
WHERE PEOPLE LIVE
Qanat technology was known in Iran by the sixth century BC,
when Indo-Iranians began to settle as agriculturists, to worship one
god (Ahura Mazda), and to conquer the Old World. Three centuries
later, when the Parthians invaded Iran, qanats were in widespread
use on the Iranian plateau (Polybius X: 28; Vitruvius VIII: 6.3). By
this time, qanats had opened alluvial fans to settlement, enabled
basin cities to expand, and established the foundations of modern
plateau settlement patterns.
Qanats became an important factor in where people lived. The
largest towns were still located at low elevations on the floors of
intermontane basins and in broad river valleys. Most of these early
settlements were defended by a fortress (qal’eh) whose water was
drawn from hand-dug wells that reached down to shallow water
tables. Qanats enabled these settlements to grow by tapping water

 





rich aquifers located deep beneath neighboring alluvial fans. Qanats
carried water from the fans below ground for many kilometers to
such settlements providing supplementary water to irrigate more
extensive fields and sustain larger urban populations.
Even more dramatically, qanats made it possible to establish
permanent settlements on the alluvial fans themselves. Earlier set
tlers had bypassed the alluvial fans because water tables there were
too deep for hand-dug wells, and the wadis on these slopes were too
deeply incised in the fans for simple diversion channels. In these
locations, qanats tapped somewhat more limited “water hinter
lands” with underground water drawn from upslope alluvial depos
its in mountain valleys. For the first time, small towns and villages
were built at these higher elevations. And further up river valleys in
the mountains, small qanat-watered hamlets appeared.

Figure 4

Qanats Converging on the City of Kirman. Built during the course of many
centuries, large numbers of qanats converge on most Iranian Plateau cities. Some
of these old qanat tunnels cross back and forth between channels, others are twin
qanats one or both of which may be active, and many have been abandoned. No
map of the resulting labyrinth of qanat tunnels is available. Note the differences in
surface definition on the image caused by drifting sand.

  



   

In many areas, these water hinterlands formed a series of pro
gressively smaller arcs with the qanats of each higher settlement
starting where those of the next lower settlement ended. Although
configurations varied on the plateau, frequently the regional settle
ment pattern exhibited a correlation in age, size, water rights, and
elevation. The largest place was the oldest and the lowest, and usu
ally had prior rights to the largest water catchment basin. In any
case, over much of the Iranian plateau these new upland settlements
increased the cultivated area, supplied additional food to urban
centers, provided living space and work for a growing population of
farmers, as well as upland bases for herders and fuel collectors.
The Iranian plateau was the first core area of intensive qanat
use. Even today, as much as one third to one half of the irrigated
fields and orchards on the plateau–an estimated 15 million acres–are
still watered by qanats. Cities like Tehran, Qum, Qazvin, Hamadan,
Nishapur, Yazd, and Kirman received virtually all of their water
from tunnel-wells until deep wells were introduced after World War
II. In the 1960s, an estimated 21,000 qanats were still functioning in
plateau settlements with an additional 17,500 used but in need of
repair (Ghahraman l958). Their aggregate length has been placed at
more than 160,000 kilometers, and their total discharge at 20,000
cubic meters per second (Goblot l962).
Although these figures are not precise, they convey a sense of the
scale of qanat use on the Iranian plateau, the role of qanats in defin
ing the location of settlements, and their importance in the day-to
day lives of Iranian villagers. In more immediate ways, qanats
defined the built environments of towns and villagers, the architec
ture of daily lives.
Figure 5

THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT
The built environments of most alluvial fan towns and villages
on the Iranian Plateau are aligned along the major watercourses
(shahjub) that run from the mouth of the qanat down slope through
the length of the settlement. In larger and more complex basin
settlements, smaller streams of water emanating from the points of
division (maqsam) of several qanats form a spatial skeleton of paral
lel pathways lined by village structures, walled orchards, and gar
dens. They are trunk lines of human activity.
Most alluvial fan settlements are triangular in shape. Below
walled orchards and gardens at the top of the village, secondary
distribution channels (jub) branch outward from the maqsam to
form “water lattices” that broaden the area being cultivated. These
smaller streams irrigate an elaborate grid of rectangular plots (kort) of
irrigated land bounded by low, parallel levees (Bonine 1982; 1979).

 

A Water Divider in Mahan. Two
granite blocks were imported to
Mahan to build a maqsam which
subdivided the water emerging
from two qanats into three major
streams (shahjub) of equal flow. At
some past time, one of the granite
blocks was dislodged by a flash
flood. Because of disagreement
about its precise location prior to
the flood, it was never reposi
tioned. The owners of the major
stream on the right clearly gained
water because of the new position
of the divider after the flood. The
owners of the central stream lost
water. Note that a third qanat
enters the stream on the right
below the maqsam.
(Illustration by Ann Coffin Delano)





The rectangular shape of these fields is designed to deliver the re
quired amount of water to the kort by the time its flow reaches the
plot’s downstream end. Rectangular fields also assist in measure
ment of area at times of land subdivision, inheritance, or sale.
The linear constraints that qanats place on settlement morphol
ogy is most obvious in small alluvial fan villages, where a single
watercourse runs downstream through the settlement providing
water to each household compound, orchard, and garden before
irrigating grain fields downslope. Each household compound has
the right to water its courtyard garden and to utilize the water for
domestic purposes. The structures in these small places are strung
out along the major stream channel; they parallel the slope of the
land along the axis of the alluvial fan.
Interestingly, qanats also underlie the street patterns of larger
cities as well. In some cities, qanat water flows in tunnels beneath
residential areas and surfaces near the cultivated area. Staircases
from the surface (payab) reach down to these streams. The first
payab usually is at a public cistern where drinking water is available
to the entire community. Sometimes these cisterns are sizable vaults
as much as l0 meters across and 15 or more meters deep with spiral
stairs leading down to small platforms at water level. In cities like
Herat in Afghanistan, these cisterns are ancient constructions en
cased in tile. Other more modest urban payabs are found along
major streets, and even in some alleys, a factor that probably played
an important role in the social and physical layout of the town.
Where tunnels run beneath houses, private payabs slope down to
the stream providing water for various domestic uses. In wealthy
homes, special rooms are constructed beside the underground
stream with tall shafts reaching upward to windcatchers (badgir)
above roof level. Air caught by the badgirs , which are oriented to
prevailing summer winds, is forced down the shaft, circulates at
water level, and provides a cool refuge from the afternoon heat of
summer. Needless to say, land located above submerged qanat tun
nels, and houses with private payabs , are highly valued (Honari l989).
Bonine has discerned an orthogonal street pattern in cities like
Kirman, Yazd, and Sabzevar where long, straight streets intersect at
right angles forming huge “superblocks” with many short, blind alleys
branching off major thoroughfares at right angles (Bonine l979).
These grids do not conform to the rigid geometry of classical Greek or
Roman towns, but they have distinctly geometric configurations. In
Bonine’s view, these configurations were established on a network of
water channels used to irrigate nearby orchards and fields. As in alluvial
fan settlements, slope is crucial. Topography and water flow are the
elemental principles of Iranian settlement geography (Bonine 1979).

  



   

SOCIAL PATTERNING
In some rural settlements, the location of structures reflects the
dynamics of water use and social status. Above the village, particu
larly where the slope is relatively steep, one or more water mills
(asiab) are built to grind the grain of nearby villages and hamlets. In
these Norse-style mills, water drops five or more meters to power a
vertical shaft that turns a heavy mill stone (Wulff 1966). Closer to
the top of the settlement, at least one branch of the qanat’s water is
diverted at a maqsam to a public reservoir or cistern, a communal
bath (hammam), and a mosque. The reservoir or cistern provides
clean water to all people in the community. The communal baths,
which are only found in larger settlements, are used by surrounding
villagers for bathing. The pool of water at the mosque is used for reli
gious ablutions in kur , or sacred water (English 1966).
Within the settlement, the location of each household com
pound along the primary stream determines the quantity and qual
ity of its water supply. As a result, household location frequently
reflects the social and economic status of its residents or owner. The
more prosperous households of landlords, merchants, and religious
leaders are in the upper section of the village where water is clean
and plentiful. The courtyards of these dwellings display central pools
with canals lined by flowers dividing the gardens into sections. The
poorer households of small landowners, sharecroppers, and day
laborers are located downstream in the village where the volume of
water is diminished and more polluted. The compounds in this
district are given over to the cultivation of alfalfa (for fodder), fruit
trees, spices, herbs, and vines.
Moving downstream through the village, water loss by evapora
tion, seepage, and domestic use can result in as much as a 40%
decrease in water available to the lower sections of the village.
Though there is a difference in the price of a share of water depend
ing on where it is used in the settlement, the price difference is rarely
commensurate with water loss which varies considerably during the
year. In most settlements, then, the powerful live in the upper
reaches. The qanat, more often than not, enters the village at the
household compound of the most influential local landlord (arbab)
(Cressey 1959).
In larger towns watered by several qanats, these water-based
social gadients often are obscured by settlement history. Frequently,
a maze of twisting distributary channels covers the landscape whose
diversions are vestiges of past business transactions, marriage agree
ments, and bequests. But in most settlements, social patterns are
directly related to water quantity and quality. Alterations in one
system involve changes in the other.

 

Qanats usually are built by wealthy
individuals, but the constant need for
tunnel repairs owing to natural disasters
or social dislocations leads to rapid
fragmentation in ownership. Many
qanats have as many as two to three
hundred owners and the water of some
qanats is divided into as many as
10,000 time shares.





Variations in water quality from one part of a village to another
are reduced by customs of sequential water use that demand coop
eration, an example of community needs taking precedence over
personal influence. As noted above, a public cistern is often located
at the top of the settlement. Its water is reserved specifically for
drinking and cooking. In a pool below the cistern, dishes and cutlery
may be washed using sand as the cleansing agent. After water is
directed to the communal bath, additional pools are drawn off from
the main channel (shahjub) in which household utensils may be
washed with soap, and still further downstream animals are watered
and straw soaked for use in construction. After these communal needs
are met, the now polluted water flows directly to the fields. This hier
archy of use conserves water and reduces pollution (Roaf 1989).
QANAT OWNERSHIP
In many villages, qanat ownership is widely diffused throughout
the population, and this widespread stake in the water supply system
reinforces social cooperation. Qanats usually are built by wealthy
individuals, but the constant need for tunnel repairs owing to natu
ral disasters or social dislocations leads to rapid fragmentation in
ownership. Many qanats have as many as two to three hundred
owners and the water of some qanats is divided into as many as
10,000 time shares.
In some cases, the system of dividing water goes back hundreds
of years. The current division of water at Ardistan in central Iran,
for example, dates back to the 1200s when Hulagu Khan, the grand
son of Genghis Khan, ordered that the town’s water be divided into
twenty-one shares with each share allotted to a specific quarter
(Lambton 1953).
A complete record of changes in ownership exists for the
Vakilabad qanat built in Mahan, a town southeast of Kirman, in the
1860s (English 1989). Initially, its water was divided among three men
in six shares. One-sixth of the water was allotted to the then custodian
of the Shah Ni’matullah Vali Shrine. This portion has increased to
one-third of the water and is now owned by twenty of his descen
dants. The remaining water was sold off bit by bit such that some
seventy families now own shares in the qanat. In another qanat system
in the same town, water ownership has fragmented to such a degree
that the owner of the smallest portion has rights to only thirty seconds
of water once every twelve days. In Lambton’s view, the historic in
ability of the Iranian upper class to retain property intact over time is
the primary reason that Iran never developed a feudal aristocracy
comparable to that of medieval Europe (Lambton 1969).

Strict and unforgiving adherence to
communal methods of water rotation
and maintenance of the water supply
system are perhaps most important in
maintaining the social cohesion of
qanat-watered villages.

  



   

WATER DISTRIBUTION AND SYSTEM MAINTENANCE
Strict and unforgiving adherence to communal methods of water
rotation and maintenance of the water supply system are perhaps
most important in maintaining the social cohesion of qanat-watered
villages. The distribution of water in these settlements is based on
ownership of time shares in the annual flow of a qanat. These rota
tions take account of variations in diurnal and seasonal flow as well
as differences in plot location, soil conditions, rates of seepage, and
evaporation.
In general, water is divided into an indefinite number of time
shares, or sahms, in a given water rotation period (Lambton 1953;
Bonine 1982). The sahms are measured by volume in terms of
qasabs, the theoretical amount of water required to flood-irrigate an
area of roughly thirty square yards once every twenty-four hours.
One hundred qasabs (in theory) would irrigate an acre of land,
except that a qasab varies in volume from one place to another.
Moreover, qanats as well as subdivisions of qanats (e.g. streams
created after division at a maqsam) rotate water on different time
schedules ranging from once every six days or twelve days to once
every eighteen, nineteen, twenty-one or twenty-two days. The length
of the rotation period varies with volume of flow and crops under
cultivation, but a host of other lesser environmental factors also
come into play.
In a relatively simple example from Mahan near Kirman, water
from one of the towns’ four qanats is divided into fifteen sahms with
a volume of forty qasabs per day on a twelve day rotation. In this
case, each sahm is equal to ninety-six minutes of water once every
twelve days or enough water to irrigate forty qasabs of land. In addi
tion, each sahm is subdivided into six dangs, each composed of six
habbeh. According to this measurement system, one dang would
equal sixteen minutes of water and one habbeh a single minute of
water once every twelve days.
Most systems of water distribution, however, are much more
complex. In a more typical case based on another qanat in the same
settlement, the flow of water passes through twelve separate water
dividers or maqsams that allocate water to specific fields at specific
times on specified days in a conjoined eighteen, nineteen, and
twenty-one day rotation (English 1989).
The person responsible for guiding the water through channels
to the right field at the right time is the water master (mirab) or
water bailiff (mubashiri ab). This official often directs a bevy of
assistants who keep the channels clean, open and close small gates to
specific fields, and breach levees when required. In some smaller
communities, these tasks are handled directly by the community of

 

When communal efforts fail, village
water supplies diminish and in some
cases the settlements are abandoned.
Government land reform programs in
the 1960s, for example, required
written deeds to determine water
ownership. Some settlements honestly
or otherwise produced deeds that taken
together made up more than twentyfours hours of water a day. The
resulting chaos led to violent ownership
disputes and sometimes to total social
breakdown.





water users (Spooner 1974). In the past, mirabs measured units of
flow with a water clock (tas) based on the time it took for a metal
cup with a hole in the bottom to sink in a container of water. Re
cently, these clepsydras have been replaced by clocks.
Annual repairs and cleaning of the qanat are usually required to
maintain its flow, and communal meetings of qanat owners are held
to decide the annual allocation of funds for this purpose. Although
large water owners tend to dominate these meetings, votes are cast
by shares. Other system responsibilities such as the payment of the
mirab, his assistants, and crop watchers (either in cash or kind) are
also decided in this fashion. In addition, more general community
needs are dealt with by vote or custom—among these are payments
to the carpenter, blacksmith, and other artisans vital to village life.
Although social equality is rare in qanat-watered villages, village
cooperation is a necessary adaptation to the ecological and social
demands of this water technology. This social cohesion, and the
water systems they are designed to preserve, defined the lifeworlds of
Iranian villagers.
When communal efforts fail, village water supplies diminish and
in some cases the settlements are abandoned. Government land
reform programs in the 1960s, for example, required written deeds
to determine water ownership. Some settlements honestly or other
wise produced deeds that taken together made up more than
twenty-fours hours of water a day. The resulting chaos led to violent
ownership disputes and sometimes to total social breakdown. In
other very small settlements where disputes over water rights oc
curred, lotteries were held on the autumnal equinox in an effort to
distribute scarcity more equitably. Water owners formed a circle,
and at a signal from the village headman threw out any number of
fingers on one or two hands. Starting with the headman, the fingers
were counted around the circle of owners. Counting off the result
ant total, the person at the end of the count received water on the
first hour of the first day of the rotation. The lottery continued until
each man had a definite time to receive water. Needless to say, own
ers near the end of the rotation usually received no water.
CONCLUSION
Qanats are renewable water supply systems that have sustained
agricultural settlement on the Iranian plateau for millennia. By their
very nature, qanats have encouraged sustainable water use. Their
major limitations are that they are expensive to build and produce
relatively small amounts of water. As a result, few qanats are being
built today. Instead, qanats are being replaced by deep wells which
produce more water to meet the current demand and support more

  



   

intensive patterns of land use.
These deep wells mine water from fossil aquifers at rates well
beyond replacement levels. Most are drilled in basin areas where
water tables are close to the surface. As aquifers are drained, the
qanats of alluvial fan settlements that share the same aquifer dry up
when the water table lowers, and settlements eventually disappear.
The communal patterns of social adaptation that bound together the
lifeworlds of Iranian villagers for centuries disappear as well. In fact,
evidence suggests that deep wells have made many small farmers
dependent on well owners, have failed to increase agricultural pro
duction significantly, and bode poorly for the long term survival of
many long-established settlements (Ehlers and Saidi 1989; Kielstra
1989). The desire for short term benefits has prevailed; the long
term costs remain to be seen.
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ABSTRACT
This paper explores why Iran was a particularly fertile ground for repeated visitation of cholera in the 19th century.
Along with certain unique Iranian cultural and religious factors, the author demonstrates how Iranian urban ecology,
particularly the qanat system, contributed to the fatal spread of the epidemic. These multi-faceted conditions, the author
concludes, resulted in distinct modes of disease transmission and mortality in Iran.

“The cholera is the best of all sanitary reformers; it overlooks no
mistake and pardons no oversight.”
The Times (London), 5 September 1848
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the subject of national identity and the verity of
topographical boundaries as reflections of a tangible identity has
been an immense source of controversy among academics (Jackson
and Penrose 1994; Anderson 1991; Hobsbawm 1993; Ranger 1992).
The Middle East has been at the heart of this debate, principally due
to the nature of its shifting national frontiers and the relative youth
of a number of its nation-states (Khalidi 1997; Bozdogan and Kasaba
1997). It should come as no surprise, therefore, that aside from the
obvious cultural, linguistic, and historic antecedents, the physical
environment of the Middle East has also been utilized by scholars as
an identity-building apparatus.1 In this paper I hope to expand this
debate by looking at a Middle Eastern national entity’s unique expe
rience with a pathogen during the great pandemics of the 19th cen
tury. By examining Iran’s encounter with the Cholera bacillus, this
paper will reveal environmental and cultural factors that made Iran’s
experience with Asiatic cholera distinct from that of other countries
across the globe which were gripped by the same microbe.
I seek to demonstrate how the Islamic disposition toward “sa
cred-law” as the yardstick for purity, together with the lack of any
sanitary base, made Iran a fertile ground for repeated visitations of
cholera. Aside from Iran’s own unique legacy, the attributes which
predisposed it to repeated invasions of Asiatic cholera can also be
used as an opportunity to assess the larger Middle Eastern legacy with
epidemic diseases, which sets it apart from its European, Asian, and
African counterparts. Furthermore, in evaluating these cultural and
environmental factors, one can see the emergence of a degree of
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One does not need to look any farther
than the colloquial use of the great riversystems from the “Oxus to the Nile” in
delineating the geographical-cultural
boundaries of the Middle East.





continuity in Iranian urban ecology as well as in its human dimen
sions, embodied by its religious ideologies, which stem from Avestan
and Talmudic traditions. More than anything else, these continuities
attest to the importance of considering historical trends in the ecol
ogy of illness in the Middle East, so as to better understand current
environmental issues in that region.
ORIGINS OF THE ASIATIC CHOLERA PANDEMICS
The cradle of cholera’s numerous visitations in the 19th century
can be traced to the banks of the Ganges River where the Cholera
bacillus had been thriving for centuries in its warm waters and the
intestines of its neighborly human hosts. A “fecal-oral” disease,
cholera is passed from the excrement of its victims into the food or
water source of a community whereby it is ingested by a slew of new
victims. The bacteria eventually find refuge in their hosts’ digestive
tracts, at which point the warm alkaline environment of the small
intestine provides the ideal environment for the germs to multiply
with great rapidity. Ironically, it is not the presence of the bacterium
that causes the demise of its victims; rather it is the host’s immune
response that unleashes the lethal poison of the germ. Consequently,
the most violent symptoms of cholera emerge as a result of the
bacterial cells’ destruction by the immune system, which releases the
powerful toxin that they contain. It is this venom that causes the
lethal manifestations of the disease (Snowden 1995). The pallet of
these symptoms, which includes massive vomiting, diarrhea, and the
blue-gray pallor of its victims, paints an abysmal picture. Indeed,
one could say that the victims of the disease bear the very faces of
death as a result of the loss of a quarter of their body fluid, which is
the cause of the emaciated, blue-gray pallor and sunken eyes of the
stricken. The Hippocratic signs of impending death are further
brought to bear with the comatose and apathetic state of cholera’s
victims (Snowden 1995).
The penetration of the East-India Company into innerHindustan and the globalization of trade with the Indian sub-conti
nent, provided the Cholera bacillus with a suitable vector through
which it could spread on an international scale.2 Maritime trade
with India, which provided fast ships and frequent ports of call,
allowed infected goods, such as recycled clothing or foodstuffs, to be
spread from port to port. Furthermore, the relative rapidity of travel
from India to a variety of ports of call, such as southern Iran, al
lowed infected human vectors also to serve as reservoirs for the
spread of the disease. This vector was especially significant during
the heyday of the anti-contagionist philosophy regarding cholera, in
the mid-19th century, which had partly emerged as a result of the
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Of course this trend in global pandemics is
nothing new. Ever since the first civiliza
tions and emergence of global trade,
disease has accompanied human quests to
penetrate new markets. The genesis of
Black Death in medieval Europe was a
product of the newly globalized economic
position of Europe, through Venetian trade
in the Crimea, which incidentally (and
fatefully) was also the port of call for
caravans from China and central Asia.
Patterns of epidemics and their impact on
civilization have been beautifully exposed in
recent works by William McNeill and
Alfred Crosby. Unfortunately, the views on
the nature and impact of disease on
civilization seem to be fairly uniform, and
the field is certainly in need of some
dissenting views as to the nature and
impact of these diseases on humanity; see
W. H. McNeill, Plagues and peoples (New
York: Doubleday, 1979) and Alfred W.
Crosby, Ecological imperialism: the biological
expansion of Europe, 900–1900 (Cam
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

  



   

futility of quarantines and was to some extent due to the epidemic’s
selective impact.3
GROUNDWORK FOR AN EPIDEMIC
Iran was perfect territory for acquiring and subsequently “ex
porting” epidemics to other continents. Known as the “crossroad of
civilizations” on account of its central position within the Eurasian
plateau and its strategic position in the path of the historic trade and
invasion routes, Iran had a long history of also being on the “cross
road” of global pandemics. In classical times it was The Plague of
Justinian that crossed this land, followed by the medieval bubonic
plagues, and, in the 1880s, an influenza pandemic. This singular
position in the path of visitations was also due to Iran’s territorial
vastness. With a geographical area of about 1,648,000 km2 and a
frontier length of roughly 4,440 km, about half of which rested on
the shores of the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, the Iran of the
1890s presented many venues for the overland and maritime importation of disease into its lands. During this time, the Iranian domin
ions bordered the Russian Empire to the north, Mesopotamian and
Anatolian districts of the Ottoman Empire to the west, and Afghanistan and British India to the east. Regrettably, this meant that Iran
was in an ideal position to acquire epidemics from the east and
subsequently export them to European territories through its exten
sive common border with the Russian Empire.
The cholera pandemics of the 19th century illustrate Iran’s role
as Europe’s “hazardous underbelly.” Indeed, during the very first
cholera pandemic (1830–1837), Europe acquired the disease
through the common Russo-Iranian border. This event was replayed
during the fifth European cholera epidemic (1869–74), when the
disease entered Europe via Iran and Russia. In 1892, Iran again
served as the transit point for cholera’s westward journey.4 Natu
rally, it was a new-found position in the global maritime trade
economy which had played an important role in sustaining Iran’s
key position in the export of cholera to Europe. Indeed, the BritishIndian commerce, with its important relay ports in the Persian Gulf,
served as a critical vector for the propagation of Asiatic cholera from
its home in India to Iran. Consequently, visitations of cholera usu
ally began their European-bound journeys in Persian Gulf ports that
had important commercial links with British India. However, it
should be acknowledged that British trade alone was not solely
responsible for abetting the epidemic. Iran’s central position in the
Islamic pilgrimage route from the east also served as an important
vector for the importation of cholera from India.
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In contrast to the blind and indiscriminate
ravages of the medieval Black Death,
cholera’s victims in Western Europe and
North America belonged to the category
of the poor and disenfranchised. Catego
rized as “the dangerous classes” by the
Victorian elite, this group, more than any
other, was feared as a source of radical
predisposition and social unrest; see Evans
1988.
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Contrary to the accusations of 19th
century sanitarians, the Ottoman Empire
and Russia, rather than Iran, bore the
brunt of the responsibility in cholera’s
westward transmission. Indeed, although
Iran lacked effective sanitary defense
mechanisms to protect it from the eastern
flow of the epidemic, it very frequently
acquired the disease from its northern and
western neighbor.


The pilgrimage to Mecca, better known as the hajj, is one of the
five pillars of the Islamic faith. After the opening of the Suez Canal
in 1869 and the development of effective railway routes in the
Caucasus and between Alexandria and Port Said, many wealthier
pilgrims from Iran, Afghanistan, and central Asia took advantage of
this circuitous, but more comfortable, northern route to Mecca
(Farahani 1990). Characteristically, pilgrims travelling this route
would leave Tehran by caravan or horse carriage to the Caspian port
of Enzeli. From there, a Russian steamer would transport them to
Baku, where they could acquire railroad passage through the
Caucasus to the port of Batum in Turkey. From Batum a steamer
would transport them to Istanbul and onward to Alexandria in
Egypt. From Alexandria, they could continue by rail to the Suez,
where maritime passage could be obtained to Yanbo and Jedda, and
from those ports caravan transportation could be obtained to Mecca
(Farahani 1990).
With the ubiquity of the steamer and railroad in the Middle East,
not only did pilgrimage to Mecca become faster, but cholera’s
spread also achieved a greater velocity and diffusion throughout the
region. On that account, the 1871 and the 1892 cholera epidemics
followed this new pilgrimage route into Iran, either disseminated by
pilgrims coming back through the Red Sea or carried by Mecca
bound travelers from northern India and Afghanistan (Lorimer
1915). Incidentally, Iran’s unique Shi’ite sectarian identity also
served to further compromise its people to the threat of cholera
visitations. This was due to Shi’ite ziyarats (devotional visits) to the
holy shrines Najaf and Karbala in Mesopotamia, which provided a
regular flow of traffic to cholera stricken areas. Located near the
banks of the Euphrates and the Gulf, these areas were usually a focal
point for pandemics originating in India, and, as could be observed in
the 1899 epidemic, as one of the vectors for cholera’s journey into Iran.
As such, for a variety of reasons Iran was ripe for the visitations
of cholera; nonetheless, the question remains: why were these epi
demics still occurring in the 1890s, at a time when the scourge of
Asiatic cholera had largely been arrested throughout Western
Europe and North America?5 Why was it that, unlike the Western
European powers, Iranian authorities could not halt the flow of the
outbreak? The answer to these questions can be found in Iran’s weak
central administration and in its sanitary neglect and lack of medical
facilities, which together with religious and cultural factors predis
posed and perpetuated Asiatic cholera among the Iranian populace.
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Nevertheless, recent work by Snowden
shows that epidemics of Asiatic cholera
continued in Europe, well into the 20th
century. Asiatic cholera in epidemic form
also appeared in Hamburg in 1892; see
Snowden 1995 and Evans 1987.

  



   

WEAK CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION
The Qajar dynasty (1796–1925) was marred by a feeble and
hampered central government, which was essentially at the whim of
the various “peripheral” power centers. Nasir al-Din Shah’s (1831–
1896) reign was not an exception. In the north, Russian and Otto
man hegemony and meddling in administrative matters, together
with Turkoman and Kurdish raids, weakened his government’s hold
on the region. In central and southern provinces of Iran, the
Bakhtiyari, Qashqa’i, and Khamsa tribal confederacies, together with
British interests in the Gulf and Baluchistan regions, were wholly
unsympathetic and even antagonistic toward any measure that
would extend the central government’s administrative hold and
threaten their position. This weakness vis à vis the provinces was
also perpetuated by the custom of assigning princes as provincialgovernors or simply auctioning ministerial appointments to inept
administrators. Although in theory these governors were representa
tives of the Crown and accountable to the Shah, in practice they
were fairly autonomous. This abuse was sustained in part by virtue
of Nasir al-Din’s own dislike of bureaucracy and tendency toward a
balance-of-power principle that rarely placed overwhelming author
ity in the hands of any one party. Consequently, any attempt by
reform-minded premiers to increase the power of the central gov
ernment met its demise at the hand of magnates and the European
powers in the peripheries whose stronger influence in court circles
overwrote ministerial authority (Bakhash 1978; Nashat 1982;
Amanat 1997).
The deficiency of the Iranian administration was also reflected in
the delay of organized response to the crisis of epidemics in the 19th
century. Indeed, it was only in 1868 that the first National Sanitary
Council (Majlis-i hifz al-sihha) assembled in Tehran. The Council,
headed by Dr. Joseph Desiree Tholozan, the Shah’s chief physician,
composed a report in which a summary of past epidemics was
brought to light together with the need for sanitary and quarantine
improvements as a means of preventing the future flow of cholera
(Tholozan 1995). Although theoretically sound, the Council’s pro
posals could never be executed owing to the lack of authority on the
part of the central government to enforce intrusive and restrictive
measures in the provinces. Furthermore, the failure of defensive
implementation was also due to the Council’s lack of mandate and
to irregular meetings, which invariably only took place when a fullblown epidemic was already at hand. It was not until 1904, in accor
dance with the provisions of the 1903 International Sanitary
Convention of Paris, that a regularly meeting Iranian Sanitary
Council was inaugurated (Gilmour 1925). This paucity in regulation
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explains the inability to enforce quarantine measures in Iran during
periods of crisis such as the 1889 cholera epidemic when “a quaran
tine station [that] had been established by the Persian Government
was so contrived that it did not hinder at all the traffic carried on
between Persia and Mesopotamia” (Dickson 1893–94).6 Moreover,
in a culture that condoned “tax-farming” as a means of acquiring
revenue, it was deemed acceptable to auction off the administration
of quarantines to the highest bidder. Hence, those who were ap
pointed to supervise cordons sanitaires during periods of crisis usu
ally managed them for personal profit, and orders issued by the
central government were not always obeyed (Camposampiero 1893–
94).7 Ironically, the Government’s weak authority sometimes com
pelled “peripheral” powers, such as the various regional tribes, to
assume the management of sanitary measures and quarantines to
protect their own people.
Dr. Camposampiero relates as an instance of the efficiency of
cordons sanitaires, that when cholera prevailed at Mashad, the chiefs
of the tribes of Bujnurd and Ghuskan, in the neighborhood of that
city, interrupted all interaction between their camps and the infected
places, and thus kept themselves free of the outbreak
(Camposampiero 1893-94).
This administrative weakness vis à vis sanitation and response to
epidemics was part of a larger “pathology,” the symptoms of which
expressed themselves in the urban sanitary decay that characterized
many cities in Iran.8
URBAN SANITATION AND NEGLECT
The occurrence and intensity of Asiatic cholera in the Iran of the
Qajar period refutes the commonly assumed link with 19th century
urbanization and its associate the Industrial Revolution. Although
an accurate population census of Iran in the 19th century is lacking,
an estimate in 1867 puts the total population at 4 million, with a
mere 850,000 souls inhabiting the principal cities.9 Indeed, urban
ization and the pattern of city growth observable in Western Europe
did not occur in Iran until well into the 20th century. Even as late as
1925, only 2.5 million were urban dwellers, out of a population of
about 11.8 million, indicating that the Iranians had kept the charac
teristic pattern of 21% in metropolitan settlements (Ehlers and
Floor 1993). Furthermore, urban populations were not concentrated
in any one Iranian city. Instead, masses were equally distributed
among a number of regional centers. For example, in 1913,
Tehran—Iran’s capital and most populated city—boasted 350,000
inhabitants (Issawi 1976; Curzon II). Now, taking the 21% “urban
dwellers factor” together with an appraisal of the total Iranian
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The inefficient quarantine enforcements
were certainly not limited to the Iranian
case. During his travel through Egypt from
Mecca in 1886 Mirza Mohammad Hosayn
Farahani tells us that: “When officials are
posted to the quarantine, it is as if they
[had been appointed] officials in charge of
fleecing and plundering the pilgrims. One of
the circumstances that makes this clear is
that the authorities of the quarantine,
especially the chief doctor, take something
from the captains of the steamers so they
won’t cause any trouble: If someone dies
during the two days stopped at the
quarantine, they don’t renew the period
and do not delay the steamer; see
Farahani 1990: 291.
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On the concept of tax farming and the
purchase of offices, Curzon tells us that
“so long as the gift of office is largely
determined by the strength of the purse,
corrupt administration must prevail, and
honest men will go to the wall.” See
Curzon 1892, I: 498.
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The issue of urban decay was not unique
to the Iranian context. Indeed, throughout
the Middle East, sound urban planning was
a prime concern that came to light
following European models of urban and
sanitary renewal; see Rosenthal 1980: 22.
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The first national census of Iran was held in
1956; see Bharier 1968 and Issawi 1971:
28–29.

  



   

population in 1890 at nine million, we can safely estimate that the
total population living in cities and large towns as late as the 1890s
stood at about 1.9 million.
Obviously, with an overwhelming segment of Iranians leading a
rural or sedentary life, the urban significance, with respect to the
Iranian experience with Asiatic cholera, might be questioned. How
ever, this issue is immediately resolved by the very nature of the
“center-periphery” relationship in 19th-century Iran. Most impor
tantly, villages, rural settlements, and even nomadic tribes, together
with larger towns and cities were part of an organic system that
depended on one another for survival. Owing to this mutual depen
dence, urban centers in Iran were the site for bazaars in which farm
ers and herders sold their harvest and cattle to feed the cities in
exchange for the manufactured commodities of urban artisans,
which they brought back to their tents and villages. As a result of its
role, the bazaar became a regular icon of the Iranian urban land
scape, ensuring frequent interaction between the “centers” and the
“peripheries.” This meant that when a cholera epidemic broke out
in a town or city, the bazaars became centers of infection, through
which peasants and nomads carried the disease to the surrounding
villages and campgrounds (Clemow 1893–94).
Trying to depict the urban sanitary condition during the Qajar
era may seem like a gargantuan task in itself. Nevertheless, in a
country of vastly contrasting climes and environments, which is
mirrored by the variety of regionally determined designs of its urban
landscape, the features of municipal sanitation (or lack thereof)
remain remarkably similar throughout Iran. Tehran of the 1890s is a
prime example of the unsanitary condition observable throughout
urban centers in the Qajar era. As Curzon remarks: “That the city
has yet much to do before it realizes the full aspiration of its royal
Hausmann is evident as soon as we enter the gates” (Curzon 1892).
By comparing Nasir al-Din Shah to Baron Hausmann, famed sani
tarian and architect of Paris, Curzon’s taunt was unwittingly appro
priate. Indeed, although the city had undergone some
reconstruction in 1870s, which included the widening of some
streets and the inauguration of several parks, on the whole, Tehran
remained a city devoid of sanitary planning or municipal mainte
nance (Nashat 1982). Dirty streets, stagnant and contaminated pools
of water, and a suffocating atmosphere characterized its scorched
summer months. Tehran’s oppression reached such intolerable
levels that it was commonplace for anyone who could afford it to
escape the city for the cool shelter of the surrounding mountains,
leaving behind the aromas of putrefying matter and the constant
harassment of flies and mosquitoes (Polak 1865). Furthermore, with
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the exception of the cities of Isfahan and Rasht—which obtained
their water exclusively from wells—highly unsanitary subterranean
aqueducts, known as qanats, conducted the crucial municipal water
supplies throughout most of Iran (Wulf 1968; Goblot 1979).
Since antiquity, qanats had been used as a method of securing
water from distant places (See English, this volume). Their shelter
ing character allowed the water to traverse through warm climes
with the least amount of loss due to evaporation. These channels
were constructed by sinking vertical shafts every twenty or thirty
yards and connecting them by tunneling (Gilmour 1925). Tehran’s
own water supply originated from streams and underground springs
in the Shemiran slopes at the foot of the Elburz range to the north of
the city. Departing from the aforementioned sources, the qanats
conveyed water to the city, branching off among the important
streets where they remained underground but very close to the
surface. Once within the municipal boundaries, water from the
qanats could be obtained by moving stone slabs that covered the
channels traversing under the streets and alleys. Frequently nothing
covered the qanats within city confines. In wealthier districts of
Tehran, water was led to the houses through underground networks,
whereas in the poorer neighborhoods, the water reached the surface
and traveled in gutters on both sides of the street (Gilmour 1925).
This water served the dual purpose of consumption and domestic
usage; and hence, by its very nature and use the qanat system per
petuated infection among urban dwellers. Indeed, a chemical analy
sis of water, conducted in 1924, from six qanats as they entered
Tehran revealed water of potable quality in only two cases. In three
other cases the water purity was questionable and in one case the
water was definitely unfit for drinking. These results were especially
shocking due to the fact that these samples were taken from closed
qanats before they were open to contamination (Gilmour 1925).
This meant that even before entering the city, water purity had been
pre-ordained, and protection from pathogens was not necessarily a
correlate with income levels or neighborhood, since the same source
which supplied the poor in the southern districts of Tehran also
found its way into the city’s wealthiest mansions. More than anything else, it was this system of water supply that was the main conveyor of the cholera epidemic, mainly due to the “fecal-oral” cycle of
the infection, whereby the cholera bacterium had to be ingested by
an unsuspecting host. As John Snow (1813–1858) had suggested in
his investigations of outbreaks in England, more often than not it
was the polluted drinking water of a community that was respon
sible for the outbreaks.10
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During the 1848 cholera epidemic, which
claimed 53,000 victims in England and
Wales, Snow published several pamphlets
and papers (On mode of communication of
cholera), in which he claimed that the
disease was a specific water-borne
infection that was distinct from other
fevers. During the 1854 epidemic he was
able to support his argument through two
famous epidemiological investigations. The
most famous of the two was the mapping
of the occurrence of cholera in his own
neighborhood of Soho and tracing the
guilty party to a single contaminated well in
Broad (now Broadwick) Street.He
accomplished this by finding visitors who
had drunk from the well and succumbed to
the disease, and by showing that the
workers at the local brewery, who had
unrestricted access to beer as a prerequi
site for their job, were relatively immune.
His careful and detailed analysis convinced
local aldermen that the well was the source
of cholera and they removed the handle to
the well’s water-pump (see Bynum 1994).

  



   

Throughout Iran, even if the qanat water was uninfected before
entering the cities, it had ample opportunities to get contaminated
while traversing the urban streets. With the lack of proper sewage
and waste disposal throughout Iranian municipalities, the cholera
bacterium easily made its way into the drinking water (Morton
1940). In the city of Bouroudjird, for example, the household sew
age drained freely onto the streets towards the middle of the city,
where an immense pit received all the waste, which was subse
quently left there to be sterilized by sunlight (Fuevrier 1894). More
over, if the bacterium was not already in the water system through
the thin porous pavement, the tradition of watering the roads for
cleaning purposes would then introduce the infection into the thinly
covered qanats and drinking gutters lining the throughways. Indeed,
the drinking gutters, which supplied the poorer districts in Iran,
were open to all kinds of contamination. In the city of
Muhammareh, for example, the only form of sewage was a channel
cut down the middle of each street, which was generally choked up
except after rain. In another city, Shushtar, the streets became recep
tacles for domestic sewage, which was left on-site until rainwater
washed the foul matter away. Obviously, open waterways were ex
posed to dirt and rainwater and the waste that was left on the streets,
but where nature did not carry infection it was the inhabitants
themselves who contaminated their drinking water directly. In
Tehran, for example, it was not unusual to see children playing in
the gutters or people washing their animals or dirty linens in them;
in some cases the linens would be the clothes of a victim who had
succumbed to cholera and hence strewn with fecal matter. More
blatant forms of pollution came in the form of direct introduction
of feces into the waterways. Indeed, the Persian word for latrine was
Kinar-i ab, “the water’s edge.” Hence, it was not unusual to see
children defecating in the gutters, which a little farther up were
being used for drinking purposes or pre-prayer ablution. Further
more, cemeteries were often built next to the very waterways that
supplied drinking water to the community. In the city of Hamadan,
for example, the municipality’s largest cemetery was built next to the
banks of the main waterway entering the city. This trait made mu
nicipal waterways highly compromised and open to infection espe
cially via soil infection and “corpse washing” using the river’s
water.11 To the untrained contemporary European mind, the univer
sal disregard for sanitation might was passed off as a simple case of
“oriental ignorance;” however, the lack of proper precautions found
its source in cultural and religious beliefs of the Iranians which were
at the very center of the popular conception of cleanliness (nizafat)
and pollution (nijasat), doctrines, which, when put to the test,
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American legation with safe drinking water
free of charge (see Pearson 1903).





proved to be more than effective in guarding the health of an urban
population; however, it was Asiatic Cholera which proved to be the
singular Achilles’ Heel in Islamic conceptions of purity.12
RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL PREDISPOSING FACTORS
When Dr. James E. Baker disdainfully observed that “Persians
‘religiously’ hold to the idea that running water cannot be defiled,”
he could not have known the irony of his statement (Baker 1886).
Indeed, at the very root of the Islamic Iranian sanitary culture lay
the belief that running water could be considered immaculate for
rituals and consumption unless its color, taste, or smell indicated the
presence of impurities. Furthermore, water from stagnant sources
such as ponds, reservoirs, and wells was also considered pure, like
running water, so long as its volume occupied at least one korr (350
liters), the religiously prescribed volumetric quantity that assured
purity. Accordingly, to be considered clean, the water that was
stored from qanats, in home reservoirs, also had to agree with the
quantitative delineation of purity (Poonawala 1991). Consequently,
basins were always guarded from dropping below 1 korr, which
assured that the water was potable, no matter how long it had stood
stagnant. This faith, rooted in the hadith (prophetic traditions)
explains why Iranians did not conceptualize the idea of jubs or
qanats as sources of infection and propagation of disease, for such a
notion would have challenged their very system of beliefs. Indeed,
the 19th century witnessed an almost obsessive concern with “ritual”
purity or taharat. Indeed, the innumerable fatwas (edicts) and reli
gious prescripts are an indication of the preoccupation of the ‘ulama
with the subject of cleanliness and the influence of these opinions on
the general public at this time.13 Nevertheless, a minority of Irani
ans—such as Nasir al-Din Shah—did espouse the European concep
tion of water-born infections and as a result they employed a saqqa
(water-carrier), whose task was to ensure the drinking water’s purity
by bringing it from the source where the qanat first came to the
surface.14
The same Islamic tradition that delineated the guidelines for
water purity also required that Iranians copiously wash the bodies of
the deceased before burial. This system, coupled with the staunch
belief in the purity of running water, led many to wash the bodies of
their loved ones who had died of cholera in jubs and streams which
supplied the urban qanats. In addition, faith in the purity of running
water also allowed graves to be dug right above the city qanats and
close to other sources of drinking water, without any concern for
pollution (Bell 1894). Unfortunately, faith in the purity of running
or voluminous water, along with the religious obligation to wash the
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It should be recognized that even water
polluted by the cholera bacillus in itself
cannot give rise to illness since under
normal conditions stomach acids should
destroy the germs. However, prolonged
periods of malnutrition and famine lower
stomach acidity and breech the body’s
normally effective defense mechanisms.
Famine and malnutrition were chronic
problems in nineteenth century Iran and it
should come as no surprise that cholera
outbreaks paralleled periods of drought
and dearth.
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Some examples of this genre are: AlBihbanani, Risala fi kayfiyyat wujub al-tahara
(Manuscript: Sepahsalar 2487); Al-Ansari,
al-Tahara (Ed. Tabriz, 1303); Al-Rashti, alTahara (Manuscript: Masjid-I Aízam 367).
Even the late Imam Khomeini had a
fascination (a common theme with the
‘ulama as we have seen) with the subject
of ritual cleanliness and purity in daily life,
see Khomeini, K. al-Tahara (Qom-Najaf,
1382–90).
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The father of Amin ul-Soltan, had started
his career as the Sakka Bashi (chief watercarrier) of Nasir al-Din shah (see Feuvrier,
Trois Ans: 187).

  



   

dead, would prove disastrous during cholera epidemics. The high
casualty rates during Iran’s encounter with these visitations are a
testament to the role of the unsanitary condition of the urban water
supply in perpetuating and abetting Asiatic cholera.
Although cholera’s etiology made it principally rely on the inter
mediary of drinking water to be disseminated, the Shi’ite tradition
of seeking entombment in the holy cities of Karbala and Mashhad
gave Asiatic cholera in Iran the unique opportunity to continue to
use a person as a vector for transmission, long after he or she had
been “dead and buried.”
Even when they are buried, the bodies are not allowed to
rest in peace. The richer families hold it a point of honor to
lay the bones of their relations in some holy place—Kerbela
[sic.], where Hussein was slain, or the sacred shrine of
Meshed [sic.]. They therefore commit them only tempo
rarily to the earth, laying them in shallow graves, and cover
ing them with an arched roof of brickwork, which practice
accounts for the horrible smell around graveyards after an
outbreak of cholera. A few months later and long before
tome has killed the germs of disease, the bodies are taken
up, wrapped in sackcloth, and carried, slung across the
backs of mules, to their distant resting place, sowing not
improbably the seeds of a fresh outbreak as they go.
(Bell 1894)
Essentially, these mule-driven caravans traveled from city to city
in Iran, collecting the deceased and a small sum of money in ex
change for a promise to the family of the departed that their loved
ones would be buried in one of the Holy Cities (Mashhad or
Karbala) for which they were bound. Often, the bodies were en
closed in an imperfectly nailed box, so as to facilitate transport, an
operation that was accomplished by tying a pair of the coffins to the
sides of a mule (Sheil 1856). The obvious result of this engagement
was that caravans of stench and disease were continuously streaming
across Iran, carrying and spreading infection at every halt. Some
times the owners of the transports would decide to dispose of the
corpse short of the promised destination so as to cut the costs of
labor and conveyance. On these occasions, it is quite conceivable
that the bodies were disposed of in rivers and streams, which might
have also supplied drinking water of a town or village.15
Cholera in Iran did not always go hand in hand with what con
temporary European observers labeled as a culture of unsanitary
praxis. Sometimes, the pursuit of cleanliness, and the virtues of
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During the 1870 cholera epidemic, Dr.
Dickson—chief physician to the British
legation—credits the exhumation of
bodies (victims of cholera) to be buried at
a holy site, with the renewed outbreak of
cholera in Iran. (Great Britain, The Public
Record Office, Foreign Office, General
Correspondence; Dickson to Granville, FO
60/326, no. 282).


bathing proved just as lethal as burial practices and the pollution of
water. Indeed, the hammam (public bathhouse) in Iran became an
important center for the propagation of cholera during times of
epidemic. This condition came about for a variety of reasons, which
included the customary location of the hammams, below the street
level, so as to facilitate pumping and carrying water; a characteristic
that also allowed sewage and garbage to have easy access to these
locales (Gilmour 1925). Furthermore, the tubs in the hammam were
usually filled with tepid water that was recycled from previous bath
ers, and it was not uncommon to see the sick or diseased bathing
side by side with the healthy, especially since many traditional rem
edies for cholera recommended bathing (Baker 1886). Hence, not
only did Iran’s physical construct help spread cholera, but also a
variety of cultural factors made people more predisposed to the
disease. The only questions that remain, in this regard, are the fac
tors for the limited frequency of outbreaks and the reasons for Iran
is never becoming an endemic region for cholera.
CONCLUSION
For students of medical history, the Victorian era, roughly span
ning from the 1830s to the closing years of the 19th century, is a
period of prodigious innovation and advances in the medical sci
ences. This period marks the beginnings of the Christian and Mus
lim worlds’ divorce from the Galenic ethos, which had dominated
their medical practice for over two millennia. Essentially, the foun
dations of various disciplines of contemporary medical sciences
were built in the 19th century, and no discipline characterizes this
debut more than the field of epidemiology and public health.16
Obviously, we should not confound our “modern” image of the
epidemiologists with the Victorian “sanitary physicians,” nor should
we lead ourselves into believing that this “sanitary” outlook emerged
overnight. Nevertheless, most historians of medicine would agree
that the cholera pandemics of the 19th century were instrumental in
the emergence of this new intellectual-scientific trend. Indeed, the
sanitary-physician of the 19th century emerged in part as a result of
active campaigns on the part of European governments to prevent
the flow of epidemics into their lands. Moreover, these sanitary
physicians, together with the active participation of their ruling
administrations, took dynamic measures to change their environ
ment and augment the sanitary standards of their citizens.
During the 19th century Iran was not isolated from these emerg
ing intellectual trends in medicine. The Dar al-Fonun, or the Poly
technic College of Tehran, with its Europeanized medical school
and Austrian instructors, is indicative of the change insofar as the
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For an in-depth exposition of medicine and
public health in Victorian England, see W.
F. Bynum’s Science and the practice of
medicine in the nineteenth century,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1994. A more focused account of the
foundations of epidemiological science in
Victorian England is presented in David E.
Lilienfeld, The greening of epidemiology:
sanitary physicians and the London
Epidemiological Society, (1830–1870),
Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 1975, 52:
503–528 and A. Dodin and J. Brossollet,
L’epidemie de cholera de 1832, ou la
naissance de l’epidemiologie moderne, in
Hommage à Marcel Baltazard, Paris, Institut
Pasteur, 1972.

  



   

medical curriculum was concerned. The issue that remains perplex
ing is the seeming lack of Iranian impetus in putting new ideas
dealing with sanitation and public health into practice.17 This is a
discrepancy, which, I propose, can be solved by comparing the
Iranian experience with cholera with its European counterparts.
Indeed, a corresponding look into the subject reveals that part of the
European motivation in creating a “sanitary police” emerged out of
the cholera’s selectivity in that it impacted the lower ranks of Euro
pean society more than its notable classes. The obvious repercus
sions of such discriminate casualties were that they bred an inherent
suspicion and hatred of the “upper classes,” which were not affected
by the epidemics. European governments felt that in due course
such resentments would lead to insubordination and rebellions, and
in some cases such uprisings, due to cholera, were actually experi
enced. Hence, there was a very tangible self-preserving interest on
the part of the European governments to institute change. Cholera
in Iran, on the other hand, selected its victims on a much more
democratic basis. Epidemics affected prince and peasant regardless
of class or status; hence, the motivation to improve the foundations
of public health was much less pressing. Obviously, this is but one
symptom of a more general pathology within the Qajar government,
which prevented it from instituting adequate sanitary measures.18
Nevertheless, it gives us yet another perspective on the uniquely
Iranian response, which emerged from its experience with the visita
tions of Asiatic cholera.
It should be reemphasized that Iran’s experience with repeated
visitations of Asiatic cholera, which included a distinct mode of
transmission and mortality, indicates that pathogens and patterns
of illness do somewhat legitimize boundaries and cartographic
delineations. In essence this signifies that in as much as the cultures
and national identities in the Middle East mirror the ecology and
environment of that region, these distinguishing cultural and envi
ronmental features in turn give rise to unique physical and social
responses to contagious diseases that further distinguish individual
countries. The transmission of Asiatic cholera in 19th-century Iran,
therefore, becomes a measure of that country’s unique environmen
tal and cultural identity. Consequently, Iran’s central position on
the Eurasian plateau, its unique practice of water husbandry, its
predominantly Shi’i faith, together with a weak central administra
tion during the 19th century, have direct bearing on Asiatic cholera’s
pathogenesis and transmission in that country.
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An active countrywide attempt at arresting
the progress of epidemic diseases only
occurs in the 1970s under the leadership of
Dr. Joseph Desiree Tholozan, the Shah’s
French physician, and E’tezad al-Saltana, the
Shah’s staunchly conservative Minister of
Science. For more on the roots of Iran’s
sanitary regime, see my upcoming article:
Defending the Guarded Domain: Epidemics
and The Emergence of an International
Sanitary Police in Iran.
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Obviously, the lack of adequate state
revenues and the decentralized “tribal”
nature of Qajar polity were also great
obstacles to the implementation of
adequate sanitary measures. Homa Nateq
gives a more conspiratorial reason for the
administrative inaction to the threat of
cholera by showing the epidemics as a
“tool” used by the ruling class to distract
the populace from administrative
corruption and abuse. See Homa Nateq,
Mosibat-e Vaba va Balay-e Hokoomat
(Tehran: Nashr-e Gostareh, 1977).
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This distinct experience with illness can be
seen in Iran’s encounter with the 1918–
1919 influenza pandemic. During Influenza’s
visitation, Iran had distinct patterns of comorbidity and significantly higher mortality
as compared to other countries that were
gripped by the pandemic; see my upcoming
article in the Bulletin of the History of
Medicine, Compromised constitutions: the
Iranian experience with the 1918–1919
Influenza Pandemic.
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Hydrostrategic Decisionmaking and the Arab-Israeli Conflict
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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the idea of hydrostrategic territory (that is, territory over which sovereignty has been sought
politically or militarily solely because of its access to water sources) and its role in the establishment of national bound
aries, warfare, and negotiations in the Jordan River watershed. It argues that although water resources constitute a
critical factor in interstate tensions and relations in the region, they have never served as the sole determinant in
strategic affairs. No boundaries have been drawn, no military strategies pursued, and no negotiating positions espoused
solely on hydrostrategic grounds.

INTRODUCTION
“Water” and “war” are topics being assessed together with in
creasing frequency. Articles in the academic literature (Cooley 1984;
Gleick 1993; Starr 1991; and others) and the popular press (Bulloch
and Darwish 1993; World Press Review 1995) point to water not
only as a cause of historic armed conflict, but as the resource which
will bring combatants to the battlefield in the 21st century. Invari
ably, writings on “water wars” point to the arid and hostile Middle
East as an example of a worst-case scenario, where armies have in
fact been mobilized and shots fired over this precious resource.
Elaborate “hydraulic imperative” theories have been developed for
the region which cite water as the prime motivator for military
strategy and territorial conquest.
The argument is thus: water is a resource vital to a nation’s sur
vival, from its inhabitants’ biology to their economy; the scarcity of
water in an arid environment, often referred to as “water stress,”
leads to intense political pressures; the Middle East is a region not
only of extreme political conflict, but also one in which states are
reaching the limits of their annual freshwater supply; therefore,
Middle East warfare and territorial acquisition must be related to the
region’s “water stress.”
This paper examines in detail the link between water and land—the
nature of “hydrostrategic territory”—in this “worst-case” water conflict
between Arabs and Israelis. The central question is: in the absence of
any other compelling strategic or legal rationale, does territory exist (a)
over which sovereignty has been sought politically or militarily, or (b)
which would be insisted upon in the course of current territorial
negotiations, solely because of its access to water sources?

Invariably, writings on “water wars” point
to the arid and hostile Middle East as an
example of a worst-case scenario, where
armies have in fact been mobilized and
shots fired over this precious resource.
Elaborate “hydraulic imperative” theories
have been developed for the region which
cite water as the prime motivator for
military strategy and territorial conquest.

  



   

Figure 1 The Jordan River Watershed (Wolf 1995).

The approach is to subdivide the question as follows:
•
Have boundaries been drawn historically on the basis of the
location of water access?
•
During warfare between competing riparians, has territory
been explicitly targeted or captured because of its access to
water sources?
•
In the course of negotiations, has territory with access to
water sources (but lacking any strategic component) been
considered vital for retention by any of the riparians?

 





BORDERS, BOUNDARIES, AND HYDROSTRATEGIC
TERRITORY
In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to distinguish
“hydrostrategic” territory (that is, land surface which has strategic
value solely on the basis of water resource access) from other terri
tory under conflict.
Ratzel defines the difference between a border line and a border
fringe: “the border fringe is the reality and the border line is the
abstraction thereof” (cited in Prescott 1987). The term “boundary”
has become more common for the line, while “frontier” and/or
“border region” are used regularly to refer to the zone on either side
of the boundary (O’Loughlin 1994). Prescott (1987) defines bound
aries as “the line of physical contact between states” and identifies
them as sources of both conflict and cooperation among states.
The link between the attributes of the border region and interna
tional conflict has been well documented. Ratzel emphasized the
physical components of boundaries, arguing that states should
establish strong military boundaries, including mountain slopes and
the far banks of rivers (cited in Prescott 1965). The functional ap
proach of political geography, as defined by Hartshorne (1950),
Jones (1954), and others, describes the motives of state behavior;
Douglass (1985) specifies security as the fundamental goal of a state:
“security for its political system, its economic system and for its
people....” Homer-Dixon (1991) offers a broad definition of security
along similar lines, to include human physical, social, and economic
well-being. If delineation of boundaries does not further these goals
for states on both sides of the line, they themselves can become a
cause of conflict. Waterman (1984) describes the hardships of the
peoples of Ireland and Palestine brought about by the imposition of
boundaries which insufficiently take geography into account. Cohen
(1986) lists almost one hundred boundary disputes and describes
the most important elements which contribute to them.
One problem is that many of these elements can be in opposi
tion. As Tonkin (1994) points out, borders imply scarcity: “Borders
now imply potential contestation and scarcity, a sense that territory
is either in short supply or potentially valuable.”
Water certainly is a source of boundary conflict. Prescott (1965)
describes disputes over water bodies which mark or cross a bound
ary (including territorial waters) as the most common source of
functional disputes, and both he and Bingham et al. (1994) describe
such examples from around the world. In contrast, ignoring water in
favor of other parameters of boundary delineation has also proved
unwise. The boundary between India and Pakistan, for example, was
drawn mostly on the basis of religious considerations, all but ignor

  



   

ing the dependence of populations on both sides on the waters of
the Indus. Religion has been sufficient to unify either country
(Donnan and Wilson 1994), and ignorance of the location of water
has necessitated years of negotiations and elaborate engineering
works to physically divide the river (Biswas 1992).
It is difficult to distinguish between military strategy, defined by
one military officer as “from where are they shooting and from
where will we shoot back” (cited in Wolf 1995), and “hydrostrat
egy,” the influence of the location of water resources on strategic
thinking. Rivers are invaluable barriers against tanks and troop
movements and are also used to delineate boundaries. High ridges,
ideal for military positioning, are also often local watershed bound
aries. As Minghi (1963) points out, much thought was given to the
relationship between boundaries and security particularly in the
periods including the two world wars—times of intense boundary
delineation. In 1907, Lord Curzon (cited in Prescott 1965) described
the superiority of “natural” boundaries,1 being dependent on physical geographic features, over “artificial” boundaries of latitude and
longitude. Writing during World War I, Holdich (1916) linked the
concept of security with boundaries, arguing that, whether it is
natural or artificial, a boundary should act as a barrier which “must
be made as secure as nature or art can make it.”2 Rivers, he argued,
may make good boundaries (second to mountain ranges), provided
“the channel is narrow in a rock-bound bed.” Lyde (cited in Minghi
1963), arguing in 1915 that the prime function of a boundary was not
as a barrier, but rather as “a feature which encourages peaceful interna
tional discourse,” suggested that rivers made in fact the most desirable
boundaries, providing “a maximum of peaceful associations.”
Johnson (1917), Broek (1942), and others have pointed out
problems unique to river boundaries, including the difficulty in
accommodating geomorphic change and the fact that rivers often
flow through heavily populated areas. With World War II, however,
came the development of new military technology bringing a di
mension to warfare which, along with a greater awareness of the
importance of ethnic and economic relations between states, obvi
ated the role of boundary-as-barrier (Spykman 1942, cited in
Minghi 1963). The war also graphically contradicted Lyde’s ideas on
the boundary as an inducer of peace. With both arguments contro
verted, Jones (1945) concludes (not surprisingly) that rivers are
especially troubling boundaries but that, “unfortunately, rivers
probably [will continue to be] adopted as boundaries even though
the geographer or engineer inveighs against them.” Jones is also
among the earliest observers to detail the conflict-inducing aspects

 

1

Prescott makes the important point that
Curzon differentiated between “natural”
and what Ratzel and, later, Kjellen
mislabeled as the geopolitically “Natural”
frontiers, to which nations ought to strive.
To avoid such confusion, Broek (1940)
argues for the term “physiographic”
boundary.
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Holdich also suggests that annexation of
any territory against the will of its
inhabitants is “a political blunder” (p. 499).





of international rivers, notably the difficulty in allocating the water
of a shared river.
It is precisely these conflicting elements of water sources—their
strategic value in the traditional sense, their functional value in a
domestic sense, and their practical role in delineating boundaries—
which inform the central questions of this paper. “Hydrostrategic”
territory must then be operationally defined as that territory which
has strategic value primarily because of its access to water resources
for irrigation, drinking and/or electric power. This is distinct from
strategic territory in a traditional military or political sense, includ
ing what Cohen (1986) calls “strategic water space,” or water-related
territory which provides traditional strategic value.
WATER AND BOUNDARIES
In this section, I seek to answer the first question posed in the
introductory section: have boundaries been drawn historically in the
Middle East on the basis of the location of water access?
BOUNDARY PROPOSALS AND DELINEATION: 1913-1923
After the first Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland in 1897,
European Jewry began its efforts to gain the support of Ottoman or
British authorities for a Jewish state in Palestine (which had been
under Ottoman rule for 400 years). Even without commitments for
independent nations, both Jewish and Arab populations began to
swell in Palestine—the former in waves of immigration from Yemen
as well as from Europe, and the latter attracted from other parts of
the Arab world to new regional prosperity (Sachar 1969; McCarthy
1990). According to McCarthy (1990), Palestine had 340,000 people
in 1878 and 722,000 by 1915.
During World War I, as it became clear that the Ottoman Em
pire was crumbling, the heirs-apparent began to jockey for positions
of favor with the inhabitants of the region. The French held favor
with the Maronite Catholics of Lebanon and therefore focused on
the northern territories of Lebanon and Syria. The British, mean
while, began to seek a coalition with (1) the Arabs from Palestine
and Arabia, for military assistance against the Turks and (2) the Jews
of Palestine, for both military assistance and the political support of
Diaspora Jewry (Ra’anan 1955). As the course of the war became
clear both the colonial powers and the local populations began to
refine their territorial interests.
A detailed description of the lengthy process which led to the
final determination of boundaries for the French and British man
dates and informed the boundaries of modern Lebanon, Syria, Jor
dan, and Israel, is beyond the scope this paper.3 The influence of
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Details of the transition can be found in the
works of Ra’anan (1955), Sachar (1969,
1987), and Fromkin (1989).

  



   

Figure 2 Boundaries proposed for Palestine, 1916-1919 (Weizmann Letters 1968).

water resources along the Palestine-Syria border is described by
Garfinkle (1994), and along the Palestine-Lebanon frontier by Hof
(1985) and by Amery (1996). The following outline of events leading
up to the Anglo-French Convention in 1923 emphasizes only certain
decisions, and is based on the works mentioned above. The inter
ested reader is referred to that literature for more detail.

 


The Zionist Position
The Zionists began to formulate their desired boundaries for the
“national home” to be determined by three criteria: historic, strate
gic, and economic considerations (Zionist publications cited in
Ra’anan 1955).
The Jews’ historic concerns coincided roughly with British allusions
to the biblical “Dan to Beersheba” area. The Zionists articulated mini
mum requirements which had to be supplemented with territory allow
ing military and economic security. Military security required desert
areas to the south and east as well as the Beka’a Valley, a gateway in the
north between the Lebanon Mountains and Mount Hermon.
Economic security was defined by water resources. The entire
Zionist program of immigration and settlement required water for
large-scale irrigation and, in a land with no fossil fuels, for hydropower. The plans were “completely dependent” on the acquisition of
the “headwaters of the Jordan, the Litani River, the snows of Hermon,
the Yarmuk and its tributaries, and the Jabbok” (Ra’anan 1955).
In a flurry of communication between world Zionist leaders, the
aspects of historic, strategic, and economic security became increas
ingly linked with the Jordan headwaters.
The guiding force on the boundary position of the Jewish side
was Aaron Aaronson. In charge of an agricultural experimental
station at Atlit on the Mediterranean coast, Aaronson’s research
focused on weather-resistant crops and dry-farming techniques.
Convinced that the modern agricultural practices which would fuel
Jewish immigration were incompatible with “the slothful, brutish
Ottoman regime” (Sachar 1979), he concluded that Zionist settle
ment objectives required alliance with the incoming Allied Forces.
Aaronson initiated contact with the British to establish a Jewish spy
network in Palestine, which would report on Turkish positions and
troop movements. Perhaps because of his training both in agricul
ture and in security matters, Aaronson became the first to argue for
boundary delineation based specifically on future water needs.
Aaronson’s “The Boundaries of Palestine” (January 27, 1919, un
published, Zionist Archives), drafted in less than a day, argued that,



Economic security was defined by water
resources. The entire Zionist program
of immigration and settlement required
water for large-scale irrigation and, in a
land with no fossil fuels, for hydropower. The plans were “completely
dependent” on the acquisition of the
“headwaters of the Jordan, the Litani
River, the snows of Hermon, the
Yarmuk and its tributaries, and the
Jabbok”.

in Palestine, like in any other country of arid and semi
arid character, animal and plant life and, therefore, the
whole economic life directly depends on the available
water supply. It is, therefore, of vital importance not only
to secure all water resources already feeding the country,
but also to insure the possession of whatever can conserve
and increase these water—and eventually power—re
sources. The main resources of Palestine come from the

  



   

North, from the two mighty mountain-masses—the Leba
non range, and the Hermon....The boundary of Palestine
in the North and in the North East is thus dictated by the
extension of the Hermon range and its water basins. The
only scientific and economically correct lines of delinea
tion are the watersheds.
Aaronson then described the proposed boundaries in detail, as
delineated by the local watershed (see Figure 2). He acknowledged
that, with the exception of the Litani, the Lebanon range sends no
important water source towards Palestine and could not therefore be
claimed on a hydrological basis. It was the Hermon, he argued, that
was the genuine ‘Father of Waters’ which could not be severed from
(Palestine) without striking at the very root of its economic life.”
Returning to the Litani, Aaronson argued that
[it] is of vital importance to northern Palestine both as a
supply of water and of power. Unfortunately its springs lie
in the Lebanon. Some kind of international agreement is
essential in order that the Litani may be fully utilized for
the development of North Palestine and the Lebanon.
Aaronson’s rationale and boundary proposals were adopted by
the official Zionist delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, led by
Chaim Weizmann. The “Boundaries” section of the “Statement of
the Zionist Organization Regarding Palestine,” which paraphrased
Aaronson, read:
The economic life of Palestine, like that of every other
semi-arid country depends on the available water supply.
It is therefore, of vital importance not only to secure all
water resources already feeding the country, but also to be
able to conserve and control them at their sources.…
The Hermon is Palestine’s real “Father of Waters” and
[Palestine] cannot be severed from it without striking at
the very root of its economic life.…Some international
arrangement must be made whereby the riparian rights of
the people dwelling south of the Litani River may be fully
protected. Properly cared for these head waters can be
made to serve in the development of the Lebanon as well
as of Palestine (Proposals dated February 3, 1919,
Weizmann Letters 1983, Appendix II).

 





Aaronson thought his ideas had been misrepresented in the
official Zionist position, perhaps because he was not included in the
final drafting. In an angry letter to Weizmann, he complained that
the draft was “a disgrace and a calamity” (emphasis Aaronson’s) and
expressed shock that, for one of the delegates, “a ‘watershed’ is the
same as a ‘thalweg.’ Incredible, but true...” (unpublished letter,
February 16, 1919, Weizmann Archives).
In June of 1919 Aaronson died in a plane crash on his way to the
Peace Conference and the Zionist proposals were submitted without
revision. Nevertheless, the importance of the region’s water re
sources remained embedded in the thinking of the Zionist establish
ment. “So far as the northern boundary is concerned,” wrote Chaim
Weizmann later that year, “the guiding consideration with us has
been economic, and ‘economic’ in this connection means ‘water
supply’” (Weizmann Letters, September 18, 1919).
The Arab Position
The Arab delegation to the Peace Conference was led by the
Emir Feisal, younger son of Emir Hussein of the Hejaz. Working
with T. E. Lawrence, Hussein and his sons had led Arab irregulars
against the Turks in Arabia and Eastern Palestine. After the war,
Feisal had developed a relationship with Chaim Weizmann as both
prepared for the Peace Conference. After a meeting in 1918, Feisal
said in an interview:
The two main branches of the Semitic family, Arabs and
Jews, understand one another, and I hope that as a result
of interchange of ideas at the Peace Conference, which will
be guided by ideals of self-determination and nationality,
each nation will make definite progress towards the real
ization of its aspirations (cited in Esco Foundation 1947).
Feisal also initially expressed support for Jewish immigration to
Palestine, in part because he saw it as useful for his own nationalist
aspirations. At a banquet given in his honor by Lord Rothschild in
1918, he pointed out that, “No state could be built up in the Near East
without borrowing from the ideas, knowledge and experience of
Europe, and the Jews were the intermediaries who could best translate
European experience to suit Arab life” (Esco Foundation 1947).
In a meeting later that year, Feisal tried to enlist Weizmann’s
support against French policies in Syria. Weizmann in turn outlined
Zionist aspirations and, “asserted his respect for Arab communal
rights” (Sachar 1969). The two also agreed that all water and farm
boundary questions should be settled directly between the two parties.

  



   

Feisal and Weizmann formalized their understanding to support
each other’s national ambitions on January 3, 1919, in a document
which expressed mutual friendship, recognition of the Balfour Dec
laration, stating that:
All necessary measures shall be taken to encourage and stimulate
immigration of Jews into Palestine on a large scale, and as quickly
as possible to settle Jewish immigrants upon the land through
closer settlement and intensive cultivation of the soil. In taking
such measures the Arab peasant and tenant farmers shall be pro
tected in their rights, and shall be assigned in forwarding their eco
nomic development (original reproduced in Weizmann Letters),
providing, Feisal hand-wrote in the margin, that Arab requests
were granted. “If changes are made,” he wrote, “I cannot be
answerable for failure to carry out this agreement.”
The Arab requests were spelled out in a memorandum dated
January 1, 1919. Because the territory in question was so large—
including Syria, Mesopotamia, and the Arabian Peninsula—so
geographically diverse, and for the most part, well-watered, it is not
surprising that water resources played little role in the Arab delib
erations. Feisal requested the following (Esco Foundation 1947):
•
that Syria, agriculturally and industrially advanced, and
considered politically developed, be allowed to manage her
own affairs;
•
that Mesopotamia, “underdeveloped and thinly inhabited
by semi-nomadic peoples, would have to be buttressed…by
a great foreign power,” but governed by Arabs chosen by
the “selective rather than the elective principle;” and
•
that the Hejaz and Arabian Peninsula, mainly a tribal area
suited to patriarchal conditions, should retain their
complete independence.
Two areas were specifically excluded: Lebanon, “because the
majority of the inhabitants were Christian,” and had their own
delegates (Amery 1996 ), and Palestine, because its “universal char
acter was left to one side for mutual consideration of all parties
interested” (Esco Foundation 1947).
Once testimony was heard at Versailles, the decisions were left to
the British and the French as the peace talks continued, culminating
at San Remo in 1920, as to where the boundaries between their
mandates would be drawn.
The French supported the Lebanese claim that the “historic and
natural” boundaries of Greater Lebanon should include the sources

 





Figure 3 Disputed area, March–September 1919 (Hof 1985).

of the Jordan River (Sachar 1979), including the Galilee Region.
They claimed that the Litani was needed for development in Leba
non, while the snows of the Hermon provided water for Damascus.
In 1919, the British first suggested the “Meinertzhagen Line” as a
boundary (see Figure 2). Based mostly on British security require
ments, this line was similar in the north to the Zionist proposals,
and was rejected by the French for similar reasons. In September the
British put forward the compromise “Deauville Proposal,” which

  



   

granted Palestine less territory than the Zionists sought, but still
included the southern bank of the Litani and the Banias headquar
ters. At the time, Banias was thought (incorrectly) to be the biblical
Dan, thereby allowing the British to remain true to their claim of
Palestine “from Dan to Beersheba” (Hof 1985).
Finally, to best comply with French objections, the British pro
posed a border running north from Acre to the Litani bend, then
east to Mount Vernon, which would increase Lebanese territory but
leave the headwaters in Palestine (Ra’anan 1955).
Although the French rejected each of these proposals, Phillips
Berthelot, the foreign minister and negotiator to an Anglo-French
conference on the Mideast in December 1919, indicated that Prime
Minister Clemenceau was insisting on the Sykes-Picot line, but that
he was prepared
to agree that one-third of the waterpower of the waters flow
ing from Mount Hermon southwards into the Palestine of the
Sykes-Picot agreement should be allotted to the Zionists
under an economic arrangement with France. The French
could do no more than this (cited in Ra’anan 1955).
At the San Remo Conference in April 1920, an agreement was
reached in which Great Britain was granted the mandates to Pales
tine and Mesopotamia, and France received the mandate for Syria
(including Lebanon). During the remainder of the year, last minute
appeals were made both by the British and the Zionists for the inclu
sion of the Litani in Palestine or, at the least, for the right to divert a
portion of the river into the Jordan basin for hydropower. The
French refused, offering a bleak picture of the future without an
agreement and suggested, referring to British and Zionist ambiguity
as to what was meant by a ‘National Home,’ “Vous barbotterez si
vous le voulez, mais vous ne barbotterez pas à nos frais” (“You will
flounder if you like, but you will not flounder at our expense.” But
ler and Bury 1958).
On December 4, 1920, a final agreement was reached in principle
on the boundary issue which mainly addressed French and British
rights to railways and oil pipelines as well as incorporating the
French proposal for the northern boundaries of six months prior.
The French delegation did promise that the Jewish settlements
would have free use of the waters of the Upper Jordan and the
Yarmuk, although they would remain in French hands (Ra’anan
1955). The Litani was excluded from this arrangement. Article 8 of
the Franco-British Convention, therefore, included a call for a joint
committee to examine the irrigation and hydroelectric potential of

 





the Upper Jordan and Yarmuk “after the needs of the territories
under French Mandate,” and added that
…in connection with this examination the French govern
ment will give its representatives the most liberal instructions
for the employment of the surplus of these waters for the
benefit of Palestine (cited in Hof 1985).
The final boundaries between the French and British mandates,
which later became the boundaries between Israel, Lebanon, Syria,
and Jordan, were worked out by an Anglo-French commission set
up to trace the frontier on the spot. They generally circumvented
settlements, divided territory on an ethnic basis (consistent with the
wishes of the inhabitants), and retained the link between settlements
and their agricultural land. The results were submitted in February
1922 and signed by the British and French governments in March
1923 (Ra’anan 1955; Hof 1985).
The frontier would run from Ras en-Naqura inland in an east
erly direction along the watershed between the rivers flowing into
the Jordan and into the Litani; the line was then to turn sharply
north to include in Palestine a “finger” of territory near Metulla and
the eastern sources of the Jordan.
Rather than include the Banias spring within Palestine as in the
French proposal of six months prior, the border ran parallel to and
100 meters south of the existing path from Metullah to the Banias.
The French insisted on inclusion of this road in its entirety to facili
tate east-west transportation and communication within its man
date, as it was a stretch of the main route from Tyre to Quneitra.
This northern border meant that the entire Litani and the Jordan
headwaters of the Ayoun and Hasbani would originate in Lebanon
before flowing into Palestine. The Banias spring, meanwhile, would
originate and flow for 100 meters in Syrian territory, then into Pal
estine. Since Palestine had a promise of water use, and also access to
the Banias Heights which overlooked the spring, the fact that the
actual spring lay outside of the boundaries was not of immediate
concern. Of the headwaters of the Jordan, however, only the Dan
spring remained entirely within Palestine.
From the Banias, the border turned south toward the Sea of
Galilee, along the foothills of the Golan Heights, parallel and just
east (sometimes within 50 meters) of the Huleh Lake and the Jordan
River. Rather than passing through the middle of the Sea of Galilee,
the border ran 10m east of its shores (even if the level should rise
because of a proposed dam), leaving the entire lake, the town of ElHama, and a small triangle just south of the Jordan’s outflow within

  



   

the territory of Palestine. The latter two territories were already
included in Zionist plans for water diversion and hydroelectricity
generation. The arrangement was beneficial to Palestine’s
hydrostrategic positioning, and, although it was made mainly for
administrative reasons, “to make customs inspection easier,” it was
also expressed that the development plans should proceed without
international complication (Ra’anan 1955). Nevertheless, according
to the agreement, fishing and navigation rights on the lake were
retained by the inhabitants of Syria. Later, between 1948 and 1967,
Syria claimed the shoreline as the de facto border, and argued for
riparian rights to the lake on that basis.
At the Yarmuk, the border went eastward along the river, meet
ing up with the Sykes-Picot line into the Syrian desert and south of
the Jebel Druze. The final agreement made no mention of joint
access to French-controlled waters.
Administrative divisions would further convolute the boundaries
along the Jordan. In May 1921, Churchill offered the Emir Abdullah
reign over that part of the British Mandate east of the Jordan River.
Transjordan became a semi-independent entity in 1923 and an
independent kingdom in 1946. While the division was originally
between administrative units under one authority—the British
Mandate—the boundary, as defined by the center of the Jordan
River, the Dead Sea, and Wadi Araba/Arava, would eventually be
come the international boundary between Israel and Jordan.4
Although the location of water resources had been an important,
sometimes over-riding issue with some of the actors involved in deter
mination of the boundaries of these territories, it is clear from the out
come that other issues took precedence over the need for water
development. These other factors ranged from the geostrategic (the
location of roads and oil pipelines) to the political (alliances and rela
tionships among British, French, Jews, and Arabs) to the historical (how
well versed one or another negotiator was in biblical geography).
Partition and Jewish Statehood: 1922-1948
During the 1930s and 1940s, water was a focus of several reports
which tried to determine the “economic absorptive capacity” of
mandate Palestine. In the absence of clear immigration policy, both
Jewish and Arab residents of Palestine became increasingly frus
trated, taking out their hostility on each other as well as on the
British. Over time, the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab
states increasingly became the most advocated option, first in an
Anglo-American plan in 1946, and later, when Britain ceded the
Mandate to the United Nations, in the U.N. Partition Plan of 1947.
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The boundary was originally defined as the
location of the river in 1922. However,
after the Jordan shifted 800 meters
westward during the winter of 1927-28,
the British high commissioner decided that
the boundary would henceforth be the
center of the water bodies mentioned,
wherever they meandered. A similar shift in
the streambed, and consequently in the
boundary, occurred in the winter of 1978
79 (Biger 1994).
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United Nations plan for the partition of Palestine, November 1947 (Sachar 1979).

  



   

In the case of partition the Zionists identified three areas that
were essential to a viable Jewish state: the Galilee region with the
Jordan headwaters, the populated coastal zone, and the Negev
Desert, to absorb “the ingathering of the exiles.” In the late 1930s,
the Jewish Agency (the Zionists’ pre-state governing body), sensing
that partition was imminent, embarked on an intensive settlement
program, building 55 farm communities between 1936 and 1939
(Sachar 1979). The northern Galilee was targeted in order to rein
force the projected boundaries and guarantee the inclusion of those
portions of the Jordan headwaters left from the Mandate process.
The Zionist position on partition and the minimum territorial
requirements for a viable Jewish state was increasingly influenced by
Walter Clay Lowdermilk. In 1944 Lowdermilk, the director of the
U.S. Soil Conservation Service, published a plan commissioned by
the Jewish Agency. In contrast to the Ionides Plan of 1939,
Lowdermilk asserted that proper water management would generate
resources for four million Jewish refugees in addition to the 1.8
million Arabs and Jews living in Palestine at the time. He advocated
regional water management, based on work of the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA), to develop irrigation on both banks of the Jordan
River and in the Negev Desert as well as construction of a canal from
the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea to generate hydro-power and
replenish the diverted fresh water (Naff and Matson 1984).
Referring to Lowdermilk’s work, a 1945 aide memoire on Pales
tine described Zionist reservations on partition:
With the sea in the West, the Jordan and the Power and
Potash concessions in the East, the chief water resources in
the North, and the main land-reserves in the South, any
partition scheme seems bound to disrupt the country’s
economic frame, and wreck the chances of large-scale
development (April 6, 1945, cited in Weizmann Letters).
At the same time, a 1944 study, “The Water Resources of Pales
tine,” undertaken by Mekorot (the national water company for
Jewish Palestine) described an “All-Palestine Project,” for irrigation
and hydroelectric development. The study included frontier adjust
ments which would be desirable for a basin-wide development
scheme in Palestine.
It was suggested that the mandate border be moved upstream
where it met the Hasbani, Dan, and Banias headwaters to allow for
more effective drainage; eastward along Lake Hula to leave room for
a conduit on the east side of the lake; and upstream along the
Yarmuk to include an area of about 80 km2 of Transjordan to

 





develop a series of impoundments along the river (Mekorot Water
Company, Ltd.1944). It should be noted that, although the report
included plans to bring Litani water into the Jordan watershed, it
was assumed that an agreement would have to be reached with the
Lebanese government to do so. Lebanese territory was not included
in the list of desirable frontier adjustments. It should be noted fur
ther that there is no evidence that any of the territorial suggestions
of the Mekorot study were ever included in political decision mak
ing, nor were the proposed boundary modifications raised in subse
quent negotiations.
Water and Boundaries—Conclusions
Prescott (1987) notes that the most common cause of boundary
disputes can be found in the history of the boundary—especially
where the “evolution” of the boundary is “incomplete.” In answer to
the question of water’s influence on boundaries posed at the begin
ning of this section, it is clear that water sources have played a role,
albeit one subservient to other concerns, in the delineation of inter
national boundaries, first between the British and French Mandates,
then between Israel, Lebanon, and Syria. In particular, the political
and military policy makers of Israel had explicit interests in retain
ing the northern headwaters of the Jordan River, arguing for them
in political arenas and reinforcing claims through settlement policy.
The goal, however, was reached with only marginal success. While
the headwaters of the Jordan originated in the territories of three
separate entities, Israel had been successful in retaining riparian
access to both banks of the Jordan River above the Sea of Galilee,
and sovereignty over the entire lake. Yet it is also clear that once
boundaries were agreed to in a legal forum in 1923, development
plans were modified to fit the legal boundaries and not vice versa.
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The wars of 1956 and 1973 are not inclu
ded because, in the author’s judgment, they
did not contain any hydrologic component.

WATER AND WAR
The next aspect of “hydrostrategic territory” to be addressed is
the relationship between military strategic thinking during wartime
and the location of water resources. During warfare between com
peting riparians, has territory been explicitly targeted, captured, or
retained because of its access to water sources?5
THE WAR OF 1948
On February 2, 1947, Great Britain officially turned the fate of
Palestine over to the United Nations. The U.N. Special Committee
on Palestine recommended partition into two states but included a
vehicle for joint economic development, “especially in respect of
irrigation, land reclamation, and soil conservation.”

  



   

Figure 5 (Mekorot 1944).

The U.N.-delineated Arab and Jewish states are displayed in
Figure 5. Jerusalem was to be an international city, and the Jewish
state would pay an annual stipend of four million pounds to the

 


Arab state to reflect the more advanced agricultural and industrial
position of the former (U.N. Resolution on the Partition of Palestine
1947, Chapter 4). The General Assembly approved the Partition
Plan on November 29, 1947.
Though the Jewish Agency reluctantly accepted partition, the
Arab states rejected it outright. When the British pulled out of Pales
tine in May 1948, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Saudi
Arabia went to war against the new state of Israel. Maintaining the
three aforementioned critical zones—the Galilee region with the Jordan
headwaters, the populated coastal zone, and the Negev to absorb antici
pated immigration—became the foci of the Israeli war effort.
Partition cost the Israelis three other strategic points along
waterways, the repercussions of which would be felt through 1967.
As mentioned above, during the Mandate negotiations, the
French had denied the Zionists the Banias Spring because an access
road they needed crossed the waterway about 100 meters down
stream. To guarantee access to the water, though, a small hill over
looking the stream, Givat Banias, had been included in Palestine.
Second, the town of El-Hama, located on one of the few flat areas
within the narrow Yarmuk valley, and an adjacent triangular area
from the Yarmuk to the shores of the Sea of Galilee were included
within Palestine territory, specifically to facilitate water resources
development. Both of these areas were lost to the Syrians during
fighting in 1948 (Sachar 1979). (Also, the Syrians crossed the Jordan
River in the Huleh Lake/Daughters of Jacob Bridge region, an area
targeted by water planners as the site of the first major Israeli recla
mation project.) Finally, although the Israeli army had occupied a strip
of Lebanese territory along the elbow of the Litani, they pulled back to
the Mandate boundaries as part of the armistice agreement, in the
unfulfilled hopes of gaining a peace treaty with Lebanon (Hof 1985).
The 1948 war added a new type of boundary to the region—the
Armistice Line. While the boundary between the British and French
mandates had the permanence and force of international law, the
Armistice agreement which was signed separately between Israel and
each of its neighbors was explicitly only a temporary military agree
ment (Hareven 1977). Negotiations continued in an unsuccessful
quest for a permanent peace agreement culminating in Lausanne
late in 1949 (Caplan 1993). Water was never mentioned during the
Rhodes Armistice talks and was referred to only intermittently dur
ing the Lausanne Conference.6
The differences between permanent legal boundaries and the
Armistice Line manifested themselves in how each boundary seg
ment was treated by each combatant.
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The eighth point of the British Eight-Point
Plan submitted in July 1949 was a call for
“an Israeli-Arab agreement for sharing the
waters of the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers”
(Caplan 1993).

  



   

The Israel-Lebanon Boundary
Israel had occupied Lebanese territory up to the Litani River, yet
withdrew its forces to the international boundary as a result of the
Armistice Agreement. Amery (1996) suggests that Israel’s with
drawal was based on the belief that it could make peace with a
Christian-led Lebanon, and that joint Lebanese-Israeli water re
sources development could proceed without territorial annexation
(citing Berger (1965) as arguing that Israel would not have withdrawn
from southern Lebanon had it not been convinced of these results).
The Israel-Syria Boundary
Syria occupied about 60 km2 of Israeli territory during the war at
three locations, as described above: (1) the Banias Springs area, (2)
the Huleh Lake/Daughters of Jacob Bridge region, and (3) the tri
angle from El-Hama to the southeastern shores of the Sea of Galilee.
During the Armistice talks, Syria agreed to withdraw from all of this
territory, save Givat Banias and El-Hama, provided that the remain
ing territory would not be militarized by Israel. While both of these
were included in Israeli water development plans, Israel did not
push for their return, given the presumed temporary nature of the
Armistice Line.
Neff (1994) suggests that Syria withdrew with the understanding
that final borders, including final sovereignty of the three demilita
rized zones (DMZs), would be negotiated in the future. Israel, in
contrast, considered itself the legal sovereign of these areas, legal
heir to the northern territory within the British mandate.
The Israel-Jordan Boundary
The pre-war boundary between British-mandate Palestine and
Transjordan, delineated when Britain split Palestine in two in 1922,
followed the middle of the Yarmuk River, the Jordan River, the Dead
Sea, and Wadi Araba southward to the Gulf of Aqaba/Eilat (Biger
1994). After the war, Jordan claimed jurisdiction over the West Bank.
Nowhere is the assumption that the Armistice Line was to be tempo
rary more clear, however, than in the “Green Line” dividing the West
Bank from Israel. While negotiations continued officially in Rhodes,
Sachar (1979) describes secret meetings which took place directly
between the Israelis and King Abdullah and his advisors at the king’s
winter palace. The agreement which was reached was informed not
only by the location of the two armies at war’s end, but also by the
location of roads and railways, as well as hilltops and high ground for
local strategic advantage. The line, drawn in green on a map at a scale
of 1:250,000,7 cut villages from their land, divided towns from the

 

7

At that scale, the width of the line alone
allowed for territorial ambiguity of 250m
along the boundary (Biger 1989).





Figure 6 Rhodes armistice demarcation line, 1948 (Sachar 1978)

  



   

springs on which they relied, and occasionally split settlements in two
(Biger 1989). As Biger (1989) points out, “in no case did the terms of
agreement provide for continuing rights of access by inhabitants to
their vital land and water resources.”
As a result of the 1948 war, the Jordan River was even more
divided than it had been under the Mandates. The Hasbani rose in
Lebanon with the Wazzani, a major spring of the Hasbani, situated
only a few kilometers north of the Israeli border. The Banias flowed
for five kilometers in Syrian territory before crossing into Israel. The
Dan rose and remained within Israeli territory. The confluence of
the three, the Jordan River, flowed along the Israeli-Syrian border,
often through a demilitarized zone, until it reached the Sea of Gali
lee. The sea lay wholly in Israel, with the Syrian border ten meters
from the eastern coast. The Yarmuk rose in Syria, then became the
Syrian-Jordanian border until its confluence with the Jordan. South
of the Sea of Galilee, the Jordan River formed first the Israeli-Syrian
border, then the Israeli-Jordanian border below the confluence with
the Yarmuk, finally flowing wholly into Jordanian territory and the
Dead Sea, which was about one quarter Israeli and three quarters
Jordanian. Groundwater was similarly divided, with the recharge
zones of two springs on which Israel increasingly relied, the Yarkon
and the Tanninim, originating in the Jordanian territory of the West
Bank (see Figure 6).
THE WAR OF 1967
Water Resources and Background to the War
The legacy of the partition and the 1948 war was the division of
the Jordan River in a manner so convoluted that unilateral water
resources development, the only strategy possible among the hostile
riparians, would lead inevitably to conflict. By the early 1950s, Arab
states were discussing organized exploitation of two northern
sources of the Jordan—the Hasbani and the Banias (Stevens 1965).
The Israelis also made public their All Israel Plan, which included
the draining of Huleh Lake and swamps, diversion of the northern
Jordan River and construction of a carrier to the coastal plain and
Negev Desert—the first out-of-basin transfer for the watershed
(Naff and Matson 1984).
Jordan, in 1951, announced a plan to irrigate the East Ghor of
the Jordan Valley by tapping the Yarmuk. At Jordan’s announce
ment, Israel closed the gates of an existing dam south of the Sea of
Galilee and began draining the Huleh swamps, which lay within the
demilitarized zone with Syria. These actions led to a series of border
skirmishes between Israel and Syria which escalated over the sum
mer of 1951 (Stevens 1965). In July 1953, Israel began construction

 





Figure 7 Jordan/Yarmuk river system (Medzini 1976).

on the intake of its National Water Carrier at the Daughters of Jacob
Bridge north of the Sea of Galilee and in the demilitarized zone.
Syria deployed its armed forces along the border and artillery units
opened fire on the construction and engineering sites (Cooley 1984).
Syria also protested to the U.N. and, though a 1954 resolution for
the resumption of work by Israel carried a majority, the USSR ve
toed the resolution. The Israelis then moved the intake to its current
site at Eshed Kinrot on the northwestern shore of the Sea of Galilee
(Garbell 1965).

  



   

Against this tense background, President Dwight Eisenhower
sent his special envoy Eric Johnston to the Middle East in October
1953 to try to mediate a comprehensive settlement of the Jordan
River system allocations.8 Johnston’s initial proposals were based on
a study carried out by Charles Main and the Tennessee Valley Au
thority (TVA) at the request of the U.N. to develop the area’s water

Figure 8 (Wolf 1995)
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For a detailed normative assessment of the
Johnston framework, see Elmusa (this
volume).


resources and to provide for refugee resettlement (Main 1953). Both
Israel and a united Arab League Technical Committee responded
with their own counterproposals. The Israeli “Cotton” plan included
integration of the Litani River’s flow into the Jordan basin, with a
subsequent increase in allocations to Israel. The Arab plan rejected
integration of the Litani and substantially reduced Israel’s share as
compared with the Main plan. Johnston worked until the end of
1955 to reconcile these proposals in a Unified Plan amenable to all
of the states involved. In the Unified Plan, Johnston accomplished
no small degree of compromise. Although they had not met face to
face for these negotiations, all states agreed on the need for a re
gional approach. Israel gave up on integration of the Litani and the
Arabs agreed to allow out-of-basin transfer. The Arabs objected, but
finally agreed, to storage at both the Maqarin Dam and the Sea of
Galilee so long as neither side would have physical control over the
share available to the other. Israel objected, but finally agreed, to
international supervision of withdrawals and construction. Alloca
tions under the Unified Plan, later known as the Johnston Plan,
included 400 million m3 (MCM)/yr to Israel, 720 MCM/yr to Jordan, 35
MCM/yr to Lebanon, and 132 MCM/yr to Syria (Unpublished summa
ries, U.S. Department of State).
The technical committees from all sides accepted the Unified
Plan, but continuing political support could not be garnered and the
Plan was never ratified. Nevertheless, Israel and Jordan have gener
ally adhered to the Johnston allocations and technical representa
tives from both countries have met from that time until the present
two or three times a year at “Picnic Table Talks,” named for the site
at the confluence of the Yarmuk and Jordan Rivers where the meet
ings were held.
As each state developed its water resources unilaterally, their
plans began to overlap. By 1964, Israel had completed enough of its
National Water Carrier that actual diversions from the Jordan River
basin to the coastal plain and the Negev were imminent. Although
Jordan was also about to begin extracting Yarmuk water for its East
Ghor Canal, it was the Israeli diversion which prompted President
Nasser to call for the First Arab Summit in January 1964, a meeting
which brought together heads of state from the Mideast and North
Africa specifically to discuss a collective Arab strategy on water.
The options presented at the summit were (1) to complain to the
U.N., (2) divert the upper Jordan tributaries into Arab states (as had
been discussed by Syria and Jordan since 1953), or (3) to go to war
(Schmida 1983). The decision to divert the rivers prevailed at a
second summit in September 1964 and the Arab states agreed to
finance a Headwater Diversion project in Lebanon and Syria and to
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Figure 9 (Wolf 1995)

help Jordan build a dam on the Yarmuk. They also made tentative
military plans to defend the diversion project (Shemesh 1988).
In 1964, Israel began withdrawing 320 MCM/yr of flow from the
Jordan water into its National Water Carrier and Jordan completed
a major phase of its East Ghor Canal (Inbar and Maos 1984). In
November 1964, the Arab states began construction of their Head

 


water Diversion Plan to prevent the Jordan headwaters from reach
ing Israel. The plan was to divert the Hasbani into the Litani in
Lebanon and the Banias into the Yarmuk where it would be im
pounded for Jordan and Syria by a dam at Mukheiba. The measure
would divert up to 125 MCM/y, thereby cutting by 35% the installed
capacity of the Israeli Carrier and increasing the salinity in the Sea of
Galilee by ~60 ppm (Unpublished memorandum, U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency, May 1962). In March, May, and August of
1965, Israeli tanks attacked the diversion works in Syria. The final
incident, which involved both Israeli tanks and aircraft on July 14,
1966, stopped Syrian construction.
These events set off what has been called “a prolonged chain
reaction of border violence that linked directly to the events that led
to the (June 1967) war” (Safran, cited in Cooley 1984).
Boundaries Following the 1967 War
The boundaries following the 1967 war, determined by an un
signed cease-fire agreement, have generally held until very recently.
The boundary between Israel and Lebanon, which was not in
volved in the war, remained the international boundary of 1923; the
boundary between Israel and Syria extended well beyond the Armi
stice line and demilitarized zones of 1949 to include the plateau of
the Golan Heights as far as Quneitra9; the boundary with Jordan
returned past the Green Line of 1949 to the 1922 British Mandate
division between Palestine and Transjordan along the Jordan River.
In addition to the territorial gains and improvements in
geostrategic positioning which Israel achieved in the war, it also
improved its hydrostrategic position. With the Golan Heights, it
now held two of the three northern headwaters as well as high
ground over much of the Yarmuk, together making the Arab Head
waters Diversion impossible. The West Bank provided riparian
access to the entire length of the Jordan River and also overlay a
major aquifer system which Israel had been tapping into from its side
of the Green Line since 1955 (Garbell 1965). Jordan had endeavored
to transport 70-150 MCM/y from the Yarmuk River to the West Bank,
but given the results of the war, its plans were abandoned.

9



There was some change along the IsraelSyria border as a consequence of the 1974
war. During that war, Syrian forces crossed
westward past Quneitra but did not
descend from the Golan Heights. Although
the Israeli counter-attack extended east
again across Quneitra, the town itself was
returned to Syria following a 1974
Disengagement Agreement (Hareven
1977; Sachar 1979).

THE WAR OF 1982
In 1982, Israel mounted its second operation against the Pales
tinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon. Its first offensive,
named “Operation Litani,” was conducted four years earlier. Then,
Israel had stopped its advance at the Litani River and had turned
over portions of southern Lebanon to the South Lebanon Army
(SLA) under the command of Major Sa’ad Haddad. Haddad

  



   

reportedly agreed to protect Israeli interests in the region, in par
ticular to defend against attempted Palestinian incursions through
the area to Israel. In addition, the militia is reported to have pro
tected the Jordan headwaters of the Hasbani by closing some local
wells and preventing the digging of others (Naff and Matson 1984).
Some Israelis involved in these issues contest these reports. Accord
ing to an Israeli officer who dealt with Haddad, extensively, the
Lebanese major made perfectly clear to the Israeli threat, “We will
cooperate with you, but there are two subjects which are taboo—our
land and our water” (Wolf 1995).
In 1979, engineers from Mekorot, Israel’s water planning agency,
developed plans to divert from 5-10 MCM/y from the Wazzani
springs for irrigation in Shi’ite southern Lebanon and in Israel. To
allow the project to flow on gravity alone, a slight northward modi
fication of the Israeli-Lebanese border, by about one kilometer, was
considered (Wolf 1995). These plans were vetoed by Major Haddad.
In the 1982 war, the Litani was again the initially stated objective,
but by July, Israeli forces had surrounded Beirut. After the invasion
was launched by then Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, a “water
hawk” who had frequently spoken of seizing the Litani, Israel cap
tured the Qirawn Dam and immediately confiscated all hydrographic charts and technical documents relating to the Litani and its
installations (Cooley 1984). Israel retreated from Beirut but retained
a “security zone” of territory extending from the international
boundary north to a bend in the Litani.
WATER AND WAR—CONCLUSIONS
Evidence of a “Hydro-strategic Imperative”
In recent years, particularly since Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in
1982, the notion of a Middle East “hydraulic imperative” has been
developed both in the academic literature and the popular press.
The theory, which might be better termed the “hydrostrategic im
perative,”10 points to some combination of the following facts (see,
for example, Davis et al. 1980; Stauffer 1982; Schmida 1983; Stork
1983; Cooley 1984; Dillman 1989; Beaumont 1991):
•
Early Zionist lobbyists and planners, from Chaim
Weizmann at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, through
the Hays and Cotton plans of the 1940s and 1950s, have advo
cated inclusion of either the Litani River within Israeli bound
aries or of Litani water into the Jordan River watershed.
•
The 1967 War had been precipitated by tensions over Israeli
and Arab water diversion schemes, and the war itself had
greatly strengthened Israeli “hydro-strategic” positioning.
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“Hydraulic” refers to the mechanics of
water under pressure. “Hydrostrategic” as
defined earlier, describes the link between
the location of water resources and
strategic decision-making.


•
•



The 1979 Litani Operation left Israeli allies in control of the
lower Litani river and the Hasbani headwaters.
The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon included capture of
the Qirawn Dam and related data. Even after Israel’s with
drawal, the “Security Zone” still leaves Israel in control of
the area from Taibe and slightly north—the most likely site
for any Litani to Jordan basin transfer.

Particularly during the years of Israeli occupation from 1982 to
1985, several analysts used this history to speculate about Israeli
actions in Lebanon. Some predicted scenarios ranging from a simple
diversion of the 100 MCM/yr available at the lower Litani and others
conjectured a permanent occupation of the entire Beka’a Valley
south of the Beirut-Damascus Highway which, along with the re
moval of Lebanese water infrastructure and the forced de-popula
tion of southern Lebanon, would allow diversion of the entire 700
MCM/yr flow of the Litani into Israel.11
Others have argued that Israel retains access to the Litani
through its “security zone” because it is, in fact, covertly diverting
water into the Jordan basin. According to John Cooley, “it was small
wonder that the first Israeli diversion plans for the Litani have come
into being” (cited in Soffer 1991). More recently, Beaumont (1994),
has written that Israel “may well be stealing Lebanese water for its
own use.” Frey and Naff (1985), even while arguing against the
imperative theory, do suggest that:

11

This last scenario is described in detail in
Stauffer (1982).

Although water may not have been the prime impetus behind
the Israeli acquisition of territory...it seems perhaps the main
factor determining its retention of that territory.
Thomas Naff of the University of Pennsylvania later testified to
Congress that “...Israel is presently conducting a large-scale opera
tion of trucking water to Israel from the Litani River...” (U.S. House
of Representatives 1990). Naff (1992) has since modified his posi
tion to argue that “water ... was instead trucked to units of the Is
raeli-supported Lebanese Army of South Lebanon in the same area
as a reward for their cooperation.”
Beaumont (1991) is among those who, building retroactively on
the charges regarding Lebanon, now include the 1967 war as proof
of water driving Israel’s territorial “imperative:”
To avoid each of the states (Lebanon and Syria) control
ling their own water resources, Israel invaded southern
Lebanon and the Golan Heights of Syria in 1967. The

  



   

pretext given was strategic reasons, but the control of the
water resources of the area seems a more compelling and
realistic reason.
Rebuttal to the Imperative
The theory that water has driven strategic thinking during war
time has been critiqued on political and technical grounds by Naff
and Matson (1984), Wolf (1995), Soffer (1995), and Libiszewski
(1995), as well as on economic grounds, by Wishart (1989). To
examine the validity of a “hydrostrategic” imperative, two questions
must be answered: (1) was the location of water resources a factor in
the military strategy of Israel in 1967, 1978, or 1982 and, (2) is Israel
now diverting water from the Litani River?
The 1967 War
It has already been noted that conflict between Syria and Israel
over water resources contributed to tensions leading to the 1967
fighting, although the hydrologic aspect ended almost a year before
the beginning of the war itself, which in the south was well away
from sensitive water sources (with Egypt expelling the U.N. forces in
the Sinai and blocking Israeli shipping to Eilat). The Sinai was the
first front when war broke out on June 5, 1967, with the straits of
Sharm-el-Sheikh being the primary objective.
The hydrostrategic locations over which Israel gained control
during the war were on the West Bank, including the recharge zones
of the Mountain Aquifer system and on the Golan Heights, includ
ing the Banias headwaters of the Jordan River.
Before the war, and even in its first days, Israel had agreed not to
engage in combat with Jordan, as long as Jordan did not attack.
Jordan did launch several artillery barrages in the first days of the
war, though, which opened up the West Bank as the second front
(Sachar 1979).
Finally, despite attacks from Syria, Defense Minister Moshe
Dayan was extremely reluctant to launch an attack on the Golan
Heights because of the presence of Soviet advisors and the conse
quent danger of widening the conflict (Slater 1991). For the first
three days of the war, Dayan held off arguments from several of his
advisors, including the CO of the northern command, David Elazar,
to launch an attack on the Golan Heights. Finally, a delegation from
the northern settlements, who had often experienced Syrian sniping
and artillery barrages, traveled to Tel Aviv to ask Dayan to take the
Heights to guarantee their security. Only then, on June 9, did Israeli
forces launch an attack against Syria (Slater 1991).

 





In the taking of the Golan Heights, the aforementioned water
sources were incidental conquests as Israeli forces moved as far east
as Quneitra. The only exception was the conquest of the town of
Ghajar, an Awali village which had no strategic importance in the
military sense (it neither contained combatants nor was it situated
in a strategic position). Ghajar does, however, directly overlook the
Wazzani springs, which contribute 20-25 MCM/y to the Hasbani’s total
annual flow of 125 MCM/y. During dry summer months, the Wazzani
is the only flowing source of the Hasbani. Moreover, Ghajar was the
site of the projected dams for the Arab Diversion project.
Oddly, Ghajar was not even taken during the hostilities. During
the fighting, Israeli troops stopped directly outside of the town since
they believed Ghajar to be situated on Lebanese territory (and Israel
did not want to involve Lebanon in the war). It turned out that the
town was Syrian, having been misplaced on 1943 British maps. Cut
off from the rest of Syria during the war, a delegation from Ghajar
traveled to Beirut to ask to be annexed but the Lebanese were not
interested. Three months after the war, another delegation traveled
to Israel and asked that the village become Israeli. Only then did
Israeli control extend north through Ghajar (Khativ 1988; interview,
Khativ, October 1991). Only the village itself was included, though,
and most of its agricultural land remained in Syria. Mekorot engi
neers did install a three-inch pipe for drinking water for the villagers
from the Wazzani springs which, although literally a stone’s throw
from the village, was left under Lebanese control (interviews, Khativ,
Paldi, October 1991).
Extensive literature exists on the detailed decision making in the
events before, during, and after the 1967 war, but there is almost a
complete absence of references to water, either as strategic targets or
as propaganda by either side. See, for example, Institute for Palestine
Studies (1970), which includes almost no mention of water; Brecher
(1974), who includes chapters on both “Jordan Waters,” and “The Six
Day War,” but documents no link; and Laqueur (1967, 50), who
claims that, “(water) was...certainly not one of the immediate reasons
for hostilities.” Stein and Tanter (1980) do not mention water at all.
Hostilities of 1978 and 1982
The same absence of documentation is true for the Israelis’
operations in Lebanon in 1978 and 1982 (see, for example,
MacBride 1982). Israel’s ally in southern Lebanon, Major Sa’ad
Haddad, had made clear to Israel in 1979 that water was not to be
discussed. It was Haddad, too, who quashed Israel’s 1979 plans for a
diversion of the Wazzani springs. Tamir (1988), a major general
who helped outline Israel’s strategic needs in 1967 and in 1982,

  



   

described in detail the military strategy of the 1982 war. Here, too,
references to water are conspicuously absent.
While the Israel Defense Forces planning branch does have an
officer whose responsibilities include water resources, both the officer
with those responsibilities during the 1982 war and Tamir (personal
communications, 1991) insist that water was not, even incidentally, a
factor in the war. When pressed on the subject, Tamir replied:
Why go to war over water? For the price of one week’s
fighting, you could build five desalination plants. No loss
of life, no international pressure, and a reliable supply you
don’t have to defend in hostile territory.
Even if water was not the immediate cause of the war, another
question remains: does Litani water reach Israel? Despite the inher
ent difficulty in proving the absence of something, my answer, after
investigating as closely as possible, is no. This conclusion is based on
the following (discussed in more detail in Wolf 1995):
1) The Litani River has a natural flow of about 700 MCM/y. A dam
at Qirawn in the Beka’a Valley and irrigation and hydropower diver
sions completed in the mid-1960s reduce the lower Litani flow to
300-400 MCM/y (Kolars 1992). This lower section, flowing within
kilometers of the Hasbani and the Israeli border, historically had
presented the possibilities of diversions in conjunction with the
Jordan system, and Israel has carried out seismic studies and intelli
gence reports to determine the feasibility of a Litani diversion (Naff
and Matson 1984). These reports concluded that a diversion would
be economically unattractive and, in any event, politically infeasible
until cooperation could be developed with Lebanon (Wolf 1995).
The Lebanese position was and continues to be that rights to Leba
nese water should be retained for future Lebanese development.
2) Reports of a secret diversion tunnel were investigated by U.N.
forces, as well as by members of the international press, to no avail
(Soffer 1991). All relevant sources of spatial data indicate only two
water pipelines crossing the Lebanon-Israel border previously men
tioned—a three-inch pipe from the Wazzani springs in Lebanese
territy to the town of Ghajar in Israel, and a ten-inch pipe from
Israel into the Lebanese village of R’meish.
3) Hydrologic records show neither unaccounted-for water in
the Israeli water budget after 1978 nor increases in the average flows
of the Ayoun or the Hasbani, the most likely carrier streams for a
diversion. Because of three years of drought, on October 14, 1991,
the Israeli Water Commissioner asked the Knesset to allow pumping
of the Sea of Galilee below the legal ‘Red Line’, the legal water level
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below which the entire lake is in danger of becoming saline. On the
same day, a field investigation showed that both the Ayoun and the
Hasbani above the Wazzani springs were dry.
4) A hypothetical trucking operation is even more difficult to
prove or disapprove. Both Mekorot officials (interview, Turgemon,
October 1991), and Israeli military officers responsible for southern
Lebanon acknowledge that witnesses may have seen Israeli military
water trucks in southern Lebanon. Each has suggested that the most
likely explanation is that the trucks were carrying drinking water
from Israel to Israeli troops stationed in the “security zone.” Israeli
military code, they point out, insists that soldiers drink water only
from official collection points, all of which are in Israel.
An officer who has acted as liaison officer between Israeli and
South Lebanon forces doubts that anyone saw Israeli trucks filling at
the Litani, pointing out that the 20-ton “Rio’s” which are used to
carry water could not make the grade of the military road which
leads away from the Litani, if the trucks were full (interview, Octo
ber 1991). Soffer (1991) has calculated that a cubic meter of water
trucked from the Litani into Israel would cost about $4 to $10, as
compared to about $1.50 for a cubic meter of desalinated water.
The Hydrostrategic Imperative—Conclusions
After closely examining the arguments both in favor and against
a hydrostrategic imperative driving military and territorial
decisionmaking, it is possible to answer the question posed at the
beginning of this section: “Has territory been explicitly targeted,
captured, or retained because of its access to water resources?”
I argue the following:
1) Water resources were not a factor for strategic planning in the
hostilities of 1948, 1967, 1978, or 1982. By this I mean that the decision to go to war, and strategic decisions made during the fighting,
including which territory was it necessary to capture, were not influenced by water scarcity or the location of water resources. The loca
tions of water resources were not considered strategic positions
(except in the purely military sense), nor were they a factor in
retaining territory immediately after the hostilities.
2) There is no evidence that Israel is diverting any water from the
Litani River, either by pipe or by truck. In fact, since 1985, when
central southern Lebanon lost its own water supply, an average of
50,000 m3/mo has been piped into that region from wells in north
ern Israel (Wolf 1995). As a consequence, it is difficult to view water
as a rationale for Israeli retention of Lebanese territory.12
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Nevertheless, Amery (1993) has
speculated that Israel will, at a minimum,
pressure Lebanon to make Litani water
available as a prerequisite to Israeli military
withdrawal.

  



   

WATER AND NEGOTIATIONS
As noted above, years of warfare have obscured most of the original
boundaries between Israel and her neighbors. The June 1967 war erased
the boundaries determined in the 1949 armistice agreement on all fronts,
with the exception of the line between Israel and Lebanon, in favor of
unsigned ceasefire lines between the combatants. These in turn gave way
to the lines of the Disengagement Agreement of 1974 on the fronts be
tween Israel and Syria, and Israel and Egypt. The post-1967 years, and
particularly the recent period of peace talks, have been characterized by a
quest for stable boundary lines, taking into account the lessons of the past.
The question which remains is how much of the quest for permanent
boundaries is influenced by the location of water resources.
BOUNDARY PROPOSALS: STRATEGY AND
HYDROSTRATEGY
The search for acceptable boundaries began immediately after
the June 1967 war. For Israel, the guiding rationale was that territo
rial concessions should be balanced by security needs, defined differ
ently depending on where one was situated on the political
spectrum. For the Arabs, regaining all land captured during the war
became the operative imperative, shadowing subsequent negotia
tions. In the survey of boundary proposals which follows, I exclude
the extreme positions of either side—from a “Greater Israel” on one
side to the elimination of Israel on the other—but rather describe
those which incorporate the concept of territorial compromise in
exchange for peace, as provided for in United Nations Resolutions
242 (1967) and 338 (1973).13 Since Israel controls the territory and
presumably will not withdraw unless its strategic and political goals
are met in negotiations, this analysis focuses on studies which inves
tigate Israeli interests in withdrawal.14 However, Foucher’s (1987)
warning that, “in the case of the strategic debate over Israel, the
West Bank and neighboring Arab states, one may have reason to
consider that ‘secure border’ for Israel and ‘security for all’ are not
synonymous concepts,” should be borne in mind.
Immediately after the 1967 war, the Israeli government spelled
out strategic needs (none of which related to water), which, if met,
would result in its withdrawal from occupied territory. According to
Moshe Dayan, the Golan Heights were negotiable even without a
peace treaty, and, with such a treaty, so was the rest of the territory
captured in 1967, save East Jerusalem (Slater 1991). This approach
was met by the “three no’s” of an Arab Summit in Khartoum in
August 1967—no peace, no recognition, and no negotiations with
Israel (Sachar 1979). As a consequence, Israel strengthened its posi
tion in the newly occupied territories through settlement activities: a
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These U.N. resolutions, the basis for peace
negotiations between Israel and each of its
neighbors, call for “the right of every State
in the area to live in peace within secure
and recognized boundaries,” and
“withdrawal of armed forces from
territories occupied.” Definite articles were
purposely omitted in the latter clause (i.e.
‘territories,’ not ‘the territories’), specifically
allowing for some flexibility in boundary
negotiations (see Julius Stone’s forward to
Blum 1971).
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I was not able to find many sources from
an Arab perspective which dealt with the
specifics of territorial compromise. Two
exceptions are Kharmi (1994), who allows
for Palestinian territorial adjustments in
negotiations provided Israel reciprocates
with a like amount of land from within
green line Israel, and Falah (1995) who,
with Newman, argues that a “good”
boundary between Palestine and Israel
would incorporate both internal and
external perceptions of threat. Since
neither study has an explicit hydrologic
component, neither is described in detail
here.





string of kibbutzim was established on the Golan Heights in 1967-68
from Senir, on Givat Banias overlooking the Banias headwaters,
south along the ridge of the Heights overlooking the previously
demilitarized zone, to Mevo Hama, adjacent to Hammat Gader with
its access to the Yarmuk River. Senir and Hammat Gader were each
situated in what had been until the war the demilitarized zone—
territory which had been part of the British Mandate, but that Syria
had occupied in the 1948 war, then had withdrawn from under
demilitarized conditions as part of the 1949 Armistice Agreement.
The same strategy of holding conquered land as an inducement
to peace talks was followed immediately after the 1982 war in Leba
non. In 1983, an Israeli-Lebanese agreement was signed which called
for an Israeli withdrawal from all of Lebanon. The agreement was
abrogated in 1984 however, and, consequently, Israel justifies its
continued presence in the “security zone” (Tamir 1988).
The Allon Plan
As mentioned, Israel began to use settlement activity as a way of
reinforcing its strategic interests immediately following the war of
1967. The Labor government which ruled Israel until 1977 adhered
generally to guidelines devised by minister Yigal Allon to address
Israeli security concerns.
The plan mainly emphasized the Jordan Valley and the eastern
slope of the West Bank mountain range facing Jordan. It should be
noted that the Allon Plan was neither endorsed nor ratified by any
Israeli government, although it guided the Labor government’s
settlement policy until 1977.
Some Israeli settlements were established outside of the Allon propos
als during the Labor years—a few reportedly to help protect Israel’s
groundwater resources on the northwest corner of the West Bank. As
mentioned above, Israel had since 1955 been tapping into the Western
sub-basin of the Mountain Aquifer (an aquifer whose recharge area
occurs on the West Bank). Because of the disparate water table depths for
this aquifer in the coastal plain and in the Judean hills (about 60m in the
plain, 150-200m in the foothills, and 700-800m in the hills (Goldschmidt
and Jacobs 1958; Weinberger 1991), and the resulting cost differences in
drilling and pumping wells in these areas, this aquifer is especially vulner
able to over-pumping along a narrow westernmost band of the northern
lobe of the West Bank, in the region of Galgilya and Tulkarm.
Some settlement plans for the late 1970s referred in part to this line,
and about five settlements around Elkanna were reportedly sited in part
to guarantee continued Israeli control of the water resources on its side of
what would soon be referred to as a “red line” (Pedhatzor 1989; State of
Israel memoranda, April-July 1977).

  



   

Figure 10 The Allon plan (Alpher 1994).

Post-1977 Boundary Studies
In 1977, the right-wing Likud party gained control of the Israeli
parliament for the first time. As Israeli Prime Minister Menahem
Begin was preparing for negotiations with Egyptian President Anwar
Sadat, he asked the Water Commissioner at the time, Menachem
Cantor, to provide him with a map of Israeli water usage from water
originating on the West Bank, and to provide guidelines to where
Israel might relinquish control, if protecting Israel’s water resources
were the only consideration.
Cantor concluded that a “red line” could be drawn beyond
which Israel should not relinquish control, north to south following
roughly the 100-200m contour line along both “lobes” of the West

 





Figure 11 West Bank groundwater (Shuval 1992).

Bank (see Figure 11). Israeli water planners still refer to this “red
line” as a frame of reference (interviews, Golani, October 1991;
Shmuel Cantor, December 1991), and it has occasionally been in
cluded in academic boundary studies of the region. This concept
was later expanded by others to areas of the northern headwaters
and the Golan Heights.
A brief description of those which mention water as a territorial
imperative follows:
Cohen’s “Defensible Borders”
Cohen (1986) explored “the geopolitics of Israel’s border ques
tion,” addressing possible boundary negotiations with a Palestinian
political entity over the West Bank and with Syria over the Golan

  



   

Figure 12 (Wolf 1995)

Heights. His recommendations for boundary adjustments were
considered from the perspective of defensible borders for Israel
within the framework of territorial compromise, and included fac
tors of a “strategic-tactical” and a “demographic-economic” nature.
They included, explicitly, defensive depth, surveillance points, mar
shaling areas and corridors, water control, space for Israeli popula

 


tion and industrial growth, absence of dense Arab populations, and
psycho-tactical space.
In describing the influence of the above principles, Cohen de
scribed how water might influence territorial compromise: Israel
would need to retain sovereignty over the Banias-Har Dov-Hermon
shoulder headwaters region, the Golan slopes east of the Upper
Jordan, and the Golan Heights that overlook the Sea of Galilee and
the Lower Yarmuk and its Raqqad tributary. On the West Bank,
Cohen argued that Israel should annex the territory which extends
until the “subterranean water divide,” which he identifies as extend
ing 2-6 km east of the Green Line.15 Despite his acknowledgment
that this territory includes Arab population centers, Cohen argued
that the substantial geopolitical advantage that Israel would gain
(presumably over and above the hydrostrategic considerations)
would outweigh those concerns. Overall, for all the factors listed
above, Cohen advised Israel to annex approximately 20% of the
West Bank, 19% of the Gaza Strip, and 50% of the Golan Heights
(see Figure 13).
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Cohen is probably referring to Cantor’s
“red line.” The watershed divide is actually
several kilometers inland along the ridge of
the Samarian and Judean Hills.

The Jaffee Center’s “Arrangements”
In 1991, the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies of Tel Aviv Uni
versity asked two researchers, Yehoshua Schwartz, the director of
Tahal, Israel’s water planning agency, and Aharon Zohar, also at
Tahal at the time, to undertake a study of the regional hydrostrategic
situation and the potential for regional cooperation. The result, a
300-page document titled, “Water in the Middle East: Solutions to
Water Problems in the Context of Arrangements between Israel and
the Arabs,” was one of the most comprehensive studies of its kind
(Schwartz and Zohar 1991). It examined a number of possible sce
narios for regional water development, including possible arrange
ments between Israel and Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Turkey,
Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza.
Scenarios were included both for regional cooperation and for its
absence. Evaluations included hydrologic, political, legal, and ideo
logical constraints. The impacts of potential global climatic change
were also considered. The study showed, in the words of Joseph
Alpher, the director of the Jaffee Center, “the potential beauty of
multilateral negotiations” (interview, Alpher, December 1991).
Some of the findings of the study contradicted government
policies at the time, however. In the sections on possible arrange
ments between Israel and the Palestinians, and between Israel and
Syria, maps of the West Bank and Golan Heights included lines to
which Israel might relinquish control of the water resources in each
area, without overly endangering its own water supply. The line in

  



Figure 13

   

Cohen’s “defensible borders” (Cohen 1986).

the West Bank, which was based on Cantor’s “red line,” suggested
that Israel might, with legal and political guarantees, turn control of
the water resources of more than two-thirds of the West Bank over
to Palestinian authorities without threatening Israel’s water sources
from the Yarkon-Tanninim (Western Mountain) aquifer, although
the authors advocated retaining control beyond the “red line.” The
same was true of more than half of the Golan Heights (see Figure 13).
These maps contradicted the position of the Ministry of Agricul
ture. Headed by Rafael Eitan of the right-wing Tsomet party, the
Ministry’s position was that, to protect Israel from threats to both

 


the quantity and quality of its water, Israel had to retain political
control over the entire West Bank.16 On December 12, 1991, 70
copies of the report were sent throughout Israel for review, includ
ing to the Ministry of Agriculture. Calling the maps mentioned “an
outline for retreat,” Rafael Eitan and Dan Zaslavsky, whom Eitan
had recently appointed Water Commissioner, insisted on a recall of
the review copies and a delay in the release of the report. In January
1992, the Israeli military censor backed the position of the Ministry
of Agriculture and, citing sensitivity of the report’s findings, cen
sored the report in its entirety.17



16

Eitan’s position, argued in full-page ads in
the Israeli press, has little basis in
hydrogeology, as discussed in Wolf 1995.
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When peace talks began in 1991, the
document remained censored out of fear
that it would reveal an Israeli negotiating
strategy. At press, the document has not
been made public.

Alpher’s Proposals
Once negotiations began in 1991, boundary proposals took on
new urgency. In one of the most comprehensive post-negotiation
examinations of West Bank boundary options, Alpher (1994) both
summarizes previous proposals for final boundary arrangements,
including the recent “Third Way” and Sharon plans (neither of
which have a hydrostrategic component), and offers his own. In
defining Israel’s requirements in a negotiated agreement, Alpher
specifies Israel’s needs according to nine parameters: security, water,

Figure 14 Alpher’s “Water Boundaries” (Alpher 1994).

Figure 15 Alpher’s “Final Boundaries” (Alpher 1994).

  



   

demography and politics, the “heritage dimension,” the “historic
dimension;” Hebron; Israeli Arabs and the danger of irredentism;
“the economic dimension;” and the need to straighten the borderline.
Alpher relies on the unpublished Jaffee Center report of 1991
described above for his description of hydrostrategic territory.18 He
delineates West Bank territory which might be annexed to Israel in
order to protect the Western sub-basin of the Mountain Aquifer, as
defined first as Cantor’s “Red Line”—the westernmost section of the
northern lobe of the West Bank, and a region around Jerusalem.
Alpher notes that, while annexation would guarantee Israeli
control of water resources, adequate supervision and control ar
rangements are possible without annexation—perhaps through the
implementation of a joint water regime. He also points out that the
territories of the West Bank which are vital for continued control
over water management have already been heavily settled because of
their importance with regard to security. Thus, he concludes:
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Alpher was director of the Jaffee Center
when it commissioned the 1991 study.
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For a more detailed accounting of the
agreements between Israel and Jordan the
Palestinian Authority, see the text of the
water components of the Israel-Jordan
treaty and Oslo II, pp. 284-296 and
Shamir’s commentary, this volume.

...the water issue is not necessarily a decisive rationale for
annexation. At the same time, to the extent that the water
issue is juxtaposed geographically with additional vital issues
such as security and demography, then it may be seen to
further enhance an annexation solution.
Alpher finally seems to weigh in against annexation. In his final
map incorporating all of the parameters he defines as crucial, no
territory which was identified as being important for water alone is
slated for annexation.
Bilateral and Multilateral Negotiations19
The Gulf War in 1990 and the collapse of the Soviet Union
caused a re-alignment of political alliances in the Mideast which
finally made possible the first public face-to-face peace talks between
Arabs and Israelis, in Madrid on October 30, 1991. During the bilat
eral negotiations between Israel and each of its neighbors, it was
agreed that a second track be established for multilateral negotia
tions on five subjects deemed “regional,” including water resources.
These two mutually reinforcing tracks—the bilateral and multilat
eral—have led, at this writing, to a treaty of peace between Israel and
Jordan and a declaration of principles for agreement between Israel
and the Palestinian Authority. Both have had a water component in
terms of allocations and projects, but in neither has water had influ
ence on the discussions over final boundaries.

 


Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace
Israel and Jordan have had probably the warmest relations of any
two states legally at war. Communication between the two has taken
place since the creation of each, ameliorating conflict and facilitating
conflict resolution on a variety of subjects, including water. As noted
above, the so-called “Picnic Table Talks” on allocations of the
Yarmuk have taken place since the 1950s and negotiations formulat
ing principles for water-sharing projects and allocations have oc
curred in conjunction with, and parallel to, both the bilateral and
multilateral peace negotiations.20 These principles were formalized
on October 26, 1994, when Israel and Jordan signed a treaty of
peace, ending more than four decades of a legal, when not actual,
state of war.
For the first time since the states came into being, the treaty
legally defines mutually recognized water allocations. Acknowledg
ing that “water issues along their entire boundary must be dealt with
in their totality,” the treaty spells out allocations for both the
Yarmuk and Jordan Rivers and Arava/Araba groundwater, and calls
for joint efforts to prevent water pollution. Also, “[recognizing] that
their water resources are not sufficient to meet their needs,” the
treaty calls for ways of alleviating the water shortage through coop
erative projects, both regional and international.
The peace treaty also makes some minor boundary modifica
tions. As noted above, the Israel-Jordan boundary was delineated by
Great Britain in 1922 and followed the center of the Yarmuk and
Jordan Rivers, the Dead Sea, and Wadi Araba. In the late 1960s and
1970s, Israel had occasionally made minor modifications in the
boundary south of the Dead Sea to make specific sections more
secure from infiltrators. They had also done so on occasion to reach
sites from which small wells might better be developed. In the last
sixteen years, no modifications were made except on the rare occa
sion that one of these local wells ran dry and had to be re-dug. All of
these territorial modifications were reversed and all affected land
was returned to Jordan as a consequence of the peace treaty, al
though Israel retains rights to the water which comes from these
wells. Moreover, a small enclave of Jordanian territory in the Arava
is being leased back to Israel in 25 year increments.
One other area was similarly affected. In 1926, a Jewish entrepre
neur named Pinhas Rutenberg was granted a 70 year concession for
hydropower generation at the confluence of the Yarmuk and Jordan
Rivers on land leased by TransJordan. The dam he built for that
purpose was destroyed in the fighting of 1948 and the 1949 Armi
stice Line left a small portion of Jordan under Israeli control. This
land was farmed by the kibbutz Ashdot Ya’akov, which was estab
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lished in 1933. With the 1994 peace treaty, sovereignty of the land
was returned to Jordan, who in turn leased it back to the Israelis,
and Israeli kibbutzniks now travel into Jordanian territory regularly
to farm their land.
Israel-Palestinian Declaration of Principles and Interim Agreement
On 15 September 1993, the “Declaration of Principles on In
terim Self-Government Arrangements” was signed between Palestin
ians and Israelis, which called for Palestinian autonomy in, and the
removal of Israeli military forces from, Gaza and Jericho. Among
other issues, this bilateral agreement called for the creation of a
Palestinian Water Administration Authority. Moreover, the first
item in Annex III, on cooperation in economic and development
programs, included a focus on:
... cooperation in the field of water, including a Water Devel
opment Program prepared by experts from both sides, which
will also specify the mode of cooperation in the management
of water resources in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will
include proposals for studies and plans on water rights of
each party, as well as on the equitable utilization of joint
water resources for implementation in and beyond the in
terim period.
At approximately the same time, Israeli water managers discov
ered an additional 70 MCM/yr of available yield in the Eastern subbasin of the Mountain Aquifer—the only one of the three main
West Bank groundwater units which was not being overpumped at
the time. This probably did not hurt Jericho’s choice as the first
West Bank town to be given autonomy.
Between 1993 and 1995, Israeli and Palestinian representatives
negotiated to broaden the interim agreement to encompass greater
West Bank territory. On September 28, 1995, the “Israeli-Palestinian
Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,” com
monly referred to as “Oslo II,” was signed in Washington DC. The
question of water rights was one of the most difficult to negotiate,
with a final agreement postponed to be included in the negotiations
for final status arrangements. Nevertheless, tremendous compro
mise was achieved between the two sides: Israel recognized the Pal
estinian claim to water rights, of an amount to be determined in
final status negotiations, and a Joint Water Committee was estab
lished to cooperatively manage West Bank water and to develop new
supplies. This committee also supervises joint patrols to investigate
illegal water withdrawals—their first “action” was to discover and

 





put a stop to illegal drilling in the area of Jenin in December 1995
(Israeline, December 20, 1995).
According to the agreement, Israeli forces are scheduled to with
draw from six Palestinian cities in order from north to south, and
from 450 towns and villages throughout the West Bank. The final
status of Israeli settlements in the West Bank has yet to be deter
mined. No territory whatsoever was identified as being necessary for
Israeli annexation due to access to water resources. The second and
third cities scheduled for Israeli withdrawal—Tulkarm, and
Kalkilya, fall well within Cantor’s “red line” delineated in Israeli
studies as being necessary to retain for water security.
Negotiations among Israel, Syria and Lebanon
As of this writing, water has not been raised in official negotia
tions between Israel and Syria.21 Serious bilateral negotiations have
only taken place since the fall of 1995 and, given the influence Dam
ascus has on Beirut, Israel/Lebanon talks are not likely until Israel
and Syria make more progress. Israelis had hoped to begin talks on
water resources with the Syrians at a meeting in Maryland in Janu
ary 1996, but the Syrians reportedly refused to broaden the scope
(Israeline, January 24, 1996).
The basis for Israel/Syria negotiations is the premise of an ex
change of the Golan Heights for peace. The discussions thus far have
focused on interpretations of how much of the Golan, with what
security arrangements, and for how much peace. The crux of the
territorial dispute is the question of to which boundaries Israel
would withdraw—the boundaries between Israel and Syria have
included the international boundary between the British and French
mandates (1923), the Armistice Line (1949), and the cease fire lines
from 1967 and 1974.
The Syrian position has been an insistence on a return to the
borders of June 5, 1967, while Israel refers to the boundaries of 1923.
Although it has not been mentioned explicitly, the difference between
these two positions is precisely over access to water resources. The
only distinction between the two lines is the inclusion or exclusion of
the three small areas which made up the demilitarized zone between
1949 and 1967 — Givat Banias, the Daughters of Jacob bridge area
and the town of El-Hamma/Hamat Gader—a total of about 60 km2.
Each of these three territories were included in British Palestine spe
cifically because of their access to the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers and,
since each is a relatively low-lying area with no strategic importance,
their access to water is still considered paramount.
In fact, even before the Israel-Syria negotiations began, a flurry
of articles has stressed the importance of water on the Golan
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Heights. As mentioned above, Schwartz and Zohar (1991) advised
Israeli retention of the Golan Heights west of the Jordan River wa
tershed line in order to guarantee continued control of both water
quantity and quality (see Figure 13). In a 1994 study, Shalev (1994),
himself a retired general in the Israeli army, cites five other retired
generals on the importance of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan to
the protection of water resources. Even in his small sample, Shalev
finds a range of military opinions, from those who suggest that
Israel retain a physical presence on the Golan Heights, to those who
advocate retention of at least the plateau above the Sea of Galilee, to
those (such as former Chief of Staff Mordechai Gur) who argue that
the water problem can be resolved politically in a peace treaty, and
that the territory is not vital. Shalev concludes that Syria would not
risk a war with Israel for water, especially since a diversion would
take years to construct and would constitute a clear casus belli. It
stands to reason, Shalev argues, that countries involved in watersharing agreements would want to maintain them.
In the meantime, Schiff (1995), Tarnopolsky (1996), and others
have argued in the popular Israeli and Jewish press that water’s
paramount importance may scuttle negotiations over the Golan,
while Israeli politicians from the Labor party, including Prime Min
ister Shimon Peres and his Foreign Minister Ehud Barak, argue that
while the land may be negotiable, the water is not (Jerusalem Post,
January 6, 1996 and January 27, 1996).
Water and Negotiations—Conclusions
In answer to the question posed at the beginning of this section,
“How much of the quest for negotiated boundaries has been influ
enced by the location of water resources?” the evidence seems to
suggest: not much. This is not to say that water has not been an
important topic in each set of negotiations—quite the opposite. The
questions of water allocations and rights have been intricate and
have been only partially resolved, and even so with great difficulty.
Nevertheless, with the concluded negotiations between Israel and
Jordan and the ongoing talks between Israel and the Palestinian
Authority (and despite the quantity of studies identifying
hydrostrategic territory and advising its retention) no territory to
date has been retained simply because of the location of water. Solu
tions in each case have focused on creative joint management of the
resource, rather than insistence on sovereignty.
The pattern which does seem to be emerging, however, is that
water in addition to one or more other concerns, may justify reten
tion of territory. For example, in the absence of any legal claims,
security interests, or settlements, Israel withdrew from territory
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which it had occupied from Jordan—even those small portions
which had hydrostrategic importance. What was important was an
agreement on water management, not territory.
By contrast, Israel developed some settlements on the
westernmost side of the West Bank to address security and demo
graphic concerns in addition to protecting its water supply. While
control of much of this territory is being turned over to the Palestin
ians, determination of the final status of those settlements has been
postponed until the final round of negotiations. Again, the solution
was found through agreements guaranteeing joint water manage
ment, precluding the need for annexation of territory.
These principles may be played out in negotiations between
Israel and Syria as well. While Syria insists on the Armistice Line as
it stood on June 5, 1967, Israel is arguing for boundaries based on
the 1923 international division between the British and French
mandates—the difference being three small areas of vital hydrostra
tegic importance. Based on the experience of other regional bound
ary delineations, Israel is likely to address hydrostrategic territorial
concerns in conjunction with its legal claims.
CONCLUSIONS
Michel Foucher (1989) describes cross-border “realities and
representations” thus:
Border analysis does not only deal with space, but also with time.
So boundaries can be considered as time written in space—not
merely the past, but also a special relationship with that past
which stands as an inevitable background to current geopolitical
decisions.
I have sought to address in this paper the existence of hydrostra
tegic territory (that is, territory over which sovereignty has been
sought politically or militarily solely because of its access to water
sources) and its role in boundaries, warfare, and negotiations.
Hydrostrategic behavior has occurred in the political realm but it
has not occurred in the military realm.
Have boundaries been drawn historically on the basis of the
location of water access? Beginning with the Paris Peace Talks in
1919 and ending with the 1923 mandate boundaries, the Zionist
position clearly defined their future state in hydrologic terms, seek
ing as much of the Jordan Basin as possible, and occasionally some
of the Litani as well. They were only marginally successful in achiev
ing these goals, losing two of the three headwaters, but retaining
most of the flow of the upper Jordan and all of the Sea of Galilee.

  



   

The watershed was further divided in the 1922 creation of
Transjordan in territory east of the Jordan River, Dead Sea, and
Wadi Araba/Arava. The Zionists attempted to reinforce their sover
eignty of the headwaters region through settlement activity in the
late 1930s, always within negotiated boundaries.
It seems clear that water was uppermost in the minds of planners
and political decisionmakers, particularly among the Zionists, as
boundaries were negotiated over the years. However, despite studies
advocating the need for greater access to water through 1947, official
adherence to sovereignty over such hydrostrategic territory has ceased
each time negotiations over legal borders have been concluded.
During warfare between competing riparians, has territory been
explicitly targeted, captured, or retained because of its access to
water sources? This has been the most elaborately argued question
in the literature relating water resources to Arab-Israeli relations,
although it is too rarely investigated in detail. In contrast to the
functionalists and advocates of a “hydrostrategic imperative,” waterrelated territory seems actually to have played almost no role in
Arab-Israeli warfare. Close examination of strategic planning and
military decision making and tactics suggest no evidence at all that
water was a factor in the hostilities of 1948, 1967, 1978, or 1982. The
only instance in which territory was sought for access to water was a
brief attempt by Israel in 1979 to move the boundary with Lebanon
about a kilometer north to gain access to the Wazzani Springs—an
attempt quickly vetoed by the local Lebanese commander.
In the course of peace negotiations, has hydrostrategic territory
been seen as vital for retention by any of the riparians? Here, too,
the answer seems to be no, despite a flurry of studies recommending
Israeli retention of territory to protect its water sources. That is not
to say that water has not been a difficult topic for negotiations
between Israel and its neighbors—again, quite the opposite, but the
debate has been over rights, allocations, and management, not over
territory. Of territory identified in Israeli studies as being vital to the
protection of Israel’s water resources, none has been retained by
Israel because of the location of water alone. This has been true of
agreements completed as of this writing—the 1994 treaty of peace
between Israel and Jordan, and the 1993 Declaration of Principles
and the 1995 Interim Agreement between Israel and Palestinian
Authority—where arrangements were made for joint management
and sovereignty concerns were not highlighted.
Hydrostrategic territory is being insisted upon, however, in
ongoing negotiations when at least one other compelling justifica
tion exists. Israel may point to demographic and/or security con
cerns over some Jewish settlements which were reportedly sited to

 





protect Israel’s groundwater resources, for example. And Israel’s
insistence that boundaries with Syria be drawn at the 1923 mandate
line rather than according to the temporary 1949 armistice agree
ment is based on precedent and its interpretation of international
law as well as on perceived hydrostrategic needs.
The facts show that water has had much less impact on the ArabIsraeli conflict than is increasingly argued, certainly in strategic,
spatial, and territorial terms. As Libiszewski (1995) concludes in a
thorough study of water and security in the Middle East,
the Arab-Israeli conflict is not primarily a struggle “over
water.” The conflict is over national identity and existence,
territory, as well as over power and national security.
In this context, water has played a minor role but only, it seems,
in conjunction with one or more of these overriding imperatives.
The true lesson of the Arab-Israeli experience seems not to be of
water as exacerbator of conflict but rather, as the people in the re
gion move from war to peace and the desire for sovereignty gives
way to principles of joint management, of water as inducer to coop
eration. As Lord Curzon (cited in Prescott 1987) said in 1907, “fron
tiers are indeed the razor’s edge on which hang suspended the
modern issues of war and peace.”
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Water Agreements Between Israel and Its Neighbors*
Uri Shamir
Technion, the Israel Institute of Technology
ABSTRACT
Israel signed a Peace Treaty with Jordan in October 1994, and the Oslo II Agreement with the Palestinians in September
1995. Both agreements address issues of water between the two parties to the agreement. The purpose of this paper is
to review and discuss these agreements, so we can draw some lessons from them.

BACKGROUND: WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Although the estimates differ somewhat, there is little doubt that
Middle East water resources are being used to the limits of their
availability. Some of the sources (particularly groundwater) are
over-utilized; that is, current annual extraction exceeds average
annual replenishment. Analyses in the professional literature uni
formly indicate that there is an acute water shortage in the region.
The Middle East’s population is growing (see Winckler, this
volume), an ever-increasing percentage of it in the cities. Standards
of living are rising, and with them unit water consumption rates.
The product of these two increasing parameters—population and
per capita water use—translates into rapidly escalating urban re
quirements for potable water.
Currently, agriculture utilizes approximately 70% of the fresh
water in the Middle East. Although this percentage is somewhat
lower in the more industrialized areas, agriculture is likely to remain
the major water-consuming sector in coming decades. However,
rising urban needs will require diversion of some potable freshwater
resources away from agriculture to the cities. This will be accom
plished in two main ways: improved water use efficiency and substi
tutions of reclaimed wastewater for irrigation and uses other than
direct human consumption. The latter is compatible with the in
creasing production of urban wastewater. Meanwhile, maintaining
the viability of agriculture in the region is desirable for a variety of
reasons, among them food self-sufficiency and the preservation of
rural pastoral lifestyle in the social fabric.
As freshwater utilization has reached the limits of its availability
in Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and Jordan, interna
tional tensions over scarce water have increased. Several attempts
have been made to reach a water agreement in the region, the best
known of which is the “Johnston Agreement,” named after the
American envoy Eric Johnston, who visited the region several times
between 1953 and 1955 (see Elmusa, this volume, and Wolf, this
volume). At the time his mission ended, Johnston had proposed
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three somewhat different versions of an agreement, one each to
Syria, Jordan and Israel, with specified allocations for each. The
basis for allocations in his proposals was agricultural use of water,
calculated via the areas of arable land of each riparian. The Johnston
agreement was never ratified. In later years, Amercian envoys Rich
ard Armitage and Philip Habib made attempts to reach an agree
ment on water allocations between the regional parties, but were
never successful.
Political, institutional, and economic constraints have hindered
water quality protection in the region, resulting in threats to human
health and the integrity of aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems. Re-use
of treated wastewater for irrigation can contribute to the reduction
of such hazards.
THE WATER PROVISIONS OF THE JORDAN-ISRAEL
TREATY OF PEACE
Since the early 1980s, progress has been made on the ground
between Israel and Jordan. Meeting in the field, close to the diver
sion point from the Yarmuk River into the Jordanian King Abdullah
Canal (KAC, earlier known as the Ghor Canal), water experts from
the two sides met to consider Jordanian requests for increasing the
diversion into the KAC. Trustful and solid relations developed in
what came to be known as the “Picnic Table Talks” (see Wolf, this
volume), and Israel consented to alleviate some of the water short
age in Jordan by increasing the quantities diverted. This, however,
did not change Jordan’s position that it was entitled to more water
from the Yarmuk, as well as from the Jordan, including from the Sea
of Galilee. Jordan stood by the position that it is riparian to the
entire Jordan River (from its headwaters in the Banias, Hasbani, and
Dan springs) and saw Israel’s diversion of water from the Sea of
Galilee into its National Water Carrier as a breach of internationally
accepted principles. Israel, on the other hand, maintains, as it did
then, that Jordan is riparian only to that portion of the Jordan along
their common border, and therefore has no legitimate claim to the
Jordan River upstream of its confluence with the Yarmuk.
This was the situation when the two countries entered direct
negotiations, following the procedure established in the Madrid
peace conference of 1991. Many rounds of negotiations ensued, in
Washington and later in the region. In the beginning, there were
two Arab delegations to the Washington rounds: a Jordanian delega
tion with Palestinian participation, and a Palestinian delegation with
Jordanian presence. (This resulted from Israel’s refusal at the time to
recognize the Palestinians as a separate entity.) Jordan delayed its
agreement to the “Agenda” for the final peace talks until Israel and
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the Palestinians signed the Oslo I Accord on the White House lawn
on September 13, 1993. The “Agenda” had been ready a year earlier,
but was signed only the day after the Israeli-Palestinian agreement,
at the State Department in Washington. This led to intensification
of the negotiations, which moved to the region, and culminated in
the Peace Treaty.
The state of belligerency between the two countries came to an
end with the signing of the Peace Treaty, celebrated by a ceremony
in the Arava/Araba Valley just north of Aqaba/Eilat, on October 26,
1994 (referred to herein as “the Treaty”). It is a comprehensive
agreement, covering all areas of concern between the two countries,
including water.
The agreement on water was one of the last issues to be con
cluded at all night meetings in the Jordanian Palace between the
water negotiators—Dr. Munther Haddadin for Jordan and Mr.
Noah Kinarti for Israel—with His Majesty King Hussein and Prime
Minister Rabin working out the final details.
GENERAL BACKGROUND AND THE JOINT WATER
COMMITTEE
Article 6 of the Treaty states the principles relating to water, and
Annex II details the “Water Related Matters.” The agreement covers
two distinct geographic areas, the first of which runs along the Jor
dan River from its confluence with the Yarmuk River to its
confluence with Wadi Yabis at Tirat Zvi (the point at which the
northern border of the West Bank meets the Jordan River), the
second of which begins near the Dead Sea and extends down to the
Red Sea at Eilat/Aqaba through Emek Ha’Arava/Wadi Araba.
The opening statement of Article 6 (“With the view to achieving
a comprehensive and lasting settlement of all the water problems
between them”) stresses that this is a final agreement. Still, the nego
tiating parties each have recognized the need for future flexibility,
and thus a Joint Water Committee (JWC) has been formed (Annex
II, Article VII) as a permanent institution. The JWC is charged with
implementing the Treaty and with resolving additional water-related
matters which may arise subsequently.
The JWC consists of three members from each side. There is no
third party involvement; however, Article 29 of the Treaty states
that “Disputes arising out of the application or implementation of
this Treaty shall be resolved by negotiations. Any such disputes
which cannot be settled by negotiations shall be resolved by
concilliation or submitted to arbitration.” The JWC obviously
comes under the supervision of their respective national leaders,
via the relevant Ministers.
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The Treaty establishes two JWC sub-committees, one each for
the northern and southern areas (Annex II, Article VII.2). The
northern sub-committee deals with matters relating to the Jordan/
Yarmuk, and the southern with groundwater in the Arava/Araba.
According to Article 6.3 of the Treaty “The parties recognize
that their water resources are not sufficient to meet their needs.
More water should be supplied for their use through various meth
ods, including projects of regional and international co-operation.”
That is, the parties have recognized that by dividing the existing
sources both will still face shortage, and thus endeavor not only to
divide the “pie” but also to enlarge it. This is also an appeal to the
international community for assistance in augmenting the region’s
water resources, as one of the so-called “fruits of peace.”
The specific areas of cooperation, as outlined in Article 6.4, are:
development of existing and new water resources, increasing of
water availability, including regional co-operation on a regional
basis, and waste minimization; prevention of contamination of
water resources; mutual assistance in the alleviation of water short
ages; information transfer; joint water research and development,
and “review of the potentials for enhancement of water resources
development and use.”
WATER ALLOCATIONS, STORAGE, AND QUALITY
PROTECTION IN THE JORDAN-YARMUK RIVER SYSTEM
The Agreement does not mention “water rights,” but states that
“the parties agree mutually to recognize the rightful allocations of
both of them in Jordan River and Yarmuk River waters and Arava/
Araba groundwater, in accordance with agreed-upon acceptable
principles, quantities and quality as set out in Annex II, which shall
be fully respected and complied with” (Article 6.1). This indicates the
pragmatic approach adopted by the parties; rather than insisting on
what their respective rights might be according to the vague and
somewhat contradictory international law on the subject, the parties
agreed on specific water quantities, qualities, times and locations.
Allocations are taken up in Annex II, Article I. Israel is allotted
flows from the Yarmuk River, specified for a “summer” period
(May 15 to October 15) and a “winter” period (October 16 to May
14), with the remainder allocated to Jordan. To implement these
allocations, “Jordan and Israel shall cooperate to build a diversion/
storage dam on the Yarmuk River directly downstream of the
Adassiya Diversion/point 121.” (Annex II, Article II.1.) Preliminary
work in the location where the dam is to be constructed has been
ongoing, but there is still no agreement on the precise location,
design and operation, or environmental protection.

  



   

Israel stores in its system 20 million m3 per year (MCM/y) of
winter flows in the Yarmuk, to be returned to Jordan in the sum
mer. This is done with a pipeline, 3.2 km long, “...from the Jordan
River directly upstream of the Deganya gates on the river.” (Annex
II, Article I.2.a). The pipeline was constructed by Jordan, partly on
Israeli territory, at its expense, and is operated by Jordan. Jordan
pays Israel the operating costs of this system, and no compensation
for the value of the water itself. A recent agreement by the Israeli
Minister of Infrastructure Ariel Sharon resulted in an increase of 25
MCM/y to Jordan from this source.
Jordan is given allocations from the Jordan River: “Winter pe
riod – 16th October to 14th May of each year. Jordan is entitled to
store for its use a minimum average of (20) MCM of the floods in the
Jordan River south of its confluence with the Yarmuk” (Annex II,
Article I.2.b). This is conditioned on the assumption that “Israel is
entitled to maintain its current uses of the Jordan River waters be
tween its confluence with the Yarmuk and its confluence with Wadi
Yabis/Tirat Zvi” (Annex II, Article I.2.c). Agreement on how this
translates into actual quantities has not been settled, and studies of
potential for storage on the Jordan River have not been completed
yet.
Annex II, Article I.2.d entitles Jordan to “an annual quantity of
(10) MCM of desalinated water from the desalination of about (20)
MCM of saline springs now diverted to the Jordan River.” The brine
from this operation cannot be discharged into the watercourses, as is
the case with other low quality waters. “Jordan and Israel will each
prohibit the disposal of municipal and industrial wastewater into the
courses of the Yarmuk or the Jordan Rivers before they are treated
to standards allowing their unrestricted agricultural uses.” (Annex
II, Article III.3.)
According to Annex II, Article I.3: “Jordan and Israel shall coop
erate in finding sources for the supply to Jordan of an additional
quantity of 50 MCM/y of water of drinkable standards. To this end,
the Joint Water Committee will develop, within one year from the
Treaty’s entry into force, a plan for the supply to Jordan of the above
mentioned additional water. This plan will be forwarded to the
respective governments for discussion and decision.”
This particular matter is one of the major outstanding issues on
which the parties have not as yet reached a plan, two years after the
expiration of the deadline. Jordan has insisted that it is Israel’s re
sponsibility to supply this water from its sources, and has repeatedly
demanded that it be supplied from the Sea of Galilee. Israel’s posi
tion was that the sources for this water should be found on both
sides of the border, and that Jordan should pay the full price of

 





developing and supplying it. The recent decision by Minister Ariel
Sharon to supply an additional 25 MCM/y to Jordan from the Israeli
system constitutes a deviation from this position. The first deliveries
of those volumes were transferred to Jordan in the summer of 1998.
GROUNDWATER IN WADI ARABA/EMEK HA’ARAVA
This is the area between the Dead Sea and the port cities of Eilat/
Aqaba. “… some wells drilled and used by Israel along with their
associated systems fall on the Jordanian side of the border. These
wells and systems are under Jordan’s sovereignty. Israel shall retain
the use of these wells and systems in the quantity and quality de
tailed in Appendix 1, that shall be prepared by December 1, 1994.
Neither country shall take, or cause to be taken, any measure that
may appreciably reduce the yields or quality of these wells and sys
tems” (Annex II, Article IV.1)
Furthermore, “Israel may increase the abstraction rate from wells
and systems in Jordan by up to (10) MCM/year above the yields re
ferred to in paragraph 1 above, subject to the determination by the
Joint Water Committee that this undertaking is hydrogeologically
feasible and does not harm existing Jordanian uses. Such increase is
to be carried out within five years from the entry into force of this
Treaty” (Annex II, Article IV.3).

This inter-linking of water systems,
allowing entry of one country into the
territory of the other, should be viewed
as an indication of the mutual trust and
commitment that prevailed when the
agreement was negotiated and
concluded.

OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS
It must be stressed that the Jordan-Israel water agreement is a single
component in a comprehensive peace treaty. What it accomplishes for
each of the parties must be viewed in this light, and not in isolation.
The northern pipeline from the Jordan River in Israel to the
KAC, built and operated by Jordan, and Israel’s continued use and
potential expansion of the groundwater in the Jordan in the south,
are quite unique in international water agreements. This interlink
ing of water systems, allowing entry of one country into the territory
of the other, should be viewed as an indication of the mutual trust
and commitment which prevailed when the agreement was negoti
ated and concluded.
The Treaty is a permanent one. It is also fairly pragmatic and
certainly complex, making it possible to present different perspec
tives on what it achieves for each side. This allows interested parties,
on both sides, to characterize the agreement as either an achieve
ment or a failure in domestic fora.
Protection of water quality and of the environment is an integral
part of the Treaty. And yet, there is concern that while other parts of
the Agreement have strong interests behind them (water users), the
environmental interests may not have strong and specific interests to

  



   

stand for them. It is therefore the role of the national authorities to
make sure that the environment does not get short-changed.
The parties recognize the need to develop additional water, not
merely to divide the existing sources.
The Treaty does not specify how shortages (in the Yarmuk and
Jordan) are to be allocated between the sides; instead the task is left
for resolution by the JWC.
Syrian involvement in the Yarmuk is an important factor. The
construction of storage reservoirs on the Yarmuk and water uses
from the Yarmuk in Syria have a critical influence on the discharge
of the river remaining for Jordan and Israel. Any future agreement
between Israel and Syria is likely to have a significant effect on the
flows of the Jordan, and thus there is a possibility of having to de
crease the quantities specified in Jordan-Israel Treaty, but also per
haps inspiring creative alternatives for increasing the quantities
available to all parties in the Jordan basin.
Similarly, the agreement is likely to need adjustment when a final
Israeli-Palestinian water agreement is discussed, for areas in the
Jordan Valley and elsewhere in the West Bank.
THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI WATER AGREEMENT IN
OSLO II
Oslo II is an interim agreement signed between the Palestinians
and Israelis in September 1995, named with reference to “Oslo I,”
the initial Declaration of Principles which initiated the peace process
in September 1993. Article 40 of the Agreement’s Annex III, entitled
“Water and Sewage,” was initialed by the water negotiators—Mr.
Nabil Sharif for the Palestinians and Mr. Noah Kinarti for Israel—in
the early morning hours of September 18, 1995. It was the first
portion of the overall Interim Agreement to be concluded between
the two sides.
INTRODUCTION OF THE NOTION OF RIGHTS, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES, AND THE TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY
While Jordan consented to discussing “allocations,” the Palestin
ians succeeded in including in the Agreement an explicit reference to
water “rights.” The first substantive language of the water provisions
of the Interim Agreement is as follows: “Israel recognizes the Palestin
ian water rights in the West Bank. These will be negotiated in the
permanent status negotiations and settled in the Permanent Status
Agreement relating to the various water resources” (Article 40.1).
The Interim Agreements’ principles echo the Jordan-Israel
Treaty’s declarations on the necessity to augment existing reserves
and to maintain existing uses (Article 40.2, 3a) and to prevent water

 





quality deterioration (Article 40.3b, f). The Agreement notably adds
language on sustainability (in terms of both quantity and quality)
and on the factoring of interannual variability in hydrologic condi
tions (Article 40.3c,d). Wastewater reuse is introduced as a principle
(Article 40.3f), as is avoidance of harm (Article 40.3h). Finally, the
Agreement calls for coordinated operation, management, and devel
opment of water and sewage systems and insurance that the provi
sions of the Agreement are applied to all resources and systems,
including those under private ownership or operation (Article
40.3g,i). “Coordinated” should be understood in this context as an
alternative to “joint.” “Joint” would mean joint ownership and
management of a resource, and the nature of joint ownership must
obviously be defined, for the principle to be made practical. “Coor
dinated” indicates that each side is sovereign in its domain, but
agrees that certain matters (which have to be defined, to make the
agreement practical) are managed together.
There is significant substantive language on regulatory and man
agement authority which calls for the transfer by Israel (and, of
course, the assumption by the Palestinians) of water and sewerage
powers and responsibilities in spheres “related solely to the Palestin
ians, that are currently held by the military government and its Civil
Administration” (Article 40.4). There are, nonetheless, caveats
which postpone resolution (like other critical components of the
peace process) until the final status negotiations, including “owner
ship of water and sewage-related infrastructure in the West Bank”
(Article 40.5).
DATA ON THE MOUNTAIN AQUIFER
Schedule 10 of the Agreement places numerical estimates on the
“utilization, extraction, and … potentials” of the sub-basins of the
Mountain Aquifer, which it refers to as the Eastern, Northeastern,
and Western Aquifers. (See Wolf, Figure 9, this volume.) The East
ern Aquifer is estimated to have an annual recharge of 172 MCM, of
which 40 MCM (from wells) are utilized by Israelis, 54 MCM (24 MCM
from wells and 30 MCM from springs) are utilized by Palestinians and
an additional 78 MCM are “to be developed.” The Northeastern Aqui
fer is estimated to yield 145 MCM, of which 103 MCM (from the Gilboa
and Beisan springs, including wells) are utilized by Israelis and 32
MCM are utilized by Palestinians (25 MCM to users around Jenin and
17 MCM from the East Nablus springs). The Western Aquifer is esti
mated to have an annual recharge of 362 MCM, of which 340 are uti
lized within Israel and 20 MCM by the Palestinians. An additional two
MCM from springs around Nablus is also to be utilized by Palestinians.

  



   

ADDITIONAL WATER
The Agreement states that “Both sides have agreed that the fu
ture needs of the Palestinians in the West Bank are estimated to be
between 70 - 80 MCM/y” (Article 40.6), and then details the addi
tional water to be provided to the Palestinians “during the interim
period” (Article 40.7), some projects to be constructed by Israel,
others by the Palestinians. The total quantity specified in these
projects is 28.6 MCM/y, of which 5 MCM/y is dedicated to Gaza from
the Israeli water system (Article 40.7.a.6, b.3), 17 MCM/yr “...to the
Hebron, Bethlehem and Ramallah areas from the Eastern Aquifer
or other agreed sources in the West Bank” (Article 40.7.b.2), and the
remainder (6.6 MCM/y) from a number of specified sources and
systems.
THE JOINT WATER COMMITTEE (JWC) AND A JOINT
SUPERVISION AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM (JSET)
The Joint Water Committee provisions (Article 40.11-15, and
Schedule 8) are far more detailed in the Israeli-Palestinian Interim
Agreement than in the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty. Although the
Agreement does not specify the size of the committee (stating only
that representation from the two sides must be equal in number), it
is more specific as to the functions of the body (see Article 40.12.a-j
and Schedule 8). Most significantly, all new water development in
the area under jurisdiction must receive approval from the JWC
from the planning stages onward (see Article 40.1.a-b, 2.d).
All JWC decisions are to be “reached by consensus, including the
agenda, its procedures, and other matters” (Article 40.13). There is
no reference to arbitration or other third party dispute resolution
mechanisms, although the Committee is obviously entitled to seek
advice or involvement by external entities, if it so agrees.
The Agreement also establishes enforcement arms of the JWC,
termed “Joint Supervision and Enforcement Teams” (JSETs), to be
comprised of at least two members from each side, with costs shared
equally, to “monitor, supervise, and enforce Article 40 and [Sched
ule 9]” and granted extremely broad inspection and data collection
powers (Article 40.17, Schedule 9.5.a-f.).
WATER RESOURCE PROTECTION AND SEWAGE SYSTEMS
The Interim Agreement requires the parties to “take all necessary
measures” for the prevention of water quality deterioration and
pollution, the protection of water and sewage systems in their own
and the counterpart’s jurisdictions (Article 40.21-24) as well as to
reimburse the counterpart for “any unauthorized use or sabotage”
to water systems under its responsibility (Article 40.24).
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OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS
It must be stressed that this is an interim agreement. As such, it
may indicate a direction for the final status agreement, but is not
binding for that stage.
Like in the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, this is but one part of an
overall agreement. It should be viewed in this context, and not in
isolation. As in the case of Jordan, the Interim Agreement is prag
matic. However, the leading statement deals with “water rights,”
which are then deferred to the final status negotiations.
The agreement is rather complex, making it possible to present
different perspectives on what it achieves for each side. This enables
interested parties, on both sides, to characterize the agreement in
domestic settings as either an achievement or a failure.
The Agreement is more comprehensive than the Israel-Jordan
Treaty with respect to monitoring and enforcement (as evidenced by
the establishment of JSETs) and with respect to the specific func
tions of the joint oversight bodies.
Water and sewage are dealt with jointly, reflecting the danger
which sewage poses to the environment and water resources, and its
importance as a source of water for irrigation.
The agreement recognizes the need for both parties to develop
additional water, not merely divide the existing sources.
The water agreements between Israel and its two neighbors–
Jordan and the Palestinian Authority–will obviously have to be
coordinated and brought in line.
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Appendix
Excerpted from the Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan, signed October 26, 1994 on the Israel-Jordan border in the Arava/
Araba Valley:
ARTICLE 6
WATER
With the view to achieving a comprehensive and lasting settlement of all the water problems
between them:
1. The Parties agree mutually to recognize the rightful allocations of both of them in Jordan River
and Yarmouk River waters and Araba/Arava ground water in accordance with the agreed accept
able principles, quantities and quality as set out in Annex II , which shall be fully respected and
complied with.
2. The Parties, recognizing the necessity to find a practical, just and agreed solution to their water
problems and with the view that the subject of water can form the basis for the advancement of
cooperation between them, jointly undertake to ensure that the management and development
of their water resources do not, in any way, harm the water resources of the other Party.
3. The Parties recognize that their water resources are not sufficient to meet their needs. More
water should be supplied for their use through various methods, including projects of regional
and international cooperation.
4. In light of paragraph 3 of this Article, with the understanding that cooperation in water-related
subjects would be to the benefit of both Parties, and will help alleviate their water shortages, and
that water issues along their entire boundary must be dealt with in their totality, including the
possibility of trans-boundary water transfers, the Parties agree to search for ways to alleviate
water shortage and to co- operate in the following fields:
a. development of existing and new water resources, increasing the water availability includ
ing cooperation on a regional basis as appropriate, and minimizing wastage of water
resources through the chain of their uses;
b. prevention of contamination of water resources;
c. mutual assistance in the alleviation of water shortages;
d. transfer of information and joint research and development in water-related subjects, and
review of the potentials for enhancement of water resources development and use.
5. The implementation of both Parties’ undertakings under this Article is detailed in Annex II.

 





ANNEX II
Pursuant to Article 6 of the Treaty, Israel and Jordan agreed on the following Articles on water
related matters:
ARTICLE I: ALLOCATION
1. Water from the Yarmouk River
a. Summer period - 15th May to 15th October of each year. Israel pumps (12) MCM and
Jordan gets the rest of the flow.
b. Winter period - 16th October to 14th May of each year. Israel pumps (13) MCM and Jordan
is entitled to the rest of the flow subject to provisions outlined hereinbelow: Jordan con
cedes to Israel pumping an additional (20) MCM from the Yarmouk in winter in return for
Israel conceding to transferring to Jordan during the summer period the quantity specified
in paragraphs (2.a) below from the Jordan River.
c. In order that waste of water will be minimized, Israel and Jordan may use, downstream of
point 121/Adassiya Diversion, excess flood water that is not usable and will evidently go to
waste unused.
2. Water from the Jordan River
a.
Summer period - 15th May to 15th October of each year. In return for the additional water
that Jordan concedes to Israel in winter in accordance with paragraph (1.b) above, Israel
concedes to transfer to Jordan in the summer period (20) MCM from the Jordan River
directly upstream from Deganya gates on the river. Jordan shall pay the operation and
maintenance cost of such transfer through existing systems (not including capital cost) and
shall bear the total cost of any new transmission system. A separate protocol shall regulate
this transfer.
b. Winter period - 16th October to 14th May of each year. Jordan is entitled to store for its
use a minimum average of (20) MCM of the floods in the Jordan River south of its
confluence with the Yarmouk (as outlined in Article II below). Excess floods that are not
usable and that will otherwise be wasted can be utilized for the benefit of the two Parties
including pumped storage off the course of the river.
c. In addition to the above, Israel is entitled to maintain its current uses of the Jordan River
waters between its confluence with the Yarmouk and its confluence with Tirat Zvi/Wadi
Yabis. Jordan is entitled to an annual quantity equivalent to that of Israel, provided how
ever, that Jordan’s use will not harm the quantity or quality of the above Israeli uses. The
Joint Water Committee (outlined in Article VII below) will survey existing uses for docu
mentation and prevention of appreciable harm.
d. Jordan is entitled to an annual quantity of (10) MCM of desalinated water from the desali
nation of about (20) MCM of saline springs now diverted to the Jordan River. Israel will
explore the possibility of financing the operation and maintenance cost of the supply to
Jordan of this desalinated water (not including capital cost). Until the desalination facilities
are operational, and upon the entry into force of the Treaty, Israel will supply Jordan (10)
MCM of Jordan River water from the same location as in (2.a) above, outside the summer
period and during dates Jordan selects, subject to the maximum capacity of transmission.

  



   

3. Additional Water
Israel and Jordan shall cooperate in finding sources for the supply to Jordan of an additional
quantity of (50) MCM/year of water of drinkable standards. To this end, the Joint Water Com
mittee will develop, within one year from the entry into force of the Treaty, a plan for the supply
to Jordan of the above mentioned additional water. This plan will be forwarded to the respective
governments for discussion and decision.
4. Operation and Maintenance
a. Operation and maintenance of the systems on Israeli territory that supply Jordan with
water, and their electricity supply, shall be Israel’s responsibility. The operation and mainte
nance of the new systems that serve only Jordan will be contracted at Jordan’s expense to
authorities or companies selected by Jordan.
b. Israel will guarantee easy unhindered access of personnel and equipment to such new
systems for operation and maintenance. This subject will be further detailed in the agree
ments to be signed between Israel and the authorities or companies selected by Jordan.
ARTICLE II: STORAGE
1. Israel and Jordan shall cooperate to build a diversion/storage dam on the Yarmouk River directly
downstream of the point 121/Adassiya Diversion. The purpose is to improve the diversion effi
ciency into the King Abdullah Canal of the water allocation of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,
and possibly for the diversion of Israel’s allocation of the river water. Other purposes can be
mutually agreed.
2. Israel and Jordan shall cooperate to build a system of water storage on the Jordan River, along
their common boundary, between its confluence with the Yarmouk River and its confluence with
Tirat Zvi/ Wadi Yabis, in order to implement the provision of paragraph (2.b) of Article I above.
The storage system can also be made to accommodate more floods; Israel may use up to (3) MCM/
year of added storage capacity.
3. Other storage reservoirs can be discussed and agreed upon mutually.
ARTICLE III: WATER QUALITY AND PROTECTION
1. Israel and Jordan each undertake to protect, within their own jurisdiction, the shared waters of
the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers, and Arava/Araba groundwater, against any pollution, contami
nation, harm or unauthorized withdrawals of each other’s allocations.
2. For this purpose, Israel and Jordan will jointly monitor the quality of water along their boundary,
by use of jointly established monitoring stations to be operated under the guidance of the Joint
Water Committee.
3. Israel and Jordan will each prohibit the disposal of municipal and industrial wastewater into the
course of the Yarmouk or the Jordan Rivers before they are treated to standards allowing their
unrestricted agricultural use. Implementation of this prohibition shall be completed within three
years from the entry into force of the Treaty.
4. The quality of water supplied from one country to the other at any given location shall be equiva
lent to the quality of the water used from the same location by the supplying country.

 





5. Saline springs currently diverted to the Jordan River are earmarked for desalination within four
years. Both countries shall cooperate to ensure that the resulting brine will not be disposed of in
the Jordan River or in any of its tributaries.
6. Israel and Jordan will each protect water systems in its own territory, supplying water to the
other, against any pollution, contamination, harm or unauthorized withdrawal of each other’s
allocations.
ARTICLE IV: GROUNDWATER IN EMEK HA’ARAVA/WADI ARABA
1. In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, some wells drilled and used by Israel along with
their associated systems fall on the Jordanian side of the borders. These wells and systems are
under Jordan’s sovereignty. Israel shall retain the use of these wells and systems in the quantity
and quality detailed an Appendix to this Annex, that shall be jointly prepared by 31st December,
1994. Neither country shall take, nor cause to be taken, any measure that may appreciably reduce
the yields of quality of these wells and systems.
2. Throughout the period of Israel’s use of these wells and systems, replacement of any well that
may fail among them shall be licensed by Jordan in accordance with the laws and regulations
then in effect. For this purpose, the failed well shall be treated as though it was drilled under
license from the competent Jordanian authority at the time of its drilling. Israel shall supply
Jordan with the log of each of the wells and the technical information about it to be kept on
record. The replacement well shall be connected to the Israeli electricity and water systems.
3. Israel may increase the abstraction rate from wells and systems in Jordan by up to (10) MCM/
year above the yields referred to in paragraph 1 above, subject to a determination by the Joint
Water Committee that this undertaking is hydrogeologically feasible and does not harm existing
Jordanian uses. Such increase is to be carried out within five years from the entry into force of
the Treaty.
4. Operation and Maintenance
a. Operation and maintenance of the wells and systems on Jordanian territory that supply
Israel with water, and their electricity supply shall be Jordan’s responsibility. The operation
and maintenance of these wells and systems will be contracted at Israel’s expense to authori
ties or companies selected by Israel.
b. Jordan will guarantee easy unhindered access of personnel and equipment to such wells and
systems for operation and maintenance. This subject will be further detailed in the agree
ments to be signed between Jordan and the authorities or companies selected by Israel.
ARTICLE V: NOTIFICATION AND AGREEMENT
1. Artificial changes in or of the course of the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers can only be made by
mutual agreement.
2. Each country undertakes to notify the other, six months ahead of time, of any intended projects
which are likely to change the flow of either of the above rivers along their common boundary,
or the quality of such flow. The subject will be discussed in the Joint Water Committee with the
aim of preventing harm and mitigating adverse impacts such projects may cause.

  



   

ARTICLE VI: COOPERATION
1. Israel and Jordan undertake to exchange relevant data on water resources through the Joint
Water Committee.
2. Israel and Jordan shall cooperate in developing plans for purposes of increasing water supplies
and improving water use efficiency, within the context of bilateral, regional or international
cooperation.
ARTICLE VII: JOINT WATER COMMITTEE
1. For the purpose of the implementation of this Annex, the Parties will establish a Joint Water
Committee comprised of three members from each country.
2. The Joint Water Committee will, with the approval of the respective governments, specify its
work procedures, the frequency of its meetings, and the details of its scope of work. The Com
mittee may invite experts and/or advisors as may be required.
3. The Committee may form, as it deems necessary, a number of specialized sub-committees and
assign them technical tasks. In this context, it is agreed that these sub-committees will include a
northern sub- committee and a southern sub-committee, for the management on the ground of
the mutual water resources in these sectors.

 





Excerpted from the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip (“Oslo II”), signed September 28, 1995 in Taba, Egypt:
ANNEX III
PROTOCOL CONCERNING CIVIL AFFAIRS
ARTICLE 40
WATER AND SEWAGE
On the basis of good-will, both sides have reached the following agreement in the sphere of Water
and Sewage:
PRINCIPLES
1. Israel recognizes the Palestinian water rights in the West Bank. These will be negotiated in the
permanent status negotiations and settled in the Permanent Status Agreement relating to the
various water resources.
2. Both sides recognize the necessity to develop additional water for various uses.
3. While respecting each side’s powers and responsibilities in the sphere of water and sewage in their
respective areas, both sides agree to coordinate the management of water and sewage
resources and systems in the West Bank during the interim period, in accordance with the
following principles:
a. Maintaining existing quantities of utilization from the resources, taking into consideration
the quantities of additional water for the Palestinians from the Eastern Aquifer and other
agreed sources in the West Bank as detailed in this Article.
b. Preventing the deterioration of water quality in water resources.
c. Using the water resources in a manner which will ensure sustainable use in the future, in
quantity and quality.
d. Adjusting the utilization of the resources according to variable climatological and hydrologi
cal conditions.
e. Taking all necessary measures to prevent any harm to water resources, including those uti
lized by the other side.
f. Treating, reusing or properly disposing of all domestic, urban, industrial, and agricultural
sewage.
g. Existing water and sewage systems shall be operated, maintained and developed in a coordi
nated manner, as set out in this Article.
h. Each side shall take all necessary measures to prevent any harm to the water and sewage
systems in their respective areas.
i. Each side shall ensure that the provisions of this Article are applied to all resources and sys
tems, including those privately owned or operated, in their respective areas.

  



   

TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY
4. The Israeli side shall transfer to the Palestinian side, and the Palestinian side shall assume, powers
and responsibilities in the sphere of water and sewage in the West Bank related solely to Palestin
ians, that are currently held by the military government and its Civil Administration, except for
the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, in accordance with the
provisions of this Article.
5. The issue of ownership of water and sewage related infrastructure in the West Bank will be ad
dressed in the permanent status negotiations.
ADDITIONAL WATER
6. Both sides have agreed that the future needs of the Palestinians in the West Bank are estimated to
be between 70 - 80 MCM/year.
7. In this framework, and in order to meet the immediate needs of the Palestinians in fresh water
for domestic use, both sides recognize the necessity to make available to the Palestinians during
the interim period a total quantity of 28.6 MCM/year, as detailed below:
a. Israeli Commitment:
1. Additional supply to Hebron and the Bethlehem area, including the construction of the
required pipeline - 1 MCM/year.
2. Additional supply to Ramallah area - 0.5 MCM/year.
3. Additional supply to an agreed take-off point in the Salfit area - 0.6 MCM/year.
4. Additional supply to the Nablus area - 1 MCM/year.
5. The drilling of an additional well in the Jenin area - 1.4 MCM/year.
6. Additional supply to the Gaza Strip - 5 MCM/year.
7. The capital cost of items (1) and (5) above shall be borne by Israel.
b. Palestinian Responsibility:
1. An additional well in the Nablus area - 2.1 MCM/year.
2. Additional supply to the Hebron, Bethlehem and Ramallah areas from the Eastern
Aquifer or other agreed sources in the West Bank - 17 MCM/year.
3. A new pipeline to convey the 5 MCM/year from the existing Israeli water system to the
Gaza Strip. In the future, this quantity will come from desalination in Israel.
4. The connecting pipeline from the Salfit take-off point to Salfit.
5. The connection of the additional well in the Jenin area to the consumers.
6. The remainder of the estimated quantity of the Palestinian needs mentioned in para
graph 6 above, over the quantities mentioned in this paragraph (41.4 - 51.4 MCM/year),
shall be developed by the Palestinians from the Eastern Aquifer and other agreed
sources in the West Bank. The Palestinians will have the right to utilize this amount for
their needs (domestic and agricultural).
8. The provisions of paragraphs 6-7 above shall not prejudice the provisions of paragraph 1 to this
Article.
9. Israel shall assist the Council in the implementation of the provisions of paragraph 7 above,
including the following:

 





a. Making available all relevant data.
b. Determining the appropriate locations for drilling of wells.
10. In order to enable the implementation of paragraph 7 above, both sides shall negotiate and final
ize as soon as possible a Protocol concerning the above projects, in accordance with paragraphs
18 - 19 below.
THE JOINT WATER COMMITTEE
11. In order to implement their undertakings under this Article, the two sides will establish, upon the
signing of this Agreement, a permanent Joint Water Committee (JWC) for the interim period,
under the auspices of the CAC.
12. The function of the JWC shall be to deal with all water and sewage related issues in the West Bank
including, inter alia:
a. Coordinated management of water resources.
b. Coordinated management of water and sewage systems.
c. Protection of water resources and water and sewage systems.
d. Exchange of information relating to water and sewage laws and regulations.
e. Overseeing the operation of the joint supervision and enforcement mechanism.
f. Resolution of water and sewage related disputes.
g. Cooperation in the field of water and sewage, as detailed in this Article.
h. Arrangements for water supply from one side to the other.
i. Monitoring systems. The existing regulations concerning measurement and monitoring
shall remain in force until the JWC decides otherwise.
j.
Other issues of mutual interest in the sphere of water and sewage.
13. The JWC shall be comprised of an equal number of representatives from each side.
14. All decisions of the JWC shall be reached by consensus, including the agenda, its procedures and
other matters.
15. Detailed responsibilities and obligations of the JWC for the implementation of its functions are
set out in Schedule 8.
SUPERVISION AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM
16. Both sides recognize the necessity to establish a joint mechanism for supervision over and en
forcement of their agreements in the field of water and sewage, in the West Bank.
17. For this purpose, both sides shall establish, upon the signing of this Agreement, Joint Supervision
and Enforcement Teams (JSET), whose structure, role, and mode of operation is detailed in
Schedule 9.
WATER PURCHASES
18. Both sides have agreed that in the case of purchase of water by one side from the other, the pur
chaser shall pay the full real cost incurred by the supplier, including the cost of production at the
source and the conveyance all the way to the point of delivery. Relevant provisions will be in
cluded in the Protocol referred to in paragraph 19 below.

  



   

19. The JWC will develop a Protocol relating to all aspects of the supply of water from one side to the
other, including, inter alia, reliability of supply, quality of supplied water, schedule of delivery
and off-set of debts.
MUTUAL COOPERATION
20. Both sides will cooperate in the field of water and sewage, including, inter alia:
a. Cooperation in the framework of the Israeli-Palestinian Continuing Committee for Economic
Cooperation, in accordance with the provisions of Article XI and Annex III of the Declaration
of Principles.
b. Cooperation concerning regional development programs, in accordance with the provisions of
Article XI and Annex IV of the Declaration of Principles.
c. Cooperation, within the framework of the joint Israeli-Palestinian-American Committee, on
water production and development related projects agreed upon by the JWC.
d. Cooperation in the promotion and development of other agreed water-related and sewagerelated joint projects, in existing or future multi-lateral forums.
e. Cooperation in water-related technology transfer, research and development, training, and
setting of standards.
f. Cooperation in the development of mechanisms for dealing with water-related and sewage
related natural and man-made emergencies and extreme conditions.
g. Cooperation in the exchange of available relevant water and sewage data, including:
1. Measurements and maps related to water resources and uses.
2. Reports, plans, studies, researches and project documents related to water and sewage.
3. Data concerning the existing extractions, utilization and estimated potential of the
Eastern, North-Eastern and Western Aquifers (attached as Schedule 10).
PROTECTION OF WATER RESOURCES AND WATER AND SEWAGE SYSTEMS
21. Each side shall take all necessary measures to prevent any harm, pollution, or deterioration of
water quality of the water resources.
22. Each side shall take all necessary measures for the physical protection of the water and sewage
systems in their respective areas.
23. Each side shall take all necessary measures to prevent any pollution or contamination of the
water and sewage systems, including those of the other side.
24. Each side shall reimburse the other for any unauthorized use of or sabotage to water and sewage
systems situated in the areas under its responsibility which serve the other side.
THE GAZA STRIP
25. The existing agreements and arrangements between the sides concerning water resources and
water and sewage systems in the Gaza Strip shall remain unchanged, as detailed in Schedule 11.

 





SCHEDULE 8
JOINT WATER COMMITTEE
Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 15 of this Appendix, the obligations and responsibilities of the
JWC shall include:
1. Coordinated management of the water resources as detailed hereunder, while maintaining the
existing utilization from the aquifers as detailed in Schedule 10, and taking into consideration the
quantities of additional water for the Palestinians as detailed in Article 40. It is understood that
the above-mentioned Schedule 10 contains average annual quantities, which shall constitute the
basis and guidelines for the operation and decisions of the JWC:
a. All licensing and drilling of new wells and the increase of extraction from any water source,
by either side, shall require the prior approval of the JWC.
b. All development of water resources and systems, by either side, shall require the prior
approval of the JWC.
c. Notwithstanding the provisions of a. and b. above, it is understood that the projects for
additional water detailed in paragraph 7 of Article 40, are agreed in principle between the
two sides. Accordingly, only the geo-hydrological and technical details and specifications of
these projects shall be brought before the JWC for approval prior to the commencement of
the final design and implementation process.
d. When conditions, such as climatological or hydrological variability, dictate a reduction or
enable an increase in the extraction from a resource, the JWC shall determine the changes in
the extractions and in the resultant supply. These changes will be allocated between the two
sides by the JWC in accordance with methods and procedures determined by it.
e. The JWC shall prepare, within three months of the signing of this Agreement, a Schedule to
be attached to this Agreement, of extraction quotas from the water resources, based on the
existing licenses and permits.
The JWC shall update this Schedule on a yearly basis and as otherwise required.
2. Coordinated management of water and sewage systems in the West Bank, as follows:
a. Existing water and sewage systems, which serve the Palestinian population solely, shall be
operated and maintained by the Palestinian side solely, without interference or obstructions,
in accordance with the provisions of Article 40.
b. Existing water and sewage systems serving Israelis, shall continue to be operated and main
tained by the Israeli side solely, without interference or obstructions, in accordance with the
provisions of Article 40.
c. The systems referred to in a and b above shall be defined on Maps to be agreed upon by the
JWC within three months from the signing of this Agreement.
d. Plans for construction of new water and sewage systems or modification of existing systems
require the prior approval of the JWC.

  



   

SCHEDULE 9
SUPERVISION AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM
Pursuant to Article 40, Paragraph 17 of this Appendix:
1. Both sides shall establish, upon the signing of this Agreement, no less than five Joint Supervision
and Enforcement Teams (JSETs) for the West Bank, under the control and supervision of the JWC,
which shall commence operation immediately.
2. Each JSET shall be comprised of no less than two representatives from each side, each side in its
own vehicle, unless otherwise agreed. The JWC may agree on changes in the number of JSETs and
their structure.
3. Each side will pay its own costs, as required to carry out all tasks detailed in this Schedule. Com
mon costs will be shared equally.
4. The JSETs shall operate, in the field, to monitor, supervise and enforce the implementation of
Article 40 and this Schedule, and to rectify the situation whenever an infringement has been de
tected, concerning the following:
a. Extraction from water resources in accordance with the decisions of the JWC, and the
Schedule to be prepared by it in accordance with sub- paragraph 1.e of Schedule 8.
b. Unauthorized connections to the supply systems and unauthorized water uses;
c. Drilling of wells and development of new projects for water supply from all sources;
d. Prevention of contamination and pollution of water resources and systems;
e. Ensuring the execution of the instructions of the JWC on the operation of monitoring and
measurement systems;
f. Operation and maintenance of systems for collection, treatment, disposal and reuse, of
domestic and industrial sewage, of urban and agricultural runoff, and of urban and agricul
tural drainage systems;
g. The electric and energy systems which provide power to all the above systems;
h. The Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for all the above systems;
i. Water and sewage quality analyses carried out in approved laboratories, to ascertain that
these laboratories operate according to accepted standards and practices, as agreed by the
JWC. A list of the approved laboratories will be developed by the JWC;
j.
Any other task, as instructed by the JWC.
5. Activities of the JSETs shall be in accordance with the following:
a. The JSETs shall be entitled, upon coordination with the relevant DCO, to free, unrestricted
and secure access to all water and sewage facilities and systems, including those privately
owned or operated, as required for the fulfillment of their function.
b. All members of the JSET shall be issued identification cards, in Arabic, Hebrew and English
containing their full names and a photograph.
c. Each JSET will operate in accordance with a regular schedule of site visits, to wells, springs
and other water sources, water works, and sewage systems, as developed by the JWC.
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In addition, either side may require that a JSET visit a particular water or sewage facility or
system, in order to ensure that no infringements have occurred. When such a requirement
has been issued, the JSET shall visit the site in question as soon as possible, and no later
than within 24 hours.
Upon arrival at a water or sewage facility or system, the JSET shall collect and record all
relevant data, including photographs as required, and ascertain whether an infringement
has occurred. In such cases, the JSET shall take all necessary measures to rectify it, and
reinstate the status quo ante, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. If the
JSET cannot agree on the actions to be taken, the matter will be referred immediately to the
two Chairmen of the JWC for decision.
The JSET shall be assisted by the DCOs and other security mechanisms established under
this Agreement, to enable the JSET to implement its functions.
The JSET shall report its findings and operations to the JWC, using forms which will be
developed by the JWC.

SCHEDULE 10
DATA CONCERNING AQUIFERS
Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 20 and Schedule 8 paragraph 1 of this Appendix:
The existing extractions, utilization and estimated potential of the Eastern, North-Eastern, and
Western Aquifers are as follows:
Eastern Aquifer:
• In the Jordan Valley, 40 MCM to Israeli users, from wells;
• 24 MCM to Palestinians, from wells; •30 MCM to Palestinians, from springs;
• 78 MCM remaining quantities to be developed from the Eastern Aquifer;
• Total = 172 MCM.
North-Eastern Aquifer:
• 103 MCM to Israeli users, from the Gilboa and Beisan springs, including from wells;
• 25 MCM to Palestinian users around Jenin;
• 17 MCM to Palestinian users from East Nablus springs;
• Total = 145 MCM.
Western Aquifer:
• 340 MCM used within Israel;
• 20 MCM to Palestinians;
• 2 MCM to Palestinians, from springs near Nablus;
• Total = 362 MCM.
All figures are average annual estimates.
The total annual recharge is 679 MCM.

  



   

SCHEDULE 11
THE GAZA STRIP
Pursuant to Article 40, Paragraph 25:
1. All water and sewage (hereinafter referred to as “water”) systems and resources in the Gaza Strip
shall be operated, managed and developed (including drilling) by the Council, in a manner that
shall prevent any harm to the water resources.
2. As an exception to paragraph 1., the existing water systems supplying water to the Settlements
and the Military Installation Area, and the water systems and resources inside them shall continue
to be operated and managed by Mekoroth Water Co.
3. All pumping from water resources in the Settlements and the Military Installation Area shall be in
accordance with existing quantities of drinking water and agricultural water. Without derogating
from the powers and responsibilities of the Council, the Council shall not adversely affect these
quantities. Israel shall provide the Council with all data concerning the number of wells in the
Settlements and the quantities and quality of the water pumped from each well, on a monthly
basis.
4. Without derogating from the powers and responsibilities of the Council, the Council shall enable
the supply of water to the Gush Katif settlement area and Kfar Darom settlement by Mekoroth, as
well as the maintenance by Mekoroth of the water systems supplying these locations.
5. The Council shall pay Mekoroth for the cost of water supplied from Israel and for the real
expenses incurred in supplying water to the Council.
6. All relations between the Council and Mekoroth shall be dealt with in a commercial agreement.
7. The Council shall take the necessary measures to ensure the protection of all water systems in the
Gaza Strip.
8. The two sides shall establish a subcommittee to deal with all issues of mutual interest including
the exchange of all relevant data to the management and operation of the water resources and
systems and mutual prevention of harm to water resources.
9. The subcommittee shall agree upon its agenda and upon the procedures and manner of its meet
ings, and may invite experts or advisers as it sees fit.

 





Toward a Unified Management Regime in the Jordan Basin: The Johnston Plan Revisited
Sharif S. Elmusa
Institute of Palestine Studies, Washington, D.C.
ABSTRACT
In 1955 an unratified agreement concerning future allocations and joint management of the Jordan River was reached
between the Arab riparians and Israel through the meditation of the American special ambassador Eric Johnston. The
author argues that this agreement, known as the Johnston Plan, is worth revisiting because it contains the essential
ingredients for the resolution of any water conflict, such as provisions for allocations for each riparian and for the
establishment of a joint commission. The author analyzes the Johnston Plan in light of current circumstances, assesses
its weaknesses, and recommends certain modifications which would make the Plan attractive and feasible for the
countries concerned.

INTRODUCTION
The conflict between Israel and the Arabs is not just about his
tory and legitimacy, but also, of course, about land—perhaps the
core natural resource of the region. The relative scarcity of water,
and its importance in determining the value of some of the con
tested lands, has meant that it has been a site of conflict since the
very beginnings of the Arab-Israeli feud. Because the main sources
of the region’s water are shared, any lasting peace between the Arab
riparians of the basin and Israel will by necessity include agreements
on water.
Through such agreements, the Arab riparians will presumably
work to secure what they see as their fair share of the area’s water
resources, the bulk of which originate in Arab territory. Israel, on
the other hand, is downstream of the two main disputed resources,
the Mountain Aquifer and the Jordan River. The Mountain Aquifer
is replenished primarily from the West Bank, and the Jordan River
from Syria and Lebanon and, to a lesser extent, from Jordan. Israel
and the West Bank contribute minor amounts of drainage area and
water quantity to the headwaters and to the basin as a whole
(Elmusa 1997). To compensate for its downstream position, Israel is
unlikely to withdraw from the Golan Heights, southern Lebanon,
and the West Bank without making arrangements for access to
water. It has been the principal user of their waters, accomplished
through direct or indirect control of the headwaters, i.e., through
the occupation of the territory that holds them or through the asser
tion of its military power to halt projects it deemed inimical to its
water supply. Under peaceful conditions, treaties would have to
replace this form of control.
My focus here is on the Jordan River system which courses
through, whether serially or contiguously (i.e. as a boundary), terri
tories of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the Palestinians, and Israel. Ac

  



   

cording to international water law, it qualifies as an international
watercourse common to all five parties.1
In this paper, I will propose that future allocations and joint
management of the Jordan River system be based on the Johnston
Plan (JP). The Johnston Plan is an unratified agreement that was
reached in 1955 between the Arab riparians and Israel through the
mediation of the American special ambassador, Eric Johnston. It
contains provisions for allocations for each riparian, diversion and
regulatory schemes, and preliminary proposals for a joint commission— all of which are essential ingredients for the resolution of any
water conflict. My main interest here is in the allocation provisions,
but the possibilities for unified management will also be indicated. In
addition, I will point out the principal weaknesses of the JP and suggest remedies. Whether, and which, riparians would agree to endorse
the JP is anything but certain; I will examine this question by citing
their individual responses to the JP and their hydrologic interests.
Before delving into the details of my main argument, however, I
must mention the water agreements that have been reached in the
course of the peace talks so far because of their ramifications for
resolving the conflict in the future. The Jordan-Israel peace treaty
(October 1994) contained what amounts to a water agreement, and
so have the interim agreements between Israel and the Palestinians.2
The Jordan-Israel agreement pertains principally to segments of the
Jordan River system that the two states immediately share. A full
accord on the basin would have to include Lebanon, the Palestinians, and Syria. The talks between Israel, on the one hand, and Leba
non and Syria, on the other, have all but come to a halt. The
Palestinian-Israeli treaties contain partial, water-related arrangements for the interim period, or Palestinian self-governing period,
and set out two main agenda items— namely, the equitable utilization of joint water resources and their joint management— for the
“final-status” negotiations between the two sides. These negotiations
commenced in May 1995, but have made little progress. They are
scheduled to conclude on the eve of the year 2000 and to resolve the
major issues of conflict between the two sides, especially borders,
refugees, Jerusalem, the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and
Gaza, and water.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE JOHNSTON PLAN 3
Eric Johnston undertook his mission in 1953, to resolve the
then escalating conflict in the Jordan basin between the Arab states
of the Jordan basin and Israel, but his mission had two broader
aims as well: (1) to “help Israel get on her feet” (Stevens 1965)
including (at least tacitly) recognition of Israel by the Arab coun
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tries through regional cooperation; and (2) to resettle in the Jor
dan Valley those among the Palestinian refugees who fled to this
region in the aftermath of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. These aims, I
believe, critically informed the size of the water allocations that the
riparians received under the JP.
The Johnston Plan was the last, but truly not the least, of a
series of plans for the development of the Jordan basin, starting in
1920 with the Anglo-French Convention. It should be recalled that
before World War I, the Jordan basin area was part of the Otto
man Empire and was not subject to inter-state disputes. In a sense,
we still are dealing with the consequences of the collapse of the
Ottoman Empire and the break up of the region into individual
“nation states.” The Anglo-French Convention accorded priority
of basin water use to Syria, which then included Lebanon and was
to be made by the League of Nations in 1922 into a French-man
dated territory. It gave Palestine, which was to fall under Britain’s
mandate, the residual flow.4 The convention, however, did not
assign specific quotas or chart a vision for the development of the
Jordan River basin.
The first comprehensive survey in the Jordan basin and pro
posals for its development were contained in the 1939 Ionides
Plan.5 M.G. Ionides, then British director of development in
Transjordan, was to my mind the most realistic and farsighted of
the Jordan River planners. Ionides’s assessment of the available
water resources in the basin, for example, proved to be more real
istic than those of John Hays and Walter Lowdermilk, whose fig
ures turned out to be highly inflated. The inflation resulted from
their mixing water and politics. The two engineers, Hays and
Lowdermilk, were hired by the World Zionist Organization, which
was trying to convince Britain to allow larger numbers of Jews to
immigrate on the grounds that there was enough water in the
country to support the numbers advocated by this organization.
Additionally, Ionides argued that water development should be
justified on an economic calculus, a view that we have come to
appreciate recently after the realization that the limited water
resources have been utilized inefficiently and that they need to be
managed from the demand side.
A series of plans followed Ionides’. Two were devised by
American engineering firms, Charles T. Main and Baker-Harza, at
the request of the U.S., Jordan and UNRWA (the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency in charge of rendering assistance to the
Palestinian refugees). In the course of negotiations over the JP,
these plans served as bases for proposals and counter proposals by
the Arab riparians and Israel. They included a wealth of hydrologic
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data and competing diversion schemes, estimates of the irrigable
area and irrigation water requirements in the Jordan basin, and
water allocations.
Johnston, unlike the authors of the other plans, was not a techni
cian drafting his own scheme. Instead, he sought to induce the Arab
states and Israel to meet midway. His plan, sometimes also known as
the Unified Plan, is both a synthesis of, and a compromise among,
previous plans. It succeeded in bringing the positions of the ripar
ians closer than any of the plans before it did, for, unlike these plans,
it resulted from “give and take” by the two sides.
The JP was not formally ratified, although both sides accepted
the water allocations or quotas de facto. This was because the Arabs
would not entertain the recognition of Israel that a unified man
agement regime would entail, without first resolving the Palestin
ian problem. Yet, although the JP was not ratified, it can be
thought of, for reasons that will become apparent in the course of
this text, as having become customary law in the basin, at least for
Jordan and Israel.
The JP incorporated provisions and involved discussions of
proposals germane to the following areas:
•

•
•

Riparian water quotas, including quantities, basis of
estimation, priorities of extraction, points of extraction,
and spatial utilization (in and out of basin boundaries);
Regulatory works, including diversion canals and dams
and their location (see Figure 1);
A joint management body, including international
representation.

From an academic point of view, the JP has been used, for
example, for the study of the Functionalist and Realist perspectives
in international relations (Lowi 1993) to illustrate the inadequacy
of the former as an approach to resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict.
But it can also serve as a case study for the Communitarian
perspective as well. Furthermore, it can amply demonstrate, for
those who are interested in the “technology-society” relationship,
how economical and political interests lurk behind what are pre
sented as purely technical matters, from data to regulatory and
diversion works.

 



Figure 1



The Johnston Plan. Source: Saliba (1968).

QUOTAS
The quotas that were assigned to the four riparians from the
Jordan River system (the West Bank was then part of Jordan),
together with recent uses, are exhibited in Figure 2. These figures
are cited by most scholars, including Israelis, as being those that
were agreed upon between the Arabs and Israel at the end of
Johnston’s mission. The overall volume that was to be distributed
among the riparians was an average of 1,273 million cubic meters
per year (MCM/y).
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Figure 2

Actual use versus quotas under the Johnston Plan in the Jordan River Basin.

The quotas for Israel were largely a residual; that is, Israel would
not divert them until after the Arab riparians had tapped theirs.
That meant they were not guaranteed quantities, owing to the fluc
tuation of rainfall. Assigning Israel a residual was in line with the
1920 Anglo-French Convention. Yet Israel fared much better under
the JP than had British-mandated Palestine under the Anglo-French
Convention. The quotas rewarded Jordan handsomely as well. The
reason for the generosity of the JP allocations to Israel and Jordan
undoubtedly lay in its broad goals, namely, “putting Israel on its feet”
and re-settlement of Palestinian refugees in the Jordan Valley. Lebanon
and Syria, in contrast, did not fare so well under the JP, although the
convention had accorded them first priority of use.
For both Israel and the Arab riparians as a whole, the quotas
were less than each side had demanded in the course of the negotia
tions, but Israel was allotted about one-third of the total allocations
and the three Arab riparians received two-thirds.
How were the shares determined? They were calculated on the
basis of the irrigable area within the Jordan basin. Agriculture at that
time was considered the main vehicle of development and municipal
and industrial use was still small.
The quotas—for convenience and economy, one assumes—
were to be tapped according to the geographical location of the
riparians on the system (see Figure 1). Lebanon was to get water
from the al-Hasbani; Syria from Banyas, the upper Jordan, and the
Yarmuk; Jordan from the Yarmuk, the lower Jordan and the side
wadis; Israel from the two Lakes (al-Hula and Tiberias) and the
Yarmuk. So while the aggregate shares did not account for geogra
phy or natural attributes, the disaggregated did. For example, Israel
was to get only 25 MCM/y from the Yarmuk and 375 MCM/y from the
upper Jordan, whereas Jordan was to get 377 MCM/y from the

 

Sources:
Based mainly on Ben-Gurion University of the
Negev and Tahal Consulting Engineering, Israel
water study for the World Bank, Washington,
DC,1994; American Friends of the Middle East,
1964, The Jordan water problem; 1994, 26-7;
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East, 41-42; Naff, 1991, Jordan River: average
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Notes:
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Quotas: 375 from the Jordan, 25 from the
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and 70-100 from the Yarmuk.
d
Quotas: 100 from the Jordan, 377 from the
Yarmuk, and 243 from the western and
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e
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actual use: 130 from the Yarmuk and 120
from the side wadis.
f
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Percentages do not add up due to rounding.


Yarmuk 100 MCM/y from the lower Jordan, and 243 MCM/y from the
side wadis.
One final point regarding the quotas is whether the JP permitted
Israel to divert water outside the boundaries of the basin to the
Negev and to the coastal plain, as it eventually did through its Na
tional Water Carrier (NWC). Some scholars have suggested that the
Arab negotiators did eventually agree to Israel’s demand for out-of
basin diversion, but there is no solid evidence to back them (Ameri
can Friends of the Middle East 1964) The maximum that the Arabs
might have agreed to was that Israel could only do so after the needs
within the basin were satisfied. This conjecture makes sense because
the water quotas were apportioned according to the irrigable areas
of each riparian within the basin. If Israel was to divert water to
irrigate land out of the basin, it would have compromised the basis
of the allocations, opening the door for each riparian to claim it had
large irrigable areas outside the basin and consequently needed
more water than the JP’s allotments. Clearly, compromising the
allocation criterion would have rendered an agreement untenable.
That the Arab countries did not consent to Israel’s out-of-basin
diversion proposals is confirmed by Mahmud Riyadh, who served
on the Arab Technical Committee that negotiated with Johnston
and who subsequently became Egypt’s foreign minister and secre
tary general of the Arab League. In a 1984 article he wrote: “We
objected in principle to the use of the Jordan River outside the ba
sin.”6 Riyadh justified the Arab position on the grounds that inter
national customary law does not permit such transfer. In any event,
the legality of Israel’s diversion of Jordan River water out of the
basin through the NWC remains an open issue, especially when the
needs of the other riparians within the basin have not been met.
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ENGINEERING WORKS AND JOINT COMMISSION
In addition to the quotas, the JP had provisions for the engineering
works that were to be used for harnessing water from the river system
and regulating its flow. There were also inconclusive discussions regard
ing the institutional framework for unified management of the basin.
The JP integrated the diversionary and regulatory works that
appeared in plans after Ionides’, and largely accommodated the
Arab riparians’ and Israel’s demands. For Jordan, it suggested the
diversion of water through two canals, as was originally proposed by
Ionides. Only the canal on the east side, referred to as the East Ghor
or King Abdullah Canal, was built; the western diversion, or West
Ghor Canal, has yet to see the light of day.
The JP also proposed the construction of the Maqarin dam at the
confluence of three Yarmuk River tributaries along the Jordanian

  



   

Syrian border. Its site was first identified in 1951 by M.E. Bunger
(author of the Bunger Plan), an American technician with the U.S.
Technical Cooperation Agency (TCA), a forerunner of USAID. It is
rumored that he spotted the site from an airplane on his way to the
United States. The dam was to benefit Jordan and Syria with hydropower and irrigation water. It would have also allowed the two
countries to store the Yarmuk River’s water inside their own territo
ries instead of in Lake Tiberias, as plans supported by Israel at first
sought to do. Like the West Ghor Canal, the dam was never built.
But the JP also gave Israel its own diversion scheme in addition to
the drainage of Lake al-Hula and the contiguous marshlands—key
Israeli demands.
Whereas the JP was specific on the quotas and engineering
works, it did not say much about a unified management commis
sion for the basin or the types of tasks and responsibilities it would
undertake. This is a weak element of the JP, which would have to be
remedied in any future negotiations. It seems that much time was
spent on getting Israel to accept an international presence, namely
the U.S. and the United Nations. The U.N. was fully involved in the
scheme from the beginning through UNRWA, the United Nations
agency in charge of dispensing assistance to the Palestinian refugees.
And the U.S., of course, was the mediator and potential financier.
RESPONSES TO THE JOHNSTON PLAN
Let us now examine each party’s response to the JP and what this
might bode for the future.
OVERALL ARAB RESPONSE
Johnston was reported to have said that he felt that the parties
accepted the allocations. But this view is not accepted universally.
For instance, Mahmud Riyadh stated (Riyadh 1985) that the Arabs
objected to the quotas, the out-of-basin transfers, and, as we shall see,
to the use of Lake Tiberias as a storage facility for Yarmuk flood water.
There was probably no unified Arab position regarding the
technicalities of the JP, and the disagreements were hidden by the
Arab opposition to its political side, namely, recognition of Israel
without a resolution of the refugee problem.
SYRIA’S RESPONSE
Syria appears never to have accepted the Johnston Plan. In the
hydropolitical literature, emphasis has been placed on the political
aspect of its rejection; it rejected the JP because it meant recognition
of Israel and provided the means for strengthening Israel’s economy.
But we must also consider the possibility that Syria was not satisfied

 


with the size of its quota. Syria is the largest contributor to the
system both in terms of drainage area and flow. While it contributes
more than 50 percent of the flow (Elmusa 1997), it was allocated
only 10 percent of the divided flow. Although international water
law and practice do not suggest that shared water should be distrib
uted among co-riparians according to their relative contributions,
upstream riparians generally consider the water originating in their
territory to be theirs. Furthermore, in the Anglo-French Conven
tion, Syria was to have priority in harnessing the water of the Jordan
River system.
Today, Syria reportedly impounds 70–100 MCM/y more than it
was allocated in the JP. It impounds the water behind a series of
small dams built since 1967 on the numerous tributaries of the
Yarmuk River, apparently using most of the water for irrigation.
The irrigable area increased from what it was in 1955 because of the
introduction of drip irrigation, which can accommodate the unfa
vorable topography of that area, unlike traditional furrow irrigation.
In any future negotiations, Syria, I would conjecture, could be ex
pected to demand more water than it was allocated under the JP.
But Syria may not push its stream position as a basis for allocations
too far because it is also downstream of its major source of water,
the Euphrates River.
Although Syria did not approve the JP, it was keen on building
the Maqarin dam. It had already signed an agreement for building it
with Jordan in 1953, before Johnston began his mission. However,
the two countries could not build the dam without Israel’s approval.
In 1987, the two countries revived the idea of building the dam, but
in a nearby location, and dubbed the new proposed structure the
Wihda (Unity) dam. Ultimately, Israel did not endorse the project,
and the World Bank, in accordance with its long-standing policy of
requiring the agreement of the concerned riparians in a situation of
conflict, did not extend the loan to Jordan which it requested for
financing this project. Whether the dam will be built or will be
supplanted by alternative structures remains an open issue.
On a broader level, it is unclear whether Syria would favor a
unified management commission for the basin. Generally,
upstreamers do not seek joint management because it does not
much promote their water-related interest. If Syria does accede to
such an enterprise, it perhaps would do so for economic and politi
cal reasons that transcend water, but would at the same time at
tempt to obtain water-related concessions. It is up to Jordanian and
Palestinian diplomacy to persuade Syria to uphold their JP shares. In
fact, and although this proposition may seem far fetched, it might be
in the interest of all the downstream riparians, including Israel, to
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help Syria in the Euphrates basin so that it might reciprocate in the
Jordan basin. That would be more fruitful as a first step than putting
forward projects for transporting water via so-called “peace pipe
lines” from Turkey down to the Jordan basin riparians.
ISRAEL’S RESPONSE
At the time of the negotiations, Israel demanded more water
than it was eventually given by the JP. That, in part, was because
Israel regarded the Litani River as part of the Jordan basin (Amery
1993). The idea of diverting water from the Litani to Israel goes back
to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, when Zionist leaders lobbied
Britain and France to enclose a segment of the Litani River within
the boundaries of what would become British-mandated Palestine.
But the two powers, France and Britain, drew Palestine’s boundaries
in such a way that the Litani River in its entirety fell within Lebanon
(See Wolf, this volume).
Israel actually invoked the JP in 1964 when it was about to inau
gurate its National Water Carrier (NWC), and when the Arab coun
tries, in response, decided to divert the headwaters of the Jordan
through Syria and into Jordan. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol was
reported to have said: “There are commitments in the world to us in
the wake of the Johnston Plan. The accomplished fact, which was
created by Johnston, created a certain situation.”7 He also was cited
as having stated that the JP was “regarded as agreed to from an
international point of view” (Farid and Sirriyeh 1985).
For Israel, the JP was without a doubt an achievement, giving it
one-third of the water of the Jordan River system, even though
mostly as a residual. Equally important, it secured the acknowledg
ment of the Arab countries that Israel was a co-riparian, which is
tantamount to tacit recognition.
In spite of its endorsement of the Johnston Plan, Israel took ad
vantage of its post-June 1967 control of the headwaters of the Jordan
River and drew from the basin quantities in excess of its JP quota. The
figures I have seen range from 200 to 300 MCM/y, or more than Syria’s
excess withdrawals. So, while both Israel and Syria have violated the JP
quotas, Syria did not endorse the plan, whereas Israel acted expediently
or pragmatically, depending on how one looks at the matter.
I am not sure what the official Israeli position on the JP is today,
and how it differs between Labor and Likud. Raphael Eitan, the
current minister of agriculture, traditionally the official wielding the
most power in water affairs, reportedly invoked the JP when Jordan
and Syria began talking about reviving the idea of the Maqarin dam8
after Jordan grew frustrated with what it saw as Israeli procrastina
tion on implementing their water agreement. Some of the JP’s
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provisions also can be sensed in the Israel-Jordan agreement, al
though the JP was not cited in the text. For example, according to
the agreement, Israel’s withdrawals from the Yarmuk would be 25
MCM/y (Elmusa 1996), the same amount as under the JP.
I have not seen, however, any Israeli officials or publications
endorse the JP. Moreover, a number of Israeli analysts, Elisha Kally
and Arnon Soffer for example, have held that the JP has become
passé owing to the changes that have occurred in the basin, includ
ing locations of scarcity and surpluses, the technical facilities, the
political context, technology, winter and summer needs, and popu
lation growth. This is an arbitrary conclusion. It does not follow
logically or practically from the changes enumerated by the authors,
who, at any rate, fail to show how it does. It is self-serving because
existing uses favor Israel. Furthermore, neither author analyzes the
implications of the individual changes for the plan, except to conclude
categorically that a new water sharing regime would have to acknowl
edge existing uses.9
True, the conditions for the basin’s riparians have changed since
the time of the plan, but the shifts have been more or less even for the
main factors that drive water demand, notably population growth and
urbanization. For example, Jordan received an influx of refugees from
the West Bank as a result of the 1967 war and from the Gulf as a result
of the 1991 Gulf crisis, and Israel received large numbers of Soviet
immigrants in the late 1980s. Likewise, the Palestinian population has
risen considerably now that Gaza, by virtue of coming under the
jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority, has become a riparian of the
basin. Further, natural population increase in both Jordan and the
West Bank has been even greater than in Israel, and also quite high in
Syria. Only Lebanon’s population did not multiply as much as the
other riparians’ thanks to the war-induced high emigration rates. In
all, Israel’s population comprised close to 17 percent of the basin’s
total in 1950 and less than 19 percent in 1992.10
With respect to a unified water commission, Israel seems to have
objected to an international presence—the U.N. and the U.S.—
during the Johnston mission. It is far from certain that Israel would
welcome U.N. representation in the future, since Israel has been
chronically at odds with this world body, evident in Israel’s consis
tent effort to keep the U.N. at bay in the multilateral forums
spawned by the peace negotiations. On the other hand, Israel could
conceivably accede to a World Bank presence because this multilat
eral lending institution could also offer financial incentives for the
development of the Jordan basin’s water resources.
A more basic issue, however, is whether Israel would be inter
ested in unified management at all. On the one hand, it may favor a
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series of bilateral agreements with the other Arab riparians. Its
hydrostrategic position (it shares segments of the Jordan River sys
tem with each Arab riparian) allows it to do that, whereas none of
the Arab riparians enjoys this type of position. Such an arrangement
would place Israel at the hub of the basin’s management. Israel’s
interest in bilateralism may be buttressed by a reluctance on its part
to be the only non-Arab member in a five-way commission, for fear
of being outvoted if a voting system is used in decision making.
At the least, Israel would probably want to ensure that the deci
sion making procedures do not allow the Arab riparians, should
they take a joint stand, to decide on key issues. Whether this fear is
well-founded is another matter; the history of the dispute suggests
that the interests or the actions of the Arab riparians have not always
been harmonious. Still, if the Arab riparians, particularly Syria,
insist on a multilateral commission, Israel may have to go along.
Furthermore, if Israel wants finally to be integrated in the region, it
might not find a multilateral commission highly objectionable.
JORDAN’S RESPONSE
On the whole, Jordan favored the JP even when it opposed it on
political grounds. Jordan’s positive response is understandable. The
Jordan River is its main water source and the JP granted it enough
water to irrigate 50,000 ha in the Valley, the principal irrigable area
in the country. As soon as the Arab world split into competing
factions during the cold war, Jordan became identified as pro-West
ern, and signed agreements with the United States to initiate work
on the East Ghor Canal. The United States itself had conditioned its
aid to Israel and Jordan for projects in the Valley on their adherence
to the Johnston Plan.
In reality, however, Jordan was able to divert only around 250
MCM/y of its JP share, half from the Yarmuk channel and half from
the side wadis that feed the Jordan river from its territory. According
to its water agreement with Israel, Jordan may be able to harness a
total volume from the basin equal to its JP quota if all the “addi
tional water” it was allotted under the agreement—as estimated by
its chief water negotiator, Munther Haddadin—materializes
(Elmusa 1996).
Jordan cannot but be apprehensive about re-negotiating the JP
allocations because it does not have the power to secure the original
share and it is downstream on both the Jordan and Yarmuk rivers.
These considerations would also make it interested in being a member
of a unified commission for the management of the basin’s waters.
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THE PALESTINIAN RESPONSE
At the time of the JP, the Palestinians opposed it, but not be
cause of water shares: they wanted the water, but they wanted it in
Palestine. The quota that was allocated to Jordan and earmarked for
the Valley’s Palestinian and Jordanian farmers (the majority Pales
tinians), was generous—720 MCM/y—of which 477 was from the
Jordan and Yarmuk channels and 243 from the lateral wadis. The
Palestinian objection was to the idea of resettlement outside their
original homes in Palestine. They did not accept the terms of the
exchange, namely, Palestine for Jordan River water in the Valley.
In the meantime, Palestinian farmers had diverted small
amounts of water directly from the river to irrigate farmland in its
flood plain (the Zawr). In 1964, however, Israel shifted the water of
the two main saline spring groups that fed Lake Tiberias into the
lower Jordan River, rendering its water too saline for irrigation. But
the coup de grace for Palestinian agriculture in the Valley was delivered
in 1967 when Israel declared the Jordan River a closed military area
and drove Palestinian farmers off.
Since the start of peace negotiations, the Palestinian reaction to the
JP seems to have been mixed, even unclear. They have demanded a
share of the Jordan River system based on the status of the West Bank
as a riparian and have invoked the JP on several occasions, especially
regarding the West Ghor Canal, which they hoped would be used to
irrigate the Jordan Valley. In this regard, Israel’s retention of the
Jordan Valley—as many Israeli officials have reiterated—would vitiate
the status of the West Bank as a riparian of the basin. Some Palestin
ian analysts, however, have claimed that: “the Revised Johnston Plan,
which is still in effect today, neglected mention of the Palestinian
people. Undoubtedly, this is one of the most blatant violations of the
water rights of a region’s indigenous peoples.”11
True, the JP did not mention the Palestinians by name and they
were not negotiators because the West Bank was part of Jordan.
Nonetheless, one of the JP’s core aims was to resettle Palestinian
refugees in the Valley through the provision of land and water.
How much water was the West Bank allocated? A 1992 PLO
report put the West Bank’s share at 290 MCM/y (220 from the lower
Jordan and 70 from the Yarmuk). Another report by a group of
Palestinian water specialists, some of whom are or were members of
the official negotiating water team, put it at 100 MCM/y, adding,
without further elaboration, that “a rational allocation” would ac
cord the Palestinians “at least 200” MCM/y.12 Neither report indicates
how the figures were arrived at.
I have proposed instead that the West Bank’s share ought to be
calculated as a percentage of Jordan’s and in proportion to the
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irrigable area on the eastern and western banks of the Jordan Valley,
as estimated in 1955 by the Chicago-based engineering firm BakerHarza. The rationale behind this suggestion is that Jordan’s share
was allocated according to the water required for that irrigable area
on both sides of the river. Calculated in this manner, the West
Bank’s share would be about 215 MCM/y (180 MCM/y from the river
channel itself and 35 MCM/y from the side wadis). This amount is
larger than what the Palestinian water specialists cited above re
garded as “rational division.” One would expect that the Palestinian
negotiators would be keen on securing that quantity. It would also
serve the Palestinian interest to take part in a unified management
regime. In fact, any major revision of the JP is likely to be injurious
to the Palestinians because they are in an even weaker position than
Jordan, located in the utmost downstream position of the Jordan
river system and having no control of any strategic part of it, not to
speak of their overall meager power resources.
LEBANON’S RESPONSE
The Johnston Plan allocated to Lebanon 35 MCM/y, the least of all
the riparians. This is commensurate not with its contribution to the
Jordan River system, but with its irrigable area within the basin.
Lebanon, like the other Arab countries, did not accept the JP in 1955
on political grounds. I have not seen much about Lebanon’s posi
tion vis-a-vis the JP in recent years, except for one statement by the
head of the Litani Commission, in which he demanded water for
Lebanon from the Jordan basin on the basis of the JP.13 In the final
analysis, Lebanon’s allocations cannot be reduced further in any
future negotiations without rendering them meaningless.
Lebanon, although an upstreamer, would theoretically be willing
to sit on a unified management commission because it lacks the
military and economic power to impose solutions of its own and
might benefit from international assistance to the basin if such aid
were forthcoming. On the whole, however, Lebanon’s position, as
in other strategic regional matters, will be influenced by Syria’s.
FINE-TUNING AND EXTENSION OF THE
JOHNSTON PLAN
In its past form, the JP is an incomplete blueprint. It needs
both extension to encompass new spheres and refinement of the
allocation formula. For one thing, the plan did not speak to the
question of water quality and protection. The environment was not
a big issue at the time, and the JP had provisions, especially drainage
of Lake al-Hula and the contiguous marshlands, that would be
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highly controversial today from an ecological point of view.14 Yet
the protection of water quality—which ultimately translates into
quantity—would have to be a key element in any future accord. This
issue has also been addressed in the Israel-Jordan water agreement,
but the scope of the provisions needs to be widened to cover the rest
of the river system.
Neither did the JP take into account the historic and ecological
attributes of the Jordan basin. The basin is central in the history and
myths of Muslims, Christians, and Jews. It is also a unique natural
region, especially the Dead Sea. In fact, it is ecologically more perti
nent to speak of the Dead Sea basin than the Jordan River basin.
This inland lake is vulnerable to the reduction of the flow from the
Jordan River, its primary feeder. It has dried up in its southern part
and could shrink further in the future. Any schemes for the develop
ment of the basin, therefore, should consider not only the utilitar
ian, economic uses but the “instream” ecological, aesthetic and
historic value of the river system and the Dead Sea.
The JP, moreover, did not specify details regarding the structure
and tasks of a joint management commission. Aspects of these were
tackled in the Jordan-Israeli water agreement, but the tasks it named
are only a fraction of what would be required for a commission
managing the entire basin. Also, an international presence may be
helpful at least at the start, especially in light of the rocky experience
of the Jordan-Israel joint commission. An international party—
such as the World Bank—can assist technically and financially to
bridge gaps and resolve outstanding problems.
Additionally, the Johnston Plan quotas can benefit from refine
ment. The aggregate allocations, for example, could be broken down
on a seasonal basis, as was done in the Israel-Jordan water agreement.
Another improvement would be to state the quotas as percentages, in
addition to fixed quantities, to account for the variations of rainfall
and the concomitant water availability in the basin. A third modifi
cation would be to give Syria a choice between the water it im
pounds behind dams on the Yarmuk’s tributaries and the water that
the plan assigned to it from the Banyas and the Jordan rivers. If Syria
opted for the latter, the dams could still be used to regulate the flow,
and the downstream riparians would compensate Syria financially
for this service.
The foregoing suggestions for improving the JP differ from
saying that it is passé. They imply that the riparians should build on
the JP, without discarding its basic allocations. Attempts to renegoti
ate an entirely new agreement and quotas are likely to be protracted,
considering the mounting water scarcity in the area. Changing the
quotas could only come at the expense of the Jordanians and Pales
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tinians, the two vulnerable downstream riparians. While it may be
possible to suppress the demands of these two riparians for a time,
an enduring management regime must be equitable.
CONCLUSION
A water agreement in the Jordan basin is key for overall ArabIsraeli accommodation. In the Jordan River system, such an agree
ment can be built on the Johnston Plan. The JP is a synthesis of
previous plans and a compromise between the Arab riparians and
Israel; it may be said to have functioned as customary law in the
basin, at least between Israel and Jordan, and by extension the Pales
tinians. The customary law status of the JP can be applied to the
Palestinians because it was negotiated when the West Bank was first
part of Jordan and then fell under Israeli rule.
The JP would have to be modified to include provisions for
water quality control and instream value for the river system and the
Dead Sea, largely absent in the historic JP. It would also have to finetune the quotas to accommodate seasonal uses and supply, as well as
the water works built by some of the basin states.
The JP was not ratified in the past mainly because the Arab states
of the basin would not accept its implicit recognition of Israel before
resolving the Palestinian question. This condition no longer obtains;
the Arab states have recognized or are willing to recognize Israel in
exchange for returning Arab territories seized in 1967. The Palestin
ian refugee issue is also on the agenda of the final status talks be
tween Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and its resolution
depends only partially on water. In other words, only the “technical”
aspect of the JP has to be re-negotiated. The stumbling block is likely
to be the quotas, although the agreement on a unified management
regime could present a formidable challenge as well.
Jordan, Lebanon and the Palestinians—the three vulnerable
riparians—would be keenly interested in a JP-based agreement. The
key to an agreement based on the Johnston Plan, however, is in the
hands of the Israelis and the Syrians—Israel because it is the riparian
with the greatest power resources in the basin, and Syria because it is
the utmost upstreamer and the main water contributor to the sur
face waters of the basin.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS:
1) Extend provisions for water quality to
river system at large; 2) Consider “instream”
ecological, aesthetic, and historic value of the
river; 3) Specify details of joint commission;
4) Refine quotas. The aggregate allocations,
for example, could be broken down on a
seasonal basis, as was done in the IsraelJordan water agreement. Another improve
ment would be to state the quotas as
percentages, in addition to fixed quantities, to
account for the variations of rainfall and the
concomitant water availability in the basin. A
third modification would be to give Syria a
choice between the water it impounds
behind dams on the Yarmuk’s tributaries and
the water that the plan assigned to it from
the Banyas and the Jordan rivers. If Syria
opted for the latter, the dams could still be
used to regulate the flow, and the down
stream riparians would compensate Syria
financially for this service.
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Section III: Nature and Culture
Cultural Ecology, Perceptions of Nature and the Advent of Monotheism
in the Ancient Middle East: An Hypothesis
Daniel Hillel
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
ABSTRACT
The Middle East encompasses five ecological domains: (1) the humid highlands and their intermontane valleys, where
rainfed farming was begun and permanent settlements were first established; (2) the semi-arid steppes, where the lesser
amount and instability of rainfall made rainfed farming marginal but still provided vegetative resources that could be
utilized by semi-nomadic pastoralists; (3) the river valleys, where irrigated farming was practiced in the floodplains and
hydraulic works (including diversion canals and ponding basins) were developed; (4) the seacoasts, where fishing,
seafaring, and maritime trade were practiced; and (5) the deserts, where a sparse population subsisted by hunting and
occasional marauding, and eventually by becoming caravaneers conveying products such as herbs and spices overland
from distant sources to centers of population. In each of these domains, a distinctive culture evolved, characterized by a
specific set of precepts, beliefs, and rituals based on the deification and worship of the dominant forces of nature whose
interplay seemed to govern the particular environment. In an exposition more fully elucidated in his forthcoming book
The natural history of the Bible: an ecological reading of the scriptures, the author hypothesizes that it was the encompass
ing ecological experience of the ancient Israelites (who shifted from one domain to another in the early course of their
history) that enabled them to perceive the overarching unity of all nature and therefore to begin worshipping a single
God. The holistic perception of nature as an integrated domain governed by consistent principles was compatible with,
and probably contributed to, the much later advent of modern science.

Much has been said and written in recent decades concerning
the impact of human societies and their activities on the environ
ment. Less attention is currently paid to the equally important influ
ences of specific environments on the evolution of human societies
and their distinctive cultures. People who live in the artificial envi
ronment of the city, sheltered from direct exposure to the natural
elements, find it increasingly difficult to perceive how profoundly
the ecology of each region must have shaped not only the material
mode of individual and collective subsistence, but also the mental
attitudes and spiritual perceptions of tribes and nations. Nowhere is this
reciprocal influence more clearly apparent than in the Middle East.
The region called the Middle East encompasses parts of north
eastern Africa and southwestern Asia. Ecologically, it spans the
transition between the humid or semi-humid environment of
southeastern Europe and the extremely arid environment of the
great desert belt of the Sahara and the Arabian Peninsula reaching to
the Thar in the Indian subcontinent. Significantly, it was in parts of
this region that in the wake of the last ice age some ten thousand

 





years ago, humans first made the momentous transition from no
madic scavenging, hunting, and gathering to regular husbandry of
crops and livestock. Here they first domesticated plants and animals,
established villages and cities, built temples and monuments, and
organized nation states. Here they invented ceramics, metallurgy,
mathematics, and writing. And here they conceived and enunciated
universal ethical and religious ideals and codified them into laws.
The Middle East is, thus, the ancient cultural and spiritual home,
indeed the birthplace, of Western Civilization.
The cultural history of the ancient Middle East is not a simple
story of uniform steady development. Rather, it is an exceedingly
complex process of fitful progress, beset by repeated crises and
conflicts, in the course of which disparate societies co-evolved and
repeatedly clashed. The complexity of that process can be related to
the inherently variable and unstable environment within which it
took place.
The variegated environment of this region consists, rather
roughly, of five principal domains, each of which gave rise to a
characteristic culture. The irregular distribution of these domains is
such that they interlace with one another, thus forcing the cultures
forming within them to interact continuously, both synergistically
and antagonistically, in mutual dependence and rivalry. The five
domains are: the humid highlands, the semiarid steppes, the river
valleys, the seacoasts, and the deserts.
The first of these domains, the humid highlands, is the arc of
upland ranges girding the Fertile Crescent on the northwest, north,
and northeast (including the mountain ranges of Galilee, Lebanon,
Taurus, and Zagros). These ranges face into the path of the
cloud-bearing winds rolling in from the west and northwest, and
therefore regularly receive a comparative abundance of rainfall. That
rainfall gave rise to a profuse cover of herbaceous and woody plants,
among which were native species of grain-bearing grasses and le
gumes, as well as of fruit-bearing trees and shrubs that provided the
progenitors of the crops domesticated by the region’s early farmers.
This is, therefore, the domain of rainfed farming.
The second domain, namely the semiarid steppes, consists of the
plains and hills that lie in the rainshadow of the humid highlands.
Here rainfall is of lesser amount and regularity, so that rainfed farm
ing is too hazardous to be practiced perennially. However, this do
main does nevertheless provide vegetative resources which, though
more sparse than in the humid domain, can be exploited by grazing
animals. Indeed, this is the subregion wherein sheep and goats and
other species of livestock were domesticated and herded by tribes of
semi-nomadic pastoralists. Hence we call this the pastoral domain.

  



   

The third domain is that of the river valleys located in the semi
arid and arid zones. These valleys receive the excess waters (runoff)
flowing from the various catchments of the humid zone. Because
these flows originate in a different and often distant zone from the
major river valleys, they are called “exotic.” As such, they tend to be
seasonally variable, with the flows being most copious during and
immediately following the distinct rainy seasons. Some centuries
following the initial domestication of crojƒ in the rainfed domain,
farmers disaÎvered that they could import the seeds of those crops
into the riverine domain and grow them successfully along the river
banks and floodplains after the recession of the annual floods. In
time, these farmers also learned to exercise greater control over the
water supplies by diverting water from the natural river courses by
means of artificial dykes, channels, and ditches. Thus arose the
“hydraulic civilizations” of the ancient Middle East, which depended
on irrigated farming for their subsistence.
The fourth domain, the seacoasts, or the littoral domain, consisted
of the strips of land and water along the shores of the Mediterranean
Sea, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf. Here the terrestrial and the
marine environments meet and interplay to form a unique ecological
zone, with a characteristic community of interlinked aquatic and land
plants and animals. Humans who lived along these coasts tended to
become fishermen, seafarers, and land-sea traders. Eventually, they
developed such characteristic pursuits as glass making (using coastal
sand), and dye making (from near-coasts sea snails). Some settled
permanently at advantageous sites (such as islands, coves, and estuar
ies); while others developed a form of maritime nomadism character
istic of the Mediterranean “Sea Peoples,” who combined coastal
trading and raiding as means of subsistence.
The fifth domain was the desert domain, encompassing the vast
dry lands that occupy the southern tier of the region. Here the sparse
population continued for a long while to maintain an austere exist
ence as nomadic hunters, gatherers, and occasional marauders who
carried out incursions into the adjacent domains. Some also engaged
in localized farming in isolated oases and others herded ungulents
over the sparsely vegetated rangelands of the semi-desert. In time, the
denizens of the desert domesticated the camel, that remarkable animal
that has long been called the “ship of the desert.” Henceforth, some
became caravaneers, conveying goods such as medicinal, aromatic,
and spice plants (along with gems, gums, and silk) from such distant
sources as southern Arabia, eastern Africa, India, and central Asia to
the centers of population along the Mediterranean.
In addition to developing distinctive material cultures, the soci
eties that evolved in each of the domains also acquired characteristic
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perceptions of nature, which expressed themselves in specific sets of
religious beliefs and practices. Their religions were based on recog
nition and worship of the dominant natural forces that, in effect,
controlled their lives. And because the landscape of the region is so
variegated, and the climate so unstable, the ancient inhabitants of
the Middle East imagined the forces of nature to be in continuous
conflict. Rainstorms alternated with searing desert winds, drenching
floods with droughts, periods of plenty with repeated famine, as if
the elements were at war. Hence, the early polytheistic religions were
directed toward warding off the evil forces and propitiating the
beneficent ones in a constant quest to attain a measure of security in
a world that seemed so inherently unstable.
Rainfed farming societies coalesced from individual clusters of
villages in separate valleys to form city-states in which a major city
served as a center for a hinterland of farming communities. The
chief gods of these communities were generally the rainstorm gods
such as Baal, and an earth goddess, often named Astarte. Baal was
depicted riding the clouds, and at whim or will, spewing forth or
withholding his beneficence in the form of precipitation upon the
reclining Mother Earth below, who would then respond with her
abundant fecundity. The process of life was thus depicted as the
mating of sky and earth. To elicit it, these societies would practice
elaborate sacrificial rituals.
The pastoral societies tended to worship the brute and procre
ative prowess of dominant male animals, such as bulls or rams. As
they too depended on seasonal rainfall, they often worshiped a
combined pantheon of animal gods and rain gods.
The hydraulic societies appealed to riverine gods, believed to
control the annual floods. In the case of Egypt, where the connec
tion between the annual spates of the Nile and its sources in faraway
Ethiopia was obscure, a popular river god was Hapi, portrayed in
murals and sculptures as a rotund hermaphrodite with feminine
breasts and masculine genitals, presumably having powers of
self-generation. In Mesopotamia, where the threat of soil salination
by rising groundwater was felt most acutely, the good river god was
perceived to be countered by the lurking Tiamat, evil goddess of the
briny subterranean waters.
The desert people naturally worshiped their own gods, among them
the all-seeing god of the sun and the god or goddess of the moon, as
well as the mysterious volcanic mountain gods who dwelt in the bowels
of the earth and occasionally emerged from caves. These capricious
gods with their pent-up power could lie dormant for long periods of
time, only to awaken suddenly and cause the earth to tremble or the
winds to kick up dust or even bring about a freak downpour.
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Finally, the coastal and island peoples worshiped the monsters of
the sea (e.g., Yam and Leviathan), who had the power to roil the
waters and either swallow the ships of the seafarers or smash them
against the rocky shoals.
The societies in the various domains did not live in exclusive
isolation. Rather, they were aware of, and influenced by, one
another’s cultures. The people of each domain often accepted the
gods of other domains as minor deities alongside their own major
gods. And when individuals or clans shifted from one domain to a
neighboring one they generally accepted the supremacy of the gods
that were relevant to their new domain (even while retaining an
allegiance to their old gods—at least for a while).
One particular tribe, namely the Hebrews, appeared to deviate
from the general pattern. As recorded in their collective diary, trans
mitted to us as the Hebrew Bible, they began during the early or
middle part of the second millennium BCE. to traverse each of the
regions domains. Originating in the eastern riverine domain of
Mesopotamia, they embarked upon a venture of serial migrations.
First they moved to the pastoral domain of eastern and southern
Canaan, where they herded flocks of goats and sheep during the
time of the Patriarchs. Some time later, in response to a severe and
prolonged drought, they moved to the western riverine domain of
Egypt, where—according to the story that remained indelibly im
printed in their ancestral memory—they sojourned for several gen
erations. Next they left that domain at the time of the Exodus to
enter into the desert domain of Sinai and the Negev, where they
apparently wandered for some forty years. Finally, they emerged
from the desert domain to reinvade the pastoral domain of southern
Canaan and even to penetrate the rainfed domain of central and
northern Canaan. As they entered the latter domains, they evidently
encountered and clashed with another nation of invaders—the
Philistines—an offshoot of the Sea Peoples who raided the coastal
domains of the eastern Mediterranean at about the same time.
At this point, we offer what is admittedly only a conjecture. It seems
plausible that the very fact of their inclusive ecological experience en
abled the Hebrews, uniquely among their contemporaries in the region,
to first perceive the notion of monotheism. Having sojourned in each of
the domains and having shifted from one to another, assimilating
elements of all the region’s cultures, they could begin to coalesce the
disparate deities into a concept of overarching unity.
The idea and ideal of a single omnipresent and omnipowerful
force, a great common denominator unifying the entire realm of
nature, was a radical departure from the prevailing pluralistic view.
It could not have been a sudden, unanimous, and irreversible revela-
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tion. Instead, it must have been a painstaking process, first dimly
perceived by a few and resisted by many and only accepted gradually
after repeated advocacy by cultural and spiritual leaders in succes
sive generations. We have abundant evidence of that process in the
repeated exhortations and castigations by the Hebrew prophets
against a nation all too prone to revert to the worship of the earlier
naturalistic gods long seen as separate entities. The concept was even
tually affirmed and carried forth by both Christianity and the Islam.
Eventually, however, the unified vision of nature took hold until
it became the major ideological force that over time—much time—
transformed the cultural foundation of the entire region, indeed of
the entire world. Apart from its ritualistic or moralistic dimensions,
which we associate with the practice of religion per se, achieving this
unified vision was a precondition for the eventual development of a
universalist science as a systematic common quest to understand
nature as an integrated system.
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Gardens of Eden: Exotic Flora and Fauna in the Ancient Near East
Karen Polinger Foster
Yale University
ABSTRACT
The idea of the garden began in the ancient Near East, in concert with the origins and development of agriculture,
urbanism, and imperialism. From the start, exotic flora and fauna played vital roles in the world's earliest transformations
of the natural environment, creating physical and metaphysical gardens of far-reaching significance. This paper examines
selected aspects of exotica in Mesopotamia and Egypt, drawing together evidence from art, texts, and archaeology.

INTRODUCTION
Since earliest times, exotic flora and fauna have been integral
components of the idea of the garden. As we cast our thoughts about
nature and culture back across millennia to the ancient Near East,
we see botanical and zoological gardens of every era replete with
exotic plants and animals. There are, for example, the zoological
firsts, bearing upon their striped and reticulated backs burdens of
great social and political weight. The nineteenth century witnessed
such firsts as the African animals brought to Antwerp and Berlin,
evocatively installed in Egyptianizing pavilions as living testaments
to colonial expansionism and to the triumph of order over the cha
otic world (Hoage and Deiss 1996; Spongberg 1990). Then there
were the first kangaroos in Europe, bred by the Empress Josephine
in her gardens at Malmaison, as part of the Napoleonic imperialistic
initiative in natural sciences (Chevallier 1993; Raby 1996). The year
1751 saw the first rhinoceros in Venice, an encounter for the Age of
Enlightenment, didactic, and sometimes tiresomely pedantic, as
shown in a “true portrait” by Pietro Longhi (Held and Posner 1971).
In 1415, the imperial Chinese court examined its first giraffe (with
some trepidation, judging from its handler’s expression), as part of
an ambitious African/Chinese trade agreement (Wilson 1992).
About 800, the first elephant in northern Europe, one Aboul-Abas
by name, made its way to Charlemagne, a gift from Harun al-Rashid to
his counterpart in the West (Croke 1997). The citizens of Athens gath
ered to gape at their first tiger, presented in 323 BCE by Alexander’s
general Seleucus as a harbinger of the Hellenistic age (Ives 1996).
In the ancient Near East, for three thousand years before this
Alexandrian tiger, exotic plants and animals were of considerable
interest to royalty and private individuals. Some collected rarities
out of intellectual curiosity, while others were motivated by poten
tial economic rewards. Many rulers saw acquisition and display of
exotic flora and fauna as effective ways to enhance prestige or to
demonstrate imperial dominion over far-flung lands. Botanical

 





gardens and zoos were often designed so that transplanted species
could successfully establish themselves in their new environments.
Specimens of exotic flora and fauna were prized as tribute offerings
and suitable gifts for royalty. Certain non-native plants and animals
were needed for the enactment of religious and other ceremonies.
Finally, the controlled coexistence of exotic and indigenous flora
and fauna in palatial and urban settings provided a powerful, living
metaphor for mental maps of a more perfect world—the original
gardens of Eden.
The present paper touches on selected aspects of this subject,
drawn from my on-going, comprehensive investigation of the evi
dence from Mesopotamia, Egypt, and other areas of the Bronze Age
world. My research has pursued three principal avenues of inquiry:
exotica in art, texts, and archaeology. I have gathered over four
hundred representations of exotic plants, animals, botanical gar
dens, and zoos. This wealth of artistic material raises the following
questions, among others: How does the pictorialization of exotica
demand new artistic solutions, instead of reliance on established
conventions of rendering? What role does the introduction of ex
otica play in the stylistic development of narrative and landscape
art? In what contexts are exotica situated geographically, so they
serve as reliable maps of the hinterland and frontier? To what extent
are depictions of exotica based on first-hand observation of species in
their native habitats? What features of exotica become subsumed into
a generalized thematic vocabulary denoting the strange or numinous?
Mesopotamian and Egyptian written sources abound with men
tion of non-native flora and fauna. My concern with textual mate
rial focuses on such issues as how exotic characteristics were
described, the significance of exotica in figurative language, and the
ways in which texts complement pictorializations, as captions or as
parallel vehicles for ideological expression.
The archaeological record provides some evidence for the pres
ence of exotic flora and fauna in the form of plant and skeletal re
mains, as well as excavated gardens and enclosures. The ancient
Near East was home to three crucial, sequential developments in the
relationship between nature and culture: (1) the domestication of
plants and animals, and the start of agriculture; (2) the building of
the world’s earliest cities, with the concomitant first agrarian/urban
dichotomies; and (3) the rise of the world’s earliest empires and
colonial powers. Within this context, my particular interest lies in
defining archaeologically how exotic plants and animals played vital
roles in the idea of the garden at its very beginnings.

  



   

EXOTICA IN MESOPOTAMIA
From nearly every period come Mesopotamian texts or represen
tations pertaining to exotic fauna. In the Sumerian literary composi
tion “The Curse of Agade,” for example, the goddess Inanna
describes the greatness of her city Agade, capital of the Akkadian
empire ca. 2300 BCE: “Monkeys, mighty elephants, water buffaloes,
and wonderful animals,” she says, “jostle each other in the public
squares” (Cooper 1983). In like manner, the royal Palm Court at
Mari ca. 1800 BCE requested many exotic and rare animals, includ
ing Elamite cats, bears, and chamois (Wiseman 1983). Their desir
ability may be gauged by the fact that a chamois born en route to
Mari was kidnapped by someone, though the mother animal arrived
safely. Finicky animals like Mediterranean seals and dolphins were
accompanied by their human handlers, who presumably were under
strict instructions to see that their charges made it to their destination.
As for exotic flora, “gardens enhance the pride of the city,” says
the Neo-Babylonian “Hymn to Ezida,” especially those with unusual
features (Wiseman 1983). Pleasure gardens and game parks with
exotic specimens were maintained for king and populace. Several
Sumerian texts describe how gods journeyed to visit certain temples
to admire their gardens: Eridu, with its rare fruit trees and carp pools
and Nippur, with its unusual palms and conifers (al-Fouadi 1969).
Gardeners trained to care for these rare plants were much esteemed
and well remunerated. Some exotic flora seem to have supplied the
needs of perfume industries, temple rituals, and herbal pharmacopeia.
The most famous Mesopotamian gardens were one of the Seven
Wonders of the Ancient World, the Hanging Gardens of Babylon.
According to later sources, the Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar (ca.
600 BCE) ordered artificial knolls, hills, and watercourses planted
with exotic trees, shrubs, and trailing vines, all this effort so that his
Median queen might be less homesick for her native mountains
(Finkel 1988). Unfortunately, there is no archaeological evidence for
these wondrous gardens. Many reconstructions at various locations
in Babylon have been proposed, entailing such elements as vaulted
supports, water wheels, terraces, and aqueducts. A recent study sug
gests that the Hanging Gardens may not have been at
Nebuchadnezzar’s Babylon at all, but at Sennacherib’s Nineveh, ca.
700 BCE, where ingenious devices, forerunners of the Archimedes
screw, raised water to several garden levels (Dalley 1994).
The Sumerian hero-king Gilgamesh is associated in symbolically
important ways with indigenous and exotic flora and fauna. At the
beginning and end of The Epic of Gilgamesh, he stands on the walls of
his city Uruk, looking down at its rich gardens, part of his enduring
legacy (Kovacs 1989). One of the epic’s incidents involves cutting rare
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giant cedars and the dire consequences of that action. In a later epi
sode, Gilgamesh travels in despair through darkness, searching for
answers to his questions about death. He emerges into sunlight to find
a garden of immortal jewels, with lapis lazuli foliage, carnelian fruit,
and flowering clusters of semiprecious stones. A fictional letter com
posed centuries later as a school exercise has Gilgamesh request a
shipment of rarities from an unnamed foreign king: thousands of
black horses with white stripes, thousands of white horses with black
stripes, and “anything precious, exotic, which I have never seen” (B.
R. Foster 1995).
The Neo-Assyrian kings of the ninth to seventh centuries BCE
elevated exotic flora and fauna to their greatest positions in the
Mesopotamian imperialistic program (Aynard 1972; Curtis and Reade
1995; Reade 1983). During this period, relentless military campaigns
extended Assyrian power from the Mediterranean to beyond the
Zagros Mountains. Much of Assyrian art, especially palace wall reliefs,
was propagandistic, intended to describe and commemorate events in
distant places. In addition, the reliefs often served to depict plant and
animal tribute from foreign lands, as well as their installation in botanical and zoological gardens that were the pride of kings.
With Assurnasirpal II’s building of a new palace and administrative center at Nimrud in 879 BCE, the acquisition of exotica escalated.
Living tribute came to Nimrud from every quarter: monkeys, elephants, bears, rare deer, sea creatures. A major group of reliefs shows
foreigners carrying luxury goods and prestige items, including a pair
of leashed monkeys. The king himself actively sought out unusual
specimens in the course of his military campaigns. As Assurnasirpal
proudly writes, “I collected their herds, and caused them to bring
forth their increase. From lands I traveled and hills I traversed, the
trees and seeds I noticed and collected” (Wiseman 1983). No archaeo
logical traces remain of what must have been extensive gardens,
parklands, and animal enclosures at Nimrud.
Shalmaneser III, successor to Assurbanipal II, continued these
patterns of acquisition and display, but sought to use exotica in art to
greater narrative effect (Curtis and Reade 1995). Foreign topography,
people, plants, and animals appear in more pictorially unified compo
sitions, which visually confirmed their forcible integration into the
Assyrian world. The embossed bronze bands made ca. 845 BCE for
the massive wooden gates of a royal building at Balawat present
Assyrian military and other enterprises, among them the royal visit to
the source of the Tigris, or perhaps the Tigris Tunnel. The explorers
wade through naturalistic grottoes, flares held high above the stream.
The four sides of the ca. 825 BCE Black Obelisk bear register blocks
showing tribute brought before Shalmaneser, including “camels
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whose backs are doubled,” elephants, simians, and a single-horned
creature, possibly a hippotamus. As on the Balawat Gate bands,
exotica receive more sculpturally coherent treatment than they did in
the essentially linear reliefs of Assurbanipal II.
A century later, Sargon II (721–705 BCE) founded a new capital
city at Khorsabad, on the Khosr River north of Nineveh. According
to his inscriptions, Sargon brought in skilled artists from Assyrianheld territories to embellish his palace (Curtis and Reade 1995).
Perhaps due to their influence, the Khorsabad reliefs reflect a more
sophisticated use of space, in which the Assyrians move with stylistic
and personal assurance through landscapes rich in exotic flora and
fauna. On panels depicting timber being transported by water, for
example, wave and ripple patterns fill entire slabs, with exotic marine
creatures swimming among the boats. Other scenes show Sargon’s
royal parks, complete with rare trees, elegant kiosks, and pleasure
lakes. Assyrian hunting parties form overlapping friezes against a
dense, controlled background of plants and animals.
Sargon II’s son and successor was Sennacherib (704–681 BCE), a
king of exceptional vision. Early in his reign, he established a new
capital at Nineveh. His “Palace Without Rival” featured rooms and
courts decorated with sculptured panels unprecedented in their
quantity and innovative quality (Russell 1991). For the narrative
scenes, Sennacherib’s artists filled whole slabs, as begun at
Khorsabad, but here the layered divisions between foreground figures
and background landscapes often disappear, resulting in more com
plex spatial and temporal relationships. Sennacherib’s reliefs are the
first internally consistent representations in Mesopo-tamian art, with
exotica playing major roles in this development. In many instances,
as in the marshland conquest scenes, they expand the pictorial field,
while in others they afford cinemagraphically changing vistas undu
lating above and below the central narrative sequence, as in the
throne room program of colossal winged bulls being quarried and
transported. Not only are exotica rendered highly naturalistically,
from the reeds bending in the current to the gnarled conifers clinging
to wind-swept hills, but they also have become indispensible
signifiers of Assyrian prowess.
Like his ancestors, Sennacherib used botanical and zoological
gardens as important components of his reign’s propagandistic mes
sage. To complement the “Palace Without Rival,” Sennacherib’s
gardens were novel creations, inspired by the king’s personal interest
in hydraulics, botany, and animal breeding. As noted above, forerun
ners of the Archimedes screw brought water to intricately terraced
gardens. Near Nineveh, Sennacherib reports that he “had a swamp
made to control the flow of water, planted reeds there, and released
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herons, wild pigs, and other animals...the plantations were most
successful; the herons which came from far away nested, and the pigs
and others produced young in great numbers” (Wiseman 1983).
Among the exotic trees in his orchards were ones “bearing wool,”
apparently a reference to cotton.
Some of Sennacherib’s gardens still flourished in the reign of his
grandson, Assurbanipal (668–ca. 631 BCE), whose reliefs at Nineveh
include views of terraces with vaulted aqueducts, elaborate plantings,
and pillared kiosks. If the Hanging Gardens were indeed
Sennacherib’s, these reliefs may afford an idea of their appearance.
Other panels show Assurbanipal’s own gardens and zoos, as well as
foreign battles and lion hunts. Assurbanipal’s sculptors seem to have
been particularly interested in seeking fresh narrative possibilities.
One is their increasing use of internal sequences as linking devices
among multi-register panels. We follow, for example, a caged lion as it
is released, springs forward, and is shot by archers. Another device is
their insertion of cuneiform captions or epigraphs, especially into
complex combat scenes filling huge slabs. A third involves their ex
panded understanding of the crucial importance of negative space in
creating boundless potential for narrative statements.
With these artistic means at their disposal, artists could rely less on
exotica to provide the necessary temporal and spatial frameworks.
Granted, Assurbanipal’s botanical and zoological scenes contain
exotica rendered with careful precision—vines twisting about trees,
stems bending under the weight of lilies, deer trapped in taut nets. Yet
the sense of situational, propagandistic immediacy is gone, replaced
by confidence in the greater power of text and compositional manipu
lation. Historical events brought these developments to an end: fifteen
years after Assurbanipal, Nineveh fell to the Medes, and the Assyrian
empire was finished.
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EXOTICA IN EGYPT
From the fourth millennium on, there was strong Egyptian inter
est in botanical and zoological life beyond the Nile Valley (Houlihan
1996; Hugonot 1989). Predynastic slate palettes and ivory handles of
ca. 3100–2900 BCE depict exotic and fantastic animals, as well as
living tribute or booty, though it is difficult to evaluate their com
memorative significance. The earliest definitively historical texts
pertaining to exotica record Old Kingdom expeditions to the Levant
to obtain cedar wood. Reliefs from the funerary temple of the Fifth
Dynasty pharaoh Sahure (ca. 2458–2446 BCE) depict the departure
and return of such a venture, which also brought Syrian bears to
Egypt. During the Sixth Dynasty, the young pharaoh Pepi II (ca.
2246–2152 BCE) requested a dancing dwarf or pygmy from the Afri

  



   

can land of Yam, for he desired this “more than the gifts of the mineland or of Punt” (Lichtheim 1973). Harkhuf, the successful expedition
commander, included Pepi II’s letter of instructions in his autobio
graphical tomb inscription. The child-pharaoh was particularly anx
ious lest this special being, considered more exotic than human, fall
overboard in the night.
Middle and New Kingdom pharaohs continued to sponsor the
collection of exotica, especially as the Egyptian empire expanded south
ward into Nubia and northward into the Levant. The Eighteenth Dy
nasty pharaoh Thutmosis III (ca. 1479–1425 BCE), for example,
conquered Megiddo and washed his weapons in the Euphrates. He
commemorated one of his Syrian campaigns with a series of wall reliefs
carved in side chambers near his Festival Hall at Karnak Temple (Beaux
1990). Nearly three hundred types of exotic plants, animals, and birds
appear in these “Botanical Garden” reliefs, many of which are artistic
creations meant to convey the idea of the unusual, even the bizarre,
rather than any botanical or zoological reality. For that, gardens and
zoos existed in the vicinity of the royal residences, certainly since the
Old Kingdom. Those of Thutmosis III perhaps included four remark
able birds “that laid eggs daily,” the first domestic chickens in Egypt
(Houlihan 1996). On a Nineteenth Dynasty ostracon, an artist sketched
a rooster, apparently drawn from life, possibly on a visit to a royal
menagerie (Houlihan 1996). Rameses II (ca. 1290–1224 BCE) outdid
Thutmosis III’s exhibition of a large dead rhinoceros with display of a
live one of prodigious size, whose measurements are given next to its
representation (Houlihan 1996). At his new city in the Delta, to cite
another example, the Twentieth Dynasty pharaoh Rameses III (ca.
1194–1163 BCE) designed a “sacred way, splendid with flowers from all
countries” (Hugonot 1989).
In literature, love poetry speaks of exotic trees planted as durable
tokens of affection in the beloved’s garden (Manniche 1989). Other love
songs make liberal use of garden imagery, stressing the rich eroticism of
perfumed flowers, shining pools, and ripening fruit (J. L. Foster 1974).
Properly cultivated trees were metaphors for model behavior, as seen in
“The Instruction of Amenemope,” part of a peculiarly Egyptian literary
genre (Simpson 1973). Yet gardeners themselves suffered poor reputa
tions, objects of ridicule in caricatures and in “The Satire on the Trades”
(Parkinson 1991), and targets of indignities to prove their innocence of
pilfering, as recorded in a Demotic contract of the late first millennium
BCE (Parker 1940).
The close Mesopotamian relationship between territorialism and
exotica is similarly reflected in the tomb paintings and reliefs of numer
ous high-ranking officials of the New Kingdom. Many of these indi
viduals seem to have directly participated in imperial activities.
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Amenemhab, for instance, accompanied Thutmosis III to Syria, there
encountering a herd of elephants: “I engaged the largest which was
among them. I cut off his hand [trunk] while he was alive” (Davies
1940). On the lintel of his Theban tomb, Amenemhab fends off a giant
hyenalike animal in a surreal landscape studded with fantastic plants
reminiscent of those in the Karnak reliefs of Thutmosis III. The artist
has supplied the visual counterpart to the narrative of heroic imposition
of order upon a chaotic, non-Egyptian world.
Another of Thutmosis III’s henchmen, Amenmose, went to Leba
non to collect tribute (Wreszinski 1923). His tomb artist emphasized
the event’s importance by painting it on a separate wall of the tomb.
The tribute bearers are shown against a screen of cedars whose slender
trunks are vertical stripes in the venerable Egyptian stylization of papy
rus thickets, but instead of the expected umbels, here they are topped by
ovoid, pointillistic crests. On the one hand, the exotic cedar forests are
seen to conform to an ordered, familiar pattern under Egyptian domi
nation, while on the other, the skillful inclusion of evocative details
provides a particularized backdrop for effective narrative.
Geographical orientation of exotic tribute played an important part
in the development of New Kingdom tomb narratives. Representations
of African flora and fauna appear on southern walls, while Levantine
plants and animals are painted on northern walls. The tethered proces
sions include elephants, bears, baboons, leopards, lions, antelopes, and
monkeys, one of whom hitches a ride on the neck of a giraffe in the
tomb of Rekhmire, vizier of Upper Egypt under Thutmosis III and
Amenhotep II (Wilkinson 1983).
The middle colonnade of the Eighteenth Dynasty pharaoh
Hatshepsut’s funerary temple at Deir el Bahri, ca. 1450 BCE, contains
an unusually complete program of wall reliefs depicting exotic flora and
fauna (Herzog 1968; Kitchen 1971; Smith 1962). The subject is her
expedition to Punt, probably located on the Horn of Africa, a destina
tion at least since the Old Kingdom, but never before recorded in im
ages. Egyptian ships sail southward to Punt on the south wall, while the
formal announcement of their return is on the north wall. Six registers
show Punt: its forests inhabited by exotic animals; its domed dwellings
raised on stilts; its diminutive king and his amply proportioned queen;
its natural treasures of ebony, frankincense, and myrrh.
Hatshepsut was justifiably proud of her idea to transplant myrrh
saplings to Egypt to ensure a local supply of the costly material needed
for incense and mummification. We observe a full narrative sequence,
from the young trees carried aboard in Punt to the lush myrrh garden
thriving in front of the temple at Deir el Bahri. In standard Egyptian
practice, the trees are planted in rows and columns of pits filled with
Nile alluvium (Hugonot 1989). Later pharaohs were less fortunate with
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their myrrh tree importations; perhaps the Puntites realized how com
petition would affect their market, and cannily cut the tap roots before
balling them up (Dixon 1969).
In several important ways, the artists gave new life to Hatshepsut’s
repeated, propagandistic cliché: “Never was brought the like of this for
any king who has been since the beginning” (Smith 1962). First, the
renderings of the Punt exotica are highly naturalistic, implying a mea
sure of first-hand observation, rather than reliance on the usual Egyp
tian recourse to hybridism, transference, or copying from
pattern-books. In addition, the upper registers are wider and longer
than the bottom ones, in part because the adjoining wall sloped inward
in the Egyptian batter mode. This creates a subtle interplay between the
lower village, with its ordered ranks of Egyptians, and the upper forests,
with their towering trees, exotic animals, and raised huts seemingly lost
in the foliage. Finally, the Punt exotica appear as sets of curvilinear
shapes, a dramatic foil to the rectilinear formality of the Egyptian del
egation. In the “Punt Colonnade,” image and text combine to demonstrate how Hatshepsut’s successful mission transformed the exotic
forests of Punt into the ordered gardens of Egypt.

In the “Punt Colonnade,” image and
text combine to demonstrate how
Hatshepsut’s successful mission
transformed the exotic forests of Punt
into the ordered gardens of Egypt.

CONCLUSIONS
This concludes our brief tour of physical and metaphysical gardens
in the ancient Near East. Neatly enclosed, carefully tended, deliberately
provided with exotic and indigenous species—these were the original
Gardens of Eden (Delumeau 1995). It was in just such a garden that
God planted the two most exotic trees of all: the tree of life, and the tree
of the knowledge of good and evil.
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Between Paradise and Political Capital: The Semiotics of Safavid Isfahan
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ABSTRACT
In the late 16th century the Safavid Shah Abbas I established Isfahan as the capital of his empire. He designed a plan on a
monumental scale in the garden fields south of the old Saljuq center, which integrated the river Zayendehrud into the
formation of the new palatial city. The orthogonal intersection of the Chahar Bagh Avenue and the river created a
chahar bagh (four garden) pattern on the scale of a city, which produced a synthesis between Persian and Islamic
concepts of paradise, Turkic nomadic traditions of ritual and social uses of gardens, and the principle of a royal capital city.
The symbolism and figurativeness of Isfahan within the frame of a chahar bagh cannot be completely separated from
traditional notions of garden and paradise, but goes beyond the allegoric interpretation of religious or mystical refer
ences to Islamic paradise, bearing distinct iconographic and deliberate political connotations of empire. This paper is
based on the hermeneutic analysis of Safavid gardens and contrasts traditional interpretations of Persian and Islamic
gardens along the paradigm of paradise with an expanded definition of the political implications of paradise.

Have you seen Isfahan, that city like Paradise,
That holy cypress, that soul nourishing Eden;
That palace of the nation and that throne of government
That face of the seven spheres, that eye of the seven lands.1

PROLOGUE
The visual image of Isfahan has been inextricably shaped both by
its architecture and its royal palace gardens. The city is acclaimed
for the magnificence and splendor of its architecture, triumphant
remainders of the Saljuq and Safavid empires. It has inspired gen
erations of art historians, architects, archaeologists, artists,
photographers, and tourists. Through city guides and coffee table
books, Isfahan’s architectural images were reproduced and prolifer
ated into worldwide photographic effigies,2 through which the
domes and portals of the Safavid mosque Masjid-i Shah, the Masjidi Shaykh Lutf Allah, the large plaza of the Maidan-i Naqsh-i Jahan,
the palatial gardens of the Bagh-i Hasht Behesht, the labyrinth of the
bazaar and the portico of the Saljuq Masjid-i Jami‘ have been pro
moted as the epitome of Islamic architecture.
In the latter half of the 20th century the pressure for industrial
ization in Iran created new concerns, and the development of urban
centers brought renewed attention to Isfahan. The acceleration of
urban growth and modernization programs under the aegis of the
White Revolution, the Shah’s 1960 land reform and industrialization
program, generated studies on urban development, city planning,
road construction, municipal infrastructure, water supply, sewage
treatment, and the preservation of historical architecture.

 

1

Jamal al-Din Isfahani: Divan-i Kamil, ed. Vahid
Dastgirdi, Tehran, 1320, p. 410.
Didi tu Isfahan ra an shahr-i khold-i Paikar
An sidr-yi muqqadas, an cadn-i ruh parvar
An bargah-i millat va an takhtgah-i dawlat
An ruy-i haft ’alam an chishm-i haft kishvar.
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Among the most renowned of these are
Wilfried Blunt’s Isfahan, pearl of Persia, and
Lockhart’s Persian cities, London: Luzac and
Co. Ltd. 1960, and the recent publication
of photographs of Isfahan by Nasrollah
Kasraian.


The need to combine the city’s historical corporeality with mod
ern urban development has directed the interests of historical re
search and archeological investigations toward the background and
development of individual palaces, mosques, shrines and palatial
gardens, with less emphasis on their wider urban context or the
historical and environmental morphogenesis of the Safavid city.
The strategic location, abundant water supply and fertile land
facilitated the expansion and development of Isfahan in the 17th
century on an unprecedented scale. As Safavid capital, Isfahan pro
vided a synthesis between the complex relations of cultural percep
tions of land, political expressions of territoriality and royal
self-representation which were articulated by the symbolic language
of its gardens and buildings.
Garden and paradise are two themes which are inextricably
attached to Isfahan and recur in associative descriptions as well as
taxonomic distinctions. A closer examination of the layout of
Safavid Isfahan shows an internal order, which is structured along
the axial quadripartite pattern of a chahar bagh (literally four gardens) formed by the axes of the river Zayendehrud and the royal
avenue Khiaban-i Chahar Bagh. This underlying urban plan or
composition combined the principles of Turco-Iranian forms of city
and Perso-Islamic and Timurid patterns of garden. It created a
dialectic relation between garden and city, based on the implicit
practical interdependence of the natural environment and the archi
tectural semiotics of royal political representation.
The traditional metaphorical interpretation of the Qur’anic or
Islamic paradise as the quintessential rationale behind Persian gar
dens is epistemologically insufficient to explain the interactive pat
terns between the religio-political system and the iconography of a
garden on the scale of a city. The ostentatious, almost monumental
layout of the new city suggests that it was not a coincidental pattern
but deliberately planned by its founder Shah Abbas I (1587-1629).
Poets and writers consciously chose the metaphor of paradise to
celebrate Isfahan’s beauty and extol its pre-eminence as imperial
city. The ubiquitous contemporary insinuations and poetic allusions
of Safavid gardens to the Garden of Eden as well as the literary com
parisons of Isfahan as khuld-i barin, the eighth level and uppermost
tier of paradise, keep them explicitly tied to the idea of paradise.3
The implicit figurative connotation of Safavid Isfahan’s quadripar
tite division along the four garden or chahar bagh model cannot be
wholly separated from common religious notions of paradise either.
Yet they reach beyond the allegoric interpretation of religious or
mystical references to Islamic paradise, and bear a distinct political
idiom. The textual and iconographic hermeneutics of royal Safavid

3



The label of paradise for Isfahan has
developed into a standard topos. Carl
Ritter called it “die Paradiesische Stadt” in
the early 19th century in Die Erdkunde von
Asien, vol. VI, G. Reimer, Berlin, 1840, p. 21.
The analogy has since proliferated as
Isfahan’s standard epithet.

  



   

gardens, and of Isfahan specifically, ultimately lead to a synthesis
between the paradise paradigm applied by traditional interpreta
tions of Islamic gardens and the political intentions of Safavid archi
tectural and urban representation.
THE PROFUSION OF GARDENS AND THE PARADISE
PARADIGM
Gardens and their associated cultural and practical principles
were a major component of the new royal city laid out by Shah
Abbas I in the late 16th century in the suburban fields between the
old Saljuq city and the river Zayendehrud. Identified as an Islamic
dynasty, both in religious and political terms, Qur’anic notions of
paradise have been understood as both the guiding motive and
principle behind Safavid gardens. The concept of “Persian garden”
in traditional interpretations has become almost synonymous with
“Safavid garden.” In their dual Persian and Islamic traditions, the
architectural, artistic, and iconographic expression of Safavid gardens has conventionally been interpreted as a metaphor of paradise,
referring to both the Biblical and Qur’anic descriptions for paradise.4 The Safavid garden has been seen as the apogee of the artistic
temporal and human construction of the religious metaphysical
paradisiacal garden of Islam.5 The association of garden with para
dise was strongly influenced by the pervasive images and epithets
such as Hasht Behesht (the eighth paradise or eight paradises), Baghi Jannat (paradise garden), and Bagh-i Eram (terrestrial paradise), as
well as evocations and metaphors in their inscriptions, poetry and
mystical traditions.
Western writers, especially since the late 18th and 19th century,
inspired by contemporary archaeological trends, excavations and the
neo-classicist trends in Europe, both explored and re-enforced the
logical sequence of pre-Islamic and Biblical notions of paradise.
Since Xenophon’s use of the word Paradeisos for the gardens of
Cyrus the Great,6 Persian gardens have been inseparably associated
with their historical Achaemenid precedents, interpreted as terres
trial allegory of metaphysical, celestial Paradise. Early European
travellers and explorers used the texts of Xenophon and other classical Greek writers as historical and literary reference, which were con
sulted and re-used by writers and travellers of the 18th and 19th
century, who produced spirited descriptions of the scents, flowers,
fruits and nightingales in Persia’s gardens. “Alexander [the Great] is
written to have seen Cyrus’s tomb in a paradise,” wrote William
Temple in the 17th century, “so that a paradise among them seems to
have been a large space of ground, adorned and beautified with all sorts
of trees, both of fruits and of forest, either cultivated, like gardens, for
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For Qur’anic descriptions of paradise see
e.g. surah 3, 16; surah 4, 14, 58, 123; surah
6, 100; surah 3, 42-48; surah 47,16; surah
55, 63-77; surah 56, 16-35. For a brief
discussion of Quranic descriptions of
paradise see: Marianne Barrucand: Gärten
und gestaltete Landschaft als irdisches
Paradies: Gärten im westlichen Islam, in:
Der Islam, vol. 65, no. 2, 1988: 244-246.
Biblical concepts of paradise are for
example the Garden of Eden, Gen. 2, 1-14:
profuseness and pleasure, Gen. 13,10;
abundance of water, Ez. 47, 1-12; fertility,
Os. 2, 2-24; celestial journey of Paul, 2 Cor.
12, 4; eschatological visions, Apc. 2, 7.
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shades and for walks, with fountains or streams, and all sorts of
plants usual in the climate and pleasant to the eye, the smell, or the
taste, or else employed, like our parks for inclosure and harbour of all
sorts of wild beasts, as well as for the pleasure of riding and walking:
and so they were of more or less extent, and of differing entertain
ment, according to the several humours of the princes that ordered
and inclosed them.” 7
Traditional metaphorical interpretations of Persian or Islamic
gardens have correlated the general orthogonal symmetry to God’s
perfection and transcendent purity. The straight lines have been
seen to represent tawhid, divine unity, and sacred order between
man and nature, in which order and harmony were expressed in
mathematical regularity and unambiguous geometric patterns. The
figure of the chahar bagh has been interpreted to denote the four
quarters or directions of the universe. The orthogonal waterways
have been seen to symbolize the four rivers of Eden;8 the water as
the Christian and Muslim symbol of moral and sacred purification,
the fish as unequivocal symbol of life, the towering cypress trees,
pointing to the metaphysical after-life, as symbol of death, and
lastly, the garden as universal metaphor for the positive and symbi
otic relation between man and nature, where water channels give
replenishment, green trees render comforting shade, and fruit
orchards extend pleasure and nourishment.9
The paradise paradigm as analytical interpretation for Safavid
gardens has developed into a conventional and strongly established
topos with few variations or attempts to expand the hermeneutics
of the theorem or to explore the gardens’ shape, function, and
iconography in their historical context. A great deal of literature has
been produced about the metaphysical and religious interpretations
of the physical configuration of Safavid gardens. The general analytical approach to Persian gardens has classified them within their
linear historic epochs, but the interdependence between garden and
garden landscapes and the historical, cultural and political environment which produced them remains understudied. Research on
Safavid gardens has primarily focused on the separate palatial gardens of Isfahan and others, such as the Bagh-i Fin in Kashan or the
large garden complex of the Bagh-i Shah at Ashraf and Farahabad
along the Caspian coast in Mazandaran. The driving ideas and the
visions of the builders and architects, the meaning of spaces and
architecture beyond the conventional and “terrestrial paradise,” and
the gardens’ aesthetic and functional use, however, have been
largely neglected. The method of describing the palatial gardens in
an essentially kaleidoscopic juxtaposition, conveying their radiance,
sensuality, and aesthetic expression, has not devoted enough atten
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tion to the historical processes of their development, transforma
tion, and relation to each other as a formation in a whole city or the
interaction of the structural and metaphorical concept of garden
and city, which is particularly evident in Isfahan.
The flourishing green countenance of Isfahan has earned it the
designation “city garden,” which has been used in a sensual and
almost romantic sense.10 In expressly visual descriptions, Safavid
and Qajar Isfahan has been identified with the “profusion of gar
dens.” 11 As one of the many travellers of the early 19th century
described it, “the valleys and plains for many miles around Ispahan,
are adorned with villages and plantations; and the first view which
the traveller has on coming from Shirauz, of this great metropolis, is
from an eminence, about five miles from the city, when it bursts at
once upon his sight, and is, perhaps, one of the grandest prospects
in the universe.”12 The European tradition of this description goes
back to that of early depictions of travel authors like the physician
and travel-explorer Engelbert Kaempfer (in Isfahan in 1684-85),
Pietro della Valle (in Isfahan in 1619), Thomas Herbert (1628), Jean
Chardin (1660s-70s), John Fryer (1677) and others. Without exception
they invoked the impressive green resplendence after a journey through
the dry, orche yellow, almost moon-like landscape of central Persia.
Sir Thomas Herbert, who sojourned in the city at the end of
Shah Abbas I’s rule, described Isfahan as “the metropolis of the
Persian monarchy. Yea, the greatest and best built City throughout
the Orient.” He found that the city’s gardens “challenge our atten
tion; than for which grandeur and fragor, no City in Asia out-vies
her. It incloses so many that at some distance from the city, you
would judge it a Forest; so sweet you would call it a Paradize.”13
All sides of the city were “beautiful, from the richness of the plain,
profusion of gardens and the domes and towers of mosques and
palaces, rearing their heads from amidst verdant groves of poplars,
sycamores, and cypresses of the most noble size;” reads J. S.
Buckingham’s description.14 “Nothing can exceed in beauty and
fertility, the country in the vicinity of Isfahan, and the first appear
ance of that city is very imposing. All that is noble meets the eye: the
groves, avenues, and spreading orchards,” wrote Sir John Malcolm a
few years later.15 The accounts offered a persuasive picture, which
continues to be invoked by descriptions of Isfahan and its gardens
today. Providing a sense of drama, they serve mostly as adornment
to emphasize the extraordinary, without concern for the functional
synthesis of garden and city expressed by the morphology of Isfahan.
The general symmetry and linear geometric patterns of Islamic and
Persian gardens have often been contrasted with the “disorganized”
and “unstructured” formation of the Islamic city. Although the
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ecological and political symbiosis of Islamic suburban gardens and
cities have been recognized, the innate principles and functions of
the Islamic city and garden have conventionally been contrasted as
implicitly antithetical.16 The underlying formal structure of Safavid
Isfahan incorporated an intentional quadripartite division with an
inherent relation to the external urban expression of the city. The
building of the new Safavid palace quarter created a dialectic affilia
tion between the old urban and new palatial center. Yet the develop
ment and expansion of the city, without the strict separation of the
suburban gardens and the districts of the old center by a compact
city wall, facilitated their gradual convergence.
Shah Abbas I’s design of Isfahan was a pragmatic scheme, which
aimed at a calculated synthesis of the practical and symbolic concept
of garden and city and carried an implicit political dimension. The
theme of garden was an essential exponent of Isfahan’s Safavid
morphology and internal rationale, which in its symbolic and politi
cal expression went beyond the phenotypical appearance.
HISTORICAL PARAMETERS OF THE SAFAVID CITY
Isfahan has been an important urban center since its origins as a
military camp during Sassanian rule. Its enduring geo-strategic
location, its agricultural advantages, and its facile and abundant
supply of water from the Zayendehrud, (meaning the life-giving, the
reviving, as well as the revived), enabled the city to develop into a
leading metropolis. Isfahan’s strategic position at the center of the
commercial transit routes from China to the Ottoman empire and
Europe, and the Persian Gulf to Russia, as well as the dual base of
both agriculture and commerce, provided the essential pillars for its
survival as urban center. This position determined the recurrence of
a historical cycle of decline and prosperity, its repeated rise and fall
from imperial to provincial capital.
Historically and architecturally Isfahan is most closely identified
with the Safavids, but it had also been the political headquarters of
the Buyids in the 10th and early 11th century, whose tenure, in spite
of volatile political leadership, represented a period of prosperity for
the city. Isfahan remained the center and political capital for most of
Saljuq rule and regained this position five centuries later under the
Safavids. The borders which outlined the domains of the Great
Saljuqs placed Isfahan at the core of their empire’s territories. Saljuq
Isfahan’s commercial and cultural prosperity reached its zenith
during the reign of Malik Shah (1072-1092), when Isfahan also
emerged as a leading center of Sunni theology. It was a period of
internal architectural activity,17 which produced several great royal
gardens including the Bagh-i Falasan, the Bagh-i Bakr, the Bagh-i
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Ahmad Siyah, the Bagh-i Dasht-i Gur (Garden of the Wild Donkey’s
Plain).18 The presence of the Saljuq government was contingent
upon the economic and cultural prosperity of the city and many of
the paradigms of Isfahan as a unique city, its geographical advantages,
its fertility, its beauty, its sophistication, its tradition as a chief center
of learning, culture and trade. Its famous epithet nisf-i jahan, meaning
half the world, date to its position and aspirations as capital under
Saljuq rule.
During Mongol rule Isfahan remained an influential city and
commercial center, but it regained its political pre-eminence only
with the Safavids. In the 17th century, at the height of Safavid
territorial domination, the empire stretched from Mesopotamia,
Gorjestan and Daghestan along the Qaraqum desert to the
Sulaymaniya Mountains in the east. Its territory replicated the geo
political order of the Saljuqs, again placing Isfahan at the center of
the empire’s crossroads. By moving his court and the seat of
government from Qazvin to Isfahan in 1597–98 Shah Abbas I
(1587–1629) re-enforced Isfahan’s geographical advantages and its
commercial importance by making it the political capital of his
empire. The scope of historicaal memory and presence of Saljuq
records at the time of the Safavids has not been sufficiently docu
mented but there is some association with the historical precedence
and the role of Saljuq Isfahan in the 12th century. Iskandar Beg
Munshi cited Kamal al-Din’s eulogy of the Saljuq capital in praise of
the architectural achievements of Abbas the Great in the early 17th
century: “Isfahan is flourishing and the people happy, nobody has a
recollection of an epoch like this.”19
Shah Abbas I himself designed and planned the new city, south
of the old Saljuq center, laying the new bazaar and royal quarter on
the existing urban and suburban landscape.20 There is only vague
information about the landscape of pre-Safavid Isfahan, but earlier
gardens had existed outside the central Saljuq city and the palace
grounds of the Bagh-i Naqsh-i Jahan and a dawlatkhaneh located
there were known since the 15th century.21 Although there re
mained a certain dichotomy between the old and the new city, by
the late 17th century, the Safavid quarter seemed to have coopted
the old city physically as well as economically and politically. The
Safavid city both engulfed the historic Saljuq district and through
the junction of the bazaar and the Maidan-i Shah connected the new
commercial and political center. The rapid growth of the city, the
influx of human resources and money, the architectural expansion,
as well as the introduction of artistic and political culture under
Safavid rule thoroughly transformed the urban landscape. Shah
Abbas’ monumental layout of Isfahan, its architectural countenance
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with his and his successors’ palaces, mosques, bazaars, and extensive
gardens within and without the city determined the physical and
architectural profile by which Isfahan still continues to be identified
at the dawn of the 21st century. Isfahan has acquired the title of
‘Safavid city’ and “anything that was to survive,” as phrased by
Bagher Shirazi, “was covered by Safavid color and forms.”22 As he
points out, the Arabs, Buyids and Saljuqs who successively ruled the
city had done the same, but none of their building and restructuring
of Isfahan was as profound as that of the Safavids.
THE CHAHAR BAGH AND THE SEMIOTICS OF THE
CAPITAL CITY
The physical layout of the post-Saljuq city was devised by Shah
Abbas I with a “preconceived master plan.”23 Iskandar Beg Munshi
reported that Abbas I, in the spring of 1598-97, after spending the
winter in Isfahan, decided to implement the building plans for the
city. He began with the building of the quarter of the Bagh-i Naqsh-i
Jahan. After eighteen years the architects, engineers, builders, artist
and craftsmen had completed the “sublime” buildings and gardens
of the Naqsh-i Jahan, which were part of the shah’s very own plan.24
A closer examination of Abbas the Great’s ground plan of
Isfahan south of the old Saljuq center reveals a transposition of the
intersecting pattern of the walled Persian garden, with its clear
quadripartite formation, the orthogonally intersecting water canals
and an octagonal pool at the center of the channels’ intersection.25
Outlining the orientation of the royal city, the Zayendehrud created
natural east west axis, crossed by the Chahar Bagh Avenue, which
was divided by the shah jub, the main canal in its center and
stretched from north to south. The direction of the Chahar Bagh
Avenue with the center and sideway jubs, or water channels, was in
this way used for the conscious re-construction of the quadripartite
Persian chahar bagh on the scale of a city. It crossed the
Zayendehrud over the Allahverdi Khan Bridge,26 reaching from the
Darb-i Dawlat, the gate of the royal precinct of the Bagh-i Naqsh-i
Jahan, to the south side of the Zayendehrud as far as the garden of
Abbasabad on the foot of the mountains, south of the city.27 Albert
de Mendelslo, who with Olearius was in Isfahan in 1637 under
auspices of the Duke of Holstein’s mission, described the
“Tsarbagh” as the “King’s Garden,” which was divided by the
Zayendehrud “so that it seems to make four Gardens of it.”28
Engelbert Kaempfer (1651-1716), who lived in Isfahan during the
rule of Shah Suleyman for nearly two years also referred to this
motive. “The royal avenue Chahar Bagh, i.e. four gardens,” he ex
plained, “derived its name from the fact that in conjunction with the
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transverse intersecting river it partitioned the terrain into four gar
den areas. It begins behind the royal residence and stretches south
west in a straight and projecting line to the front side mansion and
burgeoning Residence Hizar Jarib.”29 The layout of Isfahan itself
embodied, hence, a garden with its implicit symbolism of the four
realms of the universe, the metaphorical space of the king’s domain.
The Khiaban-i Chahar Bagh was one of the most acclaimed urban
structures of the time. It was understood as the central axis through
which the palatial city garden was articulated.30 In his contemporary
account Munshi particularly extolled the uniqueness of the Chahar
Bagh Avenue. Kaempfer, too, emphasized the Chahar Bagh as the
pivot of the city’s layout. Like Herbert, who found the Chahar Bagh
“remarkable in that abundance of green, broad, spreading, Chenor
trees, yielding shade, and incomparable order and beauty,”
Kaempfer was impressed by the extraordinary size and height of the
plane trees, which by the time he lived in Isfahan were about sixty
years old, their luxuriant branches casting shade over the street, by
forming a green portico or Taq sabz over the Avenue.31
In a brief paper about urban modernization and expansion,
Baqher Shirazi emphasized the historic geographic premises of the
Safavid construction of Isfahan. “For the first time in its history,” he
noted, “Isfahan received two quite distinct orthogonal axes of ex
pansion: the natural east-west axis (the river Zayendehrud) was
augmented by the artificial north-south axis (Chahar Bagh).” The
existing old commercial center of Isfahan circumscribed the expan
sion of the new urban midpoint. To secure access to the first draw of
irrigation water, the dawlatkhaneh, had to be situated south, closer
to the banks of the river, and further west, toward the upstream
direction of the Zayendehrud. While the growth and expansion of
the Safavid city shifted the center away from the existing commercial
town, causing the decline and decay of some of the old quarters, it
overgrew and converged with the pre-Safavid city. Shirazi argued
that the “main organic linear center,” of the city persisted and the
axes of the Zayendehrud and the Chahar Bagh Avenue remained
chiefly the axes of the royal quarter: “nevertheless, they determined
the total extension of the city in the centuries to come. The artificial
north-south axis passed over the river on one of the most noble city
elements,” the Allahverdi Khan bridge.32 The physical development
of the city took place within the topographic delineation of Abbas
the Great’s city plan. “The implementation of the plan whose northsouth extension was about six kilometers in length,” recounted
Shirazi, “imposed its geometric order on the immediately bordering
new quarters, like Abbasabad and Julfa, while the expansion of other
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quarters followed the organic growth of the old town and only
picked up the direction of the plan.”33
Safavid gardens are considered the pinnacle of Persian garden
culture, but are distinctly influenced by the tradition of their histori
cal antecedents. The form and function of Timurid gardens, which
were used for military encampments and as sites for political and
social activities, clearly recur in Safavid gardens.34 Shah Abbas was
born in Herat in 1571 where he lived until succeeding to the throne.
The ground plan of Herat, whose urban profile had been extensively
shaped during Timurid suzerainty, was divided into a very distinct
quadripartite pattern. The Deccan city Hyderabad, which was
planned in 1589 by Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah ten years before
Abbas I’s move to Isfahan, was based on an axial quadripartite pat
tern and founded on the garden suburb of Golkonda.35 Shah Abbas
I may not have seen Hyderabad, but he was definitely familiar with
the idiom of the design of Herat. Terry Allan has argued that the
“axial arrangement of the pavilions and gardens” west of the
Maidan-i Shah was “derived directly from the organization of
Timurid gardens.” It was in the new city of Shah Abbas’ Isfahan and
the gardens of Babur’s Kabul “that the memory of Timurid Herat
lived on most vividly.”36
There has been a conspicuous correlation between the construc
tion of grand gardens and territorial expansion; Timur began to
build the gardens at Samarkand as he increased his territorial con
trol. The Mughal shah Akbar (1556-1605) constructed large gardens
at the height of his rule, and Abbas the Great began to design and
build his capital after ten years of continuous military confronta
tions with the Ottomans.37 The growth of Isfahan as Dar al-Saltaneh
(Abode of Royal Government or Kingship) of Abbas I went hand in
hand with vital internal military reforms, leading to the lasting
subversion of the Turcoman military aristocracy and the expansion
of Safavid frontiers. Between 1596-98 he incorporated the vassal
states of Mazandaran, Lahijan and Rasht and, in 1592, Gilan. In
1598-99, a year after making Isfahan the seat of government, Shah
Abbas reconquered Herat and Mashad from the Uzbeks and ex
panded to Balkh, Marv, and Astarabad. In 1010/1601 he annexed
Bahrain. In 1013/1603-04 he went to war with the Ottomans, in
defiance of the humiliating 1590 peace agreement, and repossessed
Azerbaijan, Nakhchievan, Erivan, with a major victory over the
Ottoman troops in Tabriz. Further campaigns in 1607-08 restored
Shirvan and Gorjestan under Iranian control. The territorial expan
sion and consolidation took place concomitantly to the increasing
centralization of the political administration which made Isfahan the
symbol of the rise of Safavid Iran.38
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Shah Abbas’ decision to transfer his seat of government to the
former Saljuq capital and re-develop the city was based on strategic,
economic, and political considerations, as well as his personal liking
of the city’s climate; beyond this, it was an implicit reflection of his
expansionist territorial goals and desire to create a specifically
Safavid capital.39 The relation between territoriality and royal gar
dens has been discussed in the context of Timurid and early Mughal
gardens, which functioned as basis for conquest, the contention for
a consolidated empire, places of exercise of power, and military and
cultural domination.40
The reconstruction of Isfahan according to Abbas I’s plan shows
comparable intentions. The consolidation of his territorial ambi
tions, his growing political and military hegemony, the centraliza
tion of the empire’s administration, and the avowal of the Safavid
doctrine of kingship as the Shadow of God on Earth, Zill al-allah fi
al-arz, were epitomized in his plans of the city of Isfahan. The fact
that the bridge, which connects the lower with the upper Chahar
Bagh Avenue, was built by and carries the name of Allahverdi Khan,
the sepahsalar, (commander in chief), contains a clear reference to
the territorial and hegemonic connotation of the city’s design.
As has been pointed out by the many architectural studies, the
Maidan-i Shah created and represented the spatial and physical
nexus of the bazaar, the religious establishment and the govern
ment.41 Most travelers have drawn attention to its commercial
function, describing the many tents of fruit and vegetable sellers.
Kaempfer recounted that in the 1680s the spaces of the lower floors
around the four sides of the square’s gallery were occupied by crafts
men and traders, while the upper floors were divided into small
rooms for lodging which were also rented to foreigners, visitors and
occasionally prostitutes.42 Reports by later travellers about soldiers
being housed on the rooms of the upper gallery alongside the
square, and the para-military polo games, chawqan, played and
practiced on the Maidan at the time of Abbas I, seem to indicate that
in addition to its commercial and public use it also had a military
function.43 Its titles Maidan-i Naqsh-i Jahan or Jahan Nameh, in
sinuate an expansionist perspective which confirms the semiotics of
power and conquest behind the architectural structure of the city.
It has been argued that Abbas I was essentially an “itinerant”
ruler and the concept of capital city as “permanent center for gov
ernment and administration did not apply to this phase of the
Safavid state.”44 The success of his military and political objectives
could not have been predicted in 1006/1597-98. Nonetheless he
seemed clearly intent on creating Isfahan as his political headquar
ters and royal capital of a consolidated Safavid empire. The city and
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the political administration grew despite the shah’s repeated ab
sences from the city on military campaigns. The grand scale of
Isfahan’s plan, his restorations of the existing bazaar and pragmatic
efforts to invigorate the commercial life as well as the permanent
establishment of the royal administration, all belay his intention of
laying the groundwork for a capital city on a long term basis. Sir
Thomas Herbert who witnessed its shape after the development of
almost thirty years, compared its rise as capital and symbol of
Safavid hegemony with the imperial supremacy of ancient royal
palace cities like Babylon, Tauris, Persepolis and Nineveh. In a bulky
eulogy he deliberated the city’s idiom of power.
“[...] Now royall Abas rules, Spahawn must rise.
(Where Kings affect, there most men cast their eyes,
There flock the people:) ‘tis his power not thine
Which hath eclipst their light, to make thee shine.
Then use thy fortune so, that none from thence
May with thy fall, or grudge they eminence.”45
The Chahar Bagh Avenue, which formed the central axis of
Abbas I’s city plan, was lined with thirty gardens along its sides. It
posed as the urban representation of the Safavid states’ administra
tive and military backbone. “The vast expanse of territory which is
divided into four areas by the intersection of the street and the
river,” explained Kaempfer, “is partitioned by walls into thirty gar
dens.” “Shah Abbas the Great [...] has not only personally chosen
the position of the palace complex and demarcated the extension of
the city,” explained Kaempfer, “but furthermore, was also supposed
to have determined the size and the design of the described gardens,
attuned to the surrounding terrain.”46 He was awestruck by the
beauty of the small domiciles, surrounded by wide and unblemished
walkways, trees, flowers, and clear water pools.47 These gardens were
given to the chief officials courts, who also had the first right to
channel water for irrigation into their gardens.48 Under Shah
Sulayman’s rule (1666-1694) they continued along the Khiaban-i
Chahar Bagh after the four royal gardens, including the Bagh-i
Khargah, the Bagh-i Hasht Behesht, the Bagh-i Musaman and the
Bagh-i Takht. The owners of these gardens along the Avenue were
the shah’s chief officials, among them, the Sufidar Bashi (com
mander of the Safavid order), the Qullar Bashi (commander of the
royal guard), Qurchi Bashi (commander of the cavalry), and the ˆ
(quartermaster general).49 Between the four royal gardens and the
river were seven societal lots, including the Takiyyeh-yi Ni’matullah
and the Takiyyeh-yi Haidar.50
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Kaempfer also pointed to a historical continuity of which Abbas
I, if not deliberately imitating it, must have been aware. “With the
planning of the Chahar Bagh,” expounded Kaempfer, “he was said
to have directed the delineation with his own hands, which he
proved himself as real and laudable descendant of the great Cyrus,
who as may be read in Xenophon, took the design of gardens as a
kingly occupation and who not seldomly planted plants and mea
sured the rows of trees also with his own hands.”51 Thus, the city’s
internal rationale as well as its external representation states a direct
link between kingship and the creation of gardens. The practical act
of the shah himself mapping, planning and planting a tract of land is
also expression of the royal control and ownership of territory.52
The Safavid garden and the city of Isfahan as a large example of
such, had definite functional, symbolic, and aesthetic links to the
Safavid state. The van of the royal garden was usually created by a
palace, which was the governing point of the garden’s structure. The
palace and the garden created an organic unit with a gradual pro
gression from the interior of the palace through a transitional
narthex (ivan or talar) which is both part of the palace and the
outdoors, leading into and also connecting the garden to the build
ing. Akin to the classical palatial garden, the urban space devised by
Abbas I through the crossing of the Chahar Bagh Avenue and the
Zayendehrud was presided over by the royal quarter and
dawlatkhaneh, the Bagh-i Naqsh-i Jahan on the northern end, and
overseen by the Bagh-i Hizar Jarib on the southern end. It created the
same relation between the central palace and government quarter and
the city as existed between a palace and its surrounding garden, in
which the palace constitutes the head and the focus of the system.
The architectural iconography of royal gardens, as much as it
provided a space for pleasure and enjoyment, also articulated the
domination over nature, including the control of land and water,
the source of life and prosperity sine qua non. Traditional interpreta
tions understood the use of water in pools and fountains as the
obvious symbol of life. In the context of a more pragmatic rendition
the use and display of water, and in the case of Isfahan the river as
part of the city’s chahar bagh pattern, recognizes the eternal interde
pendence of the organic relationship between the river, the city, and
the surrounding country side and is a statement of the absolute
royal guardianship over life and property.
Shah Abbas I had gradually turned most of the lands in Isfahan
and its surroundings from mamalik (state lands) into khasseh prop
erty (land and estates owned by the crown). Rather than a reflection
of the mere religious-metaphysical relation to nature, Safavid royal
gardens, and Isfahan as a royal garden on the scale of a city, are a
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reflection of the socio-political aspects of the division, control,
organization of land ownership and cultural production.
Isfahanis were always proud of the exceptional fecundity of Isfahan’s
earth, its bounteous river and good climate. The surviving notion of
Isfahan being a place with special benison has its roots in Saljuq times. It
was believed that Isfahan was at the center of the “fourth clime”, which
in the system of Ptolemaic cosmology was considered the best of the
earth’s seven astrological belts, each of which was presided over by a
planet.53 The location of Isfahan in this world system has been used to
explain its outstanding fertility, and has played an important role in the
justification of its eminence as a city and the attribution of its paradisia
cal qualities. The city’s epithet nisf-i jahan (half the world) as well as the
name Bagh-i Naqsh-i Jahan (Garden of the World’s Picture) of the
palace complex, offers the notion of Isfahan at the center of the empire,
and the world in imperial and religious terms. This suggests that Shah
Abbas positioned his capital in a deliberate competitive self-definition
with the world. The semiotics of the location and architecture implies a
political, cultural as well as religious hegemony. Under Safavid patron
age Isfahan developed into the foremost center of Shi’ite theology and
orthodoxy in the Islamic world. Iskander Beg Munshi notes that Abbas
I built the Masjid-i Shah intending to surpass the Masjid-i Aqsa in
Jerusalem and the Ka’ba in Mecca, which is a clear statement of ambi
tions beyond the local or regional.
The quadripartite delineation of Safavid Isfahan also denoted the
hierarchical order of the cosmos, pointing to the position of the world
and the shah within it. The city was at once the creation and the reflec
tion of the king’s domain. Abbas I’s conception of Isfahan perpetuated
the function of garden as an allegoric and symbolic political order on
multiple levels. It centered in the internal space of palace courtyards and
from there expanded to the level of the walled palace and government
gardens of the Bagh-i Naqsh-i Jahan, to the next level of the city with its
axial center from where it extended to the level of the province, and
after that to the expanse of the empire’s domains. This pattern may be
interpreted as perpetuating further from the territory of the empire,
encompassing the realm of the globe and reaching from there to the
metaphysical world of the universe to the seven spheres of heaven, to
the ‘arsh, the throne or seat of God.54
The palaces and gardens of the later Safavids like the Hasht Behesht,
the Aineh Khaneh, Shah Sultan Hussayn’s garden of Farahabad, were
mainly extensions to this fundamental structure. They reflected greater
ostentation and a panoply of royal self-representation with a stronger
emphasis on pleasure and enjoyment as opposed to the articulation of
political and territorial aspirations, which is discernible in the earlier
gardens, palaces and mosques of Shah Abbas I.
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EPILOGUE: THE POLITICAL CIRCLE OF PARADISE
The figurativeness of Safavid Isfahan conveyed a pervading sense
of a leading city, as cultural, political, religious and imperial center
and the exclusive domain of the shah. The motives of political and
dynastic self-representation in Shah Abbas’ layout of Isfahan and the
iconographic as well as textual references to paradise remain inextri
cably attached to Isfahan. Contemporaries consistently applied the
metaphor of khuld-i barin or khuld-i paikar to the city. Rustam alHukama, chronicler and native of Isfahan, left no doubt that when
Aqa Muhammad Khan Qajar conquered Isfahan at the end of the
18th century it was a city equal to the highest paradise, khold-i barin,
despite the destruction caused by the tribal and civil wars of the 18th
century. Yet, he not only intended to praise Isfahan’s beauty and
express his liking of its open and metropolitan spirit but also to
underscore its political stature and superiority.55
In his research and publications about Mughal gardens, James
Wescoat argues that Mughal gardens expressed a “denotation but
not connotation of Islamic Paradise,” that is, they “achieved the
form, but not the meaning of paradise gardens.”56 This subtle but
crucial distinction applies to Safavid royal gardens as well.
Aesthetically, Safavid gardens, like Mughal gardens, incorporated
clear references to the pictorial imagery of Qur’anic paradise, but
the builders’ semiotic intent had also pragmatic goals with roots in
the profane world, which was largely disinterested in the eschat
ologic implications of a metaphysical paradise in its essentially reli
gious or theological meaning. Further readings of Safavid theo
logical, scientific, and philosophical texts may yield more precise
insights into the contemporary weltbild and the implications of
cosmological models on political legitimacy as well as the relation
ship between paradise and political hierarchy.
Aside from the Bagh-i Hasht Behesht (The Garden of the Eighth
Paradise) the names of the early palatial gardens laid out by Abbas
the Great carry largely political-secular connotations which invoke
size, status, and often their function, like the Bagh-i Abbasabad or
Hizar Jarib (The Thriving Domain of Abbas or Garden of a Thou
sand Acres), Bagh-i Naqsh-i Jahan (Garden of the World’s Picture),
Bagh-i Takht (Garden of the Throne), Bagh-i Khargah (Garden of
the Donkey), and those of simple ownership or cultivated fruit.57
Persian Islamic gardens have developed in a dialectic cycle of
pre-Islamic Persian garden traditions and Islamic and Qur’anic
notions of paradise, which derived their imagery of paradise from
contemporary pre-Islamic and Persian traditions. The forms of PreIslamic Persian gardens have roots in the antecedent garden structures
of Mesopotamian and Egyptian gardens and probably absorbed
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major structural, functional and aesthetic patterns from Assyrian
Gardens of the 8th century BC.58 The Safavids created a Shi’ite state
and orthodoxy, whose theological system provided a direct basis of
political legitimacy. At the same time, there are evident pre-Islamic
Iranian traditions which surface in Safavid notions of divine king
ship, with direct implications for politics and statehood. The
Qur’anic or Islamic paradise as connection between both is not
implausible, as Qur’anic images of paradise have roots in the preIslamic Persian and Mesopotamian traditions of worldly gardens.
The concept of chahar bagh in the Safavid city garden of Isfahan
thus has links to the metaphysical divine order of political power,
which the Safavids deliberately insinuated.
The two interpretations, political-functional and metaphysicalsacred or theological, are not necessarily contradictory. If 16th and
17th century royal Persian gardens are analyzed as representative of
royalty, reflection of kingship and territorial control, the theological
aspect or divine inspiration of Safavid kingship has again a metaphysical
and theological aspect, albiet with political consequences.
The allusions the Qur’an in Safavid gardens were less a reflection
of the theological and eschatological meaning of the Qur’anic para
dise. In the case of Isfahan, the chahar bagh pattern staged a nexus of
pre-Islamic Iranian traditions of divine kingship and Shi’ite con
cepts of legitimacy. Safavid gardens, and Isfahan as a grand royal
garden on the scale of a city, had very strong elements of regal selfrepresentation. It was an expression of royalty, power, and a state
ment of political sovereignty as it was innately linked to the rise and
fall of the Safavid empire. Its symbolism combined worldly political
power with the theological mandate of monarchical authority,
through which the Safavids aimed to balance divine kingship and
Shi’ite legitimacy. This is based in the metaphysical world, where
paradise is the domain or abode of God, the absolute and ultimate
source of might and authority.
The form of the classical Persian garden was a deliberate leitmotif
in Shah Abbas’ location of the capital and the outline of the new
part of the city. The organization of Safavid Isfahan represented a
space of political consolidation, the epitome of centralization, ex
pression of dynastic legitimacy and the primary center of exercise of
power and territorial control. Isfahan was thus the quintessential
royal garden and not only the geographic but also the allegoric
midpoint of the Safavid empire, the Maqarr al-saltaneh, the royal
city and residence of the shah, the highest abode of paradise, the
definitive source and center of power.
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Rethinking the Islamic Garden
Attilio Petruccioli
Islamic Environmental Design Research Centre, Como, Italy
ABSTRACT
A broader inquiry into the relationship among the garden’s form, structure and meaning should aim to address
two crucial issues: (1) the need for common ground in research which will organize the field and foster future scholarly
work and (2) the importance of laying out an analytic method capable of shedding new light on the garden’s formative
process and in informing new urban development. This paper underscores how the garden has always played a crucial
role in any anthropic process. It examines how the structural relationships among its components reflect other forms
of settlement, such as the encampment, the royal palace, the city as an image of the king, and finally, the larger
landscape. It suggests a new direction for further study based on two axioms: that there is a substantial continuity
between different cultures in their appropriation of space, and that there are pertinent methodologies to retrace the
garden’s evolution.

PULLING THREADS
The wonders of Harun al-Rashid’s garden described in A Thousand
and One Nights have never existed. They were fictional hyperbole. But
not everything is poetry and imagination. The renowned description
recalls many gardens in Dar al-Islam from Samarra to Granada, Lahore,
and Isfahan. Rather than depicting a single garden, it portrays an atti
tude toward the environment shared by the entire Islamic world: the
taming and glorification of nature enclosed within four walls, juxta
posed with the hostile wilds of the outside world.
What is left of it? What is the impact of this philosophy in today’s
world? The first question has been answered by a vast scholarly body of
work which can be seen as a collective effort to gather the information
necessary to address the second, and more important issue.
Attention within European culture to the Islamic garden began in
the 17th century, as part of a general discovery of the East. “The taste for
Oriental culture and Islamic imagery, already present during the ro
coco,” writes Paolo Portoghesi, “suddenly erupts in Europe. The new
fascination for the exotic symbolized the emancipation from an aca
demic classicism, the inspiration of which had, by then, almost com
pletely dried up.” The Islamic garden was one of the most seductive
symbols of the new, exotic world—the place where the novel taste for
space and decoration was most freely expressed.
Its influence can be seen in the Moorish decorations of Villa
Torlonia, in Villa Melzi’s casino, in the landscaping of the Stibbert
garden in Florence and, most strikingly, in the Sezincote villa and
in the Royal Pavilion of Brighton, England. By the 19th century, the
infatuation with Islamic culture had become a glamorous fashion: it
was extensively exhibited in World Fairs, chosen as the “official” archi
tectural style of thermal resorts, and eagerly showed off first by the

  



   

bourgeoisie and then by the masses. Its influence continued through
out the 19th and into the beginning of the 20th century, before the
Modern Movement’s disenchantment with it and its final oblivion.
Alas, much of this oriental contagion was born out of pure excite
ment for the new and unknown, based on a few exotic-looking objects
and the enchanting, passionate accounts of travelers upon their return
from the East. As a result, the Islam portrayed in Europe was merely an
enthusiastic reinterpretation of a culture heavily filtered by the mer
chants of the time.
The first pragmatic studies on the Islamic garden didn’t attract
much attention. They came as late as the first quarter of the 20th cen
tury, produced by two researchers to whom much is owed for the diffu
sion in Europe of the history and form of the Islamic garden. C. M.
Villiers-Stuart analyzed all Mughal gardens, although still captured by
their exotic atmosphere and botanical species rather than by their spa
tial and structural layout; her romantic portrayal of ornate details was
more reminiscent of Gertrude Jekyll’s Garden Ornament (1918) and less
of a methodological study. A more substantial contribution was offered
by Die Indische Garten (1923) by the Baroness M. L. Gothein, who had
already authored Geschichte der Gartenkunst (1913). For the first time,
the Indian garden was studied as a structural whole within a specific
context, examining it as a product of Indo-Muslim culture.
Overall, these two works laid the foundation for further Islamic
garden studies. They were all the more precious for witnessing and
reporting information at a time when the Civil Service, with great effi
ciency but mediocre preparation, restored Mughal gardens according to
romantic models rather than according to original features. Also, at that
time the possibility of unlimited substitutions of plants and trees had
drastically complicated any botanical research on the original species.
More than in architecture, where wounds and transformations can’t
mislead an expert eye, the original character of a garden can be erased:
drastic changes often occurred in only one generation’s time, com
pletely altering previous forms and meaning. Scientific studies on veg
etal fossils and seeds, or on the chemical composition of the terrain (like
the ones undertaken in Pompeii) are still far from a reality in the Islamic
world. In the end, the original literature, the iconographic archives and
the survey of ruins have got to carry the day themselves.1
Scholarly interest in the Islamic garden has somehow revived in
recent years, along with the passion for European gardens, and Italian
gardens in particular. In the 1970s, however, the Islamic garden was still
considered to be of marginal importance. Its study still showed a gen
eral lack of method. In The landscape of man (1972), S. Jellicoe dedi
cated a few superficial paragraphs to it; N. T. Newton (Design of the
land, 1971) wrote two brief chapters on the Andalusian garden as part
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of a general historical introduction; F. Fariello’s Architettura dei Giardini
(1967) didn’t reach any further.
A second generation of British scholars (Crowe and Haywood, J.
Lehrman, E. B. Moynihan, D. Wilber, and many others) gets the credit
for finally doing the dog’s job: an unprecedented systematic survey,
catalogue, and database of Islamic gardens existing to date, although
many publications lack graphic evidence and, perhaps consequently, a
careful spatial analysis. We had to wait until 1988 for the renowned
work co-authored by C. Moore, W. J. Mitchell, and W. Turbull, Jr. to
have an interdisciplinary reading of the most famous gardens and their
underlying design ideas—a research approach of great nourishment
and crucial importance.
However, it seems that, apart from scholarly research, we are slip
ping back to 19th-century World Fair trends: today the Islamic garden,
perhaps less than Islamic architecture and decoration, is adopted as an
easy model of an artificial pan-Islamism, centrifuging all forms and
meanings within Dar al-Islam, and scattering them around the world
with modern mass-media nonchalance. On one side, this process is
made easy by the eclectic character of Islamic art, since the laws of Islam
discipline daily life but avoid any strict regulation on art and architecture. Its art almost always joins sophisticated concepts with a vernacular
tradition that, through a blend of craftsmanship’s variations-on-a
theme and popular fantasy, cannot help but be eclectic. On the other
side, Islamic art has never produced a precise code like Classical archi
tecture, nor suddenly shifted taste, style, or fashion. Rather, it has always
preferred to elaborate on its universal but multifaceted grammar, vary
ing it by minimal changes and adjustments over time.
All these elements further complicate research. In approaching a
complex theme such as the Islamic garden, one of the first discoveries is
that the idea of unity within diversity is, in reality, multilayered over
centuries of seemingly unimportant mutations. The Islamic Garden,
then, or gardens of the Islamic world? We can start addressing the
question by outlining the archetypes belonging to three different preIslamic roots: the Arab, the Persian, and the Turkish—three concepts of
nature, and consequently of space.
In Arab geographers’ and travelers’ reports, we note their excite
ment about tame and well-ordered nature, but also their lack of enthu
siasm for the wilds. Locus amoenus coincides with locus ferax. But
pleasure is possible only through contrast: if green gardens stand for
paradise, hell wears the yellow sand of the desert. The concept of space
in a culture evolved from the desert is by necessity based on protecting
living space, thus transforming the enclosure into an archetypal sign of
distinction—not only separation—between the nomadic and the seden
tary, between oasis and desert, irrigated and arid land. There can be no
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dialogue between the two: the enclosure almost becomes a fortress
under constant attack from the desert’s symbolism-thirst, death, and
evil spirits. Sheltered by high walls, the Arab can enjoy the perfumes
and colors of his paradise in solitary sensual pleasure.
The pursuit of order in the Arab garden is taken to the extreme in
Persia. Here a biaxial symmetry—although a third zenithal axis is
always implied—is the means of drawing earth and cosmos together.
Everything is organized according to this principle: the layout of archi
tectural elements, the hierarchical organization of decorative symbols,
even the practice of gardening. Sophisticated and passive, the Persian
garden is a place for contemplation: “Persians don’t walk in gardens as
we do, but look at them from one viewpoint only,” writes the 16th
century traveler and merchant Jean Chardin. Excluding the hectic
commercial city by a well-defined enclosure, the geometrical order
simul- taneously materializes and fosters the dreaming and making
of love.
The Turkish world, settled in the high plains, is inspired by the
wide open space of the prairies: a landscape to explore rather than
contemplate. The garden becomes a resting spot in a never-ending
journey. Its types and techniques, foreign to the nomadic world, had
been imported from nearby Iran. The fundamental difference be
tween the Arabs and the Turks can be exemplified by their opposite
relationship between dwelling and garden—the first based on the
introverted patio-house with the garden in the center, the second based
on the hall between two gardens, open toward them on both sides.
Things were already intricate enough, but history shuffled the
cards even more. The three different cultures influenced each other
in a way apparently impossible to retrace. In the Abassid period, the
Persians extended their domain to the whole Mediterranean, all the
way to Gibraltar. After 1453, the Turks started dominating the same
sea, as still evidenced by the periphery of Algiers and Istanbul, and by
the Dalmatian coast of the Republic of Venice. On the other side,
they met Iranian culture and, at the time of the Timurids, merged the
static and centripetal conception of Iranian space not only with
Turkish wide open spaces, but also with its dynamics and centrifugal
exploration. What can we say when this synthesis met the Indian world,
where the sense of time depended on agricultural seasons, and where
traditional architecture had long been born in symbiosis with nature?
In approaching such a complex problem, it seemed legitimate to
establish general classes in order to group phenomena. But this call for
order led scholars to overgeneralize. Grimal’s subdivision into parkgarden and courtyard-garden, the first deriving from the Persians and
the second from the Romans, is too generic not to be true, but can’t be
applied much further.2 The classification suggested by M. Moynihan in
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tomb-garden, palace-garden, and delight-garden is ambiguous and
incomplete, the first group being the only one featuring specific charac
teristics.3 On the contrary, although limited to a much smaller geo
graphical area, M. Alemi’s method seems more promising: he identified
physical structures behaving according to specific rules under the poetic
names of pairidaeza, khiaban-i cahar bagh, bagh-i takht, etc.
Along the lines of this last example, it seems valid to pursue a line of
research capable of shedding new light on the evolution and structural
organization of Islamic gardens. This study might start from a general
inquiry into its perpetual, tangible traces: the mutual, never-ending
relationship between garden and urban form.
GARDEN IN CITY FORM
The Islamic garden has always been an area of research essen
tially pursued by art historians. The obvious consequence is that it
has been considered a specific, self-contained entity removed from
its context—its surroundings, the city, and the environment. Along
the same lines, reading the spatial qualities and structural layout of
the garden, as well as the design ideas underlying it, cannot focus on
the garden solely as an object, but ought to reach out beyond its
boundaries to seek a larger set of relationships, a richer palimpsest
where agriculture, garden, encampment, city, and territory recur
sively and mutually influence one another.
A 1984 conference in Genzano, Rome, entitled “The Garden as
City, the City as Garden,” started looking at the topic from that
viewpoint. Among many examples from other cultures, the impact
of orchards’ patterns on urban morphology, or the influence of the
garden on medieval city-building—considered an ideal urban labo
ratory for building with minimal means and methods—suggested
how an interdisciplinary approach could widen the perspective of
previous studies.
The structural relationship between the garden and its context
should be analyzed from all possible viewpoints, both physical (at all
scales, from the environment to the city) and metaphorical or alle
gorical (the relationship between the garden and the city as an image
of the king).
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A famous article by Begley on the Taj-Mahal 4 demonstrates how
emblems of power were an everyday Mughal obsession, and shows
that the equation between architectural forms and celestial prototypes
(always viewed in terms of the celebration of the deified image of the
king) was the real spur to any architectural enterprise. What could not
be stated by the orthodox Muslim, vicar of Allah, was left to the meta
phor of stone. Playing continually on the ambiguity between Divine
Throne and royal throne (an unbridled vanity) transformed tombs
and monuments into symbols of glory and called for the laying out of
gardens, replicas of the Qur’anic paradise, to exalt the figure of the
holy demiurge.
The royal city is based on three recurrent key themes: first, gardens
and palaces, merged together as places of heterodox pleasure; second,
the importance of the court ceremonial; and third, the vast and com
plex system of gardens and palaces, sometimes taking the form of a
labyrinth as if to express the idea of the king’s divine and quasimagical isolation.
The world of the garden persists both in the royal palace and in
the city. It endures through the structural relationship between garden
and encampment, and by the bottom-up procession from the monu
mental entrance located at the lower level to the enclosure of the royal
palace at the very top (as in the darbar of Agra). In the city, it persists
in the pre-existent pattern of fields and orchards, as well as by the ever
sought-after relationship between the garden and the city as an image
of the king. The latter is best exemplified by the plan of the city of
Hyderabad in the Deccan, founded by Sultan Quli Qutb Shah in 1591
on the banks of the river Musi with a cross-shaped plan designed by a
Persian architect: as a response to an ideological program which pre
scribed the creation of a replica of the Paradise of the Qur’an, the
archetypal form of the Persian garden (a vegetal metaphor for heaven)
appeared as the most adequate solution.
In fact, besides the function of retreat from reality and protection
from wild nature, the Islamic garden has generally aimed to represent,
in more or less explicit form, the religious paradise. To complicate the
play on imagery and metaphor, it also offers an allegorical sequence
for the exaltation of royal power. Despite the difference between
western and eastern Islam, the theme was always the same: in Spain
and in Maghreb, the Sultan, vicar of God, exploited the association
between the garden-of-paradise and garden-of-the-king as the aulic
representation of their authority. In the east, in the Hellenistic tradi
tion, conferring divine nature on the emperor transforms the garden
into a royal hall for the theophany of the king. In both cases, the
garden is the favorite symbol for the omnipotence of the king.

 

Despite regional differences, Islamic
anthropic processes behave according
to the same rules underlying governing
the culture: on one side, religious
imagery and hierarchy; on the other
side, the necessity (and vanity) of
expressing the power of the dominator.
4

See W. Begley, The myth of the Taj-Mahal
and a new theory of its symbolic meaning,
in Art Bulletin, March 1979, pp. 7–37.


But it is in Kashmir that the relationship between garden and city
as image of the king is not only confirmed, but extended to the scale
of the territory. Around Srinagar, Jahangir and his son Shahjahan
started transforming the environment in order to mark their territory.
It is significant how small the architectural intervention was com
pared to the great production of gardens which spawned, according to
the sources, no fewer than seven hundred throughout the valley. The
“royal enclosure” of Kashmir, then, becomes a systematic grand
oeuvre of redesign of the landscape–an organic attempt to glorify the
sacred image of the king. “The garden is the place of illusions where
the king is venerated and where all proofs (though completely imagi
nary) of his infinite power have accumulated.”5 In these gardens,
existent water sources are channeled and converge to pass under the
throne where the king sits as the “distillate of the emanation of the
Divine Being; a ray of sunshine illuminating the Universe; the subject
of the book of perfection; the repository of all virtues.”6
In Shalimar Bagh, for instance, the first terrace after the entrance
built by Jahangir in 1619, dominated by a telar (a pavilion sheltering
the throne), was the place reserved for the darbar (the public audi
ence, the representation of the divine origin of the king) where the
characteristic theatrical attitude of the Mughals prescribed a precise
role for all. “When the king sits on the throne, all those present shall
prostrate themselves and then remain standing in the place assigned
on the basis of their rank, their arms crossed, receiving the light from
the Divine Countenance... The firstborn prince shall be at a distance
of one to four gaz from the throne... the second-born... sits a distance
of three to twelve.”7 The diwan was decorated for the occasion, and
illuminated for the king’s solar and lunar birthdays, during various
religious festivals, as well as to celebrate military victories.
On these occasions, the scenic venue was extended beyond the
garden to embrace the entire lake. The second and third terraces are
two typical caharbagh, completed by Shahjahan after 1630. The first is
the private garden: again, according to a Kashmiri ritual, the king sits
in the center of a square pool of water marked at its corners by four
monumental plane trees. The second is the caharbagh of the zahane,
featuring the magnificent Black Pavilion. A torrent, diverted into the
garden, is a broad channel measuring six meters across, majestically
flowing among plane trees and chenar (Platanus Orientalis). The
enclosures of the terraces of Shalimar represent the correct layout for
the performance of daily court life, based on a rigorous ritual yet
extremely flexible in the use of space. It represents a model subjected
to infinite variations and reinterpretations according to the same
underlying principle.
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GARDEN AND ENCAMPMENT
Garden and landscape interrelate through the intermediary form of
the encampment. In this way they establish a fundamental relationship
bound to affect, either consciously or unconsciously, the other acts of
appropriation and settlement in the same territory.
The link between garden and encampment derives from the ex
traordinary mobility of the court, dictated by the need to strengthen the
royal image throughout the country, control the political behavior of
the population, and discourage possible sources of rebellion. But there
were many other occasions for moving the court in grand style, from
military campaigns to hunting parties and pilgrimages, as well as sea
sonal movements toward milder climates.
It is clear that the organization of the royal camp, required the highest
level of administrative and logistic ability. The easiest and fastest way to
settle in was to refer directly to established ways to lay out, organize, and
subdivide areas. The natural way to do it was to rely on archetypal forms
of appropriation of the environment in a way that were simultaneously
capable of taming nature and expressing the hierarchy of the court.
Within this set of parameters, the archetype per excellentia was the gar
den, because traditionally it addressed both issues. In fact in Mughal
culture, according to the Timurid tradition, the garden combined the
functions of contemplation and state ritual. It was also a place for feasts
and receptions, fitting for celebrating the apotheosis of the King of Kings.
The description of a camp given by Abu’1 Fazl demonstrates the
existence of a close functional relationship between the layout of the
camp (derived from the garden) and that of the royal palace, in a blend
of nomadic and sedentary culture. The world of the tent persists, how
ever, in the forms of masonry architecture, the juxtaposition of courts
and buildings, the pavilions, skylines, the mouldings and other decora
tive details, to the extent of justifying for the opulent palaces of the
Mughals the description of “a camp in stone.”8
How does the archetype of the garden evolve into palaces and new
cities? And how can we retrace the process? Shalimar Bagh, for example,
on the east coast of lake Dal, is a garden to discover step by step, one
enclosure after the other. It is a royal garden. Typologically it refers to a
scheme that, almost without exception, aligns in sequence the public
ambits (diwan-i ‘am), the semi-public ones reserved to the king and his
court intimates (diwan-i khass), and the private ones (harem). This
scheme is repeated in all palaces, and has a clear origin in the model of
the Timurid encampment not only in its spatial layout, but also in its
architecture and in the nomenclature directly taken from the tents. Even
more strikingly, metaphor and reality often exchanged roles: in the long
summer seasons, the garden’s lawns became the ideal campground for
the royal tents, decorated with red drapery, the symbol of the crown.
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GARDEN AND URBAN DESIGN
The idea of the Oriental city as a puzzle of cramped houses
around a maze of narrow streets and cul-de-sacs, surrounded by an
indecent periphery oppressed by deafening traffic, is a misleading
one. Before the transformation brought about by a fairly recent
immigration process, Islamic cities had always been portrayed as a
unique blend of nature and human settlement. Low building density
was maintained in order to preserve a strong relationship with
greenery. Vegetation prevailed. Even in the humblest house, the
courtyard left room for a tree. Wide green spaces functioning as
food reserves, orchards, and flower gardens formed a green belt
between the city center and the walls. With the usual prosaic empha
sis, European travelers described fabulous green oases for cities:
Pietro della Valle saw Istanbul and Teheran as garden cities—the first
dominated by cypresses, the other by plane trees; the Spanish ambas
sador Clavijo portrayed Samarkand as “... such an abundance of
gardens and vineyards that when a traveler comes within sight thereof,
all he sees is a great mass of greenery with the city in the center.”9
Of course, emphasizing the symbiotic relationship between
gardens and buildings in the urban fabric is almost trite. However,
far from being either urban decoration or functional green lung, the
garden has always played a generative role in city form. It seems of
crucial importance to bring up the structural relationship between
the two, where “structure” is viewed as an organic relationship of
elements behaving according to a set of rules.
Ever since the last century, instead of interpreting tortuous lanes
and cul de sacs as an impenetrable blend of the exotic, the unhealthy,
and the horrid, a few scholars perceived the Islamic city in a totally
different light, namely, as an extremely rational construction. In
1898, Shetalov remarked that the roads of Yazd, Iran, were traced
according to a precise orthogonal scheme. The cities of Sabzavar,
Kerman, Ardekan and, more confusedly, Tabas, were following the
same principle. Along the same lines, Bonine noted how the urban
grid of Mehrir (not far from Yazd) continued straight out of town
toward the hills to the southeast. Although street networks were
later interrupted by cul de sacs, the urban grid derived directly from
the agricultural fabric, whose orthogonal pattern was generated by
the cheapest and simplest irrigation technique: water was channeled
at the base of the hills, then diverted to the arable area thus generat
ing long rectangular lots (kort).10
Thus we can deduce that the morphology of Persian towns is
linked to the development of a settlement (the original urban
nucleus) within an irrigated agricultural system. In fact, we can note
how the roads issuing from the urban gates of Yazd continued the
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urban alignments and trajectories without any deviation induced by
the need to link nearby towns or landmarks. The extramural fabric
of fields, orchards and gardens, then, becomes an integral part of the
city: it constitutes its original parcel. The relationship is taken to the
extreme (and the axiom is best evidenced) in the urban huertas of
Spain, and in the kitchen-gardens of suburban Maghreb.11 The list of
examples could be much longer, one for all the widespread urban
plans conceived according to existent irrigation channels, or those
cities whose survival literally depends on the constant flow of under
ground canals, as in the foggara of Gourara. 12
In the so-called “Classical Islamic” period, before the devastating
invasion of the Ilkhanids, the royal city developed through a serial
repetition of large monumental complexes laid out according to the
above-mentioned regular grid of agricultural origin: at the begin
ning, palaces were punctual elements within an endless sequence of
square and rectangular gardens. We can distinguish three main
variants: 1) gardens straddling a central thoroughfare, often con
tinuing or slightly deviating from the axis of symmetry of the resi
dential areas (i.e., the Balkuwara Palace in Samarra); 2) more
seldom, gardens aligned in sequence (Ghaznavide of Lashkari
Bazaar); and 3) an uninterrupted collage of gardens, adjoining lin
early or perpendicularly according to simple symmetries (i.e., in the
Alhambra, the Courts of the Myrtle and of the Lions, and the
Garden of Linfaraja and of the Partal).
Even after the Ilkhanid invasion of 1256, marking the end of the
unity of Islam, the reappropriation of the territory in the image of
the new emperor didn’t destroy former fabrics, but reinterpreted the
existent structural palimpsest of gardens and cities. The Persian
caharbagh archetype-a square with four sides, four quadrants, four
canals and four axes of symmetry-responded adequately to the
renewed demand for centrality as symbol of power. Later on, the
Tamerlane dynasty took up the same principle: the layout of the
capital Herat is a square recalling a gigantic qual’e (fortified farm),
with four gates giving access to four straight roads splitting the city
in four sectors. Herat may be considered the culmination of experi
mentation with city form (further exemplified by Merw, Termez
and Shahr-i Sabz,13 and the reference for all following urban devel
opments in the Deccan of India, ending with the layout of
Shahjahanabad (Old Delhi) in 1638.14
But one of the most enlightening processes can be observed in
the urban design of the Mughals after the invasion of Northern
India (1526). The garden and the camp were the only forms avail
able to the Mughals when they started redesigning Indian cities in
the semblance of the new royal image. Refusing to adapt to the
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existing fabric and the torrid Indian climate, they created exclusive
settlements for themselves. Instinctively, design layouts were drawn
from the garden. Neglecting the Indo-Muslim city of Agra on the
right bank of the river, Babur decided to settle on the opposite side,
building a regular pattern of gardens in the manner of those of
Lahore and Dholpur, stretching for more than a kilometer, in which
the idea of “monumentality” and “representation” of the new order
was entrusted to the high, continuous stone plinth along the river.
This pattern ended up establishing a framework for future urban
development: Babur’s successors strengthened the previous Mughal
fabric by building the Red Fort and the Taj-Mahal, and further
pursued the design of gardens along both banks of the Yamuna,15
among which the outstanding example is the tomb-garden of
I’tirnad-al Dawla. Furthermore, starting from the second half of the
16th century, the Mughal “gardens of delights” progressively turned
to marble and sandstone palaces, rigorously retaining the order,
rhythm and ratios of pre-existent gardens, the typical forms of the
original pavilions, the hierarchical arrangement of the enclosures
(baradari) and, despite the decrease of greenery, all the garden fur
nishings—fountains, pools, canals, and chadar.
GARDEN AND TERRITORY
To approach the relationship between garden and territory in the
Islamic world, we may once more consider the Mughal gardens of
Kashmir. They allow us to draw a more precise set of inferences,
because the geographic isolation of Kashmir favored the mainte
nance of the same cultural archetypes over a long period of time.
Thus, the Kashmiri garden represents a relatively uncorrupted typo
logical process, one that allows us to draw similar deductions in
more complex cultures.
“Kashmir is the garden of eternal spring, a safe (haven) for the
palace of the King,”16 wrote Jahangir about his trip to Srinagar. But
what does that really mean? What can we infer from this apparently
simple statement? First of all, reading between the lines, we can note
how a one-line epithet blends together different, seemingly incom
patible scales, and how their metaphors depict a set of peculiar
spatial relationships: the 170 x 60 km valley of Kashmir becomes a
single “garden,” one of eternal flourishing beauty; then, it suddenly
becomes one with the strong, opposite imagery of the safe haven,
merging a vast valley and the architecture of a royal palace into a
whole-a seemingly all-inclusive organic system. Analyzing the to
pography and spatial layout of its anthropic elements, we can note
how Kashmir was to Hindu eyes a ksetra—a complex hierarchical
system of holy places linked by pilgrimage circuits (yatra).17 The
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whole Indian subcontinent is structured according to a hierarchy of
similar landmarks, within which ritual movement generates a hier
archy of pilgrimages to specific places. India is covered by a meshed
pattern of these revered sites and the roads necessary to reach them,
a pattern further subdivided into secondary systems according to a
precise religious hierarchy. Everything, from the larger scale (the
four corners of the continent) to the smaller subsystem (the single
city) is structurally configured according to ritual movement and
symmetrical references. Within such a system, the smaller unit
always reflects the principle of the larger scale as an all-inclusive
religious and cultural unity.
Returning to our example, the smaller unit—the city of
Srinagar—is situated in such a way that the surrounding topography
simultaneously suggests and strengthens the holiness of the place.
Thus it is a matter of individuating the “sacred area” around
Srinagar—those significant points that define its lines.18 The ideal
line connecting temples, linga, villages, orchards, vineyards, water
sources, sanctuaries, gardens and tombs, defines the lines of this
sacred space. Surprisingly, this line does not coincide with the ridges
of the mountains overlooking the Fhelum valley, but marks the edge
of the cultivated land, separating the artificial world of orchards,
vineyards, floating gardens, and canals from swamps and forests.
Mountains, then, are not the ideal walls of the king’s haven! After
all, it is not a coincidence that, in Brahman art, the ksetra is always
represented as an enclosed garden.
The lines mainly contain an aquatic world. “The Gods approach
the places which contain water and gardens,” says the Bhavisya
Purana (I.CXXX, 10).” The Gods reside close to the forests, rivers
and mountains, streams and in the cities which are full of gardens”
(I.CXXX, 15). In the 7th century Kadambari of Banabhatt, we find a
description of a garden-palace featuring various devices for the
collection and transportation of water, and pools for bathing. In the
Rajatarangini, Kalhana mentions a garden founded by the king
Jaysingh in 1150 in Kashmir (VII, 3360). Although we can’t prove
the existence in pre-Islamic times of formal gardens based on water
sources instead of simple forests and lawns, everything seems to
confirm it. We can imagine a continuous sequence of different
gardens blending with the pattern of agricultural fields and or
chards, sometimes floating on the lake to ultimately express a per
fect synthesis of water and agriculture. Gardens, then, embody and
foster that synthesis at the same time. They can be taken as the crys
tallization of the structural organization of that particular culture.
Extending our overview beyond Kashmir, the gardens of Persia,
Central Asia, and India—supported by a philological reading of
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their miniature representations—suggest a general process based on
a progressive metamorphosis of water from a dynamic to a static
state and, similarly, from open to enclosed form in the relationship
of garden to environment. The formative process of the typical
garden shows the prevalence of a hierarchy based on the longitudi
nal axis, marked by a waterline, which evolved from a marginal
position (such as in Bagh-i Fin of Kashan) to an increasingly promi
nent location (as in the Babur garden in Kabul, where a line of water
runs through fourteen terraces). As in the scenes portrayed in min
iature paintings, in reality the original short perspective of the
caharbagh is progressively extended, until it reaches outside the
enclosure to include part of the surrounding landscape.19
Thus, the changing nature of the garden progressively marked a
crossover from an idea of nature closed within the abstract scheme of
the caharbagh to an organic representation of the relation between the
garden and the landscape itself. Babur, founder of the Mughal dynasty,
aimed to provide the territory with equidistant points of sojourn and
recreation at Dholpur, Agra, Fathpur Sikri and even Sheikhupura, close
to the site of the Panipat battle: the system was constructed through
environmental-scale gardens connected by a welter of roads and hy
draulic infrastructures which his successors ceaselessly strengthened and
added to. The final aim was always the same: to gaze on the impossible
model of a single great garden as large as the whole Empire.20
Symmetry, simplicity, metaphor: a simple canvas of design elements
blending landscape and formal gardens pervades the entire modeling of
the environment in the encampment, the palace, and the city. We have
already discussed how palaces, having been turned into the administra
tive centers of a bureaucratic empire, were conceived in their layout as
gardens through the intermediary stage of the royal encampment. These
palaces further built up the structural grid, growing out of all propor
tion so as to house services, ministries, and the increasingly more com
plex activities of representation. But it is only in the valley of Kashmir,
again, that the Mughal dynasty reached the goal of integrating the
design of the garden into a larger territorial structure.
To conclude, Mughal geometric order ascends in a territorial
grid capable of reaching beyond the regional scale. Similarly, the
concept of the oasis of the Arab world projects the idea of enclo
sure to the scale of the whole territory. The Indian subcontinent
has always been an incomplete system of hydraulic infrastructure
and street networks, as well as services and gardens for the stop
overs in the king’s journeys, where each garden was itself a smallscale territory furrowed by canals and tree-lined paths—a constant
set of relationships that has shaped the territory of today.
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TOWARD INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH
The relationships among garden, encampment, palace, and finally
city and territory as the image of the king, open up new insights into the
study, still in its infancy, of Islamic town planning. The outline above
argues that, throughout Islam, a crucial aspect of the Islamic garden is
the complex set of relationships it establishes at various scales, and how
it serves as the basis for all human developments. The garden-territory
nexus, then, may be seen not only as an aesthetic but, on the contrary,
as a complex anthropic reality.
The numerous studies done by geographers, among them the fun
damental work of Xavier de Planhol on anthropized landscapes, of
Lambton on agriculture in Iran, of Sauvaigo on Mediterranean agricul
ture, and of Bisson on the oases as production areas, have always
skimmed the theme of the garden. In an essay of at least fifteen years
ago—Dar al Islam, Architetture nel Territorio dei Paesi Islamici—
I tried in my turn to link Islamic settlements with the extraordinary
infrastructures realized by those cultures for irrigation and agriculture. I
also aimed to demonstrate how those functional works had much in
common with the garden, aesthetics aside. In that same book, the envi
ronment is deliberately left aside (or seldom brought up) in order to
focus on a narrower set of relationships. As the former arguments tried
to evidence, it deserves a much more ample space. The field remains
open for efficient ways to tackle the subject.
In approaching such a complex problem, it seems legitimate to
establish certain categories in which to group single phenomena in
homogenous classes, to define a chronological order, to examine their
variants and how they affected the original categories. Furthermore,
synchronic variants will class the differences introduced by the single
designer within the general category. The analysis of these variants and
their evolution will be referred to herein as the “typological process” whose
aim is to retrace the crucial links between the garden and other forms of
anthropic appropriation of the environment.
The multi-layered world of Islam seems to allow this approach only
by cultural region. On the other hand, typological process may be an
effcient way to undertake a study of the complex influences absorbed by
Islamic cultures. For example, consider the city of Samarra, Iraq, capital
of the Abassid empire from 836 until 892. A boundless city of enormous
linear extension (a 35-km strip along the Tigris)21 for the exclusive use
of the Caliph, Samarra is a juxtaposition of Palatine cities according to
typological schemes of various cultural matrixes, such as the Roman,
Hellenistic, Byzantine, Sasanian, and Umayyad, dilated to the territorial
scale. Typological analysis may show how this extraordinary case is far
from being unique, and provide the methodological tools for retracing
its apparently impenetrable evolution based on what exists today.
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We can lay out a typological approach keeping in mind three funda
mental issues: the meaning of type, the search for unity within the
complexity of Islam, and finally the garden as the aesthetic distillate of
agriculture.
We can define “type” as the ensemble of characteristics and tecton
ics that are common to a set of buildings, cities, and gardens in a precise
geographical area and a precise period of time. But type, according to
Saverio Muratori, is also a generative action a priori: it already exists in
the subconscious of the designer, and it is an integral part of collective
imagery, thus anticipating the act of building. In the entire Islamic
world there is an archetypal form that has become almost synonymous
with the Islamic garden, namely, the Chahar bagh, a system composed
of two perpendicular axes intersecting and defining four equal quad
rants sometimes featuring a monumental landmark (see Walcher, this
volume, for a discussion of Chahar bagh as manifested in the Safavid
capital of Isfahan). It is not important to argue about the origin of the
form so much as to underline its universality, and start engaging in
research on the process of its evolution.
Typological research could start from regional cultures and expand
its overview to the whole Islamic world, as a consequence of the overlap
between sacred topography in Hindu and Muslim cultures. In fact, we
can argue that the appropriation of territory by the Islamic dynasties
from Shams al-Din to Akbar occurred through a ritual refoundation
based on the simple resacralization of venerated places and water
sources. Thus, in spite of cultural and religious differences, there is a
substantial continuity between Hindu and Muslim dynasties, as proved
in the territorial management of the valley of Kashmir. Continuity, in
any case, is confirmed by the toponymy, conserving an unmistakably
Sanskrit origin.22
The garden is often regarded as a manifestation of refined beauty
and intricate symbolism—essentially as an object. In reality, it is but the
aesthetic distillate of an agricultural civilization, always playing a deci
sive role in any anthropic process. Of the three axioms, this last one,
because of the continuity of its evolution in all cultures, may be the
starting point for future interdisciplinary research.

22
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Section IV: Marine Environments
Middle Eastern Marine Environments: An Overview of Anthropogenic Impacts
Menakhem Ben-Yami
Fisheries Development and Management Adviser
ABSTRACT
The seas that surround the lands of the Middle East have been significantly affected over the last century by human
activities, including fishing, coastal engineering projects, and pollution from municipal, industrial, agricultural, and shipping
sources. The impacts of these activities are only likely to increase in the future. Without coordinated, cooperative efforts
by the nations involved, the seas of the Middle East are threatened with catastrophic change.

INTRODUCTION
The marine areas of the Middle East include four major basins:
the Levant Basin (i.e., the Southeast Mediterranean); the Red Sea;
the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, and the Gulf of Oman (which are
more or less contiguous); and the Persian Gulf. Problems associated
with anthropogenic change have increasingly affected the marine
environments of the Middle East just as they have the world’s other
seas, but Middle Eastern seas also have to contend with problems
and issues that are peculiar to, or especially acute in, the region.
Among these features are:
• the Suez Canal, with its dense ship traffic and the huge
amounts of crude oil, fuels, and petro-chemicals that are
transported through all Middle East marine areas;
•
biological issues specific to the two semi-enclosed basins of
the region (i.e., the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf) including
such special tropical biotopes as coral reefs; and
•
inadequate regional and sub-regional cooperation in envi
ronmental matters, due to historical, political, and cultural
reasons.
Numerous studies describe the changes in marine environments
that have occurred throughout the Middle East during the past few
decades (Ben-Tuvia 1985; Ben-Yami and Glaser 1974; Caddy 1993b;
Caddy and Oliver 1996; Golik and Goldsmith 1986; Inman and
Jenkins 1984; Nir 1989; Vadiya and Shenuda 1985). These changes
include pollution and eutrophication as well as the side effects of
certain engineering projects.
The main environmental problems in Middle Eastern marine
environments today are:
•
Pollution originating from municipal, industrial, and agri
cultural sources in densely populated areas with high popu
lation growth rates, e.g., in the southeastern Mediterranean;

  


•
•
•

•
•

   
Coastal erosion and other effects of engineering
projects;
The question of fisheries sustainability;
Conservation of marine and coastal biotopes and
endangered species, as well as biota migration through the
Suez Canal;
Oil spills;
Pollution due to shipping.

MUNICIPAL, INDUSTRIAL, AND AGRICULTURAL
EFFLUENTS
These effluents, which are the most common and significant
sources of marine pollution, often contain a wide variety of nutri
ents, untreated bio-wastes including bacteria and viruses, and pesti
cides and other toxins including heavy metals and assorted
chemicals. They are on occasion abnormally acidic or basic relative
to the marine environment that they enter. These effluents may
trigger physical and/or chemical processes, including both those
inherent in the existing marine ecosystem as well as those that can
only happen in the presence of pollution. For example, certain efflu
ents may result in the synergistic creation or transformation of
poisonous materials and/or the re-accumulation of contaminants,
with unpredictable and accumulative consequences, to which some
species may be more sensitive than others (Patin 1992).
Areas particularly affected by this sort of pollution can be found
along the coasts of Israel and Gaza, the Nile Delta, the Gulfs of
Aqaba and Oman, and the Persian Gulf. The situation is exacerbated
by the fact that certain industrial interests, both from within the
region and without, are often looking for locales where anti-pollu
tion legislation is either weak or un-enforced in order to establish
production facilities that would not be permitted under more strin
gent anti-pollution regimes (or would face high-cost investment in
environment-friendly technology).
MARINE AND COASTAL FISH FARMING
Coastal and marine fish farms produce primarily organic waste,
which can be especially detrimental to the ecosystems of semi-en
closed bays and inlets. Coastal fish farm effluents are mainly nutri
ents, but may also include misapplied chemicals (Berg and
Lavilla-Pitogo 1996). Marine cage farms also produce effluents,
although these are more readily dispersed because of their offshore
location. In addition to waste feed and fish feces, marine cage farms
may also introduce such undesirable elements as residual antibiotics
and chemicals from disease and parasite treatments. Marine fish
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farming development in the Red Sea (Shehadeh and Feidi 1996) may
lead to environmental damage, especially of coral reefs, if sites and
culture practices are not chosen with care.
HOSTILITIES
Oil pollution, whether from accidents or hostilities, has so far
occurred mainly in the Persian Gulf, where the world’s most dra
matic oil spill resulted from intentional Iraqi releases during the
1991 Gulf War. The Iraqis spilled an estimated eleven million barrels
of crude oil into the Gulf, which spread quickly and affected hun
dreds of kilometers of coastline, mainly in Saudi Arabia. Cleaning
efforts recovered an estimated 13% of the total. Contrary to a num
ber of pessimistic forecasts, the Gulf environment managed to re
bound rapidly from this disaster. Experience with this and other
spills seems to indicate that warm, tropical marine ecosystems en
able more rapid and effective decomposition of oil pollution than
more temperate ecosystems, thanks in large part to intense solar
radiation and the action of oil-degrading bacteria.
FISHERIES
Fisheries play an important economic role in the Middle East,
especially in the countries of the southern Arabian Peninsula and in
Egypt (see Feidi, this volume). Although some of these resources are
currently under pressure from excessive fishing and other anthropo
genic factors, none of them are currently considered seriously over
exploited (Caddy and Oliver 1996; Feidi 1996; Sanders and Morgan
1989). Since most of the fish stocks straddle the waters of more than
one country, international and regional fishery management has an
important role to play. In the semi-enclosed Mediterranean, fisher
ies have increasingly been affected by the combined effect of inten
sive fishing activities and persisting enrichment (eutrophication)
due to runoff of nutrients and other polluting agents. Coastal pollu
tion and the resulting eutrophication are playing a paradoxical role
with respect to fisheries in oligotrophic seas (i.e. seas that are poor
in nutrients and of low primary production). Although pollution is
generally seen as something to avoid, the stable and even growing
Mediterranean fish landings can only be explained in terms of manmade enrichment of its waters. This enrichment seems to be com
pensating for the reduction of nutrients that were once supplied by
the Nile River but that were halted after the 1964 construction of the
Aswan High Dam. Apparently, anthropogenic eutrophication is the
main cause of the increasing landings in Mediterranean fisheries
(Caddy 1993b, 1996). The sardine fishery offers a case in point.

The Gulf’s experience with this and
other spills seems to indicate that warm,
tropical marine ecosystems are able to
deal more quickly and effectively with oil
pollution than more temperate
ecosystems, thanks in large part to
intense solar radiation and the action of
oil-degrading bacteria.

  



   

Prior to the construction of the Aswan High Dam, this fishery pro
duced 18,000 to 25,000 T/yr off the Nile Delta. After 1964, this fish
ery collapsed to 550 T in 1966. Since the 1980s, however, sardine and
other small pelagic catches in Egypt’s Mediterranean waters have
rebounded to about 50% of the pre-Aswan period. Catches of some
demersal fish have also grown significantly. These and other yield
increases appear to be a result of anthropogenic enrichment rather
than of the inadequate fisheries management that characterizes the
region. Still, the relationship between eutrophication and fisheries
should concern all Mediterranean countries, particularly in view of
the ecological calamity that befell the Black Sea fisheries in early
1990s, which evidently was triggered and fed by man-made pollu
tion, resulting in eutrophication, combined with a devastating intru
sion of an exotic predatory comb-jelly (Zaitsev 1993; Caddy 1993;
Ben-Yami 1994).
TOURISM DEVELOPMENT
Expansion of the tourist industry, as in the case of the recent
rapid development along the coasts of the Gulf of Aqaba/Eilat, is
quite a separate issue. Inadequate planning of tourist infrastructure,
especially large hotels, can put severe strains on existing sewage
treatment and disposal systems that were originally established to
serve much smaller populations.
In semi-enclosed marine basins, all projects involving massive
increase of the density of coastal population, whether permanent or
transient, should be looked upon as components of one combined
system. One way to assess eventual combined damage and at the
same time to set limits on proposed tourism development is: (a) to
assess the existing contribution to marine pollution in terms of
person/day/pollution factors; (b) to assess the maximum sustainable
pollution capacity throughout the affected marine area (approxi
mate pollution carrying capacity (GESAMP 1986; Krom and Cohen
1991)); (c) to determine the additional number of person-days that
the ecosystem affected can sustain without permanent damage to
coral reefs, water clarity, etc., taking into consideration the existing and
additional (planned) means of sewage treatment; and (d) upon such
determination, to allow additional population in the various projects.
In areas such as the Gulf of Aqaba, this integrated approach
would call for international cooperation, which has, of course, not
always been easy for Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.
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CORALS
In the Middle East marine environment, corals still abound and
thrive. Coral reefs are sensitive biotopes, vulnerable not only to
anthropogenic but also to natural stressors. Pollution (of any kind)
and coral piracy can bring about, directly or indirectly, the degrada
tion or death of a reef. Dead coral reefs are often found covered with
sponge growth or algal turf, while multi-species bleaching of coral
reefs, recently reported from the southern Persian Gulf (Dr. Roger
Uwate—private communication), is the result of breakdown of the
symbiosis between the corals and Zooxanthellae algae. Coral bleach
ing has been ascribed to several factors, most often to warming of
the sea water. Seasonal floods carrying sediment that deposits on
coral reefs are another natural cause for reef degradation. It remains
to be seen whether proposed marine reserves will serve as an effec
tive means for saving coral reefs (Russ 1996).
POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MARINE POLLUTION
In seas with low natural productivity, such as the Red Sea and
the Mediterranean, eutrophication may initially enhance marine
organism populations, but it may also later lead to major environ
mental damage and even to collapse of whole ecosystems. Pollution
may reduce biodiversity and cause harmful genetic changes, espe
cially in the sensitive ecosystems of coral reefs in the Red Sea/Indian
Ocean system and the brackish and hypersaline lagoons in Egypt.
Algal and medusae blooms linked to pollution may reduce water
clarity and threaten other marine organisms as well as the tourist
and recreational industry in coastal areas, such as the Levant Basin
and along the shores of the Sinai Peninsula. Another danger from
pollution is the concentration of heavy metals or other toxic sub
stances in seafood. Special attention must be paid to the presence of
such contaminants as mercury and cadmium in the run-off from
existing and developing industries in the region (Enserink et al.
1991; Simpson 1981; Talbot 1989; Nogawa 1984). Countries of the
Middle East have a joint interest in protecting their waters from
pollution, in particular from non-biodegradable contaminants.
Cooperative regulation and enforcement on the part of the littoral
states would benefit the environmental health of the Middle East’s
marine basins (i.e., eastern Mediterranean; Red Sea; Gulf of Aden,
Arabian Sea and Gulf of Oman; and the Persian Gulf). The Persian
Gulf in particular is ecologically vulnerable to the actions of its
littoral states as well as the riparians of the Tigris-Euphrates river
basin whose waters flow into the Gulf.
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MIGRATION, BIODIVERSITY, AND EXOTIC SPECIES
In some areas of the Middle East, native marine life faces not
only exposure to pollution and destruction of feeding and breeding
habitats, but also the added risks of competition due to intentional
or accidental introductions of exotic organisms. Examples of this
include diseases and their carriers, such as the new Noda virus which
is the cause of viral encephalopathy in seabass, a fish cultured in the
area, or the viruses that have been plaguing shrimp farms in south
ern Asia. Introductions and immigrations of exotic wild and farmed
species may affect biodiversity in the marine ecosystem. Indeed, this
phenomenon has long been an issue in the Mediterranean, where
numerous migrants from the Red Sea have been continually settling
in the Levant Basin in niches occupied by native species (Golani, this
volume; Ben-Tuvia 1978, 1985; Ben-Yami and Glaser 1974; Golani
and Ben-Tuvia 1989). More recently, for example, in the Gulf of
Aqaba, the Mediterranean gilthead seabream raised by Israeli cage
farmers in Eilat have already found their way into the wild.
COASTAL CONSTRUCTION
Coastal and other marine construction is often detrimental to
the coastline, low delta areas, and in-shore biotopes, both in biologi
cal and physical terms. Too often the damage done by such con
struction could easily have been predicted and avoided. Unfortu
nately, steadily increasing real estate values in heavily populated
coastal areas have often led developers to disregard the environmen
tal costs of their work.
Additionally, engineering projects influencing the flow of major
rivers may lead to ecological damage of the marine environment
downstream, as in the Nile Delta-Suez Canal area and below the
Shatt al-Arab (Inman and Jenkins 1984; Vadiya and Shenuda 1985).
Especially conspicuous has been the coastal erosion in Egypt in the
wake of the Aswan High Dam construction.
Poorly planned harbors, marinas, and similar projects, both
already completed and still in the planning stage, have become or
may yet become ecological calamities. In Israel, these include the
Ashdod harbor and the marina at Herzlia. Also, the coast of Gaza is
already heavily eroded due to the rather small structures existing
there (Golik and Goldsmith 1986). Any major construction, such as
a deepwater harbor, especially if based on sea walls or breakwaters
protruding seawards, would certainly substantially accelerate the
coastal erosion, endangering not just the beaches, but also coastal
roads and residential areas (Nir 1989). Such at-risk sites may in fact be
developed by innovative, alternative solutions, such as offshore har
bors connected with the coast by bridges allowing free flow of water.
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SHIPPING
Pollution generated by shipping, notably oil tankers, (particu
larly along the shipping lines leading to and from the Suez Canal,
the Straits of Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Oman, and Shatt al-Arab)
contaminates both the sea and coastlines. This pollution is partly
caused by the flushing of ships’ bilges and oil and fuel tanks at sea,
and partly by jettisoned waste and litter, some of which is practically
indestructible plastic (Golik and Gertner 1989). Much of this pollu
tion arrives at beaches in the form of tar-like products and as ordi
nary garbage. Frequently, marine animals may swallow plastic bags
and other containers or fasteners, while others may become en
tangled in this waste with potentially fatal consequences. The Suez
Canal alone carries some 20,000 vessels that transport about 14 % of
the world’s trade. This includes 2,500 oil tankers. The average
amount of crude oil passing daily through the Suez Canal is ap
proximately 800,000 barrels. The Canal has been deepened recently
to 17.5 meters, which makes it navigable by all but the largest oil
tankers. The load of the oil traffic on the Canal seems, however, to
be subsiding owing to increased use of the Suez-Mediterranean
Pipeline (SUMED) and to a lesser degree the Trans-Israel Pipeline
(TIP). Because the oil to and from these pipelines is carried by ships,
the transfer of oil into and out of the pipelines may in fact increase
the risk of spills.
Apart from Persian Gulf oil, the crude-oil load of the Suez Canal
also derives from local production which is centered on the Gulf of
Suez basin. Further development of oil refineries and petro-chemi
cal industries has been projected in Egypt.
FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS AND COASTAL ZONE
MANAGEMENT
In all areas, but especially in enclosed and semi-enclosed bays,
gulfs, and lagoons, there is a need for “preventive” research and
surveys. One objective for research is the assessment of their capac
ity to absorb waste originating from human activities (GESAMP
1986), with special attention to heavy metals and other toxic sub
stances. This research should include the water at all levels, the
sediments, and the flora and fauna (Caddy 1993). Routine monitor
ing and regular scientific research represent an essential condition
for rational decision-making and should be introduced in all marine
areas to prevent unpleasant surprises, including environmental
effects due to global warming (Everett 1995) and ozone depletion
(Baker 1991) on especially sensitive ecosystems.
At the same time we should bear in mind the widely discussed
limitations of environmental sciences, both in terms of the reliability
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of environmental capacity assessments (Krom and Cohen 1991) and
forecasting of the influence of natural and man-caused changes on
whole ecosystems and their separate components.
Undoubtedly, the world-wide movement toward integrated
coastal zones management (ICZM), which appears increasingly
essential in view of the multiple users of coastal waters, beaches, and
related resources, will also arrive in the Middle East. Coastal devel
opment and protection are largely a national issue related to envi
ronmental degradation of shores, including coastal lakes and
lagoons, mangrove areas, beaches, and coral reefs. This issue may
become international where major coastal construction projects in
one country may cause beach degradation in another, or where
pollution originating in one country is contaminating beaches and
inshore waters of its neighbors.
CONCLUSION
In view of the high rate of population growth, industrial and
tourism development, and crude oil production and transportation,
problems in the marine environment of the Middle East will in
creasingly require national attention and international cooperation
among neighboring countries. In some areas, such as the Persian
Gulf, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the southeastern Mediterranean, whole
marine ecosystems may collapse without such cooperation. Efforts
toward the establishment or reinforcement of such cooperation
must continue despite the often tense political situations in many of
these regions.

Routine monitoring and regular
scientific research represent an
essential condition for rational decisionmaking and should be introduced in all
marine areas to prevent unpleasant
surprises, including environmental
effects due to global warming and
ozone depletion, especially on sensitive
ecosystems.
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Impact of Red Sea Fish Migrants through the Suez Canal on the Aquatic Environment of the
Eastern Mediterranean
Daniel Golani
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

ABSTRACT
The invasion of Red Sea organisms through the Suez Canal, known as “Lessepsian migration” (after Ferdinand de
Lesseps, the Frenchman who directed the canal’s construction), has profoundly modified the ecosystem of the Eastern
Mediterranean. This migration, the result of major man-made changes in the area, has given us a unique opportunity to
study the process of invasion and colonization by tropical biota of a sub-tropical region populated by temperate biota.
The present research on Lessepsian fish focuses on three major areas: 1) identifying the characteristics distinguishing
colonizer species from closely related non-colonizer species in the Red Sea; 2) assessing the colonizer populations’
responses to the new environmental conditions; and 3) studying the impact of the Lessepsian migration on the Eastern
Mediterranean ecosystem.

INTRODUCTION
No zoogeographic marine area of the world has been affected
more by man-made changes than the eastern Mediterranean. Two
major projects have heavily influenced the Levantine marine ecosystem: the construction of the Suez Canal, completed in 1869, and, to
a lesser extent, the Aswan High Dam. The dam, which became fully
operational in 1964, resulted in the cessation of fluvial sedimentation and nutrients to the Mediterranean, leading to a sharp decrease
in fish populations, mainly sardines (Aleem 1972); as a result, the
Egyptian purse seine fishing industry today takes only 10% of the
pre-dam catch. The Suez Canal, however, has had an even more
significant and lasting impact.
The opening of the Canal in 1869 has had zoogeographic and
ecological ramifications far beyond those envisioned by its design
ers, who only intended to provide a quick trade route from Europe
to India and the Far East. Stretching from Port Said in the north, the
Suez Canal continues southward for 162.5 km, crossing Lake
Timsah and the Bitter Lakes on its way to the city of Suez and the
Gulf of Suez. For most of its length, the canal is quite narrow, only
200–300 m, and very shallow, 10–15 m. The canal connects two
major bodies of water, the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, which
differ fundamentally both faunistically and hydrographically. The
main abiotic difference between the two regions is the temperature
regime, which is stable in the tropical Red Sea but experiences wide
fluctuations in the subtropical Mediterranean. The fauna of the Red
Sea is of tropical Indo-Pacific origin, while that of the Mediterra
nean is mainly of temperate Atlantic origin. In the wake of the
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opening of the Suez Canal, each sea was exposed to invasion of
organisms from the other sea. However, the vast majority of migra
tional movement has been from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean.
This influx of biota from the Red Sea into the Mediterranean has
been termed “Lessepsian migration” (Por 1978), in recognition of
Ferdinand de Lesseps, the engineer and spirit behind the creation of
the Suez Canal. The minor migration in the opposite direction is
known as “Anti-Lessepsian migration.” This phenomenon encom
passes all major taxa. It is interesting to note that in all studied taxa,
the percentage of Lessepsian migrants in the Levant is quite high:
7.1% of Polychaeta (Ben-Eliyahu 1995); 22.9% of decapod crusta
ceans (Galil 1992); 9.4% of Mollusca (Barash 1992) and 13.2% of
fish (Golani 1996). Among all taxa, the study of fish is advantageous,
since their taxonomy is well known and, due to their commercial
importance, constant information on quantitative and qualitative
changes of migrant and native populations is available through the
local fisheries (Golani and Ben-Tuvia 1995).
The phenomenon of Lessepsian migration provides a unique
opportunity to investigate, on a large scale, processes of migration,
invasion and colonization, processes which usually occur over a
geological time scale.
Lessepsian fish research commenced shortly after the opening of
the Suez Canal, with the monitoring of fish species in the canal itself
(Keller 1882; Tillier 1902). Until the late 1970s, the vast majority of
studies were limited to reporting new arrivals and creating invento
ries of migrant species (Ben-Tuvia 1966, 1978). In the 1980s and
1990s, a wider approach has been taken, emphasizing quantitative
and qualitative ecological analyses (Ben-Tuvia 1985; Golani and
Ben-Tuvia 1995). The present research on Lessepsian fish focuses on
three major areas:
•
identifying the characteristics distinguishing colonizer
species from closely related non-colonizer species in the
Red Sea;
•
assessing the colonizer populations’ responses to the new
environmental conditions; and
•
studying the impact of the Lessepsian migration on the
Eastern Mediterranean ecosystem.
WHAT IS A SUCCESSFUL LESSEPSIAN FISH MIGRANT?
It has been observed in many taxa that some species have a high
dispersal and colonization ability while other closely related species
with similar ecological requirements do not. In the Red Sea, there
are a number of fish families with several species, of whom only
a few have established populations in the Mediterranean.
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For example, there are 14 Goatfish (Mullidae) species in the Red Sea
(Goren and Dor 1994), but only two, Upeneus moluccensis and U.
pori, have migrated to the Mediterranean. Similarly, there are 15
species of Squirrelfishes (Holocentridae) in the Red Sea but only one
colonizer in the Mediterranean, namely, Sargocentron rubrum.
The question of how to distinguish a potential colonizer was first
approached by Elton (1958). In the mid 1960s, Baker and Stebbins
(1965) and MacArthur and Wilson (1967) were among the first to
study this problem in a multidisciplinary manner. In the Red Sea,
their approach was utilized in the study of mollusc migrants (Lavee
1983; Lavee and Ritte 1994). Selander and Kaufman (1973) noted
that there are great differences between invertebrates and fish con
cerning their response to changes in the environment. In the current
study, criteria which distinguish the successful colonizer were exam
ined in four critical areas. The goatfish family (Mullidae) was the
subject of this multidisciplinary approach. The four factors chosen for
examining the correlation to successful colonization were:
• genetic variability;
• breadth of trophic niche;
• life history strategy; and
• relative importance in the fish assemblage in the source site
(Red Sea).

GENETIC VARIABILITY
Since the conditions in the target area differ from those prevail
ing in the source area, the colonizer must respond rapidly to
changes encountered in order to establish a sustainable population.
Theoretically, an adequate response to the new selective pressure
demands high genetic variability, so that within the given wide
genetic repertoire, the appropriate genotype can be found, become
dominant, and thus lead to successful adaptation. Five non-colo
nizer species of Mullidae, Mulloides flavolineatus, Parupeneus
forsskali, P. rubescens, P. macronema and Upeneus subvittatus, were
compared to two mullid colonizers, Upeneus moluccensis and U.
pori. Genetic variability was tested by electrophoretic examination of
allozymes; the results revealed no correlation between genetic vari
ability and success in colonization (Golani and Ritte 1993). These
results confirm the general findings of Gray (1986) and Barrett and
Richardson (1986). However, Parsons (1983) claimed that examina
tion of specific allozymes responsible for adaptation to new environ
mental conditions and facilitating success in colonization would
reveal differences between colonizers and non-colonizers.

  



   

TROPHIC NICHE BREADTH
The theoretical basis for examination of this factor resembles
that for the previous factor, genetic variability, namely, that species
which feed on a wide variety of food types (termed “generalist
feeders”) will be better potential colonizers. Species with a narrow
trophic niche breadth (“specialist feeders”) are less likely to find
appropriate food in the new area. The feeding habits of three noncolonizer mullids, Mulloides flavolineatus, Parupeneus forsskali and
P. rubescens, were compared to that of the colonizer Upeneus pori
(Ben-Eliahu and Golani 1990). No correlation was found between
trophic niche breadth and success in colonization.
LIFE HISTORY STRATEGY
This factor is defined as the sum total of demographic features
that determine the species’ fitness. MacArthur and Wilson (1967)
developed a model, by which a continuum of life history strategy is
determined. One end of the continuum represents the “r-strate
gist,” which is characterized by rapid growth rate and a high repro
ductive potential (which is expressed by a high intrinsic rate of
increase, early sexual maturity, small body size, a short longevity
and usually only one reproductive season). On the other end is the
“K-strategist,” which is characterized by the opposite features.
MacArthur and Wilson (1967) and Safriel and Ritte (1980) pre
dicted that r-strategists would be better colonizers. Their reasoning
was based on the hypothesis that smaller populations have greater
probability of random extinction. Since the pioneer group of in
vaders is usually small, not more than a few individuals, the invad
ers must have the ability for rapid population growth in order to
avoid extinction. Moreover, in the case of invaders who perceive
their new environment as unpredictable in contrast to the source
environment to which they have been long adapted, the invaders
are prone to ecological catastrophes that are liable to decrease their
population, leaving a very small number of individuals.
The association between life history strategy and success in
colonization has been studied also in the family Mullidae. Table 1
summarizes demographic data on goatfishes in the source area of
the Red Sea, obtained by Golani (1988) and others. From the data
it can be concluded that the two colonizer species are indeed
“r-strategists” as compared to the non-colonizers. However, Golani
(1988) postulated that in the particular case of the eastern Mediter
ranean, which is a heterogeneous ecosystem as compared to the
Red Sea, the r-strategists had an advantage in colonizing this un
predictable environment. Therefore, r-strategists are not necessarily
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always better universal colonists. For example, the rivers of North
America are dominated by typical K-strategist (mainly Cich lidae)
colonizers (Stauffer 1984).
Relative importance in fish assemblage in source site
It is evident that, in order for colonization to be successful, there
must be some similarity between the environmental conditions of
the source habitat and that of the target habitat. This overlap must
be within the range of tolerance of the colonizer. Golani and BenTuvia (1989) showed that the habitat in the eastern Mediterranean
that is the most prone to Lessepsian colonization is shallow sandy or
muddy substrates. The closest equivalent to this Mediterranean
habitat in the Red Sea is the sandy shore. Examination of the fish
assemblage in the Red Sea sandy shore revealed that the dominant
species in this assemblage were Lessepsian migrants, who inhabited
this habitat throughout all their life stages (Golani 1993 a). It was
therefore concluded that dominance in the equivalent source habitat
constitutes pre-adaptation to success in colonization of the Eastern
Mediterranean by Lessepsian fish migrants.

Table 1

Some demographic data of colonizing and non-colonizing goatfishes (Mullidae) from the Red Sea and other native sites.

COLONIZERS

NON-COLONIZERS

U. mol.

U. pori

M. fla.

M. van.

Spawning season

Apr.- Dec.a

Mar.-Apr.

Mar.-Aug.

May-Sep.c

Size at benthic
settlement (mm, SL)

45.0b

27.2

50.0

Age at first reproduction
(month)

12b

9

Size at first reproduction
(mm, SL)

104b

Maximum attainable size
(mm, SL)
Growth rate coefficient

P. for.

P. hep.

—

—

—

50.0

—

36

—

24

—

61

130

—

115

—

170b

135

328c

363c

230

444e

0.303b

0.663

0.213c

0.160c

0.261d

0.208e

a

- Southern Red Sea (Ben-Tuvia 1968) b - Hong Kong (Lee 1974) c - Gulf of Aqaba (Wahbeh 1992)
- “ “ (Wahbeh and Ajiad 1985) e - “ “ (Al-Absy and Ajiad 1988)
U. mol. = Upeneus moluccenis, U. pori = Upeneus pori, M. fla. = Mulloides flavolineatus, M. van = Mulloides vanicolensis, P. for. =
Parupeneus forsskali, P. hep. = Parupeneus heptacanthus.
d

  



   

RESPONSE TO THE NEW ENVIRONMENT
Once the colonizers have established a population in the target
area, they are presumably isolated from their source population and
are exposed to new selective pressures which may result in pheno
typic and genotypic changes in the new population (Parsons 1982).
In order to test this hypothesis, a comparison was made between the
source and target populations. Golani (1990) compared specimens
from the source (Red Sea) and target (Eastern Mediterranean)
populations of seven species of Lessepsian migrants. In most species,
the spawning season was shortened in the Mediterranean, presum
ably due to the constraints of the colder temperature regime. In
some species, changes were noted in some meristic counts, namely,
number of dorsal and anal rays, number of lateral line scales and
number of vertebrae. All these changes have been attributed to the
prevailing temperature during spawning season (Golani 1990; also
see Lindsey 1988).
Golani and Ritte (1993) compared allozymes of source and target
populations of two Lessepsian fish migrants, Upeneus moluccensis and
U. pori. No discernible genetic differences were found. It should be
noted that this method of allozyme analysis is rather crude and is not
sufficiently sensitive to discern small alterations. Current techniques
such as DNA sequencing are able to detect minute changes and it is in
this direction that research should progress.
Diet adaptations were studied in several species of Lessepsian
migrants. As anticipated, the feeding habits of colonizers remained
generally similar to those of the mother population. Some small dif
ferences were noted; for example, Upeneus pori feeds in the Mediterra
nean upon a wider size range of prey. The algal composition of the
diet of the two rabbitfish, Siganus luridus and S. rivulatus, was altered
in the Mediterranean. However, lack of quantitative data on trophic
resources in both the source and target areas prohibits a determination
of whether these changes are the result of selectivity or availability.
IMPACT OF LESSEPSIAN MIGRANTS ON THE EASTERN
MEDITERRANEAN
A total of 54 Lessepsian fish species have been recorded to date
(Golani 1996), representing 37 families, of which 13 are new to the
Mediterranean (Table 2). Out of these 37 families, 25 are repre
sented by only one species; 8 by two species; three families by three
species and one family (Clupeidae) by four species. The Lessepsian
fish species constitute 13.2% of the total number of ichthyofauna in
the Levant. These species have a qualitative and quantitative impor
tance beyond their percentage in the composition of the local ich
thyofauna; more than half of the species have become common in
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Cumulative count of Lessepsian migrant species as a function of the year of first record.

the eastern Mediterranean and at least 18 species contribute to the
local fishery. Almost half of the catch of trawl fishery in the Mediter
ranean coast of Israel consists of Lessepsian migrant species (Golani
and Ben-Tuvia 1995). It is difficult to determine precisely the per
centage of Lessepsian migrants in the catch of other fishing meth
ods, but it is estimated to be considerable.
There is a clear east-west gradient in the distribution of Lessep
sian migrant species in the Mediterranean. There are 54 Lessepsian
migrant fish species along the Levantine coast. This number gradu
ally decreases along the gradient westward, up to the coasts of Tu
nisia and Sicily. Thirty Lessepsian migrant fish species inhabit the
southern coast of Turkey and 32 inhabit the Mediterranean coast of
Egypt. Only four Lessepsian species have been found along the
southern coast of Italy, and no Lessepsian species have been found
in the western basin of the Mediterranean.
From Table 2 and Figure 1, a clear correlation can be seen be
tween the year of first record of individual Lessepsian migrant spe
cies in the Mediterranean and each species’ current abundance along
the Mediterranean coast of Israel. In general, those species that
appeared earlier are currently more abundant. Although date of first
record is not identical with the actual first arrival of a Lessepsian
species to the Mediterranean, it is reasonable to assume that the
chance of a species being collected and recorded increases with

  



   

Table 2

List of Lessepsian fish migrants. * - new family to the Mediterranean; IP - inshore-pelagic, M - muddy, P - pelagic, R - rocky, S - sandy,
V - vegetation; Abundance: + - rare, ++ - prevalent, +++ - common; 1st Year of Record - year of first record in the Mediterranean;
BS - beach seine, N - trammel and gill nets, PS - purse seine, T - trawl.

Family
DASYATIDAE
CLUPEIDAE

CONGRIDAE
MURAENESOCIDAE*
SYNODONTIDAE
EXOCOETIDAE
BELONIDAE
HEMIRAMPHIDAE
ATHERINIDAE
HOLOCENTRIDAE*
SCORPAENIDAE
PLATYCEPHALIDAE*

SERRANIDAE
TERAPONIDAE*
APOGONIDAE
SILLAGINIDAE*
RACHYCENTRIDAE*
CARANGIDAE
LEIOGNATHIDAE*
LUTJANIDAE*
MULLIDAE
HAEMULIDAE
SPARIDAE
PEMPHERIDAE*
MUGILIDAE
SPHYRAENIDAE
LABRIDAE
BLENNIDAE
GOBIIDAE

CALLIONYMIDAE
SIGANIDAE*
SCOMBRIDAE
CYNOGLOSSIDAE
MONACANTHIDAE*
OSTRACIIDAE*
TETRAODONTIDAE

DIODONTIDAE*

 

Species
Himantura uarnak
Dussumieria acuta
Etrumeus teres
Herklotsichthys punctatus
Spratelloides delicatulus
Rhynchoconger trewavasae
Muraenesox cinereus
Saurida undosquamis
Paraexocoetus mento
Tylosurus choram
Hemiramphus far
Hyporhamphus affinis
Atherinomorus lacunosus
Sargocentron rubrum
Pterois miles
Papilloculiceps longiceps
Platycephalus indicus
Sorsogona prionota
Epinephelus coioides
Epinephelus malabaricus
Pelates quadrilineatus
Terapon puta
Apogon nigripinnis
Sillago sihama
Rachycentron canadum
Alepes djedaba
Leiognathus klunzingeri
Lutjanus argentimaculatus
Upeneus moluccensis
Upeneus pori
Pomadasys stridens
Crenidens crenidens
Rhabdosargus haffara
Pempheris vanicolensis
Liza carinata
Sphyraena chrysotaenia
Sphyraena flavicauda
Pteragogus pelycus
Petroscirtes ancylodon
Monishia ochetica
Oxyurichthys papuensis
Silhouetta aegyptia
Callionymus filamentosus
Siganus luridus
Siganus rivulatus
Rastrelliger kanagurta
Scomberomorus commerson
Cynoglossus sinusarabici
Stephanolepis diaspros
Tetrosomus gibbosus
Lagocephalus spadiceus
Lagocephalus suezensis
Torquigener flavimaculosus
Chilomycterus spilostylus

Habitat

Abundance

1st Year of Record

S&M
PS
P
IP
IP
M
M
S&M
P
P
P
P
IP
R
R
S
S
S
R
R
S
S
R
S
P
S&IP
M
R
S&M
S&M
S
S&V
S
R
S&IP
P
P
S
S
S
S
S
S
V
V
P
P
S
R&V
S&V
S
S
S
S

++
+++
+++
+++
+
+
+
+++
++
+
+++
+
+++
+++
+
+
++
+
+
+
++
++
+++
+++
+
+++
+++
+
+++
+++
++
++
++
+++
+++
+++
+
+
+
++
+++
++
+++
+++
+++
+
+++
++
+++
+
+++
+++
+
+

1955
1953
1963
1976
1978
1993
1982
1953
1935
1963
1927
1967
1902
1947
1992
1990
1953
1947
1969
1969
1970
1976
1947
1977
1986
1927
1931
1977
1947
1950
1969
1970
1992
1979
1971
1930
1992
1992
1989
1927
1983
1991
1953
1964
1927
1971
1935
1953
1927
1988
1953
1977
1987
1993

Commercial
T
IP
PS
PS
—
—
—
T
PS
—
PS
—
—
N
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
PS
—
BS&PS
—
—
—
T
—
N
—
—
BS&PS
T&PS
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
N
N&PS
—
N&PS
—
—
—
—
—
—
—





population growth upon arrival to the target area. Therefore, date of
first record may be used as a baseline for initiation of a species’
colonization. There are several explanations for this correlation.
First, the longer the time elapsed since colonization, the better the
opportunity to establish large, flourishing populations; in addition,
the species may have undergone further adaptation to the new habi
tat during these years. Second, these species may have had a superior
colonization and competitive ability that allowed them to arrive first
into the Mediterranean and closely thereafter establish a population.
Another explanation may be that the increase in ichthyological
studies in the last few decades has revealed more first records, some
of which may represent abortive colonization events which would
not have been detected prior to the use of intensive research meth
ods. It is interesting to note that the vast majority of species re
corded since 1970 have been rare (see Figure 1); however, five
species (Herklotsichthys punctatus, Sillago sihama, Pempheris
vanicolensis, Oxyurichthys papuensis, and Lagocephalus suezensis)
recorded in the late 1970s are very common in the eastern Mediter
ranean. There is no obvious common feature between these five
species, yet together they constitute an exception to the pattern of
gradual building of population size.
The success of Lessepsian migrant fish species in colonization of
the Eastern Mediterranean has often been explained as the exploita
tion of unsaturated niches. For example, the success of the two
herbivore siganids Siganus luridus and S. rivulatus was attributed to
their entering temperate waters of the Mediterranean where there
were scarcely any herbivores (Lundberg and Golani 1995). Similarly,
the lack of nocturnal species facilitated the success of the coloniza
tion of three nocturnal Lessepsian migrants: Sargocentron rubrum,
Apogon nigripinnis and Pempheris vanicolensis (Golani and Diamant
1991). One might conclude that penetration and colonization
should be easier for species whose families have no or very few rep
resentatives in the target area; conversely, one might assume that
species whose families are well represented by species in the target
area would have a high resistance to confamilial colonization. Figure
2 offers four categories according to the percentages that the
Lessepsian migrants represent among all species in a particular
family in the Levant, as well as the composition of each category by
the number of species in each family. In thirteen families, all species
are Lessepsian migrants and in another eleven families, 50% or more
are Lessepsian migrants. However, there are thirteen other Lessep
sian migrant species which have succeeded in penetrating and colo
nizing the Mediterranean, despite many indigenous confamilial
species already inhabiting the Mediterranean.

  



   

12

1 species
2 species
3 species
4 species

9

No. of
Families
6

3

0
<19

19-49

50-99

100

% Migrants in Family
Figure 2

Percentage of Lessepsian migrant species in their families in the Mediterranean,
with further breakdown according to the number of Lassepsian species per family.

There are very few studies which directly investigate the impact
of Lessepsian migrants on the autochtonous species. The difficulty
lies mainly in the lack of information available from the period prior
to invasion. The method of investigating this relationship should be
the study of the ecological requirements of closely related species
(Ben-Yami and Glaser 1974). Such an investigation was conducted
by Golani (1994) on Goatfishes (Mullidae), in which there are two
migrant species, Upeneus moluccensis and U. pori, and two indig
enous Mediterranean species, Mullus barbatus and Mullus
surmuletus. A similar study (Golani 1993b) was conducted on
Lizardfishes (Synodontidae,) which has a single Lessepsian migrant,
Saurida undosquamis, and an indigenous species, Synodus saurus.
The family Sphyraenidae was also studied (unpublished material).
In all three families, the feeding habits of the colonizers and the local
species were remarkably similar and niche partitioning was presum
ably accomplished along bathymetric axes. Among the goatfishes
(Mullidae), the colonizer species occupied a shallower sector, while
an opposite trend was observed among the lizardfish (Synodon
tidae). It is difficult to determine whether the colonizers displaced
the local species or whether the latter occupied the same bathymet
ric niche prior to its confamilial’s colonization. An examination of
the bathymetric distribution of local species in those areas where
colonizers have not penetrated will be of no avail in determining this
question, since there are many other environmental factors which
on one hand may be affecting the local species and on the other
hand may be preventing the entrance of colonizer species.

 





It is important to note that no local species has disappeared since
the study of Lessepsian migration. Nevertheless, there are two cases
which deserve further study. The indigenous meager Argyrosomus
regius was once one of the most common commercial species in
Israel. Since the 1980s this species has almost completely disap
peared in local catches, while simultaneously, the Lessepsian migrant
narrow-barred Spanish mackerel Scomberomorus commerson has
dramatically increased its population. Both species are piscivores
and may utilize a similar niche. Similarly, the Lessepsian dragonet
Callionymus filamentosus is one of the most common by-catch spe
cies in local fisheries. The other three confamilial indigenous species,
who also occupy a similar shallow habitat, have almost disappeared
from local catch. The only indigenous dragonet still being collected is
Synchiropus phaeton, which inhabits much deeper waters (150–300 m).
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ABSTRACT
Arab fisheries resources, including the coastal waters of the Arab states, inland waters, and aquaculture potential, are an
important sector for development. If rationally and scientifically exploited, fisheries could play a role in meeting increased
food demand, and in activating the economies of the region, possibly surpassing oil exploitation by being a renewable
and self-replenishing resource.

INTRODUCTION
Marine waters border the Arab countries on all sides: the Ara
bian Gulf on the east, the Atlantic Ocean on the west, the Mediterra
nean Sea on the north, and the Indian Ocean on the south. In
addition to these, the Red Sea and various gulfs, rivers—mainly the
Nile, the Tigris, and the Euphrates—and the natural and man-made
lakes constituting inland water resources afford the Arab countries
very important potential for fisheries. The Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) expands Arab marine waters to rich international fishing
grounds. Engaging in aquaculture activities in marine and inland wa
ters, as well as better exploitation of the available fisheries resources,
would create a more sound and more beneficial fishery industry. It
could become one of the main pillars of Arab economic activities, of no
less importance, in some countries, than the fishery industry in the
economy of major fishing nations such as Japan and Norway.
Prior to the discovery of oil in some Arab states, fish had traditionally been an important source of animal protein, particularly
along the coastal areas. Increasing incomes from oil, providing
higher purchasing power, made other protein sources available,
causing diversification of protein intake and reducing fish consump
tion. In recent years, however, due to various economic and social
reasons, demand for fish and its consumption in fresh or processed
form have risen to some degree. On the whole, consumers have
begun to turn to cheaper foods, often consuming traditionally un
marketable fish products, developing new uses for fish by either
diversifying preparation methods or accepting imported products
previously unknown locally.
Fish marketing opportunities are increasingly opening up in the
Arab states. Such an increase in the demand for fish products may
be met either from better exploitation of fisheries resources or
through the importation of quantities that may not be obtained
from local sources.
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Fishing and fisheries contribute more than any other animal pro
duction activity to protein intake in most of the developing regions of
the world, including most of the Arab states, and are important for
the food security of many coastal populations. By all accounts, many
wild marine and freshwater resources are on the decline.
THE ISSUE OF FISHERIES GLOBALLY
In past decades the rapid growth of the exploitation of fisheries
resources has taken its toll: during the 1950s and 1960s, the global
catch from commercial fishing grew three times faster than the
world population. Production growth was slower afterwards; cur
rently, as global fishery production (catch and aquaculture) averages
100 million tons (MT) per year (113 MT in 1995, a record so far), per
capita supplies are on the decline. These trends have an obvious
impact on prices: during the last decade seafood prices have risen
almost 4%/yr on average, rendering a traditionally inexpensive
source of protein much less accessible to the poor.
Blame for the depletion of aquatic resources has been placed
mostly on two factors:
•

The development of excess fishing capacity with respect to
existing fish stocks and their natural growth rates; and

•

the deteriorating condition of fish stocks due to the pollution
of sensitive aquatic systems, both freshwater and marine.

Small-scale fisheries in developing countries have generally
played a minor role beyond their communities, although the pres
sure of growing local demand has occasionally contributed to the
over-exploitation of coastal waters.
The development of fishing capacity has taken place mostly in
the large-scale (industrial) and medium-scale fishing sub-sectors.
Since the early days of international development assistance, the
main objective of fisheries development projects has been to in
crease fishing efficiency and income levels through motorizing
boats, improving gear, and in harbor development and other infra
structure facilities. The sector and its manpower have grown, draw
ing workers from rural to urban areas.
At the same time, large numbers of small-scale fishermen have
had no access to that assistance, finding it increasingly difficult to
survive in an overexploited environment. From this perspective, the
crisis of fisheries has been a crisis of livelihoods.
The implications go far beyond dwindling fish stocks available to
small-scale fishermen. Globally, fishing provides the main source of
income for about 100 million fishermen and their families, the

  



   

majority of them among the world’s poorest. They are among the
one billion people—nearly a fifth of the global population—for
whom fish is the main source of animal protein. The scarcity of
fisheries resources is leading to clashes between neighbors as fishing
fleets stray across maritime borders after depleting stocks in their
own waters.
It is estimated that 85% of the world’s fish harvest is still caught
in the wild, although the practice has reached the limits of sustain
ability in many areas. This, in part, is because the means of exploita
tion have become so efficient. Fishing fleets use sonar, radar, aircraft
and satellites to track shoals. Winches and motors and drift nets
typically trap more than 18 tons of fish. This enables trawlers to
increase not only catches but the by-catches—species that are netted
but are unwanted and consequently discarded.
The issue of discards is a very disturbing one since it results in a
very large wastage of fisheries resources . FAO estimates that 18–39 MT
of fish per year may be discarded at sea to catch about 50 MT of fish
suitable for human consumption.
PRESENT STATUS OF ARAB FISHERIES
FISHERIES BOUNDARIES
The geographical boundaries of the Marine Statistical Areas as
classified by FAO place Arab waters in the following areas:
AREA 34: East Central Atlantic, Mauritania, and Morocco
The most dominant fisheries of Area 34 consist mainly of rich
resources of hake, crustaceans (shrimps and lobsters), cephalopods
(octopus, cuttlefish, and squid), small pelagics (sardines, mackerels),
and tunas (big-eye and yellowfin). Rich demersal resources are also
present. This area is the largest contributor to Arab fish landings.
AREA 37: Mediterranean Sea, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya,
Egypt, Gaza (Palestine), Lebanon, and Syria
Area 37 is generally considered medium to poor with regard to
fish productivity. The western parts of this area have small pelagics,
with its main fishery consisting mostly of sardines and anchovy, as
well as a modest population of demersal species. The central parts,
while rich in demersal and small pelagic species, suffer from
over-fishing in such areas as the Gulf of Gabes in Tunisia, for ex
ample, while other waters bordering Libya are under-exploited.
The eastern portions consist of poorer fisheries fished by much
smaller boats than those of the central and western portions. Pales
tinian fisheries off Gaza have in recent years dropped from about
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4,000 T/y to about 1,000 T/y as a result of the reduction of the fishing
limits from 20 km to 12 km from the shore. This has also caused the
reduction of the number of fishermen from 13,000 in 1980s to the
current estimate of some 1,500 or so.
Area 51: North Western Indian Ocean, Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti,
Somalia, Yemen, Comoros, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait,
Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman
Area 51 is an extremely varied area consisting of the Red Sea, the
North Arabian Sea, several gulfs, and the northern parts of the In
dian Ocean. The Red Sea is considered of poor productivity (outside
of the Gulf of Suez, which is actually over-fished) and its fisheries
resources consist of quantities of small pelagics, jack, and some
demersal and crustacean resources. The fisheries of the Arabian Gulf
and Gulf of Oman are modest in their production of small pelagics,
demersal species and crustaceans. Some areas, especially in the Gulf
of Oman and the north Arabian Sea, could withstand further exploi
tation of their resources. Only the shrimp resources are highly ex
ploited. The Gulf of Aden is considered a fish-rich area and is
underexploited, the fisheries consisting of mostly small pelagics
(sardines and anchovy) and several high-value demersal species.
Crustaceans resources and cephalopods are also available and could
withstand further exploitation. The unexploited resource of meso
pelagic fish in the Gulf of Aden as well as in the Gulf of Oman,
estimated to be not less than 1.5 - 2 MT, is another resource which
offers potential. Finally, the southern part of Area 51, waters border
ing Somalia, is considered rich in small pelagics (sardines) as well as
a good resources of demersal species, tunas and crustaceans.
In addition to the traditional and conventional fisheries, a wide
variety of seafoods, such as abalone, bivalves, crabs, sea cucumbers,
jelly fish, sea-unicorn and sea turtles, are available in Arab waters. It
is possible that some of these species may be nationally exploited for
export purposes once the expertise for their processing and market
ing becomes available, as long as the harvest of endangered species is
still strictly prohibited.
The coastlines of the Arab states total 23,000 km, and span a
continental shelf area of 608,000 km2. Inland waters are estimated to
have an area of about 7.2 million hectares of marshes, water reser
voirs, rivers and lakes.
Latest FAO fisheries statistics on the Arab world indicate that in
1995 fish production from marine and inland waters including
aquaculture was 2 MT or about 1.8 % of global catches. The 1994 fish
landings from all sources were 1.9 MT amounting to 1.7% of the
world catch of 109 million tons, i.e., a rise in landings of about 1.1 %
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from all sources over the period of 1990–1995.
Marine and inland catches over a period of six years have fluctu
ated slightly but maintained an increasing trend (see Figure 1).
With regard to the contribution of aquaculture to Arab fisheries
resources in both marine and fresh waters in 1995 the total produc
tion reached 69,000 MT. Aquaculture is a relatively new source of fish
in the Arab states but has made significant progress since 1984 in
creasing by about 68% in roughly a decade. It is significant to note
that the practice of aquaculture in Egypt, Iraq and Syria for many
years has been contingent upon the availability of fresh water. In
recent years, aquaculture has been initiated in several countries
where fresh water is very scarce, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain and United Arab Emirates (Figure 1).
CLASSIFICATION OF FISHERIES RESOURCES
Fisheries resources may be classified into four main areas:
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EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE FISHERIES
The introduction in the mid-1970s of Exclusive Economic Zones
(EEZs) and the adoption in 1982 of the United Nations Convention
of the Law of the Sea provided a new framework for the manage
ment of marine resources. The new legal regime of the oceans gave
coastal states rights and responsibilities for the management and use
of fishery resources within their EEZs. However, many coastal states,
including several Arab countries, continue to face serious challenges,
lacking experience and financial and physical resources to achieve greater
benefits from the fisheries within their EEZs.
Subsequently, the FAO Committee on Fisheries (COFI), at its
Nineteenth Session in 1991, called for the development of new
concepts which would lead to responsible, sustainable fisheries. As a
result, the International Conference on Responsible Fishing, held in
1992 in Mexico, requested FAO to prepare an international Code of
Conduct to address these issues. The outcome of this Conference
was an important contribution to the 1992 United Nations Confer
ence on Environment and Development (UNCED), particularly
Agenda 21. Afterwards, the United Nations Conference on Strad
dling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks was convened,
to which FAO provided important technical back-up. In November
1993, the Agreement to Promote Compliance with International
Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the
High Seas was adopted.
As a result of these developments, the Code of Conduct for
Responsible Fisheries, adopted in October 1995 by the FAO Confer
ence, provided a necessary framework for national and international
efforts to insure sustainable exploitation of aquatic living resources
in harmony with environmental management activities. It has also
brought about a significant change in the conditions under which
fisheries are carried out on a world wide basis. The extent of na
tional EEZs and the nature of jurisdiction claimed differ from coun
try to country, but in the majority of cases the zone extends 200
nautical miles offshore and in all cases jurisdiction over fishery
resources is included.
All Arab states, albeit in ranging degrees, may have access to
fisheries resources in their EEZs. However, it is not yet clear what
benefits the Arab states can gain from fish resources available in
their EEZs. The only extension of jurisdiction by Arab states of
possible benefits to their fisheries is in the fishing areas of the coun
tries bordering the east central Atlantic Ocean (Mauritania and
Morocco) and the northwest Indian Ocean (Oman, Yemen and
Somalia). However, although extension of jurisdiction by these
countries over the fish resources in their EEZs provides an opportu

  



   

nity for more effective development and national management of
fisheries based on the stocks available, realization of that opportu
nity depends on the solution of a number of difficult problems.
MARINE FISHERIES
The fisheries of the Arab Middle East and North Africa are
quite heterogenous as a result of wide geographical spread. They
may be classified into two broad categories based on vessel size,
gear types and species targeted.
HIGH SEAS (OFFSHORE) FISHERIES
In large fish-producing countries such as Morocco and
Mauritania, the category is characterized by a large modern mecha
nized fleets with vessels equipped with freezing, storage and other
facilities capable of up to three months of operation at sea at a
stretch. These vessels operate beyond the 20 mile fishing zone and
their catches are almost exclusively destined for export. This is
capital intensive activity requiring large investment, often beyond
the reach of most private local fishermen. It is an export-oriented
sub-sector of high-value species, such as cuttlefish, octopus, squid,
shrimp and tuna. The fleets operating in this fishery are largely
fleets from Spain and Portugal operating in most instances under
license or joint ventures. Their catches are of high value, but they
are not, in most cases, reported as catches of the countries border
ing the waters where fishing operations take place.
COASTAL FISHERIES
Within this category, two sub-groups are usually considered:
intermediate and small scale (artisanal) fisheries.
Intermediate Fisheries
This sub-group is characterized by vessels of 25 meters or less,
operating up to 20 miles off shore, mostly targeting pelagic species,
sardines and mackerels in particular. Because an important pro
portion of the production of this category goes to canning and, to a
lesser extent, fish meal and fish oil industries, they are sometimes
referred to as “industrial fisheries.” The average share of these
fisheries is 15–20%.
Small Scale Fisheries
This sub-group is characterized by a fleet of small motorized
boats, 5–6 m in length, of small catching capacities equipped with
various kinds of traditional fishing gear. Fishermen composing this

 





group are scattered all along the coastlines of Arab states. Their
numbers are high and much of their fishing is subsistence fishing for
local markets, families and clans. The official statistics of their catches
are not recorded systematically and therefore lack reliability. The
species they target are mostly demersal, near shore species and crus
taceans (mainly shrimps) where they exist. The average share of
coastal fisheries in the Arab world fish landings has been estimated
at 80-85%.
Inland Fisheries
Inland fisheries resources are those landed from the various
inland water bodies, which are estimated to cover about 1.5 million
km2. The major states where these are available are Egypt, Sudan,
Iraq and Syria. These include lakes, rivers, marsh lands, swamps,
reservoirs, and natural and man-made lakes. The lakes in the Egyp
tian Delta region are the main fish production water bodies in addi
tion to Lake Nasser in the south, Lake Qarun, and the River Nile. In
Sudan, the main inland fisheries are in the Blue and White Niles in
addition to the main stem of the Nile. Iraq’s main fisheries are lo
cated on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers as well as some man-made
reservoirs. Other rivers with smaller size fisheries exist in Syria,
Lebanon, Jordan, and Mauritania.
Most of the inland fisheries in the Arab states are characterized
by subsistence fishing to meet immediate food supply needs of
populations living in the vicinity of the water bodies. Any excess to
their food needs is sold to the local markets. The major problems
facing these rivers are:
•
reduced volumes from upstream diversions and flood
control; and
•
compromised water quality from pollution.
Aquaculture
Aquaculture’s global importance grows each year because of
population growth and the fact that the natural fisheries resources
may have reached their maximum sustainable yield. The Arab world
is no exception. Many states with freshwater resources, such as
Egypt, Sudan, Iraq and Syria, have practiced aquaculture for many
years. Other countries where freshwater is scarce are engaging in
mariculture activities, farming fish along their coastlines (such as in
Tunisia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain). The U.A.E.
and Oman have also established research centres with the aim of
developing mariculture in their waters.
In 1995, fish from aquaculture reached a production level of
68,000 MT, 4% of total fish catches in the Arab region, valued at about

  



   

$300 million. Production in 1984 was only about 22,000 MT valued at
only $59 million. The 1995 level represents an increase of 67% in
quantity and 95% in value (Figure 1).
The main species farmed are those indigenous species which are
popularly accepted in the individual Arab countries. In Egypt and
Sudan Tilapia is farmed and is also being introduced for farming in
Saudi Arabia where Egyptian and Sudanese minorities live. Grou
pers and rabbitfish are farmed in the Gulf Cooperation Council
States (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and U.A.E.),
and shrimp farming has been attempted along the Egyptian coast of
the Red Sea. There are also experimental projects aimed at develop
ing the commercial cage farming of sea bass and sea bream in Egypt,
begun in 1990 in Port Said in the east and Mersa Metrouh on the
Mediterranean coast in the west. When research studies on fish
farming become feasible, and as the technologies and know-how
become readily available, fish from aquaculture production is ex
pected to expand substantially.
With a coastline stretching for about 23,000 km, the Arab region
offers considerable possibilities for fish farming both in inland and
marine waters. It remains to be seen, however, whether aquaculture
production of fish will substantially increase fish supply in the re
gion and significantly reduce either the supply/demand gap or de
pendence on imports.
FISH CONSUMPTION AND PREFERENCES
Average per capita fish consumption in the Arab world in 1995
was about 6.6 kg, compared with the world average of about 13 kg/y.
Per capita fish consumption among the Arab countries is highest
in the United Arab Emirates (51.1 kg/y) followed by Oman (36.7 kg/y)
Bahrain (16.93 kg/y) Mauritania (16.6 kg/y) Qatar (16.5 kg/y) and
Morocco (15.4 kg/y). All other Arab states are well below the inter
national average, with some as low as less than 1 kg/year, as in Leba
non and Syria.
Fish consumption in the region as a whole has some distinctive
characteristics:
•
Fish consumption is highest in coastal countries where fish
are comparatively abundant, the population is low, and fish
represent an important part of the national diet.
•
All other Arab states generally have a low consumption rate.
This is mainly due to low production levels, high populations,
and shortage of hard currencies to import fish as a supplement
to local supplies. The coastal areas in several such countries have
very high consumption levels, e.g., Somalia and Yemen, but
remote inland populations may consume negligible amounts.
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Fish consumption patterns have changed somewhat in
some of the countries having a substantial foreign labor
population, notably the oil-producing countries. This is due
to the increased import of non-traditional species to satisfy
new consumer demands, the introduction of new fish
preparation methods, changes in eating habits, and innova
tions in product forms.

The list of preferred locally produced seafood species includes
shrimp, lobster and cuttlefish, caught mostly in the waters surround
ing the Arabian Peninsula and Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania.
However, as local market demand in the region is limited, such spe
cies are largely exported due to their high international market prices.
Generally, fish consumption is affected by conditions and sys
tems of marketing, distribution, and transport and, to a minor
extent, by tribal, traditional, and social attitudes. Fish consumption
thus presents a complex pattern, ranging greatly between countries
and within different areas in the same country or subregion.
FISH RESOURCES POTENTIAL
The fisheries statistics of FAO indicate that total fish catches
from all Arab sources during 1995 was about 2 MT. However, fishery
statistics issued by the Arab Organization for Agricultural Develop
ment (AOAD) indicate that Arab fish landings in the same year were
10% higher. The discrepancy in reported figures implies that statis
tics require harmonization in order to arrive at a more reliable and
accurate database.
However, considering the potential of all the marine waters that
border the Arab states, it is believed that the marine fish total caught
from Arab waters is higher than that which is actually reported. This
assumption is made on the belief that there are many foreign fishing
vessels operating, legally or illegally, in Arab fish-rich waters such as
those off Morocco, Mauritania, Somalia, and Yemen, and the catches
made are not recorded as catches from these waters. These catches are
estimated to be about 1-2 MT. In other words, actual fish landings from
Arab marine resources may be in the range of 3-4 MT per annum.
In the absence of strict surveillance, monitoring, and control of
the fisheries resources of the fish-rich countries, it is difficult to
substantiate and document the actual fish volumes caught from
Arab waters. It is well known that there are several joint ventures
between Arab states and foreign companies, but the extent and volume
of their actual operations are not publicly known or documented.
The 1993–94 negotiations between Morocco and the European
Union (EU) over fishing rights in Moroccan waters offer a case in

  



   

point. During the negotiations European fleets did not operate in
Moroccan waters. Catches by the local fishermen jumped to a record
high of 40 MT/d during May-November 1995. Morocco’s territorial
waters have an abundance of sardines, mackerel, squid, octopus,
tuna, hake seabream, and shrimp. Moroccan fishermen feel that the
foreign fleets are a threat to their domestic resources and feel they
can better exploit their own fisheries themselves. During negotia
tions, the coastal fleet was catching up to five MT/d, which is still
only half the record of the seventies (possibly due to the effects of
indiscriminate over-fishing by the foreign fleets) but above the one
MT/d maximum catch during the presence of foreign fleets.
Morocco, in its consideration of the future beyond the year 2000
when the renewed agreement with the EU expires, has embarked on
an investment plan to reshape its fishing industry. It has earmarked
over $200 million to upgrade installations industry-wide as part of a
long-term goal to exploit its rich waters without foreign interven
tion. The fisheries authorities’ objective for the year 2000 is to
achieve yield on an annual sustainable basis ranging from 1.5 to 2.5
million tons. Production objectives are 1.5 MT/y, up from the 1994
production of 752,000 MT/y, and 846,000 MT/y in 1995. The Moroc
can authorities are also establishing another fisheries research centre
and imposing longer fish conservation periods to protect the stocks.
The rehabilitation of several ports and fleet servicing facilities are
part of the upgrading process.
FISH TRADE
TRADE TRENDS
Although the collection and dissemination of fishery statistics
has generally improved over the last few years in several Arab coun
tries, information on fish trade within each country is still not suffi
cient. For example, it is not well established how much of the total
fish production is marketed. Subsistence fishing is practiced to a
considerable extent in the region, especially in the countries border
ing the Arabian Peninsula and along the shores of inland lakes and
rivers, especially in Iraq and Egypt. Therefore, it is assumed that a
considerable portion of total production is consumed by the fisher
men and their families.
Marine catches constituted about 84% of total catches in 1995.
Quantities not consumed locally by the coastal population are
mostly cured and exported. In the last few years, foreign fish and
fishery products have also been exported. These exports should not
be interpreted as a genuine surplus as there is probably a strong

 





potential demand for fish in the interior, which in some countries
lacks accessibility due to poor communications and transportation.
Exports in 1995 are mostly attributed to expanded fishing activi
ties off the coast of Mauritania (14% of the total) possibly by foreign
fleets and trans-shipment of foreign fish. Morocco has also shown a
substantial increase in canned fish product exports (61% of the total).
Most countries of the region are importers of some quantity of
fish. Egypt is the largest importer (28% of the total) followed by Saudi
Arabia (25% of the total). Apart from the imports to Egypt, other
major import items include canned and foreign products and some
high-value fish preparations (especially for the Gulf countries).
It might be expected that the Arab region would be a net ex
porter of fish and fishery products. However, when excluding MoAlgeria
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rocco and Mauritania, the total for other countries classifies them as
net importers. It should also be noted that the exports from
Mauritania are predominantly small pelagic species caught mostly
by foreign fishing vessels off the territorial waters and similar fish
species caught and canned by Morocco. Exports by other exporting
countries are mainly high valued demersal species, crustaceans and
cephalopod species, mostly for export outside the region (Figure 3).

It might be expected that the Arab
region would be a net exporter of fish
and fishery products. However, when
excluding Morocco and Mauritania, the
total for other countries classifies them
as net importers.

TRADE CONSTRAINTS
Shortage of dependable information on demand and supply,
prices and price fluctuations, as well as buyers and sellers in most of
the countries, has been a major factor adversely affecting the growth
of Arab trade in fish and fishery products. Coupled with this is the
dearth of technical know-how and trained manpower, together with
inadequate infrastructure. Attempts at product development, prod
uct and market diversification and value addition have been quite
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limited in scope and results, in spite of improvements in
recent years.
Lack of regular and direct flights linking the production and
consumption centres both within and outside the Arab world has
restricted trade in fresh fish, while irregular shipping facilities ham
per smooth flow of frozen fish from one port to another. Moreover,
though some of the countries in the Arab world are among the
richest in the world, there are also several countries that are not so
fortunate. This has resulted in insufficient communication facilities
even between neighbors. Due to such problems, the share of intra
regional trade in fish and fishery products in the total import-export
trade within the Arab region is also quite negligible.
Another trade constraint is associated with canned small
pelagics, a major export item. It is estimated that the GCC countries
together consume between 25,000 and 30,000 MT of canned fishery
products per annum. Despite the growing demand, a major share of
these imports are not from Arab exporters of the same commodities.
At times, countries such as Tunisia and Morocco are stuck with
quantities of canned products for want of buyers. Moreover, the
installed capacity utilization in these two countries is quite low,
often due to lack of orders. In some Arab countries, the general
pattern of trade linking producers to buyers is based exclusively on a
few traditional products, depending on a few traditional buyers and
sellers. In other countries, where there is a wish to diversify prod
ucts, enter new markets and increase trade, producers and proces
sors suffer from acute lack of up-to-date information on such vital
matters as product requirements and specifications, the required
processing technology, quality standards, current prices, and mar
keting opportunities and trends, all of which leads to the misapplica
tion of production capacity, loss of potential profits, loss of foreign
exchange, and reduced employment opportunities.
MAJOR TRADE MARKETS
The Arab world is most likely to continue to be a major importer
of fish and fishery products in the years to come. This is in spite of
the efforts made to increase indigenous production. Some of the
items available in this region, such as cephalopods, crustaceans,
molluscs and high-value demand species, will have to be exported to
markets elsewhere due either to little domestic demand or the quest
for hard currency earnings.
The major importer among of the Arab states is Egypt, with
129,000 T valued at $79 million imported in 1995 or 46% of all Arab
fish imports. Egyptian imports are mostly frozen small pelagic spe
cies of sardines and mackerels which are consumed by the low in

  



   

come section of the population at subsidized rates. The next major
market is the six GCC states, which as a combined market area
imported a total of 89.3 thousand tons valued at $153.7 million and
in 1995 led by Saudi Arabia as the main importer of the GCC states
and second from the Arab countries (Figure 2).
Irrespective of the varying size of markets and the corresponding
levels in quantity and value of imports, the consumption pattern as
well as marketing channels in the GCC states have many things in
common. All the GCC countries are characterized by close socioeco
nomic and linguistic links as well as population growth trends. With
the implementation of a free trade area and free movement of na
tionals, funds and goods, and the liberalization of wholesaling and
other marketing activities, the importers, distributors, and wholesal
ers, in general, have benefited immensely.
The average expatriate population in the GCC countries is esti
mated at 45% of the total population. Consumer preferences among
the expatriates is very often different from that of the nationals.
Thus, fish and fishery products imports fall into two categories:
chilled/fresh fish, as well as canned and dried products preferred by
the native population and items like frozen fish in demand among
the expatriates.
With regard to exports, the major Arab exporter is Morocco,
with exports totalling 233,900 MT in 1995 or 61% of total exports,
valued at $786.5 million. Most of these exports are canned small
pelagic fish species to markets in Europe, some of which are re
exported to the Arab markets. Mauritania is the second largest ex
porter, with 55,000 MT, or 14%, valued at $167.3 million. The main
exports are cephalopods, Japan being the most important importer.
Also Italy, Spain, France and Germany are importers of Mauritanian
demersal fish species. African countries import small pelagic species
from Mauritania.
ROLE OF INFOSAMAK CENTRE IN DEVELOPING ARAB
FISH TRADE
One of the most visible impediments to enhancing inter-regional
trade in fish and fishery products and consequently a better exploi
tation of Arab fisheries is the fact that this sector has not in the past
been given the priority it deserves in some of the Arab countries.
The Centre for Marketing Information and Advisory Services for
Fishery Products in the Arab Region (INFOSAMAK), which was
established in Bahrain in 1986 as a link in the FAO worldwide Fish
Marketing Information Network, has played a major role in provid
ing fish trade promotional services.

 





INFOSAMAK services help raise the level of awareness and
importance of the sector. Inter-country trade has benefited in both
value and quantity by the information made available by
INFOSAMAK. The market information service is an efficient and
productive mechanism for fish trade information and collation.
With respect to market promotion, the ability of INFOSAMAK to
match buyers and sellers has been productive.
Investment opportunities in the field of Arab fisheries has also
been one of INFOSAMAK’s promotion and identification services.
It undertook pre-feasibility studies on behalf of investors which led
to the strengthening of contacts with Arab national and regional
institutions and organizations who are potential investors in the
fisheries sub-sector.
INFOSAMAK has proven to be an important regional service
and an active participant in the Arab international fish marketing
sub-sector. Its establishment has boosted the development of the
Arab fish trade.
DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES
Total fish landings attributed to the Arab states from marine and
inland resources have stagnated during the last few years at about
1.7 MT/y. Aquaculture, a newly developed resource, added about
60,000 MT in 1993. Although an increase in production from capture
fisheries is possible and will probably occur in response to intensi
fied fisheries activities, it is very unlikely to keep pace with popula
tion growth if the most sought-after and most easily caught fish are
to be maintained as supply to the local domestic markets. The chal
lenge here is organizing and stimulating production from fish re
sources so that per capita supply of fish as food does not decline.
In order to meet this challenge, proper management of available
resources is required by the fisheries authorities in the Arab states.
Maintaining efficient measures of monitoring and controlling these
resources is essential. When applied properly and effectively, these
measures could mitigate the effects associated with over-fishing of
the major fisheries resources. The measures include building the
capability to enforce laws against poaching in the territorial waters
and high seas under national jurisdiction, banning fishing methods
which are a threat to the resources, and finding a balance in the
multi-purpose use of coastal resources to ensure a sustainable and
optimum supply of fish. (Coastal fisheries at present provide Arab
states with over 85% of their fish landings). In other words, the stockdamaging experience of the “shrimp-rush” of the 1960s in the Ara
bian Gulf by foreign fleets should not be allowed to take place again.

  



   

In aquaculture, the challenge here lies in the fact that it has not
yet fully taken hold in the Arab states. In order to sufficiently de
velop aquaculture, governments and research institutions concerned
will need to increase and improve research that could be applied
inland and along the coastlines. Involvement of the private sector
and industry to identify research needs and priorities is essential.
Research in aquaculture must address improvements in technolo
gies, contribute to a reduction in the cost of production, and con
sider the increasing need to ensure that aquaculture is environmen
tally safe and that farming indigenous and popularly-demanded
species as well as possible introducing new species can be achieved
without endangering the local ecology.
Fisheries statistics is another challenge that needs to be met. Much
of the recorded data and information on the sector is incomplete,
inconsistent, and outdated. Concerted efforts are needed to improve
and develop the methods of data compilation, documentation, and
analysis which are essential to making proper management decisions.
Provision of upgraded data should be the responsibility of all con
cerned governments in the region, to optimize appropriate exchanges
of economic, commercial, and biological data.
Training and upgrading of the fisheries workforce poses another
serious challenge to the development of the fisheries sector. Training
on the various aspects of fisheries management administration and
technology is required. Attention should also be given to the
strengthening and establishment of fisheries training institutions.
This challenge will prove to be an essential contribution and, in
some cases, has already had a major impact on a country’s fisheries
development. When fisheries resources have a human resource base
adequate for supporting more efficient national exploitation and
increasing that exploitation, the result is better job opportunities for
those who receive training. Experience has shown that a national
institution designed to meet national scientific training needs can
make a bigger contribution than a regional institution, which can
not satisfy all the different needs of the various countries of the
region. Regional training institutions would be effective, however, if
established in a region where the countries involved have common
fisheries resources, similar experiences, and homogeneity in the
exploitation of their fisheries, as exists in the GCC countries.
CONCLUSIONS
The Arab states’ fisheries sector can be a much better contributor
to the economic development of the Arab countries and could pro
vide increased benefits to the Arab peoples. Enhancing fisheries
production would increase food supplies to help avert shortages in

 





animal protein, give support to food security measures, and reduce
imports (which are a drain on hard currencies). It could open job
opportunities to rural and urban populations, raise the standard of
living of small-scale fishermen, and develop rural areas and fishing
communities. Furthermore, with increased and enhanced fisheries
activities, fisheries industries would improve the utilisation of fish
landings, develop value-added products, and promote marketing,
distribution, and inter- and intra-regional trade.
However, to embark on such activities, considerable improve
ments to the sector have to be implemented. These improvements
require initiatives by the governments of the region to give higher
priority in their national development plans to their fisheries sector.
Public investment in fisheries infrastructure and services has to be
increased to create an encouraging environment for potential pri
vate investors. Fisheries research must be encouraged in marine and
inland fisheries and aquaculture in order to bring about better man
agement of resources including measures for resource conservation.
The new internationally recognized Code of Conduct for Respon
sible Fishing is an opportunity which the Arab states may seize upon
in order to achieve increased benefits from their own resources.
There are various challenges to the Arab states which have to be
met in order to achieve the desired results. Fisheries should not by any
means be considered a side- or marginal activity and should be given
sufficient support and protection measures to allow the gradual
growth and development. Fisheries development is, by its very nature,
a long term activity, and development projects or programmes often
require considerable time until they start to bear fruit.
In the past few years marine fisheries in many areas, Arab waters
included, have achieved their maximum sustainable yield. However,
future concentration of development should be in the rational ex
ploitation of some marine areas offshore and in the EEZs, as well as
in maximizing benefits from joint ventures with foreign fishing
fleets by negotiating better terms. Furthermore, the small-scale
fisheries sector should have greater emphasis, and aquaculture, in
fresh and marine waters, should be a major growth area.
Finally, it cannot be over-emphasized that, for the Arab states,
fisheries are vital for the food security and economic livelihood of a
major portion of the population. Fisheries productivity and renewability are dependent on both high-quality management and a high
quality natural environment. Therefore, better management of
currently over-exploited stocks, cautious utilization of under- or
non-harvested marine and fresh water resources, expansion of
acquaculture, and improvements in post-harvest utilization are
prerequisites for the development of Arab fisheries.
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ABSTRACT
Historically, about half the oil transported through the global marine environment has come through the Arabian Gulf
and the annual input of oil to the gulf’s marine environment is skewed toward sources connected with marine transport.
As a case study, we assess the damages from an oil spill caused by a collision between the crude oil tankers Baynuna and
the Seki on 30 March 1994. The collision released approximately 16,000 metric tons (MT) of light Iranian crude oil into
the coastal waters of the Emirate of Fujairah, United Arab Emirates. Under the sponsorship of the Government of
Fujairah, we analyze the effects on commercial fisheries and marine environment of Fujairah resulting from the spill. This
analysis was the first comprehensive natural resource damage assessment conducted in this area. The major difficulty was
to establish the economic damages associated with the environmental contamination and fisheries declines. We adapt an
established compensation schedule to the UAE situation. Information on the amount and type of oil spilled, the amount of
oil recovered, the season, the habitats oiled, the resources exposed, and the sensitivity of the resources is then used to
establish the economic value of losses associated with environmental contamination and fisheries decline.

INTRODUCTION
Oil currently supplies about 40% of the world’s energy, and
recent estimates suggest that the Middle East has over 65% of
world’s petroleum reserves (World Resources Institute 1996). The
countries bordering the Arabian Gulf produce almost 6 billion
barrels (bbl) or 798 million metric tons (MT) of oil a year, about 27%
of the world’s production in 1993 (World Resources Institute 1996).
Historically, about half of the oil transported through the global
marine environment has come through the Arabian Gulf (Gupta
et al. 1993).
Besides the dramatic and well-publicized catastrophic oil spills, a
substantial amount of oil enters the marine and coastal waters of the
Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman from a variety of other sources:
ballast water discharges, fueling spills, platform blowouts, pipeline
leaks, and spills from tanker and barge accidents. Natural seeps also
constitute a significant contribution.
Little information is available on the magnitudes of inputs from
these more routine sources, and what estimates are available differ
by orders of magnitude (e.g., Oostdam 1980; Linden 1990; Sorkoh
1992; Literathy 1993; Price 1993). Transported oil constitutes a
more significant source in the Gulf than in other parts of the world

  



   

because of this region’s importance as a shipping route to the West
(Sheppard et al. 1992; Price 1993). For example, an estimated
400,000 to 750,000 mt of ballast water and other oily water dis
charges from tanker and ship traffic enter Gulf waters annually
(Linden 1990; Price 1993). A single pipeline spill in Kuwait released
over 15,000 bbl (about 2 000 MT) to marine waters (Linden 1990).
Assuming a tanker spill equivalent to the Seki oil spill occurs every
four years, the annual oil input is 4,000 MT from tanker accidents.
About 14 tanker accidents of various kinds occur annually in the
Arabian Gulf and at least 13% of these release oil (Linden 1990). For
comparison, spills released about half a million bbl (67,000 MT)
during the Iraq-Iran War (Price 1993). The world’s largest oil spill
occurred during the 1991 Gulf War and released 3.81 to 8.1 million
bbl (500,000 to 1,100,000 MT) into the northern Arabian Gulf (Sauer
et al. 1993).
Tankers carry oil from the Arabian Gulf, with 20,000 to 35,000
individual tanker passages per year through the Strait of Hormuz
(Price 1993). Hundreds of tankers can be seen anchored off Fujairah
on the East Coast of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) awaiting
passage into the Arabian Gulf. In this area on 30 March 1994, two
tankers, the Baynuna and Seki, collided, and the Seki released about
16,000 MT of light Iranian crude oil into the coastal waters of the
Emirate of Fujairah. Spills such as this differ from chronic releases in
that a large amount of oil contaminates a limited area in a short
time period. This acute contamination is certainly more discernible
and its effects, while difficult to demonstrate, are certainly made
more evident through the acute toxicity of high oil concentrations
and through the increased attention given them compared to the
chronic exposures.
This paper treats the Seki oil spill as a case study to draw some
lessons for both science and policy concerning the assessment of
damages from such spills. Before reviewing the events of Seki and
discussing the results of our assessment of spill damages, we offer
some background on the region’s environment.
THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT OF THE GULF REGION
The waters of the Arabian Gulf have several unique features,
described well in Sheppard et al. (1992) and concisely in Sheppard
(1993). First, this geologically young region has an enclosed shallow
sea with a low flushing rate (i.e., 3 to 5.5 years). Second, although
the climate is arid, there is a marked seasonality with hot summers
and cool winters. Heating and chilling events are common. Third,
the excess of evaporation over rainfall leads to high salinity. Salinity,
especially in the southern part of the Gulf, is often above 40 points
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per thousand (PPT) and may reach to 70 PPT in embayments.
Fourth, with most of the Gulf less than 60 m deep (and therefore
within the photic zone), benthic production contributes strongly to
the high biological productivity reported for the Arabian Gulf.
The region’s climate subjects its living marine resources to high
natural stressors (Sheppard 1993). The reef areas of the Gulf can
experience temperature maxima approaching 36 °C and seasonal
differences ranging up to 25 °C. Many species are living at the limits
of their tolerances to temperature and salinity. This situation has led
to questions of whether the biota of the region may be more vulner
able or more resistant to pollutants, or are some mixture of vulner
able and resistant species. Fish kills following shamals (cold winter
winds) and red tides and coral bleaching following temperature
extremes are examples of consequences of such natural stressors.
The region’s high temperatures and high concentrations of oil
degrading microbes also produce a strong weathering environment
for spilled oil. Much of the volatile and more toxic components of
oil spilled in the region evaporate within hours (h) or days. Indeed,
about half of the oil spilled in tropical waters is expected to disappear within 24 h (Gupta et al. 1993). After the first 24 h, oil disperses
through a variety of physical and chemical processes and also begins
to degrade. Ultimately, oil that is not degraded can remain as asphaltic layers within beach sediments or become tar balls. For example, studies of beaches contaminated during the Gulf War Oil
Spill also found relict asphalt pavements derived from the Nowruz
oil spill in 1983 (Hayes et al. 1993). Tar balls can be found com
monly on the Gulf’s sea surface (Gupta et al. 1993), sometimes at
depth (Gupta et al. 1993) and on many, if not most, gulf beaches
(Price et al. 1987; Badawy and Al-Harthy 1991; Sheppard et al.
1992). Despite this strong weathering environment, oil that is se
questered in certain environment compartments can remain rela
tively unweathered. Recently, Randolph et al. (1997) found beach
sediments heavily contaminated during the Gulf War Oil Spill were
still toxic to amphipods some 30 months after the spill (Randolph
et al. 1997).
The region’s critical habitats are well described by Sheppard et al.
(1992), and the list in Table 1 is expanded from Price et al. (1993). Here
as elsewhere, critical coastal habitats are often also the ones vulnerable
to oil and other disturbances. While Price (1993) lists oil pollution as
potentially degrading to the Gulf’s coastal habitats, he considers
coastal infilling and development as potentially more destructive.
The important living resources of the Gulf include fisheries,
birds, sea turtles (both green and hawksbill), and dugongs
(sea cows) (Price et al. 1993). The region’s oil and gas are of course



The reef areas of the Gulf can experience temperature maxima approaching
36 °C and seasonal differences ranging
up to 25°C. Many species are living at
the limits of their tolerances to temperature and salinity. This situation has led
to questions of whether the biota of the
region may be more vulnerable or more
resistant to pollutants, or are some
mixture of vulnerable and resistant
species.

  



   

Table 1 Critical coastal habitats in the Persian/Arabian Gulf (expanded from Price et al. 1993)
HABITATS

IMPORTANCE AND COMMENTS

Mangroves

Nursery area for fish and shellfish

Seagrasses

Direct food for dugong, sea turtles, some urchins and fish; indirect food for
many other marine species; nursery area for fish and shellfish, especially shrimp

Coral areas

Principally patch reefs; true coral cays around offshore islands; food and shelter
for resources supporting artisanal/commercial fisheries

Tidal flats

Major energy and nutrient input to marine system

Tidal flats w/algae mats

Habitat with most injury from 1991 Gulf War oil spills

Rocky reef fisheries

Food and shelter for resources supporting artisanal/commercial fisheries

Carbonate rock platforms
Nursery areas for shrimp and pearl oyster spat
with microalgae

the major non-living resource, but increasingly important is clean
seawater for desalination. During the Gulf War, substantial effort
was directed at preventing oil from reaching the intakes of desalina
tion plants. In July, 1997, diesel fuel spilled from a grounded barge
in Sharjah, UAE entered the intake of a desalination plant, contami
nating the water supply of an estimated half million people.
FUJAIRAH AND ENVIRONS
The spill environment is Fujairah, which contains most of the
eastern UAE coastline bordering the Gulf of Oman. The Gulf of
Oman is just south of the Strait of Hormuz, and seawater from both
the Arabian Sea to the south and the Arabian Gulf to the north
circulates through it. The shoreline north of the port of Fujairah is
characterized by coarse- and fine-grained sandy beaches inter
spersed by rocky headlands and occasional mixed sand and cobble
shores, with occasional boulders. Bedrock outcrops of sedimentary
rocks are common in several locations, particularly in the lower
intertidal zone. The tidal range (vertical distance between mean high
and low tide) along the Fujairah coast is about 2 m. Depending on
the slope of the shore, the intertidal zone (the area between the
mean high and low tide lines) may be anywhere between a few
meters to more than 200 m wide. The shallow nearshore area con
tains mixed substrates. Rocky reefs and coral reefs are common
throughout the area.
The coastal and offshore waters of Fujairah support a rich and
diverse fish fauna, including many species of reef-associated fish,
seasonally abundant large pelagic species, and small schooling fish
(Sheppard et al. 1992). These fish support moderate to large local
commercial and artisanal fisheries of substantial economic value to
the people of Fujairah. These fisheries are based in several fishing
ports along the east coast of the UAE. Ministry of Agriculture and
Fisheries (MAF) statistics indicate that 1993 fish landings along the

 

The coastal and offshore waters of
Fujairah support a rich and diverse fish
fauna, including many species of reefassociated fish, seasonally abundant
large pelagic species, and small
schooling fish
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east coast of the UAE totaled ~29,300 MT, with a value of
227,577,000 Dirhams (about $62 million).
These shallow coastal waters support abundant marine life,
particularly in association with coral reefs. Small nearshore islands
are important habitats for marine birds and sea turtles. There is a
growing tourist industry based on the warm, sunny climate, sandy
beaches, and nearshore reefs of Fujairah. All these natural resources
and the commercial interests they support were adversely impacted
by the Seki oil spill.
A SHORT HISTORY OF THE SEKI OIL SPILL
On the evening of 30 March 1994, the crude oil tanker, Seki, fully
loaded with Iranian light and heavy crude oils, was moving slowly
south-southwest about 9.6 km off the port of Fujairah, UAE. The
Baynuna, moving in ballast, attempted to pass in front but instead
collided with the Seki. The bow of the Baynuna penetrated to a
depth of 6 to 7 m into the Seki’s No. 1 port cargo tank, which con
tained a light Iranian crude oil (American Petroleum Institute [API]
gravity 33.9 at 60 °F).
An estimated total of 16,000 MT (~18.7 million liters [L]) of
crude oil escaped. Booms deployed around the Seki failed to contain
the oil, and the oil slick spread away from the vessel, initially carried
offshore by winds. However, on 2 April, the winds changed, and oil
began drifting in a northwesterly direction toward the coast north of
the port of Fujairah. On 2 April, large amounts of oil came ashore
on the Fujairahan coast between Lu’lu’iyah and Rul Dibba (Figure
1). Approximately 30 km of coastline from about Al Bidhiya north
ward to about Ras Dibba were oiled initially. However, oil washing
off the shore with each tide tended to be driven northward by the
prevailing winds, oiling additional shoreline. Some of the coastline
of the Musadam peninsula of Oman, north of Fujairah, was also
oiled. Booms deployed across the entrance to the fishing ports of
Dibba Fujairah and Dibba Sharjah prevented many but not all the
slicks from entering the ports themselves.
The spill response was organized and managed by the Fujairah
Port Authority. Small skimmers were deployed shortly after the spill
to recover oil from the sea surface. Approximately 813,600 L of oil
was recovered (about 4% of the amount spilled). Cleanup of oil on
the shore was initiated in early April by local contractors. However,
efforts were halted after it was learned that the oil had penetrated
deeply into the sandy shoreline sediments. Cleanup resumed in late
August and continued until the end of the year. The cleanup con
tractors from Saudi Arabia and France removed an estimated 10,000
cubic meters (m3) of oil-contaminated sediments for offsite disposal.

  



   

Figure 1 Map of the spill region.

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
There is general agreement the Seki spill caused substantial harm
to the marine environment and natural resources of the UAE’s East
Coast. A large number of damage claims for business interruption
and losses were filed against the potentially responsible parties on
behalf of the people of Fujairah. However, these business loss claims
did not cover all the injuries sustained by natural resources and the
people of Fujairah who depend on the resources for a livelihood.
Commercial fisheries in nearshore waters are important to the
economy of the Emirate of Fujairah, which sponsored our assess
ment of the damages to its fisheries and marine environment result
ing from the spill.
Our assessment principally involved:
•
determination of the extent to which resources of concern
(e.g., commercial and artisanal fishery resources) were
exposed to the spilled oil;
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determination of the extent to which the resources or
resource uses sustained injury (i.e., reduced fishery catch)
as a result of exposure to the spilled oil;
determination of the extent to which the resources and
resource uses recovered over time; and
economic valuation of the injured resources or resource uses.

In July 1995, at the request of the Government of Fujairah, the
Battelle Memorial Institute performed a preliminary study to deter
mine whether additional scientific investigations would facilitate an
improved assessment of the effects of the Seki oil spill. Battelle’s
feasibility report (Neff et al. 1995) indicated that there was evidence
of environmental degradation along more than 30 kilometers (km)
of shoreline and of localized degradation in shallow subtidal areas
attributable to the spill. Also, data available from the MAF at the
time indicated that decreased fish catch rates were evident and
strongly associated with the spill. To assess more fully the potential
exposure of fish and the extent and implications of the decreased
catch rates, Battelle recommended the chemical analysis of archived
beach, subtidal sediment, and fish samples, and more detailed examina
tion of fisheries information.
This subsequent more detailed assessment (Pearson et al. 1996)
was also sponsored by the Government of Fujairah and included an
exposure assessment, an injury assessment, and an economic evalua
tion. The Exposure Assessment documented the exposure of marine
habitats and bottom fish from fishery areas along the coast of
Fujairah to crude oil from the Seki. The injury assessment included a
quantitative description of the reduction of fish catches from fishing
ports in the spill area relative to reference areas. Information gath
ered by interviews with east coast fishermen and fish landings data
from the MAF were evaluated. MAF data on market price and sales
were also examined. An analysis of marine climate examined pos
sible alternative explanations for fishery declines. The damages
assessment used information from the exposure and injury assess
ments to establish economic damages.

There is general agreement the Seki
spill caused substantial harm to the
marine environment and natural
resources of the UAE’s East Coast. A
large number of damage claims for
business interruption and losses were
filed against the potentially responsible
parties on behalf of the people of
Fujairah. However, these business loss
claims did not cover all the injuries
sustained by natural resources and the
people of Fujairah who depend on the
resources for a livelihood.

EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT
The exposure assessment consisted of several interrelated itera
tive steps which accomplished the following:
•
confirmation of the release of oil from a known source;
•
identification of the exposure pathways from the source to
resources at risk; and
•
demonstration that the resources at risk and their environment
actually were exposed to the released oil or to its byproducts.

  



   

The major results were as follows:
Clearly, the Seki released a substantial amount of oil that subse
quently contaminated the marine environment of Fujairah. The
observations of International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation,
Ltd. (ITOPF), Centre de Documentation de Recherche et d’Exper
imentation sur les Pollutions Accidentelles des Eaux (CEDRE), U.S.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and
Wimpey Environmental confirmed that a substantial amount of
crude oil was released from the tanker Seki following its collision
with the Baynuna on 30 March 1994. A large amount of the spilled
oil reached and contaminated the shoreline of Fujairah (CEDRE
1994; Wimpey Environmental 1994a, b).
The results of Battelle’s chemical fingerprinting analysis (Sauer et
al. 1993; Sauer and Uhler 1994) of shoreline and offshore sediments
in April and May 1994 confirmed that the shoreline and offshore
sediments were contaminated with crude oil, the source of which
was unequivocally identified as the Seki. Some samples contained oil
from other sources. The Seki oil persisted in the marine environ
ment for at least 19 months after the spill.
The fisheries resources were exposed to Seki oil at the time of the
spill. Fish samples collected by trap from the oil spill path off Ras
Dibba a few days after the spill were moderately to heavily contami
nated (42 to 478 parts per billion [ppb] total polycyclic aromatic
hydrocarbons [PAHs]) with crude oil residues analytically linked to
the Seki. With a large majority of the samples having tissue burdens
of PAHs above 100 ppb, the evidence for recent high exposure of
demersal bottom-dwelling fish is strong. The observed levels were
high compared to other spills (Pearson et al. 1996).
Some PAH exposure of fisheries resources was detectable 19
months after the spill, but its lower magnitude suggested that recov
ery from contamination was occurring. Nineteen fish samples col
lected by traps from spill path areas and a reference area off the
Fujairahan coast in November 1995 contained much reduced con
centrations of total PAHs (4 to 32 ppb). Concentrations were high
est in tissues of fish from Al-Ghais Station 2, south of Ras Dibba, an
area of heavy contamination during the spill. Concentrations were
higher in fish from the other two oil spill path stations than in fish
from the reference station off Fujairah City.
Other evidence of continuing exposure was equivocal. Analyses
of the P-450 enzyme and 7-ethoxy resorufin O-deethylase (EROD)
activity in the fish samples collected by traps in November 1995
showed slightly elevated levels at all stations. These levels suggested
recent exposure of demersal fish along the Fujairah coast to
contaminants that induce the enzyme activity. Without more
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information, including an adequate baseline, further interpretation
of the enzyme data beyond a general indication of recent exposure
was not possible.
EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT DISCUSSION
The observation of subtidal oil and the confirmation that it
derived from the Seki was unexpected. After the Gulf War oil spill,
subtidal oil contamination was observed by Michel et al. (1993),
who found no evidence of sinking oil and argued for a mechanism
in which oil stranded on beaches sorbed to particles that sank when
subsequently eroded from the beaches. A similar mechanism for the
transport of Seki oil into subtidal areas is plausible.
Bottom-living fish from the spill path were exposed to and be
came contaminated with crude oil from the Seki shortly after the
spill. Some fish from the most heavily contaminated area of the spill
path may still have been slightly contaminated 19 months after the
spill. However, limited sampling did not allow estimation of the full
extent of exposure and contamination.
INJURY ASSESSMENT
Our injury assessment focused primarily on commercial fisheries
resources. The examination of fisheries information included inter
views with fishermen, analysis of the MAF landings data, and analy
sis of the MAF market data. In addition, an analysis of the marine
climate was performed to examine alternative hypotheses for the
declines in fish catch rates.
FUJAIRAHAN FISHERIES
East coast fishermen deploy a combination of gear types and
change those combinations seasonally as the target species change.
Fujairahan fishermen in small outboard boats (tarrads) use nets
(drift and set), traps (gargurs), and hook-and-line to capture pelagic
and demersal fish. Larger diesel-powered dhows (lanshs) deploy
primarily traps for demersal fish, but do some net and hook-and
line fishing for pelagic and demersal species. Lanshs usually fish
deeper waters than tarrads. In the winter and early spring, shorebased tarrads also engage in a beach seine fishery for sardines
(Sardinella spp. and Stolephorus spp.), which are sun-dried for fertil
izer and export. Demersal fish species account for approximately
40% of the landings along the East Coast of the UAE. However,
pelagic migratory species are generally the most valuable fish har
vested, in terms of unit value per fish, along the Fujairahan coast.
Fishing occurs year-round, with the largest landings in the winter
and spring, and the smallest landings in July and August each year.

  



   

During the spill, a fishing ban was declared that caused fisher
men to lose from 20 to 40 days of fishing. At the time of the spill, the
sardine fishery had already concluded. Upon return to fishing, fish
ermen targeted pelagic and demersal fish.
FISHERMEN INTERVIEWS
Information from fishermen concerned changes in catch rates,
fishing grounds, and/or gear selection during and after the spill. We
were most interested in the success that fishermen experienced after
they returned to fishing when the ban was lifted. In November 1995, we
interviewed fishermen and boat owners in focus group settings in the
ports of Fujairah, Dibba, Kalba, Khor Kalba, Dibba Hosn, and Dadnah.
The major results of the interviews were as follows:
•
It is incorrect to assume that fishermen only fish off the
coast near their home port. Most fishermen fish along the
entire UAE East Coast.
•
All fishermen reported that they were affected by the spill to
some extent, mainly due to loss of catch.
•
Fishermen reported that fish stocks were reduced, and that
only recently (after almost two years), they appear to be
recovering in diversity, but not yet in quantity.
•
Fishermen in some areas, such as Dibba Hosn, Dibba
Fujairah, and Dadnah, which received heavy oil contamina
tion, reported that decreased catches were continuing and
that oil or tar still occurred on their traps.
According to the fishermen interviewed, market prices at
Fujairah were reduced for 6 months to one year after the spill, due
mainly to public reluctance to buy fish from the east coast that were
believed to be contaminated. The market recovered, and several
fishermen believed that market price fluctuations in November 1995
were within pre-spill range.
ANALYSIS OF FISHERIES LANDINGS DATA
We examined the catch records to assess whether any change in
fishing success occurred after the spill. Our analysis focused on the
fishing success or catch rate once the fishermen returned to fishing,
rather than on the number of days of lost fishing resulting from the
fishing ban. The rationale for such focus is that while lost fishing
days were already claimed as direct damages, the effects of the spill on
fishing success and the fisheries resource had not yet been examined.
The fish landing records showed that the fishing strategies differ
among the ports and by season within each port. Pelagic species are
seasonally abundant and are generally targeted with specific gear
types in the fall and winter months. This pursuit of pelagic fish can
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lead to some high catches at particular times and ports. There is also
a basic fishing strategy conducted year-round at several ports that
employs a mixture of traps and handlines. This strategy produces
mostly demersal fish with some specific species of pelagic fish. Khor
Kalba, an unoiled port, and Dibba Hosn and Dibba Fujairah, oiled
ports, target demersal fish with traps. Our analysis examined the
pelagic and demersal fish groups separately.
The analysis of fish landings yielded the following findings:
Catch patterns, in particular at Khor Kalba and Fujairah fishing
port, did not show a significant change in the catch rate (kg/boat/
trip) for pelagic species (Table 2).
Patterns in the catch rates for demersal species did show an
abrupt and substantial decrease at oiled area ports of Dibba Hosn
and Dibba Fujairah in April and May 1994 that was not seen at
unoiled area ports of Khor Kalba or Fujairah. For Dibba Hosn, the
monthly mean catch rates for demersal fish fell from 128 kg/boat/
trip in the pre-spill period to 22 kg/boat/trip in April and May 1994
(Table 2). After September 1994, the demersal fish catch rate at
Dibba Hosn was 51 kg/boat/trip. (This post-spill average may have
been an underestimate, because the dataset for Dibba Hosn lacks
data for the winter months when the highest demersal and other
catches are normally expected.)
The decrease in catch rates of total species and demersal species
at Dibba Hosn in April and May 1994 were about 63% and 83%,
respectively, of their average rate at Dibba Hosn before the spill. For
Dibba Fujairah, catch rates for total species and demersal species in
May 1994 decreased by about 80% and 77%, respectively.
The catch rates for Dibba Hosn appear to have recovered by fall
1994, but because there are no data available to us from Dibba Fujairah
after May 1994, we cannot say when the catch rates there recovered.
Table 2

Catch rates at Khor Kalba and Dibba Hosn in the Emirate of Fujairah, and
indicators of statistical significance.
Pre-spill
During spill
Post-spill
F statistic
(kg/boat/trip) (kg/boat/trip) (kg/boat/trip)

P-value

KHOR KALBA (unoiled)
Total species minus small pelagic

295

56

144

3.4

0.062

Pelagic species

93

14

40

2.0

0.166

Demersal species

152

33

69

3.2

0.072

Demersal and mixed species

186

40

96

3.0

0.085

DIBBA HOSN (oiled)
Total species minus small pelagic

262

36

95

3.7

0.074

Pelagic species

115

14

36

2.9

0.115

Demersal species

128

22

51

5.6

0.030

Demersal and mixed species

136

22

52

5.7

0.029

  



   

ANALYSIS OF MARKET DATA
From data on the prices (Dirhams/kg) and quantities (kg) of fish
sold in the Fujairah fish market, several findings were evident:
•
In the two months (April and May) immediately following
the spill, the average daily quantities of fish sold in the
Fujairah market decreased for all categories except for shark
and mollusks/crustaceans.
•
The quantities sold in the market appear to have recovered
in September 1994, but not fully to pre-spill conditions.
•
Market prices showed little fluctuation when grouped by
species classes.
Average daily total market value, the summed products of the
prices and the quantities sold for all species, fell in the two months
following the spill. Because the prices did not change substantially,
the reduction in total market value was likely a function of the de
crease in quantity rather than a decrease in price.
The fishermen reported that prices were reduced immediately
following the spill, but this information was not supported by the
analysis of data from the Fujairah market.
From these data, it is not clear whether the decrease in quantity
of fish sold in the market was due to the fishing ban, reduced catch
rates, the perception that fishing would not be worthwhile, or some
combination of these elements.
OCEAN CLIMATE ANALYSIS
We examined available physical oceanographic data to deter
mine whether there was any evidence that special ocean climate
changes occurred at the time of the spill that could confound inter
pretation of the fisheries data. The data used came from two
sources: 1) The Global Temperature-Salinity Pilot Project (GTSPP)
database and 2) the Comprehensive Ocean-Atmosphere Data Set
(COADS) Release 1a. The monthly mean sea surface temperature
for all 6 years of the GTSPP data and the COADS long-term means
and standard deviations demonstrated that the year 1994 did not
significantly deviate from the long-term regional means. Based on
the analyzed data, the Gulf of Oman did not show significant devia
tions from the long-term average oceanographic climate for the
region in and around the time of the spill.
INJURY ASSESSMENT DISCUSSION
The decreased catches, especially for the bottom-dwelling fish,
were strongly associated with the Seki spill. The catch rates were not
only abruptly and substantially low at ports in the spill area immedi-
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ately after the spill, but were also decreased compared with other
ports with similar fishing strategies outside of the spill area.
Attributing the decreased catches to the Seki oil spill is reason
able. As mentioned by MacAlister, Elliott, and Partners (1995), such
abrupt change is unlikely to be a seasonal change, which would have
been more gradual. Further, recovery occurred by the fall of the year
the spill occurred. Such rapid recovery is consistent with a decreas
ing exposure and argues strongly against overfishing as the cause of
the decreased catch rates. There is no evidence of a dramatic change
in ocean climate during or after the spill; therefore, major oceano
graphic changes were not likely to be involved. Moreover, the find
ing that the pelagic catch rates showed little change associated with
the spill also argues against a change in ocean climate as a cause of
the decreased rates. Although a change in fishing grounds could
have led to decreased catch per unit effort, the fishermen reported
no change in their grounds. Instead, they continued to fish over
broad areas of the east coast.
The spill events could have led to the decreased catches in several
ways. The reduced catch could have been a result of reduced num
bers of traps and nets from lost gear. As an alternative or in addition
to decreased amounts of gear deployed, the gear could have been
functioning less effectively. The fishing strategy most clearly affected
was that employing traps and handlines, both of which use bait.
Decreased effectiveness of baited gear could have been due to de
creased response of the fish to the bait, or to decreased numbers of
fish due to avoidance of “oiled” areas. Decreased chemosensory
responses in fish and shellfish in the presence of oil and avoidance of
oil-contaminated sediment by commercial fish and shellfish have
both been experimentally demonstrated (Weber et al. 1981; Pearson
et al. 1981, 1984; Pinto et al. 1984; Martin et al. 1992). The work of
Martin et al. (1992) is noteworthy, because their conclusions are
based on a field experiment in which salmon homing, which re
quires the salmon’s sensing the odor of homestream water, was
transiently disrupted at hydrocarbon concentrations between 1 and
10 ppb.1 Although it is not known which of these alternatives led to
the decreased catches, all are plausible, and all were derived from the
spill events.
A consistent story emerged from the fishermen and the landing
reports, even though there were some discrepancies between them.
Both the market data and the fish landings data indicated that there
were fewer fish caught and sold in the two months immediately
following the spill. Demersal fish were the component of the catch
with both observed contamination and a clear decrease in number.
Further, the fishermen in some areas, such as Dadnah, which were

1



These concentrations do not refer to total
organic carbon (TOC) but instead to a
mixture of mono- and diaromatic organics
intended to mimic the high solubility
components of Prudhoe Bay crude oil. See
Martin et al. (1992).

  



   

not sampled for the MAF landings records, continued to report
decreased catches and the existence of oil or tar on their traps. At
tributing the decreased catches to the spill is reasonable, given the
observations, but the available data were too limited in amount and
kind to give more than a rough indication of the extent of the effects
on the fishermen.
While the available catch rate and economic data suggested that
decreased catch rates encountered upon return to fishing resulted in
losses in net revenue to an “average” fisherman operating in the two
months following the spill, we do not know how many fishermen
actually suffered such an effect. Also, because the MAF landings data
are a sampling of a portion of the fishermen from only some of the
ports, we have no data to extrapolate the effect of the decreased
catches to all the potentially affected fishermen. Another approach to
estimate the monetary damages derived from injury to the fisheries
was needed.
ECONOMIC DAMAGES ASSESSMENT OF FISHERIES AND
ENVIRONMENTAL INJURIES BY THE COMPENSATION
SCHEDULE APPROACH
To estimate the economic value of the injuries (i.e. damages)
from the Seki oil spill to the fisheries and marine environment of the
UAE East Coast, we used procedures based on the Washington State
Marine Oil Spill Compensation Schedule (Geselbracht and Logan
1993; Washington Administrative Code Chapters 173-183), and
applied them to the circumstances of the spill and to the UAE envi
ronment. The Washington schedule was developed to estimate
comprehensive environmental damages when actual data on injuries
are sparse and cannot be obtained without inordinate expense, when
restoration of the resources is not technically feasible (and thus
cannot be used to estimate monetary damages), or when data gaps
or other circumstances do not permit adequate compensation to the
resource trustees. All of these conditions applied in the case of the
Seki spill. The schedule approach was thus well-suited to the Seki oil
spill situation, where there was clear evidence of widespread con
tamination of the marine environment and of effects on marine
resources, especially fisheries, but incomplete data on the distribu
tion of oil among habitats and ecosystem components, and inad
equate data to determine the full extent of fisheries injuries and their
linkage to economic effects. Moreover, using the schedule enables
estimation of damages not only for the obvious injuries to commer
cial fisheries, for example, but also for those to other environmental
components that we were not able to study directly.
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The Washington schedule requires as inputs:
•
the amount and characteristics of the oil spilled that deter
mine the severity of effects,
•
the resources exposed and their sensitivity, and
•
the actions taken by the spiller—primarily, recovery of the
oil (Geselbracht and Logan 1993).
The schedule applies general and expert knowledge of the re
sources and oil characteristics to arrive at coefficients between $1
and $50/gal of oil. Coefficients for a series of ecosystem components
are multiplied by the number of gallons spilled, and the products are
summed to give a total comprehensive environmental damage as
sessment. We derived coefficients for habitat, commercial fisheries,
sea turtles, marine birds, and environmentally-based recreation
following the compensation schedule approach and using expert
knowledge of UAE marine fisheries and environment. The result of
this effort was a total comprehensive damage assessment that was
distinct from other damages resulting from business interruption
and other disruptions and costs. We believe this assessment to be the
first of its kind in the Gulf Region.
ECONOMIC DAMAGES ASSESSMENT METHODS
The Compensation Schedule has two main components: re
source vulnerability scores and oil effects scores (Geselbracht and
Logan 1993; Washington Administrative Code Chapter 173-183).
Geselbracht and Logan (1993) provided resource vulnerability rank
ing formulas for seven ecosystem components: habitat, marine
birds, marine fisheries, shellfish, salmon, marine mammals, and
recreation. We did not develop scores for shellfish, salmon, and
marine mammals. The shellfish caught in the UAE are primarily
crabs and mollusks captured in traps along with demersal fish. Be
cause the shellfish are caught with the demersal fish and because no
effect was evident on shellfish, we elected not to develop a separate
scoring for shellfish. Because there are no salmon and marine mam
mals are of low occurrence off the east coast of the UAE, we did not
develop scores for those categories.
The evidence discussed in previous sections made it clear that
contamination and degradation of both intertidal and subtidal
habitats had occurred and that there were impacts on fisheries and
fisheries resources beyond interrupted fishing or gear loss. The
formulas provided by Geselbracht and Logan (1993) were used to
score habitat and commercial fisheries. Because sea turtles occur as
juveniles feeding along the coast in the spill area, and because turtle
mortalities were observed during the spill, we developed a formula

  



   

modified from the marine mammal formula of Geselbracht and
Logan (1993) and applied that formula to estimate damages for
marine turtles. Because marine turtles are endangered and protected
by law in the UAE, we followed Geselbracht and Logan (1993) in
multiplying the score for the sea turtles by a factor of 1.5. This en
dangered species factor was applied only to the score for turtles.
Because marine birds are often one of the most heavily impacted
ecosystem components during an oil spill, we used the formula of
Geselbracht and Logan (1993) to assign a score for them. Since the
beaches and reefs of the east coast provide opportunities for recre
ation that would be obviously impaired by oil contamination, we
used the approach described in Geselbracht and Logan (1993) to
develop a formula specific to the affected areas. This recreation score
compensates for the impact of oil contamination on the recreational
potential of the environment in the oiled area, and is separate from
and in addition to specific economic losses suffered through busi
ness interruption (e.g., cancelled reservations).
Using the Washington Schedule we calculated damages for the
Seki spill. The schedule requires the scores to be assigned based on
seasonal values, and we assigned scores for the spring season based on
the early spring occurrence of the spill. Input values for vulnerability
scoring range from 5 (most sensitive or most important) to 1 (least
sensitive or least important) and were derived by a group of scientists
with oil spill and UAE experience. For example, because weathering of
oil is higher in the UAE than Washington state, the persistence scores
used were lower than those that would have been assigned for Wash
ington. Also, a highly valuable habitat, such as mangrove stands, was
assigned a score of 5 because of its high biological productivity and its
role as nursery and feeding grounds for fish and other wildlife. Using
tables for the nonlinear relationship between raw and scaled scores,
the raw scores produced by applying the formulas to the input values
were scaled to provide a final score between 1 and 5.
The habitat types used in scoring were derived from data pre
sented in the Wimpey Report (Wimpey Environmental 1994a) and
are specific to the Seki spill area. To obtain the distribution of oil
among the habitats, we assumed that the oil was distributed among
the intertidal habitats in proportion to their observed occurrence in
the spill area, as presented by Wimpey Environmental (1994a). For
the distribution of oil among the subtidal habitats, we assumed that
the oil was evenly split between hard and soft substrata, and among
the hard substrata evenly split between coral and rocky reef habitats.
Without data from a systematic subtidal survey, this assumption is
the most conservative. Although there was clear evidence that oil
reached the subtidal habitats, the precise extent of subtidal oiling
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was not known. Consequently, we used two scenarios in estimating
the damages. The first scenario assumed that 15% of the spilled oil
reached the subtidal habitats, and the second assumed that 25% did.
Based on evidence from other spills and the oil characteristics, we
doubt that more than 25% of the spilled oil reached subtidal habi
tats. Local expert knowledge was used to develop values for the
importance of the habitat and other inputs.
For marine fisheries, we developed scores for small pelagic,
pelagic, and demersal fish, because these three groups showed clear
differences in seasonal abundances, stock conditions, oil sensitivi
ties, and importance to fisheries and the environment. The scores
for the three groups were then combined into one composite score
for marine fisheries.
For each recreational category, we estimated the proportion of
coast where recreation could occur and derived an attribute score
for that activity. The products of the coastline length and attribute
scores were then summed and scaled to fall between 1 and 5 for the
final vulnerability score.
Following Geselbracht and Logan (1993), oil effects rankings
were developed for three aspects of injury: 1) acute toxicity, 2) mechanical injury, and 3) persistence. Using the API gravity for light
Iranian crude oil of 33.84 and following Geselbracht and Logan
(1993) and Washington Administrative Code Chapters 173-183, we
assigned an acute toxicity ranking of 2 (out of 5), a mechanical
injury ranking of 3, and a persistence ranking of 3. The amount of
oil spilled was assumed to be 4,949,952 US gal (~18.7 million L),
and the amount recovered, 214,935 US gal (~814,000 L).
The calculation of damages followed the formula of Geselbracht
and Logan (1993). For each resource, the vulnerability scores, the oil
effects scores, and the number of gallons spilled (less the number of
gallons recovered) were multiplied according to the formula. The
total environmental damages were then calculated as the sum of the
damages for the five components: habitat, marine fisheries, marine,
turtles, marine birds, and recreation.



Depending on the assumptions
concerning the amount of oil reaching
the subtidal habitats, the estimates for
the total comprehensive environmental
damages for habitat, commercial
fisheries, sea turtles, marine birds, and
marine-based recreation ranged
between $48,680,946 and
$48,930,581.

ECONOMIC DAMAGES ASSESSMENT RESULTS
Depending on the assumptions concerning the amount of oil
reaching the subtidal habitats, the estimates for the total compre
hensive environmental damages for habitat, commercial fisheries,
sea turtles, marine birds, and marine-based recreation ranged be
tween $48,680,946 and $48,930,581 (Table 3).
Habitat injury had estimated damages of $5,393,505, assuming
that 15% of the oil reached the subtidal and $5,643,140, assuming
25% reached the subtidal (Table 3). The difference in damages

  



   

Table 3

Summary of environmental damages from theSeki spill as calculated by the Marine
Oil Spill Compensation Schedule, assuming different amounts of oil reaching
subtidal habitats (Pearson et al. 1996).

Category

15% reaching subtidal

25% reaching subtidal

Habitat

$5,393,505

$5,643,140

Marine fisheries

$15,665,931

$15,665,931

Marine turtles

$10,718,795

$10,718,795

Marine birds

$9,482,011

$9,482,011

Recreation

$7,420,704

$7,420,704

$48,680,946

$48,930,581

TOTAL

between the two scenarios for the amount of oil reaching the
subtidal habitats was less than 1% of the total comprehensive dam
ages. About 49% of the intertidal zone of the coastline affected by
spill was rocky, whereas the remainder was primarily sandy. Highly
valued and oil-sensitive habitats, such as mangroves and mud flats, were
not found in the oil spill area. If such valued habitats had been oiled, the
damages for habitat injury would have been substantially higher.
The category with the largest estimated damages was marine
fisheries (Table 3). Based largely on their seasonal presence, relative
commercial importance, and other factors, the demersal fish had the
highest vulnerability, followed by the pelagic, and then by the small
pelagic. Because of their threatened and endangered status, marine
turtles had estimated damages in the vicinity of $11 million (Table 3).
Had the spill affected the turtle breeding areas, the estimated dam
ages would have again been higher. Had the turtles not been endan
gered, the estimated damages would have been about one-third
lower. The marine bird and environmentally-based recreation dam
ages were estimated to be $9.4 million and $7.4 million, respectively.
ECONOMIC DAMAGES ASSESSMENT DISCUSSION
The application of the Compensation Schedule provided an
estimate of the total comprehensive environmental damages for five
natural resource services known to be contaminated and affected by
oil from the Seki oil spill. It enabled the estimation of damages in a
situation in which clear evidence of contamination and of effects on
the environment and fisheries existed, but in which the data to link
oiling and environmental effects to their economic value losses were
inadequate or incomplete.
The results of the schedule approach were consistent with the
observed effects and prevailing values. For example, marine fisheries
had the highest estimated damages and were resources with clear
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effects and high value (Table 3). The fisheries damages estimate was
about one quarter of the annual value of the east coast fisheries.
Marine turtles had high estimated damages because of their threat
ened status. Damages for habitat injury were lower than expected.
However, these estimated damages were reasonable in hindsight
because Seki oil did not reach the most sensitive or most important
habitats, such as the mangrove stands in Khor Kalba to the south of
the spill area.
There is still some uncertainty about the estimate of habitat
damages, because we do not know the proportion of spilled oil that
reached the subtidal habitats. Seki oil did reach the subtidal, but
without a systematic survey of sediment contamination, we know
neither the amount that reached the subtidal nor its distribution
there. However, even a high-end estimate of 25% of the oil’s reaching the subtidal only increases the estimated damages by about
$250,000 (Table 3). The marine fisheries damages overshadow those
for habitat injuries.
CONCLUSION
Lessons can be drawn from the Seki oil spill for both science and
policy concerning oil spill damage assessments. The first is that
although the assessment was hampered by incomplete data, the
compensation methodology worked to produce damage estimates
that are, in our opinion, reasonable. Fingerprinting analysis proved
successful and necessary for demonstrating the contamination of the
marine environment by Seki oil and exposure of demersal fish. The
fisheries data provided strong evidence for the occurrence of effects
but, while adequate for the management purposes for which the
fisheries data are routinely collected, did not enable estimation of
the full spatial or temporal extent of fisheries effects. The linkage of
the fisheries effects to their economic damages could probably not
have been made without an approach similar to the one we took.
Similarly, the linkage of contamination of the coastal habitats to
economic damages could not have been possible without the com
pensation schedule approach.
To improve the compensation schedule approach in the Arabian
Gulf and Gulf of Oman, we recommend that the coastal habitats be
classified and mapped in detail. The emerging Geographical Informa
tion Systems (GIS) is ideal for such a task. We believe that an oil spill
compensation procedure developed in more detail for the region would
enable rapid calculation of damages without large or time-consuming
studies. Such a schedule is appealing from several policy perspectives,
and its more frequent and widespread use would enhance its value as a
deterrent to less than full attention to oil spill prevention.
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Global Climate Variations Over the Past 250 Years: Relationships with the Middle East
Michael E. Mann
Raymond S. Bradley
Department of Geosciences, University of Massachusetts
ABSTRACT
We analyze recent global temperature reconstructions over several centuries in time based on calibrations of tempera
ture patterns against global networks of long instrumental and “proxy” data (natural archives such as ice cores, corals,
and tree rings), focusing on long-term climatic variations in the Middle East. The pattern of global warming of the past
century does not show a strong influence in this region. Instead, patterns of natural low-frequency variability appear to
dominate the region. One of these patterns is associated with the well-known “North Atlantic Oscillation” and leads to
changes on interannual and decadal timescales. Another distinct pattern appears to relate to influences of low-frequency
variability in the North Atlantic ocean circulation and overlying atmosphere circulation, and describes changes that are
predominantly multidecadal in timescale. This latter pattern is especially important in predicting possible climate change
scenarios in future decades in this region.

INTRODUCTION
Documenting the patterns of large-scale climate variability dur
ing the past several centuries is important to understanding the
significance of long-terms trends and low-frequency variations in
the global climate. Once such large-scale patterns of variability are
established and statistically verified, they can provide a context for
understanding the variations present in particular regions of the
globe, including those regions of importance in the history of hu
man civilization. Unfortunately, there is no instrumental climate
data available on the century and longer timescales of interest in this
context. However, widespread networks of high-resolution proxy
climate indicators and the few very long instrumental and historical
climate indicators available several centuries back can be combined
into a global “multiproxy” network that can potentially be used to
describe annual global temperature patterns during past centuries.
Here we analyze climatic variability back to the mid-18th century
based on the multiproxy-reconstructed global surface temperature
patterns of Mann et al. (1997a). We focus here on the variations in
the Middle East region and its relationship with larger-scale patterns
of climate variability. We can thus examine in detail the relationship
between Middle Eastern climate and global climatic variations sev
eral centuries back in time.
DATA
The reconstructed surface temperature patterns of Mann et al.
(1997) are based on the multivariate calibration of globally distrib
uted annual resolution proxy climate indicator network. The net

  



   

work includes (see Figure 1, left) the collection of annual resolution
dendroclimatic, ice core, ice melt, and long historical records used
by Bradley and Jones (1992) combined with other coral (Lough
1991; Quinn et al. 1993; Dunbar et al. 1994), dendroclimatic (Jacoby
and D’arrigo 1989, 1990; Briffa et al. 1992), and long instrumental
(Jones and Bradley 1992) records. The available instrumental
records are formed into annual mean anomalies relative to the 1902
1980 reference period, and gridded onto a 5 degree by 5 degree grid,
consistent with the instrumental gridpoint data described below.
This provides 11 temperature gridpoint records, 12 precipitation
gridpoint records, and 3 station surface pressure gridpoint records
dating back to 1820 or earlier.

Figure 1

Data used in this study. (left) Distribution of annual resolution proxy indicators used in this study. Dendroclimatic reconstructions are
indicated by “tree” symbols, ice core/ice melt proxies by “star” symbols, coral records by “C” symbols. Long historical records and
instrumental “gridpoints” series (see text) are shown by squares (temperature), or diamonds (precipitation or surface pressure). All 58
sites (62 records) available back to 1820 are shown, with records dating back to at least 1820 (red), 1800 (blue-green), 1750 (green),
1600 (blue), and 1400 (black) shown with different colors. Certain sites (e.g., Quelccaya ice core) provide multiple proxy indictors (e.g.,
multiple nearby cores, and both d 18o isotope data and ice accumulation). (right) Distribution of the (1082) nearly continuous available
land air/sea surface temperature gridpoint data available from 1902 onward indicated by shading. The blue squares indicate the subset
of 219 gridpoints with nearly continuous records extending back to 1854 that are used for verification. Northern Hemisphere (NH)
and global (GLB) mean temperature are estimated as areally-weighted (i.e., cosine latitude) averages over the Northern hemisphere
and global domains respectively. A Middle Eastern (“MNET”) surface temperature index is constructed from the gridpoints available
over the large-rectangular box shown in that region.

The instrumental temperature anomaly data (Figure 1, right)
used to train the proxy dataset span the interval 1902-1993 and are
taken from a gridded combined land air and sea surface temperature
dataset of Jones and Briffa (1992). Although there are notable spatial
gaps, this network covers significant enough portions of the globe to
estimate a global mean (“GLB”) temperature, and enough of the
Northern hemisphere and of the extreme eastern equatorial Pacific
to construct highly faithful estimates of both the Northern Hemi
sphere mean (“NH”) temperature series, as well as certain indices of
particular importance (e.g., the “NINO3” index important in the
context of the El Niño phenomenon). A box including all gridpoints
in the region 30N to 50N latitude, 20E to 40E longitude is used to

 

  



construct a Middle Eastern (“MNET”) temperature index. An in
strumental estimate of the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) taken
from Hurrell (1995) is also made use of in our analysis.
MULTIPROXY CALIBRATION
Multiproxy networks appear to provide the greatest opportunity
for large-scale climate reconstruction (Bradley and Jones 1993;
Hughes and Diaz 1995) and climate signal detection (Mann et al.
1995; Barnett et al. 1996). While limitations (e.g., dating errors) in
the individual proxy indicators must be carefully accounted for in
constructing an appropriate multiproxy network (see Mann et al.
1997a), the mutual information contained in a widely distributed set
of independent climatic indicators can more faithfully capture the
consistent climate signal that is present, reducing the compromising
effects of biases and weaknesses in the individual indicators.
The reconstructions of which we make use (Mann et al. 1997a)
are based on a calibration of such a multiproxy network against
widespread instrumental surface temperature data of the 20th cen
tury. Multivariate statistical calibration approaches have previously
been applied to proxy climate data for local or regional climate
reconstruction, particularly in the field of dendroclimatology (see
e.g., Fritts et al. 1971; Cook et al. 1994). Related statistical methods
have more recently been applied to the problem of interpolating
sparse early instrumental climate observations through training
them against the dominant large-scale patterns of variability isolated
in shorter, but more widespread recent climate fields (Kaplan et al.
1997). Our approach to long-term climate pattern reconstruction
combines these traditionally distinct applications. We first decom
pose the instrumental training data into its dominant patterns of
variability, and subsequently perform a multivariate calibration of
the climate proxy indicators against the time histories of these dif
ferent patterns. In doing so we make a number of important as
sumptions. We assume (1) that the indicators in our multiproxy
trainee network are linearly related to one or more of the instru
mental training patterns. In the relatively unlikely event that a proxy
indictor represents a truly local climatic phenomenon which is
uncorrelated with larger-scale climatic variations, or represents a
highly non-linear response to climatic variations, this assumption
will not be satisfied. We further assume (2) that a relatively sparse
but widely distributed sampling of long proxy and instrumental
records may nonetheless sample most of the relatively small number
of degrees of freedom in climatic patterns at interannual and longer
timescales. Regions not directly represented in the trainee network
may nonetheless be indirectly represented through teleconnections

  



   

with regions that are. Finally, we assume (3) that the patterns of vari
ability captured by the multiproxy network have analogs in the pat
terns we resolve in the shorter instrumental data. This latter assump
tion represents a fairly weak “stationarity” requirement—we don’t
require that the climate itself be stationary. In fact, we expect that
some sizeable trends in the climate may be resolved by our recon
structions. We do, however, assume that the basic spatial patterns of
variation that the climate has exhibited during the past several centu
ries are similar to those by which it has varied during the past century.
Studies of instrumental surface temperature patterns suggest that such
a form of stationarity holds up at least on multi-decadal timescales,
during the past century (Kaplan et al 1997). The statistical crossvalidation exercises we describe later provide the best evidence that
these key underlying assumptions are reasonable.
We isolate the dominant patterns of the instrumental surface
temperature data through principal component analysis (PCA)
(Preisendorffer 1989). PCA provides a natural smoothing of the
temperature field in terms of a small number of dominant patterns
of variability “empirical eigenvectors” that describe 20th century
temperature variations. Each of these eigenvectors is associated with
a characteristic spatial pattern or “Empirical Orthogonal Function”
(EOF) and its characteristic evolution in time, or “principal compo
nent” (PC). The first 5 eigenvectors describe a fraction (ß = 0.27, or
27%) of the total multivariate variance (“MULT”) in the raw data,
90% of GLB, 85% of NH, 67% of NINO3, and 76% of the detrended
(“DETR”), interannual-to-multi-decadal timescale variability in
NH. The first 40 eigenvectors, for comparison, describe nearly all of
the GLB and NH annual mean variance, about 90% of the NINO3
annual mean variance, and 73% of MULT. The rank of the eigenvec
tors orders the fraction of variance they describe in the standardized
data (1=12%. 2=6.5%, 3=5%, 4=4%, 5=3.5%). The first eigenvector
describes a modest 12% of the full spatiotemporal variance in the
dataset, but a majority of variance in GLB (88%) and NH (73%)
estimated temperatures. This eigenvector is associated with the
significant global warming trend of the past century. The second
eigenvector describes 8% of the multivariate data variance, and is
associated with much of the ENSO-scale variability, describing 40%
of the variance in the NINO3 index. This eigenvector exhibits a
modest negative trend. The third eigenvector describes much of the
traditional NAO pattern (verified through correlation analyses
described later), with opposed centers of warm and cold anomalies
in and neighboring the North Atlantic. The fifth eigenvector is
associated with variability centered in the Atlantic basin exhibiting
significant multi-decadal variability (see Kushnir 1994; Mann and

 

  



Park 1994,1996). Figure 2 shows the EOFs for eigenvectors 1, 2, 3
and 5. (The verification exercises described briefly below and in
detail in Mann et al. (1997a) indicate that the fourth eigenvector can
not be skillfully resolved by the present multiproxy network). The
associated PCs are shown along with their reconstructed counter
parts (“RPC”s) below. Note that both EOFs 3 and 5 have large pro
jections in the Middle East. Indeed, as discussed below, these two
independent patterns compete for influence on Middle Eastern
temperature variations.
As described in detail by Mann et al. (1997a), we calibrate the
multiproxy data network against these empirical eigenvectors at
annual mean resolution during the training (1902-1980) interval.
This multivariate calibration provides a transfer function that can be
applied to the multiproxy network to reconstruct temperature pat
terns before the calibration interval on an annual basis, with a spa
tial coverage dictated only by the spatial extent of the instrumental
training data. The statistical skill of the temperature reconstructions
is established through independent cross-validation or “verification”
exercises. Verification statistics were determined based on two

Figure 2

EOFs of the leading eigenvectors (#’s 1,2,3,5) of the global temperature data from 1902-1980 retained in the analysis. The EOFs are
renormalized to remove the areal weighting factor which tends to diminish the amplitudes of the pattern at higher latitudes.

  



   

distinct verification datasets described by Mann et al. (1997a). Here
we will discuss the results from one of these verification datasets, the
sparse subset of the gridded data (M’ = 219 gridpoints) for which
independent values are available from 1854-1901 (see Figure 1,
right). NH and GLB verification statistics are computed, as is the
multivariate (“MULT”) gridpoint level verification statistic.
A sequence of multiproxy calibration experiments were per
formed in which progressively lower rank eigenvectors are retained.
Sensitivity to the exclusion of certain intermediate rank eigenvectors
was also investigated. While calibration described variance increases
monotonically with increased retained eigenvectors, an optimal
subset of eigenvectors can be isolated which maximizes the verifica
tion described variance. In this study, that subset corresponds to
only a handful of the highest ranked eigenvectors. We also test the
network for sensitivity to the inclusion or elimination of particular
trainee data (e.g., instrumental records, the Northern treeline
dendroclimatic indicators of North America, and tropical coral
records). The technical results and details regarding calibration/
verification are described by Mann et al. (1997). These experiments
demonstrate that the multiproxy network appears able to capture
much of the variance that can potentially be described by the mod
est retained set of eigenvectors generated by cross-validation exer
cises. Although more widespread proxy data are available, the
network used here is intentionally sparse, illustrating the principle
that skillful pattern reconstruction can be performed with a rela
tively sparse trainee network. More widespread proxy networks
should allow an increasingly large number of eigenvectors to be
skillfully retained, and a consequently increased fraction of de
scribed variance. The patterns of calibration and verification ß for
the full reconstructed patterns are shown in Figure 3.
In Figure 4, we show the comparison of the raw and reconstuct
ed MNET temperature index during the 1902-1980 calibration
interval. The match is excellent, with a correlation of r = 0.5 between
the raw and reconstructed series (r2 = 0.25) and a value of ß = 0.17
for described variance. Note that the values for this coarse-averaged
regional index are better than for the individual gridpoints making
up the index because of the large-scale optimality of our EOF-based
reconstruction approach. Although the 1854-1901 verification
dataset poorly samples the rectangular region used to construct the
MNET index, the verification ß values for the gridpoints which are
present are with one exception statistically significant at the 99%
level, albeit negative—the impact of quality problems with the in
strumental data themselves before the 20th century is unknown and

 

  

Figure 3



Spatial patterns of calibration (left, based on 1902-1980 data), and verification ß (right, based on 1854-1901 data) (bottom). Values that
are insignificant at the 99% level are shown in gray, while negative, but 99% significant values are shown in yellow, and significant positive
values are shown in two shades of red.

may artificially degrade the apparent skill of the reconstructions.
We thus believe the reconstructed MNET index to be quite faithful.
TEMPERATURE RECONSTRUCTIONS
The reconstructions discussed below are derived from the opti
mal eigenvector subsets for the period 1760-1980 as described by
Mann et al. (1997a), reconstructed with EOF #s 1,2,3,5. To illustrate
the effectiveness of the proxy pattern reconstruction procedure, we
show as an example (Figure 5) the raw, EOF-filtered, and recon
structed temperature patterns for a year during the calibration inter
val (1941).
It is clear that the proxy network in this example is capable of
resolving much of the structure that is resolved by the 4 EOFs them
selves used in calibration. Figure 6 shows the 4 reconstructed princi-

Figure 4

Comparison of raw and proxy-reconstructed MNET index during the 1902-1980
calibration interval.

  



Figure 5

   

Comparison of the proxy-based spatial reconstructions of the anomaly pattern for
1941 vs. the raw data. based on (upper left) raw and (bottom) proxy-recon
structed data. Anomalies (relative to 1902-1980 climatology) are indicated by color
scale, with lighter shading corresponding to warm anomalies and darker shading to
cold anomalies. Noteworthy is a warm event in the tropical Pacific, and presumably
associated teleconnections over the Pacific/ North American sector, as well as
substantial cool anomalies over Eurasia. The major features of this year are
captured, albeit highly “smoothed” by the filtering of the pattern by the small
number of EOFs (#s 1,2,3,5) used in the reconstruction procedure. The
comparison of the multiproxy reconstruction with the equivalently eigenvectorfiltered raw pattern (the “target” for reconstruction) is excellent. during the 1902
1980 calibration interval.

pal components (“RPCs”) #s 1, 2, 3, and 5 (the associated spatial
patterns were shown in Figure 2).
The positive trend in RPC 1 during the 20th century is clearly
exceptional in the context of the long-term variability in the associ
ated pattern, and indeed describes much of the unprecedented
warming trend evident in the NH reconstruction. Equally interest
ing is the negative trend in RPC 2 during the past century which is
also anomalous in the context of the longer-term evolution of the
associated pattern. The recent negative trend is associated with the
modest long-term cooling trend in the eastern tropical Pacific (su
perimposed on warming associated with the pattern of eigenvector
#1) which may be a modulating negative feedback of global warming
(Cane et al. 1997). The third eigenvector exhibits much of the NAO
signature in the data. The fifth eigenvector exhibits notable
multi-decadal variability throughout both the modern and pre
calibration interval, associated with the wavelike trend of warming
and subsequent cooling of the North Atlantic this century that has
been discussed elsewhere (Kushnir 1994; Mann et al. 1994, 1996;
Schlesinger and Ramankutty 1994) and longer-term multi-decadal
oscillations in that region detected in a previous analysis of proxy

 

  
climate networks (Mann et al. 1995). This variability may be associ
ated with ocean-atmosphere processes related to the North Atlantic
thermohaline circulation (Delworth et al. 1993, 1997). Table 1
shows the correlations between the MNET index, the NAO, and the
four reconstructed principal components of this study.
Middle Eastern climate is known to have a significant relation
ship with NAO on inter-annual timescales (see Cullen and
Demenocal 1997). This is certainly substantiated in Table 1. How
ever, of particular interest here are the patterns of variation influ
encing the region on longer timescales as well. The correlations also
show that a distinct pattern of variation associated with EOF 5 has
considerable influence on Middle Eastern temperature. The long
term trend in the reconstructed NH series exhibits a a general period
of coolness through 1850, and warming thereafter. In Figure 7, we
show the reconstructed NH series along with the MNET index.
Although there are some broad similarities, MNET does not track
NH on the longer timescales. In particular, the marked NH warming
of the 20th century is not evident in the MNET index, although
there is multi-decadal variability as described below. This difference
appears to be associated with multi-decadal cool periods in the
Middle East associated with the pronounced multi-decadal varia
tions in RPC 5. These variations favor negative temperature anoma
lies in MNET during the early and late 20th century, offsetting times
at which the global warming trend and its weak projection onto the
region was most rapidly accelerating.
A comparison of the power spectra (Figure 8) of the MNET
series, RPCs 3 and 5, and the NAO provides considerable insight
into the natural of the patterns of variability influencing Middle East
temperatures on different timescales.
Table 1

Figure 6



Reconstructed Principle Compo
nents (“RPCs”) 1, 2, 3, 5 used in the
climatic reconstructions.

Correlations of RPCs with NAO and MNET indices over two
different periods of time during the reconstructed 1760-1980
time interval.

RPC

r(NAO)

1864-1980
r(MNET)

1760-1980
r(MNET)

1

-0.28

0.26

0.28

2

-0.06

-0.30

-0.18

3

0.41

-0.63

-0.68

4

-0.09

-0.32

-0.26

  



Figure 7

   

Reconstructed Northern Hemisphere mean (NHEM) temperature series along with
reconstructed MNET index.

It is evident that the MNET temperature index exhibits en
hanced power (which is statistically significant) in the “multi
decadal” frequency range of f = 0.01-0.02 cycles/year (50-100 years
period) as well in the decadal f = 0.05-0.1 (10-20 years period) fre
quency range. These spectral peaks are most pronounced in the
longer 1760-1980 data interval. This is distinct from the behavior of
the NAO which, although displaying a secular peak during the past
century (i.e., a near-zero frequency trend isolated in the above fig
ure), does not exhibit significant decadal or multi-decadal spectral
peaks. The long-term multi-decadal variability is a robust feature of
the North Atlantic climate (Mann et al. 1995) which appears unre
lated to the NAO, and in fact nearly orthogonal to it, probably asso
ciated with the response of atmosphere to multi-decadal changes in
surface heating by the ocean (Kushnir 1993; Mann and Park 1994,
1996). These multi-decadal variations appear to be associated with a
stochastically-excited eigenmode of the coupled ocean-atmosphere
system (Delworth et al. 1993; 1997). This relationship is also shown
in Figure 9. The multi-decadal variations in MNET have a close
relationship with intervals during which the RPC 5 (associated with
the pattern EOF 5) favors warming (negative) or cooling (positive)
in the Middle East. In contrast, the inter-annual/decadal variations
in MNET have a closer relationship with episodes during which the
RPC 3 associated with NAO-like pattern EOF 3 favors warming
(negative) or cooling (positive) in the region.

 

  

Figure 8



Power spectra for (upper left) reconstructed Middle/Near Eastern “MNET”
temperature index, (upper right) NAO index, and (bottom) RPCs 3 and 5. The
spectra are based on the multitaper method, with best red noise median power
levels and 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels (dashed) lines estimated by the
robust method of Mann and Lees (1996).

In Figure 10, we show some example patterns for different re
constructed years.
The warm MNET year 1760 appears to have been associated with
a particularly prominent NAO-type pattern superimposed on the
otherwise cool multi-decadal period. 1783, a strong El Niño year
(Quinn and Neal 1992) exhibits, by contrast, a prominent negative
MNET temperature anomaly. A (weaker) negative MNET anomaly
is also observed during the very strong (Quinn and Neal 1992) El
Niño year 1878 shown. Analysis of ENSO variability in these recon
structions is discussed in more detail elsewhere (Mann et al. 1997b).
The pattern of 1816 shows anomalous cooling throughout much of
the globe (even relative to this generally cold decade) but with a
quadrupole pattern of warmth near southern Greenland and the
Middle East, and enhanced cold in the eastern United States and
Europe. This latter pattern is indeed consistent with the anomalous
atmospheric circulation associated with the North Atlantic Oscilla
tion (NAO) pattern observed in empirical (Kelly et al. 1996) and
model-based studies (Kirshner 1995) of the atmospheric response to
volcanic forcing. This latter pattern is evident in neither the follow
ing nor preceding year, and is likely associated with the large

  



Figure 9

   

(left) RPC 5 along with MNET index, filtered on multi-decadal timescales (40 year lowpass) and (right) RPC 3 along with MNET index,
filtered on interannual timescales (5 year lowpass).

Tambora eruption of April 1815 both in terms of the hemispheric
coldness and the superimposed NAO-like pattern.
CONCLUSIONS
With the large-scale temperature reconstructions that we have
available over the past couple of centuries, we are able to document
the importance of at least two distinct patterns on the climate of the
Middle East. One of these patterns is associated with the North
Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) and dominated by inter-annual and
decadal timescales. The other pattern is distinct from the NAO and
more consistent with the atmospheric response to multi-decadal
oceanic variations (Delworth et al 1993; Kushnir 1994; Mann and
Park 1996). This suggests that patterns not easily resolvable in the
short instrumental record (in particular, patterns distinct from the
NAO) may be of increasing relative importance on progressively
longer timescales, and are important to understanding climatic
variations in the Middle East on multi-decadal and longer
timescales. As increasingly larger numbers of high quality proxy
reconstructions become available in diverse regions of the globe, it
will be possible to assimilate a more globally representative
multiproxy data network. Given the high level of skill possible in
large-scale reconstruction back to 1450 with the somewhat sparse
network of the present study, there is reason to believe that it may
soon be possible to reconstruct much of the spatio-temporal
variability of the global climate back over the last 500 to 1000 years.
With such reconstructions in hand, we will be able to document
more confidently the climatic variations in the Middle East during

 

  



the past millennium. Such reconstructions should be useful for
understanding changes in human land use and patterns of civiliza
tion in that region on longer timescales.
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Figure 10

Reconstructed large-scale temperature patterns for (i) 1760, (ii) 1783, (iii) 1816, (iv) 1878. Middle Eastern box used to compute MNET
index is shown. The color scale indicates regions which exceed (either positively or negatively) the threshold indicated. The zero baseline
is defined by the 1902-1980 climatological mean for each gridpoint.
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Rapid Population Growth and the Fertility Policies of the Arab Countries of the Middle East
and North Africa
Onn Winckler
University of Haifa
ABSTRACT
The population of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has increased rapidly over the course of the 20th
century. During the 70 years between 1914 and 1994, the region's total population has grown by nearly a factor of five,
largely as a result of natural rates of increase in indigenous populations (with the notable exceptions of Israel and the
Gulf states, whose population increases are generally attributable to migration). Population growth rates among many of
the nations of the region are presently among the highest worldwide. Despite family planning measures undertaken in
many MENA countries, continued population growth remains the most critical socioeconomic problem in the region as
governments struggle to support their growing populations with inadequate resources. This paper argues that only the
continued reduction of fertility levels, combined with massive shifts of financial resources away from the military toward
socioeconomic development, will avert wide-scale human and environmental hardship in the region.

INTRODUCTION
During the last hundred years, the global population has more
than tripled, growing from 1.7 billion at the turn of the 20th century
to nearly 5.75 billion in 1995 (Durand 1977; United Nations Demo
graphic Yearbook–1995). This rate of increase is far higher than has
ever before been witnessed in human history.
Over time, the global population has undergone a “demographic
transition” which can be generally divided into three stages. The first
stage lasted from the beginnings of human civilization until the
middle of the 19th century, a period characterized by high crude
birth rates (over 40 per 1,000) and high total fertility rates (over six).
Nevertheless, because mortality levels were also high during this
period, natural increase rates of the world’s population were gener
ally quite low (and sometimes even negative during periods of star
vation and epidemic disease).
In the developed West, the second stage of the demographic
transition began in the middle of the 19th century (with the devel
oping world following between 30-80 years later), as improved
sanitation, preventive medicine, and nutrition resulted in vastly
reduced mortality rates and significant increases in life expectancy.
All of these developments were a result of the Industrial Revolution
and thus occurred only in western countries. The decline in death
rates was not followed immediately by a decrease in fertility levels,
however, and the growing gap between high fertility rates and falling
death rates led to a sharp increase in population growth as com
pared with past centuries.
In industrialized countries, a third stage of demographic transi
tion began in the early 20th century, characterized by declining

 





fertility rates caused by the forces of modernization. During the past
two decades, falling birth rates have converged with low death rates
to generate rates of natural increase approaching zero in many of the
developed countries (Todaro 1990; Caldwell and Caldwell 1982;
Lutz 1994). By 1995, in the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ger
many, for example, the natural increase rates of the population were
0.2%, 0%, and -0.1%, respectively (UNICEF 1997).
Most of the world’s countries, however, including those of the
Middle East, have not yet reached the third stage of demographic
transition. These developing countries have been the main contribu
tors to rapid global population growth over the last two generations.
By 1994, only a fifth of the world’s population was living in regions
classified as industrialized. However, during recent years, there have
been strong indications of a worldwide fertility decline, even in subSaharan Africa, which appears to be the last region to begin the third
stage of the demographic transition (Lutz 1994).
As in other developing areas, the Middle East has witnessed rapid
population increases in the 20th century, especially from the late
1950s onward (see Figure 1). The total population of the Middle
East and North Africa (including Iran and Turkey) increased from
roughly 68 million in 1914 (Issawi 1982) to more than 340 million
in 1994 (World Bank 1996; ESCWA 1995), a fourfold increase dur
ing a period of only 80 years. The reason for such a dramatic in
crease is not migration, as has been the case in North America, for
example, but instead the growth of natural increase rates in the
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indigenous populations over the last two generations, which are
considered to be among the highest worldwide.
The vast majority of the Middle East population is Muslim (pri
marily Sunni), but there are numerous other religious groups, in
cluding Christians, Alawis (concentrated in Turkey and Syria), Jews
(almost all in Israel), and Druze (present in Syria, Lebanon, Israel,
and Jordan). The most prominent ethnic group in the Middle East
are the Arabs, representing about half of the total population of the
region (including Iran and Turkey, but not including North Africa).
Among the remainder, 25% are Turks, 12% Persians, 7% Kurds, 2%
Jews, and 4% an amalgam of smaller ethnic groups, such as Arme
nians and Baluch (Omran and Roudi 1993; Weeks 1988).
This chapter is explicitly concerned with population growth in
the Arab Middle East. Demographic trends and their socioeconomic
implications among the Arab populations of Israel, the West Bank,
and the Gaza Strip will not be taken up here. It is nonetheless im
portant to note population growth patterns in Israel. According to
official Israeli figures, by 1996 the total population of Israel (exclud
ing the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip but
including its Jewish Israeli residents) was 5.76 million, among which
4.64 million were Jews and 1.12 million were Arab and others, as
compared with 3.9 million and 875,100, respectively, in 1990. The
growth of the Jewish population in Israel during this period is cen
trally a result of large-scale migration from the former Soviet Union
and Ethiopia, amounting to nearly 600,000 Jewish immigrants to
Israel between 1990 and 1996, whereas the growth of the Arab and
other populations is more attributable to natural growth (Israel,
Statistical Abstract–1997).
The objectives of this paper are threefold: first, to examine the
causes and effects of high natural increase rates in the Arab Middle
East; second, to investigate government policy in reaction to the de
mographic changes in the region; and third, to analyze demographic
projections for the future and their socioeconomic implications.
REGIONAL BACKGROUND AND THE NATURAL
INCREASE OF THE MIDDLE EAST POPULATION
Crude birth rates, which were very high at the beginning of
recorded history (about 45 per 1,000 inhabitants), remained so
through the 1970s. In 1980, the crude birth rate was 38 in Egypt, 46
in Syria and Saudi Arabia, and 47 in Jordan. Only in the last decade
has there been evidence of a reduction in crude birth rates. In 1994,
the crude birth rate was estimated to be 29 in Egypt, 33 in Jordan,
and 26 in Tunisia. However, in some countries in the region, even

 





during the first half of the 1990s, fertility rates have continued to be
very high, mainly in the oil-exporting countries of the Persian Gulf,
as a result of the pro-natalist policies adopted by the regional re
gimes. However, even in these countries, there was some reduction
in fertility levels during the past decade due to drastic improvement
in the education of women as well as increases in their labor force
participation (see Figure 2).
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By 1995, according to UNICEF, the average crude birth rate in
the Middle East and North Africa region was 33 per 1,000, as com
pared with 48 in 1960 (UNICEF 1997). Crude death rates, which
were very high in the 18th century (about 42-44 per 1,000 inhabit
ants), began to decrease during the 19th century, especially from the
1850s onward, dropping to approximately 33 by the end of the 19th
century. During the 20th century, crude death rates declined even
more rapidly, dropping by 1995 to 7 per 1,000, as compared with 21
in 1960 (UNICEF 1997).
There are several reasons for the marked reduction in crude
death rates in the Middle East over the last two centuries. Initially,
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the decrease was a result of the elimination of starvation and epi
demics. At the end of the 19th century and throughout the 20th
century, the further reduction is attributed primarily to improve
ments in medical care, both in quantity and quality. During the
second half of the 20th century, the rise in the standard of living has
also been responsible (Gilbar 1990).
The result of this increasing gap between crude birth and death
rates has been the growth in natural population increase throughout
the Arab Middle East.The average natural increase rate in the region
tripled from 1% to 3% in some countries over the course of the
current century. By 1995, the natural increase rate in the Middle
East and North Africa region generally was 2.6%, resulting in a net
population increase of 9 million annually and a doubling of the
population every 26.6 years (see Table 1).
This general trend has prevailed in most developing countries
globally during the last two generations. However, while in most of
the other developing areas the crude birth and fertility rates started
to decrease during the late 1960s and early 1970s, in many Middle
Eastern countries high crude birth and fertility rates have continued
even into the 1990s. The “demographic revolution” of the Middle
East was, more than anything else, a revolution in crude death rates.
The drop in crude death rates in the region has been in part a
function of marked reductions in infant (0-1) and child (1-5)
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mortality rates. Average infant mortality rates in most of the Middle
East dropped from 170-230 per 1,000 live births (U.N. ESCWA
1988), during the 1950s to 158 in Egypt, 96 in Syria, 90 in Jordan,
146 in Saudi Arabia, and only 49 in Kuwait in 1970. During the
1970s and the 1980s, this trend continued, particularly among the
oil-exporting countries of the Persian/Arabian Gulf. By 1994, the
infant mortality rate was estimated to be only 25 in Saudi Arabia,16
in Kuwait, and 24 in Bahrain. The other Arab countries of the
Middle East also reached relatively low rates of infant mortality,
including 30 in Syria and 33 in Jordan in 1994 (see Figure 3). Simi
larly, the under-five mortality rate also fell very sharply.The average
under-five mortality rate in the Middle East and North Africa region
dropped from 244 per 1,000 live births in 1960 to 64 per 1,000 live
births in 1995 (UNICEF 1997). A second factor contributing to the
crude death rate decline has been a dramatic increase in the life
expectancy, also attributable to advances in medical care and general
improvements in the standard of living. In Egypt, life expectancy
increased from 46 years in 1960 to 68 years in 1994 and in Syria,
from 50 in 1960 to 70 in 1994. In the Gulf, the increase in the aver
age life expectancy was even more marked than in the other Middle
Eastern countries (see Figure 4; see also Hill 1981).

  



   

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH RATES OF
NATURAL INCREASE IN THE “OVERPOPULATED”
COUNTRIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST
Many of the Middle Eastern countries are “overpopulated,”
which is to say that the ratio between the population and the avail
able resources is so high as to limit economic development. For
example: although the total population in Saudi Arabia is almost
four times higher than Jordan’s, Saudi Arabia is not deemed “over
populated” because of its vast oil resources. Jordan, lacking substan
tial natural and economic resources, is considered overpopulated.
The most important consequence of the high natural increase
rates among the Arab population of the Middle East during the last
two generations has been the creation of a wide base of the age
pyramid. In 1960, 51% of the total population was below the age of
15 in Egypt (Egypt, Statistical Yearbook, 1952-96), and 46% in Syria
(U.N., Demographic Yearbook-1970), 46% in Jordan (ESCWA 1992).
A quarter century later, those percentages grew to 51% in Egypt in
1986 (Egypt, Statistical Yearbook-1952-96), and 49% in Syria in 1990
(Syria, Statistical Abstract-1990), 49% in Saudi Arabia in 1992
(ESCWA 1993), and 48% in Kuwait in 1988 (ESCWA 1992). In the
developed West and Far East, such percentages are typically at least a
factor of two lower, with only 20% of the population in France
below the age of 15 in 1990, for example. (U.N. Demographic Year
book-1990).
The high percentage of the young in the developing countries
has led to very low crude economic activity rates, due to the rela
tively low percentages of the working age (15-64) population within
the total population and the tendency of women not to work outside
the home. The percentage was 28% in Egypt in 1986 (ILO, Yearbook
of Labour Statistics-1992), 24% in Jordan in 1991 (ILO, Yearbook of
Labour Statistics-1994:) and 18% in Kuwait in 1985 (Looney 1994).
Again, in developed countries, such rates tend to be a factor of two
higher, as the result of both larger percentages of the population in
the working age group and high percentages of working women. In
1993, the economic activity rate was 53% in Japan, 50% in Hong
Kong, and 49% in the United Kingdom (ILO, Yearbook of Labour
Statistics-1994). Thus, the ratio between breadwinners and those
being supported is 1:2 in the developed countries, as compared with
1: 4 or even 1: 4.5 in most countries of the Arab Middle East.
Children and teenagers are large consumers of public services,
such as health care and education, while their productive contribu
tion is marginal. In many countries of the Arab Middle East, where
public services are largely free of charge, or are heavily subsidized,
the high percentage of the young people has far-reaching conse

 


quences and a substantial negative impact on economic growth,
particularly in the non-oil-exporting countries.
An additional problem of high population growth rates has been
that growth in the labor force has outpaced economic growth and
the creation of new work opportunities, causing an increase in un
employment and underemployment. In Egypt, for example, during
the second half of the 1980s, approximately 400,000 people were
entering the labor force every year (Egypt, Statistical Yearbook-1952
92), of whom 292,000 were graduates of universities and colleges
(al-Ahram, April 12, 1990). Since it was beyond the capacity of the
Egyptian economy to create hundreds of thousands of new work
opportunities on an annual basis, unemployment rates increased
very rapidly during the 1970s and 1980s, despite large scale migra
tion of Egyptian workers to the oil-exporting countries of the Gulf
and Libya after the “oil boom” of October 1973. The Egyptian un
employed numbered approximately 175,000 in 1960 but swelled to
one million in 1982 and reached as high as two million in 1988 – an
unemployment rate of some 15% in that particular year (alMusawwar, June 30, 1989).
In order to mitigate these high unemployment rates, Egyptian
authorities increased available work opportunities by absorbing
large numbers of employees into the governmental bureaucracy,
service sectors, and other publicly-owned companies. Subsequent
reductions in unemployment were not sustained over the long term
and inefficiency within governmental services in the long run in
creased substantially.
Such unemployment and underemployment patterns are not
unique to Egypt, but prevail in other Middle Eastern and North
African countries as well. During the late 1980s, official figures
placed the Tunisian unemployment rate at 14% in 1989, but unoffi
cial estimates were substantially higher (25%), and higher still
(40%) for the youngest working age population category (18-26)
(EIU, Country Profile-Tunisia, 1989/90). In Algeria, unemployment
grew from approximately 16% in 1984 to almost 23% in 1989 (EIU,
Country Profile-Algeria, 1991/92).
In Jordan, during the 1970s and the early 1980s, the unemploy
ment rates were among the lowest in the entire Arab Middle East. By
the mid-1970s, Jordan had obtained almost full employment for its
citizens, and in 1976 the unemployment rate in the Kingdom was
less than 2% (Hammouda 1980) – an unusual statistic for a non-oil
exporting country at the time. The central explanation for this
phenomemon was the migration of hundreds of thousands of Jorda
nian workers to the Gulf, mainly to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. This
massive labor force export actually caused a manpower shortage in
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Jordan, bringing about a counter-migration to Jordan primarily
from Egypt and Syria (Winckler 1997).
However, as a result of King Hussein of Jordan’s support of Iraq
during the Gulf War of 1990-91, about 350,000 Jordanians and
Palestinians returned to Jordan, mainly from Kuwait (MEED,
August 14, 1992). The Jordanian labor market consequently
changed dramatically, and by October 1991, the official unemploy
ment rate rose to approximately 23%,with unofficial estimates plac
ing the statistic closer to 35% (Jordan Times, October 14, 1991). This
placed Jordan among the countries with the highest unemployment
rates in the region.
An additional negative consequence of the rapid population
growth patterns has been increasing pressure on natural resources,
with the most obvious being a steady decline in the relationship
between population, on the one hand, and water and cultivable
lands, on the other hand. In Egypt, for example, cropped area per
capita decreased by more than 40% during the years 1952-88
(Winckler 1992). A similar trend is also seen in Syria, where the
cropped area per capita dropped during the years 1960-94, despite a
nearly 40% increase in total cultivated area, as a result of a massive
population growth over that period (Syria, Statistical Abstracts-1960,
1995). Similar trends are also evident in Jordan and in most of the
other countries in the region.
Today, in Jordan (as in the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel), the
demand for water already far exceeds the supply, and the gap is
widening steadily. According to the Water Authority of Jordan, total
annual water demand in the Kingdom was 900 MCM but total annual
supply was roughly 550 MCM in 1990. By the year 2000, annual water
demand in the Kingdom is projected to rise to 1,600 MCM, but sup
ply is unlikely to surpass 700 MCM (MEED, May 28, 1993). In Egypt,
the steep increase of water allocations for domestic use in parallel to
the rapid population growth has caused a steady reduction in the
water available for agriculture, while in other parts of the region,
water continues to be devoted to irrigation with municipal consum
ers experiencing increasing shortages and higher prices. In general,
however, water for municipal consumption has led to a growing
food gap all over the Middle East, a region that was a net agricultural
exporter until the beginning of the 1950s. (See Allan, Shamir,
Elmusa, this volume).
Egypt, which was a net agricultural exporter only two genera
tions ago, has become one of the largest food importers worldwide.
By the end of the 1980s, total food imports to Egypt amounted to $4
billion and constituted one of the major factors responsible for the
large deficit in the Egyptian balance of trade, which was $7.5 billion
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in the 1988/89 fiscal year (MEED, June 8, 1990). Jordan also became
a net food importer as a result of rapid population growth and the
increasing shortage of water for agricultural purposes. By 1987, net
food imports to Jordan amounted to $359.5 million and increased
to $487 million in 1991 (EIU, Country Profile-Jordan, 1993/94).
Similar trends are apparent in Algeria, where the rate of cereal im
ports increased from 29% of total domestic cereal consumption
during the years 1970-73 to 65% on average during the years 1979
82, staying at that level throughout the 1980s (EIU, Country ProfileAlgeria, 1991/92; ESCWA and FAO 1993).
Urbanization in many developing countries began around the
1940s. While in the industrialized countries the “pull” factor (to
ward the cities and their economic opportunities) dominated, in
developing countries the “push” factor (away from rural areas and
their poverty) was responsible for the massive rural-to-urban shift.
In addition, while in the industrialized countries the urbanization
process was gradual and continuous over more than a century and
half, in developing countries (including those of the Middle East) it
has been a very rapid process, occurring over less than two genera
tions (Saad Eddin 1974, 1985; see Figure 4). The rate of urbanization
in the Middle East has risen faster over recent decades than in any
other region in the world, and is likely to continue in the coming
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decade as well. The Middle East’s urban population rose from 28%
in 1950 to 47% in 1980, and is likely to reach almost 60% by the year
2000 (Symarsky 1988).
As a result of this rapid urbanization, the larger cities in the
region have been forced to absorb a large number of the rural mi
grants and have experienced a doubling of the urbanized area in a
process of relatively uncontrolled sprawl. Urban expansion has far
outpaced the capacity of governments to adequately integrate and
service these new areas. Throughout the overpopulated Middle
Eastern countries, there is a chronic shortage of housing, which has
led to rising housing prices in the major Middle Eastern cities. This
shortage has also brought about an increase in the construction of
informal dwelling units, the most well-known of which is “the City
of the Dead,” the old cemeteries of Cairo.
Moreover, since the major cities in the Middle East are located
near central water sources, their expansion has been at the expense
of the cultivated lands. This phenomenon is particularly apparent in
Cairo, where many villages have been swallowed by urban sprawl.
Due to urban expansion, the total cultivated area of Egypt did not
grow between 1952 and the mid-1980s, despite the construction of
the High Dam in Aswan and massive projects to expand cultivated
area (The Egyptian Gazette, May 10, 1985). Similar trends are appar
ent in Syria and Jordan.
FERTILITY POLICIES AMONG THE ARAB COUNTRIES OF
THE MIDDLE EAST
Generally speaking, it can be said that all Middle Eastern coun
tries are trying to influence the level of the crude birth and fertility
rates of their citizens. However, the motivations for intervention
differ. In general, the Arab countries of the Middle East can be di
vided into three main groups according to their reproductive poli
cies during the second half of the 20th century.
The first group, comprised of Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco, has
put national family planning programs into effect as a result of the
acute intensity of the resource pressures resulting from the over
population syndrome (Gilbar 1997).
The second group, consisting of Syria and Jordan, does not
suffer from pressures as acute as those in the first group. While the
Syrian and Jordanian governments do consider the high fertility
rates an obstacle to socioeconomic development, neither has a de
clared family planning policy. The authorities of these countries are
attempting to bring about reductions in population growth through
indirect means, particularly via improvements in women’s educa
tion and employment opportunities.

 





The third group includes countries whose governments are
attempting to increase, or at least preserve, their current high fertil
ity rates. This group is made up of the oil-exporting countries of the
Gulf. The small national populations of these countries relative to
their political aspirations and economic needs have led their govern
ments to adopt pro-natalist policies following the “oil boom” of
October 1973. Their purpose has been to rapidly increase the num
ber of nationals so as to reduce the proportion of foreigners in the
short run and to diminish labor scarcity and foreign worker demand
in the long run.
DECLARED ANTI-NATALIST POLICIES: THE EXAMPLES
OF EGYPT AND TUNISIA
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, many leaders in developing
countries, including those in the Middle East, saw a blessing in rapid
population growth and made no attempt to limit it. Instead, they
adopted pro-natalist policies based on the idea that a large nation is
a strong nation (Baer 1973).
However, during the late 1950s and into the 1960s, leaders in
these same countries awakened to the link between rapid population
growth and the socioeconomic problems which had begun to sur
face, and understood that their only solution was the reduction of the
natural increase rates of their population (Symonds and Carder 1973).
The Free Officers in Egypt became aware of the population prob
lem in their country shortly after the July 1952 revolution. They
thought, however, that widespread socioeconomic development
would gradually bring about a decline in fertility levels without
direct intervention, particularly as a result of the education of wo
men and improvements in living standards. The results of the 1960
census proved the approach to be a misguided one, indicating only
that most of the economic development that had been achieved
until that point was likely to be counterbalanced by the burden of
supporting the exploding population. In any case, it was only in
1966 that the Egyptian government established the Higher Council for
Family Planning, and in August of that year it was announced that
2,850 family planning clinics were operating throughout the country.
The Egyptian authorities adopted the “direct-supply” approach to
family planning, which was the common approach among interna
tional organizations active in the field at the time. The theory was that
the population was anxious to reduce its fertility rate but lacked the
contraceptive methods needed to do so. By providing birth control
along with instructions for its use, the aim of fertility reduction would
be achieved. A similar approach was adopted by Tunisia, which was
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the first Arab country to adopt a declared family planning policy in
1964 (Gilbar 1997; Faour 1989; World Bank 1985).
However, during the 1970s, and especially following the 1974 World
Population Conference in Bucharest, this approach was changed to
emphasize not only the availability of contraception but also the likeli
hood of its use. The governments of the participating nations decided
that in order to increase the rate of contraceptive use, they would have
to affect changes in traditional social norms, and that family planning
objectives could only be achieved in the context of broader socioeco
nomic development plans.
In accordance with the new strategy, Egypt adopted a new family
planning policy in 1973. Its aims were to bring about a substantial
reduction in crude birth rates by (1) raising the educational level of the
entire population, though particularly among women; (2) increasing
employment opportunities for women so as to boost the rate of labor
force participation; (3) enhancing agricultural mechanization in order
to diminish the need for children as cheap labor; (4) increasing indus
trialization; (5) reducing infant mortality; (6) strengthening social
security; and (7) improving family planning services (Gallagher 1981;
Stycos et al. 1982).
The Tunisian government altered its reproductive policy in a
similar fashion in the mid-1970s, folding family planning into the
framework of comprehensive socioeconomic development initiatives
aimed mainly at improving the status of women (Stubbs 1980; U.N.,
Department of International Economic and Social Affairs 1990; Inter
national Planned Parenthood Federation-Middle East and North
Africa Region 1981; and Hill 1976). In 1987, the Tunisians added
economic incentives, issuing allowances to employees supporting
families with no more than four children and with amounts decreas
ing with the addition of each newborn. A year later, the allowances
were limited to families with three children (Faour 1989; U.N.,
Department of International Economic and Social Affairs 1990).
Increasingly, the mass media have been utilized in Egypt to promote
the lowering of fertility levels. During the past two decades, numerous
articles by well-known journalists have highlighted the issue, and direct
appeals by political leaders have appeared in the newspapers to increase
public awareness. At the same time, the Egyptian government is actively
expanding the network of family planning services, and making consid
erable effort to obtain the support of prominent religious leaders. Con
firmation by the religious leaders that family planning does not
contradict the tenets of Islam is considered by all an essential require
ment for the success of national family planning programs (Gilbar
1997). Indeed, fatwas (religious decrees) and interviews with religious

 





leaders have appeared in the Egyptian newspapers on a regular basis
(see, for example, al-Ahram, February 7, October 22, 1989; April 20,
1990).
UNDECLARED ANTI-NATALIST POLICIES: THE
EXAMPLES OF SYRIA AND JORDAN
While the countries included in the first group started to take
anti-natalist steps from the mid-1960s onward, the countries in the
second group initiated undeclared anti-natalist measures much
later, in the mid-1970s in the case of Syria and only in the early
1980s in the case of Jordan.
Until the mid-1970s, the Syrian government did not advocate a
family planning policy; instead, it strove to increase fertility rates by
providing financial benefits to large families and forbidding the
promotion, distribution, or use of birth control methods (Habbab
1974), largely out of the conviction that the Syrian population was
small in comparison with the economic needs and political aspira
tions of the country.
However, at the beginning of the 1970s, especially after the re
sults of the 1970 census became known, the attitude of the Syrian
authorities toward family planning and the rate of population
growth began to change. This was primarily due to the emergence of
social and economic problems whose origin lay in the high birth and
fertility rates, including a reduced rate of labor force participation,
an increase in public spending on food subsidies and imports, and
growth in costs for subsidized health care and education (Syria,
CBS, 1973).
The change in the Syrian approach was gradual and did not
lead initially to an overall national family planning policy. In 1974,
the Family Branch of the Ministry of Health was established in
order to coordinate activities in reproductive policy within the
framework of the mother and child clinics that had been operating
in Syria since the 1950s. In February of 1974, the Syrian Family
Planning Association, headed by the Minister of Health, was estab
lished with the objectives of (1) improving health care for both
mothers and children; (2) supplying contraceptives and providing
training on their proper use; and (3) conducting research in the
area of family planning and other demographic subfields (Habbab
1974; al-Ba’th April 28, 1974; ESCWA 1992; Population Division of
the UN and UNFPA 1980).
During this period, the Syrian authorities consistently stressed
the close connection between family planning activities and the
health of mothers and children, as well as the socioeconomic condi
tion of the family. The change in the authorities’ attitude towards

  



   

family planning was also reflected in the Syrian mass media, which is
under strict governmental control. Since the late 1970s and the early
1980s, the Syrian press has published reports and articles about the
rapid population growth and its socioeconomic consequences not
only on the national level, but also on the individual family level,
thus underlining the need to implement family planning measures
(see, for example, Tishrin, August 23, September 6, and October 20
21, 1982; December 7, 1983; January 22, 1984; and October 30,
1985).
A turning point occured in 1987 in the natalist policy of the
Syrian government. The subsidies given to large families were cancelled, and the Ministry of Health began to appeal directly through
the mass media to young families to adopt family planning practices.
At the same time, the range of activities of the Family Planning
Association was expanded (ESCWA 1992) and conferences on de
mographic issues and family planning were convened with increas
ing frequency (Zisser 1994). As in Egypt, endorsements of official
religious figures were sought (Tishrin, April 10, 1994).
Among the Arab countries of the Middle East, Jordan was one of
the latest to take anti-natalist steps, beginning only in the early
1980s. This is surprising, since demographic pressures are consider
ably greater in Jordan than in Syria, for example, which began its
anti-natalist agenda at least a decade earlier. The explanation, as we
have discussed, is that during the “oil decade” (1973-82) nearly 40%
of the Jordanian work force was employed outside the Kingdom,
living in the Gulf along with their families. Thus, until the early
1980s and the return of large numbers of Jordanian workers and their
accompanying family members from the oil-exporting countries, the
demographic pressures remained below the surface, and Jordanian
authorities were not forced to deal with the population problem.
The marked decline in oil prices in 1986-87 caused not only a
massive reduction in workers’ remittances (which until then had
constituted the main source of foreign exchange in the Kingdom)
but also a sharp decrease in foreign aid from the wealthy Arab oilexporting countries. This caused experts in the areas of demography
and economics to advocate a reduction in fertility rates by adopting
open population policies in order to maintain the high rates of
economic growth (Jordan Times, June 18, 1992; May 5, 1993).
The return of 350,000 Jordanians and Palestinians from the Gulf
states at the end of 1990 and the first half of 1991, which created
even greater pressures on employment, housing, and public services,
sparked an acceleration of family planning measures instituted
earlier. However, as in Syria, most of these steps were indirect and
concentrated mainly in the improvement in women’s educational
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and expansion of women’s employment opportunities outside the
home. In addition, the Jordanian government began subsidizing the
Jordanian Family Planning Association and established family plan
ning services in public clinics and hospitals (Warren et al, 1990;
Badran 1992). However, in contrast to the clinics in Egypt, those in
Jordan did not actively encourage the use of contraceptives, but rather
provided information and guidance only to individuals requesting
assistance with family planning.
Finally, the explicit statements of political leaders promoting
family planning, such as those offered by President Mubarak in
Egypt, are effectively absent in Syria and Jordan.
PRO-NATALIST POLICIES: THE EXAMPLE OF THE
GULF STATES
Since the early 1970s, measures have been taken by the Gulf oilexporting countries whose aim is to increase fertility rates among
their national populations.
The strictest policy, adopted by the Saudi government partly as a
result of the disappointingly small numbers of Saudi nationals re
ported in the 1974 population census, was that contraceptives were
pronounced to be contrary to the teaching of Islam, and their im
port was banned in the spring of 1975 (Hill 1976; Allman 1978;
ESCWA 1992).
Another measure was government-initiated housing develop
ment. In all of the Gulf oil-exporting countries, albeit with some
local differences, governments began to sell housing at-cost, pro
vided plots of land for building, and offered long-term loans for
housing at very low interest (Al-Najjar 1993). The Qatari govern
ment, for example, built housing projects whose buyers were re
quired to pay back only 60% of the cost over a period of 20-25
years (Nafi 1983).
The encouragement of early marriage is a measure that has come
to be accepted as the norm among the Gulf oil-exporting countries.
Since the beginning of the 1980s, the Kuwaiti government has
granted a marriage allowance of 2,000 Kuwaiti Dinar (KD) to na
tionals marrying for the first time, with an additional 1,000 KD
offered as a soft loan. This allowance was designed to compensate
men for the expenses incurred by the custom of mahr (bride’s gift),
which the groom is expected to offer to the bride’s father (U.N.
Department of International Economic and Social Affairs 1988a;
ESCWA 1992).
Despite the severe damage to the Kuwaiti economy as a result of
the Iraqi invasion, a substantial increase in the marriage grant to
Kuwaiti nationals was approved by the Council of Ministers at the
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beginning of 1992. According to this decision, eligible Kuwaiti males
were entitled to receive $14,000 (half as a grant and half as a loan)
for their marriage to Kuwaiti women, amounting to twice the previ
ous sum. The reason for the increase, according to the Kuwaiti
Minister of Finance, was “to encourage Kuwaiti youths to
marry”(Gulf States Newsletter, April 6, 1992). The Saudi authorities
adopted a similar policy in 1982 (UN, Department of International
Economic and Social Affairs 1990).
Although the full subsidies provided for education (including
books, clothing, etc.) from the first grade through the university
level, is generally considered to be admirable social policy, it none
theless constitutes an implicit incentive to produce larger families.
EVALUATION OF THE FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMS
The aforementioned pro-natalist measures were, without a
doubt, effective in increasing or at least maintaining fertility rates in
the Gulf oil-exporting countries. During the last 25 years, the na
tional populations of these countries have risen at among the high
est rates in the world. By 1994, the total national populations of the
GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) countries numbered 16.3 million
(ESCWA 1995a), as compared with barely than 6 million in 1975
(Winckler 1997).
In all of the countries implementing declared anti-natalist poli
cies, there has been an impressive decline in the fertility rates, espe
cially over the last 15 years. In Egypt, the crude birth rate decreased
from 43 per 1,000 in 1960 to 29 in 1994, and in Tunisia, from 49 to
26 during the same period. In the countries which operate unde
clared anti-natalist policies, there has also been a substantial reduc
tion in the fertility rates. In Jordan, for example, crude birth rates
dropped from 47 in 1960 to 33 in 1994 (see Figure 2).
Two main factors contributed to the reduction in the crude birth
and fertility rates in the anti-natalist countries during recent years.
The first and most important has been a massive increase in the
rates of contraceptive use. In Egypt, the rate of contraceptive use
among married women increased from 23.8% in 1980 to 47.6% in
1991 (Yehia 1994). In Jordan, the increase was from 22.8% in 1976
to 26.0% in 1983 (Jordan 1984), and 40.0% in 1990 (Jordan 1992;
ESCWA 1994). The rate of contraceptive use in Syria also increased
significantly, from 20% in 1978 (SAR 1982) to almost 40% in 1993
(Syria and PAPCD 1995).
The second factor was a significant rise in the mean age at first
marriage among females, both in the countries operating antinatalist policies, as well as in those advocating pro-natalist policies.
This delay in the mean age at first marriage served to slow down
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reproduction and thus constituted a major factor in the reduction of
fertility levels. In Jordan, for example, the mean age of first marriage
for females increased from 20.1 years in 1961 to 24.5 years in 1992,
and in Egypt from 20.2 years in 1960 to 22.6 years in 1991 (ESCWA
1994).
In the oil-exporting countries, the increase in the average age of
first marriage was counteracted by the economic incentives of the
pro-natalist policies in terms of the effect on reproduction within
the marriage system. Thus, only relatively small reductions were
made in the fertility rates, which remained very high as compared
with those in the countries actively operating anti-natalist policies.
By 1994, the crude birth rate among Saudi nationals was 38 per
1,000 inhabitants and 44 in Kuwait, while in Egypt and Tunisia, the
rates were only 29 and 26 (see Figure 2).
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND PROJECTIONS
Today, rapid population growth appears to constitute the most
critical socioeconomic problem in the Arab Middle East. Nearly two
generations of high natural increase rates have created a wide base of
the age pyramid, and in most countries half of the national popula
tions are under the age of 18, making them consumers but not
producers. The wide base of the age pyramid, which also accounts
for the low crude death rates, will be responsible for further high
natural increase rates in the future, in spite of the decline in the
fertility rates, at least in the next two decades.
In spite of the relative success of the family planning programs in
the Middle East during the last 15 years and the sharp reduction in
the crude birth and fertility rates, the population growth rates in all
of the countries in the region remain high. In Egypt, for example,
despite the substantial decline in the natural increase rates, the net
annual population growth at the mid-1990s was about 1.2-1.3 mil
lion. This increase is almost the same as it was a decade ago, in the
mid-1980s, when the natural increase rate was 3%, simply because
the total population has increased by 14 million during that period.
The situation is common to the rest of the countries in the Middle
East and North Africa region.
Rapid population growth is likely to continue throughout the
region. According to World Bank projections, the Egyptian popula
tion will continue to increase rapidly, at least in the first half of the
21st century, and will reach 102.6 million by the year 2050. Likewise,
the Algerian population at that time will be 58.6 million, and that of
Syria almost 49 million (World Bank 1995).
The peculiar nature of the demographic problem, as compared
with other socioeconomic problems, is that while it is possible to
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change economic policy within a period of only a few years, experi
ence tells us that it generally takes at least two generations to alter
reproductive behavior. Until changes take hold, governments of
“overpopulated” countries must absorb and support their bulging
populations with inadequate resources.
Since this process is irreversible, the governments of these coun
tries have to plan the development of their economic infrastructure to
support populations which will at least double in number. Is it pos
sible for the Egyptian economy to support more than 100 million
people, or for Jordan to support more than 10 million? The creation
of a single job in Egypt costs about $5,000 (al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi
March 12, 1990) and every year more than 400,000 additional people
are joining the labor market.Therefore, Egypt needs to invest more
than $2 billion annually just to create additional work opportunities
without taking into consideration existing unemployment.
One of the major obstacles to reducing the fertility rates all over
the Middle East has been a skewed set of economic incentives. Educa
tion at all levels, as well as health care and basic foodstuffs, are either
provided entirely free of charge or are highly subsidized. These mea
sures serve, in effect, as incentives for high fertility. Naturally, how
ever, it is not advisable to terminate these social policies in these
countries, thereby threatening the well-being of millions of citizens.
A key question is why the authorities of the overpopulated coun
tries delayed the implementation of family planning programs for
many years after they became aware of the population problem and its
devastating consequences in their countries. Gamal Abd al-Nasser, for
example, acknowledged the population problem in Egypt shortly after
the July 1952 revolution. However, it took 13 years until the first
Egyptian family planning program began operation. In addition, after
the June 1967 war, the issue of the population problem was aban
doned in favor of military buildup. President Mubarak began to
devote greater resources and attention to the population issue only a
decade ago. This means that during the better part of twenty years, the
population problem in Egypt was almost totally neglected.
Egypt is only one example. Other governments in the region also
delayed the implementation of family planning programs well after
they became aware of the issue. In Syria, although overpopulation
was recognized as problem in the mid-1970s, it took more than a
decade until the financial benefits to large families were canceled.
It appears that the combination of two factors is to blame for the
delay. The first was the sensitivity of family planning in traditional
Islamic societies and the strong opposition of the Islamic fundamen
talist movements to any anti-natalist measures. The movements
claimed that the central reasons for economic hardship were not

 


high natural increase rates but instead misguided leadership of the
secular regimes. The Islamists argued that the establishment of
religious regimes, in accordance with the Islamic Shari’a, would
return the prosperity that they once enjoyed.
In an attempt to avoid direct confrontation with these move
ments, most of the regimes in the “overpopulated” countries de
layed the implementation of family planning measures for as long as
possible. However, the problem finally reached the point at which
further denial of its consequences would constitute a greater threat
to the continued stability of the current regimes, even in the short
term, than a confrontation with the Islamic fundamentalist move
ments over the issue.
The second reason for the delay was the Arab-Israeli conflict,
particularly in the cases of Egypt and Syria. The longstanding con
flicts led the regimes of these countries to allocate scarce resources
to military purposes, and away from socioeconomic problems (such
as rapid population growth).
In the case of Syria, after the signing of the peace treaty between
Egypt and Israel in 1979, and until the late 1980s, more than half of
governmental expenditures went to the military, resulting in a re
duction of more than 20% in the per capita GDP during the years
1981-89 (Kanovsky 1995).
Only the continued reduction of the fertility rates, combined
with a shift in resources from military purposes to socioeconomic
development, will bring about an easing of the population pressures
in the Middle East. Indeed, this will prove to be one of the most
critical variables in the prospects for Middle East peace.
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ABSTRACT
We describe a variety of satellite-derived datasets and their application to understanding changes in the landscape of
southwest Asia, including regional climatology, natural vegetation, and the expansion and intensification of agricultural
production. We demonstrate the effectiveness of several remote sensing tools in gauging environmental change in this
semi-arid region as well as offering insights into the appropriate analysis of remotely sensed datasets.

INTRODUCTION
Agricultural and pastoral production in the semi-arid regions of
southwest Asia has expanded rapidly over recent decades to meet the
subsistence needs of one of the world’s fastest growing populations
and the demands of the international economy. This growth is
constrained by great interannual variation in the amount and timing
of rainfall, which restricts dependable farming to very limited areas.
Development, nonetheless, has proceeded undeterred—defying
climate through feats of hydrological engineering or betting against
it by cultivating vast areas of agriculturally marginal land. These two
processes, the intensification and extension of agricultural produc
tion, have been among the dominant forces shaping the modern
environments of southwest Asia, but their spatial expression is com
plex. The many nations of this region differ widely in their climate
and natural resources as well as in their development priorities,
available capital, and access to technology. Everywhere, however,
pressure on limited water, soil, and plant resources has increased,
often nearing the point of exhaustion or international conflict.
Growing concern about the natural resource base has led govern
ments and independent groups across the region to initiate ambitious
and costly conservation and management programs. Ultimately, the
success of these efforts depends on the development of methods for
efficient, quantitative measurement of the distribution, use, and re
generation of natural resources at a range of spatial scales.
Multispectral satellite data and techniques of image analysis offer
a potentially powerful tool for understanding problems in the clima
tology, environmental history, and natural resource management of
southwest Asia. Satellite data have been collected over southwest

  

   

Asia for the past twenty-five years and offer a virtually unexplored
archive for analyzing regional environmental changes. During the
next few years, a new generation of earth resource satellites will
come on line, providing more frequent and more detailed measure
ments of the earth’s surface than are yet possible. Southwest Asia is
particularly well suited to satellite observation. There are few trees
and, during much of the year, few clouds to obscure the land sur
face; the major vegetation cycles of the region (winter cereal farm
ing, summer cash cropping, deciduous forest growth) occur out of
phase, allowing them to be studied easily and independently of one
another. On the other hand, the bright reflectance of the land sur
face and the high dust content of the atmosphere can often cause
difficult technical problems in the detection of change over time and
in the estimation of surface biophysical parameters.
Satellite sensors are best described as imaging spectrometers that
measure the earth’s reflectance or emission of electromagnetic radia
tion over small areas, or pixels, ranging in size from several meters
to several kilometers. Most satellite sensors measure pixel reflectance
or emission in multiple bands of the electromagnetic spectrum, so
that each pixel is characterized by several different values. These
values can be treated in one of two ways. First, pixel values or ratios
among them can be assigned to the three primary colors and used to
modulate their intensity so that they combine to produce for each
pixel one color from a palette of millions. The result is a richly de
tailed, false color representation of the land surface that can reveal
features, contrasts, and textures not apparent on aerial photographs.
A second approach treats pixel values as discrete physical quantities
that can be compared mathematically to each other and to known
spectral characteristics of plants, soils, rocks, and other surface
materials (Figure 1). In this way it is possible to produce rapid landuse and land-cover classifications and to estimate land surface prop
erties such as vegetation density, temperature, and evapotrans
piration, among others.
The most commonly used satellite-derived estimate of vegetation
density is the normalized difference vegetation index (NDVI), which
takes advantage of the strong reflectance of green vegetation in the
near-infrared wavelengths and its relatively strong absorption of
visible wavelengths (Tucker 1979). This index, calculated as the
difference between infrared and visible reflectance divided by their
sum, is a dimensionless quantity ranging in value from –1 to 1.

NDVI = (REFVIS - REFNIR) / (REFNIR + REFVIS)

 

Reflectance (%)



Figure 1

Reflectance spectra for common
crop, shrub, and soil types in semi
arid southwest Asia.
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Numerous studies have demonstrated strong positive correlation
between NDVI and widely used surface measures of vegetation
density such as biomass and leaf area index, though the precise
nature of this relationship for a particular crop and region must be
determined experimentally. Because it is a ratio of two reflectances,
NDVI is particularly resistant to varying scene illumination and thus
provides fairly consistent measurement fields across broken terrain.
On the other hand, in very dense or multi-layered vegetation cano
pies, some vegetation may be obscured from direct view and hence
not measured by the NDVI. In sparsely vegetated areas, bright soils
tend to dominate the measured pixel reflectances, resulting in low
signal-to-noise ratios. A number of alternative vegetation indices
have been developed to minimize these problems, but their judi
cious use typically requires additional information about soil prop
erties and other surface characteristics, complicating their appli
cation over large areas (Huete 1988; Qi et al. 1994). In general,
NDVI is well suited for exploratory analysis of changing vegetation
patterns in southwest Asia and is used extensively in the analyses
that follow.
At present, multispectral data collected by existing satellite sen
sors are of two general types (Table 1). The first is coarse to moder
ate spatial resolution, high temporal frequency reflectance data
collected within a limited number of spectral bands. The most com
mon sensor of this type is the Advanced Very High Resolution Radi
ometer (AVHRR) carried on NOAA’s meteorological satellites,
which provides daily measurements of global reflectance and ther
mal emission in five spectral channels with a pixel size of 1 km.
Another general type of satellite sensor provides high spatial
resolution data in as many as seven spectral channels every 14–16
days. Sensors of this type include the widely used Landsat, SPOT,
and IRS systems, which produce images with pixel sizes as small as
5-10 meters. New satellite systems are breaking down this di
chotomy of data types, but successful application of satellite data to
ecological problems has depended and will continue for some time
to depend on the integration of different spatial and temporal scales
of analysis as well as ground-level and satellite data. This paper
presents ongoing research by the Southwest Asia Project at the Yale
Center for Earth Observation on the application of satellite data to
mesoscale climatology, environmental history, and resource
management in southwest Asia.

  

Table 1 Sources of earth-monitoring remotely sensed data.
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MESOSCALE CLIMATE, HYDROLOGY, AND
VEGETATION OF SOUTHWEST ASIA
One objective of the Southwest Asia Project is to understand the
relationships among climate, water resources, and the distribution
of vegetation across southwest Asia. There are two unique aspects of
our work in this area. First, we carry out geographical analysis on a
rather small spatial scale (i.e. the mesoscale) using a grid spacing of
five kilometers. The advantage of mesoscale analysis is that it cap
tures many of the significant natural patterns and human induced
features of the landscape, including meteorological phenomena and
terrain variations. Examples of mesoscale landscape features are
mountains, coastlines, rivers, cities, and rangeland and agricultural
patterns. Second, we make use of satellite-derived data extensively to
complement conventional climate station data. Satellite sensors,
even in their current early state of technical development, can de
scribe fine scale spatial patterns of standing water, snow, and vegeta
tion at reasonably frequent intervals.
A classic problem in climate and vegetation description is the
combined spatial and temporal variation of the relevant field
quantities: temperature, precipitation, snow cover, soil moisture and
runoff. Putting aside long-term trends and interannual variation,
one must still capture the seasonal cycles of these quantities. We
approach the problem of graphical presentation using the technique
of cluster analysis, known also in the remote sensing field as
unsupervised classification. This approach groups into a particular
class all pixels in the image having similar seasonal cycles,
independent of where they occur geographically. The complete
spatial and temporal description of a particular field quantity (e.g.
precipitation) can then be concisely presented in two diagrams: a
class map showing the geographical distribution of each class and
signature plots showing the seasonal cycle of the quantity. There is
of course some lost information and some arbitrariness in such a
descriptive method. First, one must choose how many different
classes are to be defined. The more classes one defines, the more infor
mation is retained, but the more complex the result. Second, a quantita
tive measure of pixel difference must be defined. It is this difference that
will be minimized among pixels assigned to the same class.
The objective of the Southwest Asia Project is to analyze most of
the relevant climatological, hydrological, and vegetation fields and
to examine the relationships among them using simple models. In
this short paper, however, we can only give the briefest description
of two important fields: precipitation and vegetation cover.

  

Figure 2

K-means classification of average monthly precipitation in semi-arid southwest Asia.
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PRECIPITATION
The starting point for our analysis of climatological precipitation
is a collection of station data available from FAO (FAOCLIM ver
sion 1.2). This dataset includes monthly values for standard climate
quantities, averaged over a period from 1940 to 1970, for about 1500
stations in southwest Asia. The station density is quite variable. It is
particularly high along the Mediterranean coast but very low in the
desert and mountainous interior regions. The typical distance be
tween stations varies from about 10 to 200 km, depending on the
region. A critical step in our analysis is the interpolation of station
data to a regular array of grid points with 5 km spacing. This
interpolation is done using a Gaussian weighting function:
-r2/R2

where r is the distance between station and grid point and R is the
radius of influence. To account for the variable station density, the
value of R is adjusted at each grid point so that the sum of the sta
tion weights remains constant. During the interpolation procedure,
the temperature values are corrected for altitude using an assumed
lapse rate of –5oC/km. The resulting monthly gridded fields are then
subjected to a k-means clustering algorithm to assign each grid
point to one of ten classes. The members of each class have similar
seasonal cycles of precipitation. The geographical distribution of the
precipitation classes is illustrated in Figure 2. The seasonal cycle of
precipitation for each class is shown in Figure 3.
Several important aspects of Middle East precipitation are clear
in this analysis. Throughout the region, precipitation is low or ab
sent in summer, reaching a maximum in mid-winter, excepting only
the coastal regions of the Caspian Sea (class #10), where a striking
autumn rainfall maximum is evident. Several strong spatial gradi
ents are also clear. The plentiful winter rains along the Mediterra
nean Coast decline rapidly inland due to orographic lifting and
descent as well as decreasing water source proximity. From south
and southwest to north and northeast in the interior, precipitation
increases due to the decreasing influence of the subtropical high and the
increasing effect of mid-latitude frontal storms and orographic lifting.

Precipitation (mm)

W=e

Month
Figure 3

Class signatures from k-means
classification of monthly
precipitation

VEGETATION COVER
The most appropriate satellite sensor for studying vegetation
cover and dynamics over large areas is the AVHRR. This instrument
has been in continuous operation since 1979, and there are several
ongoing projects to produce consistently processed global images at
a high temporal frequency (James and Kaluri 1994; Eidenshink

  



   

1994). Because on a given day a significant part of the land surface is
obscured from view by clouds, daily AVHRR images are routinely
lumped into 10-day groups, and a single image is derived for the
period by choosing the pixel with the highest NDVI. The result is an
image that is largely (though not completely) cloud-free and is
suitable for many types of multi-temporal analysis (Holben 1989,
Myeni et al. 1997).
To produce a preliminary analysis of vegetation cover in south
west Asia, we acquired one year (October 1992 – September 1993) of
1-1 km resolution AVHRR data, geometrically registered, radiometrically calibrated, and composited into 10-day periods by the
USGS EROS data center (Eidenshank and Faundeen 1994). After
computing NDVI for all pixels in each image, we stacked the images
so that each pixel is characterized not by one but 36 NDVI values.
As in the preceding analysis, we then used a k-means clustering
algorithm to assign each pixel to one of thirteen classes having
similar seasonal cycles of vegetation cover. The geographical
distribution of each class is shown in Figure 4 and the characteristic
seasonal NDVI cycle for each class in Figure 5.
Table 2

Description and provisional interpretation of classes from k-means cluster analysis of NDVI from 10 day composite 1 km AVHRR data,
Figure 4). Interpretations must be verified by fieldwork.

 

Figure 4

K-means classification of 10-day composite 1 km AVHRR NDVI data for southwest Asia., October 1992-September 1993.
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Figure 5 Class signatures from k-means classification of NDVI from 10 day composite 1 km AVHRR data.

The resulting distribution of vegetation classes is complex. On
broad scales, it reflects the natural influence of rain and winter
snowfall. On finer scales, however, it shows the effects of city build
ing, deforestation, grazing, and rainfed and irrigated agriculture.
Using characteristic NDVI curves for each class and partial analysis
of corresponding climatological fields, tentative interpretations of
each class are presented in Table 2.
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO CLASSIFICATION
The k-means algorithm employed above uses Euclidean distance
to describe similarity among pixels characterized by measurements
of a single variable at multiple time points. This approach empha
sizes the mean of the time series for each pixel and, to a lesser extent,
each pixel’s value at a given time point but ignores the sequence in
which these values occur. In other words, the k-means algorithm
assigns greater significance to the amplitude of the seasonal curve
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than to its shape. This is clear from the plot of class means from the
vegetation classification (Figure 5), where several classes having the
same general shape differ only in their amplitude.
For some applications, however, it is useful to emphasize the shape
of the seasonal curve when classifying multitemporal datasets. For
example, in Mediterranean-type ecosystems there is considerable
regional and interannual variability in both the timing and the length
of the growing season, and hence subtle changes in the timing of
seasonal maxima and minima may be of considerable interest to
agroclimatologists (Benedetti et al. 1992). Patterns of land use and
land cover may also be better differentiated by the shape of the annual
cycle, especially in areas where there are multiple cropping cycles.

Figure 6

Rules-based classification of Fourier coefficients 1-6 computed for average monthly NDVI from 10-day
composite 8 km AVHRR data, 1982-1993.

Finally, it is important to consider that in moderate to coarse resolu
tion satellite data vegetation signals are often diluted by mixture
with seasonally invariant terrain, such as barren or urban land. Thus
in the case of pixels having the same general type of vegetation but at
different densities, a k-means classification would separate them by
density, while a classification based on the shape of the curve would
correctly recognize the basic ecological similarity among them.

  



   

One common method for describing the shape of time series data
is Fourier analysis, a technique that represents complex waveforms as
the sum of simpler components, usually sine waves. To assess the
utility of Fourier methods for analysis of vegetation patterns in south
west Asia, we computed mean monthly NDVI values over the period
1982-1993 using the 8 km resolution Pathfinder AVHRR dataset
(James and Kaluri 1994). As in the precipitation analysis presented
earlier, averaging helps reduce inherent noise and the effects of
interannual variability on the analysis of seasonal cycles. Following a
method described by Olsson and Eklundh (1994), we computed the
first six Fourier coefficients for the 12-month time series for each pixel
and the proportion of the series variance explained by each compo
nent and by the sum of all components up to and including the one in
question. These components provide information about the general
shape of the curve (number of NDVI peaks), its phase (timing of
peaks), and amplitude (height of peaks). Using a series of rules and
threshold values, we then divided pixels into distinct classes based on
the number, timing, and magnitude of NDVI peaks. The results of this
classification are presented in Figure 6.
Like the k-means method, the Fourier approach distinguishes well
among the major ecological regions of semi-arid southwest Asia: 1)
the desert and steppe (no peaks), 2) the dry-farmed areas (March-May
peaks), 3) the irrigated areas (double and triple peaks), and 4) the
deciduous forests (June-July peaks). To examine the differences be
tween the two classification techniques more closely, we used the kmeans algorithm to assign the image pixels in the 12-year average
dataset to 16 classes, the same number recognized in the Fourier
approach. We then chose a representative sample of individual pixels
and compared their seasonal NDVI cycles to those of the classes to
which they were assigned by each method. Figure 7 (left) shows two
pixels, a and d, which have very similar double-peaked seasonal cycles
but differ in amplitude. In the Fourier classification, both of these are
assigned to class 3, while the k-means classification divides them
between two classes (15 and 10) based on their different annual
means. Significantly, the Fourier technique recognizes neither pixel b
nor c as double peaked, though the k-means technique lumps them
with Classes 15 and 10, respectively, because of general similarity of
overall mean. The difference between the two techniques in the case of
single-peaked pixels is more subtle but still significant. Figure 7 (right)
plots the seasonal cycle of five pixels (e-i) that the k-means algorithm
divides into two classes (e-f and g-i) based on differences in their
annual means. The Fourier approach, which is more sensitive to the
timing of the maximum, groups pixels f, g, and i together on the basis of
their sharp May peak (Class 13) but classifies pixels e and h separately.
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Comparison of k-means and Fourier classifications

In general, we found that the Fourier technique is a useful
method for classifying pixels according to the shape of their seasonal
cycle and is therefore an invaluable complement to the more widely
used k-means method. Unlike the k-means algorithm, however, the
rules-based approach to classification contains an element of subjec
tivity, as the analyst must decide a priori what classes are to be dis
tinguished and what the threshold values should be. While this
limits the usefulness of the technique for exploratory data analysis, it
provides a powerful tool for isolating and extracting specific classes
of interest.
CHARACTERIZING INTERANNUAL VARIABILITY
All of the analyses presented so far have used either a single year
of data or multiple-year averages to represent climate or vegetation
patterns generally or during a particular period of time. With their
fast and efficient repeat coverage, satellite sensors also provide im
portant data for the analysis of land surface change over time. While
these changes are easy to detect, they often have multiple causes that
are difficult to infer from satellite data alone. In the analysis of veg
etation dynamics, climate variation is clearly an important driving
force, but not all types of vegetation respond uniformly to climate
change. Some cropping systems in southwest Asia are heavily buff
ered against climate variation either by irrigation or by careful as
sessment of risk. In other systems, enforced schedules of crop
rotation or speculative cultivation in marginal areas can amplify
minor climate fluctuations considerably (Nguyen 1989).
One very useful approach to isolating climate effects on vegeta
tion is the vegetation condition index (VCI), proposed by Kogan
(1993) for use in drought monitoring. This index is computed for a
particular time point in a long, cyclical time series by comparing the

  



   

NDVI value of each image pixel to that pixel’s maximum and mini
mum value at the same time point in all years spanned by the series.
The result, typically scaled between 0 and 100%, provides a relative
measure of vegetation cover within the ecological parameters of each
vegetation type. In other words, the VCI attempts to normalize
ecological variability across the image and to emphasize changes due
to relatively high frequency meteorological fluctuations.
In Figure 8, we use the 8-km pathfinder AVHRR dataset to com
pute the VCI across southwest Asia in April for four years character
ized by markedly different precipitation patterns. In each image, the
approximate distribution of rainfall during the preceding six months

Figure 8

Vegetation condition indices (VCIs) for April of four successive years. Contours show the approximate distribution of total NovemberApril precipitation for each year.

(November-April) is represented by 200mm contours derived from
the Global Precipitation Climatology Project’s Combined Precipita
tion dataset (Huffman et al. 1997). This analysis highlights both the
high interannual variability of rainfall and vegetation state across
southwest Asia and the strong correlation between these two variables.
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MONITORING THE INTENSIFICATION AND EXPANSION
OF PRODUCTION
A steady expansion of cereal cultivation into regions used tradi
tionally as rangeland has been underway for decades in southwest
Asia. The principal crop sown in these marginal areas is barley, and
a graph of annual changes in its harvested area in Iraq and Syria
shows rapid increase throughout the 1980s and early 1990s (Figure
9). This increase is due in large part to the growing economic im
portance of barley and barley straw for livestock feed as sheep and
goat numbers far exceed the carrying capacity of available range
land. Much of this cultivation has been carried out on very large
scales, and tractors are often used to plow and sow fields several
kilometers in extent. If adequate rain falls, crop production can be
very high, but crop failure is very common during normal or dry

5000

4000
Irrigated area (103 ha)
Barley harvested (10 6 ha)

3000

2000

1000

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

YEAR

Figure 9

Trends in irrigation and barley cultivation in Syria and Iraq, 1960-1995 (from FAO/
FAOstat).

years. Because deep plowing destroys the natural vegetation com
munities adapted to local climatic conditions, cultivation in the
steppe can result in serious erosion hazards and rapid deterioration
of forage production. Although cultivation of marginal zones is now
outlawed in many countries, identifying areas where high-risk culti
vation has occurred and continues to occur can aid in formulating
conservation strategies and revising policy.

  



   

To identify areas where high risk agriculture was practiced dur
ing the 1980s and early 1990s, we have summed March and April
NDVI maxima computed from the 8-km Pathfinder AVHRR dataset
for each year between 1982 and 1994. The resulting series of 13
images shows the approximate density and distribution of green
vegetation across the study area just before the maturation and
harvest of winter crops. We then calculated the standard deviation
of this series for each image pixel and divided the result by the series

Figure 10

Marginal agriculture in semi-arid southwest Asia. Standard deviation of March-April
NDVI divided by mean of March-April NDVI.

mean (Figure 10). Low values of this ratio indicate stable spring
NDVI values as expected in core agricultural areas, healthy range
land, and barren desert. High values, on the other hand, indicate
areas where spring NDVI fluctuates strongly about a lowered mean
or where agriculture has been introduced or abandoned during the
period of observation. The distribution of high values therefore
provides a useful tool for recognizing areas where vegetation cover
has changed significantly during the period of observation.
The three regions highlighted in this analysis are A) the lower
Jazirah in eastern Syria and Northern Iraq, B) the Hakkari and Van
provinces of southeastern Turkey, and C) small areas along the
branches of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers in southern Iraq. Of
these regions, only the first corresponds to regions where extensive
dry farming of cereals is practiced. A plot of the full NDVI time
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Figure 11 Mean NDVI values as a function of time, northeastern Syria test area.

series from a roughly 400 km2 area within this zone confirms high
interannual variation of vegetation cover about a low mean (Figure
11). In the last two years of the time series, NDVI values rise sharply,
signaling either unusually high rainfall (which did not occur) or a
qualitative change in land-use practices.
Higher resolution satellite data (Figure 12) allow further analysis
of land use change in this area. A Landsat MSS image acquired June
1975 (top) shows barley cultivation on an extremely large scale.
Fallow and plowed fields, which appear pink and green respectively,
are often several kilometers in length and are arranged haphazardly
across a broad basin where deep calcic soils have developed in a
region with otherwise very limited agricultural potential. This pat
tern is a clear result of the use of mechanized plows to till large areas
in hopes of abundant winter and spring rains. A second image ac
quired nearly twenty years later by an imaging radar system on
board the Space Shuttle (bottom), shows that these broad fields have
been subdivided into hundreds of smaller parcels. This change,
which began in 1993, resulted from the discovery and exploitation
of ground water reserves and represents a transition from extensive
dry farming to intensive irrigation.
The rapid growth of irrigation elsewhere in southwest Asia over
the past two decades (cf Figure 9) can also be investigated through a
combination of moderate and high resolution satellite data. Because
much of the irrigation agriculture in the region is practiced in the
summertime, when dry farming is impossible, it is easy to recognize
irrigated areas by elevated August-September NDVI. In addition,
because of higher ground surface temperatures and increased evapo

Figure 12 Landsat MSS (top) and SIR-C
(bottom) imagery depicting the ex
pansion of irrigated farming in the Jebel
‘Abd-al ‘Aziz region, eastern Syria.

  



   

Figure 13 Intensification of irrigated agriculture in semi-arid southwest Asia. Standardized difference between mean AugustSeptember AVHRR Channel 5 brightness temperature in 1993-4 and 1981-2 subtracted from standardized
difference between August-September NDVI in 1993-4 and 1981-2.

transpiration during the summer, irrigated fields may also be recog
nized by their comparatively low emission in the thermal infrared
wavelengths. To map areas where irrigation increased or decreased
between 1981 and 1994, we computed and standardized the differ
ence between mean August-September NDVI in 1993-94 and 1981
82 and between mean brightness temperatures at the two time
points. A simple difference of these values (NDVI-Temperature)
assigns high values to pixels where NDVI has increased and tem
peratures have decreased and low values to areas where NDVI has
decreased and temperatures increased.
The spatial distribution of this index is shown in Figure 13. High
values correspond well to known locations of major irrigation
projects: A) the Ceyhan valley in southern Turkey, B) the Maskanah
region of central Syria, C) the Harran plain (GAP project area) of
south central Turkey, D) the Ceylanpinar-Ras al-‘Ain region on the
Turkish-Syrian border, E) the upper Tigris valley, and F) the
Hamrin region of northern Iraq. The analysis also highlights areas
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Figure 14 NDVI and summer cultivation profiles of the Harran Plain, Southeastern Turkey.

where summer vegetation has declined significantly such as the
marshes of southern Iraq (G) and the shores of the Caspian Sea (H).
As in the preceding analysis, much more can be learned about the
nature of vegetation changes in specific areas by examining the full
time series of NDVI values. Figure 14 shows the NDVI profile of a
1500 km2 region of the Harran plain in southern Turkey (area C,
Figure 13). Between 1981 and 1987, the characteristic seasonal
NDVI cycle of the region was characterized by a large late winterearly spring peak representing dry-farming in the region and by a
second, considerably smaller peak in July-August indicating limited
summer cultivation. After 1987, however, the size of the late sum
mer peak grew rapidly as water from deep wells and later from the
Attaturk dam was used to irrigate larger areas each year.
The magnitude and spatial distribution of these changes can be
seen clearly in a pair of late summer Landsat images of the Harran
plain in 1984 and 1992 (Figure 15). In this color combination,
which approximates that of an infrared aerial photograph, vegeta
tion (mostly cotton) appears bright red due to its strong reflectance
in the infrared wavelengths. Using unsupervised classification tech
niques to distinguish cultivated from fallow land, we estimate that
between these two time points, the extent of summer irrigation on
the Harran plain increased from 15,000 ha to more than 45,000.
Similar estimates from images from 1985, 1987, and 1990 provide
further information about the timing of this growth and generally
confirm trends apparent in the AVHRR data (Figure 14).

  



   

Figure 15 Expansion of summer irrigation in the Harran Plain (GAP project area), southeastern Turkey.

ESTIMATING BIOPHYSICAL PARAMETERS
As demonstrated in the preceding examples, two key aspects of
the SWAP methodology are a multi-sensor approach and the use of
satellite data from archives maintained over the past 20-30 years by
Digital
Number
the National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA), the
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), and other national and interna
tional agencies. Successful integration of data acquired by different
instruments at different times and under different conditions re
quires careful attention to the different sensitivities and calibration
of satellite sensors as well as to the effects of atmospheric aerosols
and gases on the transmission of electromagnetic radiation.
To illustrate the importance of these considerations, we have
Reflectance
(%)
selected two Landsat TM images of the Palmyra region in Syria,
taken one month apart (August 31 and October 10, 1984). Because
vegetation and land-use changes are minimal in the region during
this time of year, the spectral signatures of corresponding areas on
the two images should be nearly identical. A plot of the average pixel
values of four different 20 ha test areas present in both images,
however, shows no clear similarity between the spectra of each test
area on the two different dates and no systematic difference among
the spectra of the different test areas (Figure 16, top). These results,
Figure 16
which bode poorly for the use of satellite images to analyze land
surface changes over time, have two main causes. First, differences
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in the relative positions of the satellite, the sun, and the earth’s
surface at each time point can result in significant differences in the
amount of sunlight illuminating the earth’s surface and the amount
that is reflected toward the satellite sensor. Second, the intensity of
solar radiation varies significantly across the visible and near-infra
red wavelengths and different scaling factors are used to convert
satellite-measured radiances within each wave band into digital
numbers for computer image analysis. By applying known calibra
tion equations for each wave band to recover pixel radiances mea
sured at the satellite and normalizing these for the viewing angle of
the sensor, digital numbers can be converted into estimates of sur
face radiance that are comparable across space and time. By further
dividing this result by the total amount of incident solar radiation in
each waveband, radiance spectra can be converted to reflectance, a
dimensionless quantity that allows the integration and comparison
of spectra obtained by many different kinds of sensors in orbit, in
the field, or in the laboratory. Although these operations neatly
recover coherent and reproducible reflectance spectra from satellite
data (Figure 16, bottom), full integration of multitemporal and
multisource spectral data must consider also the more subtle (but
cumulatively significant) effects of changing atmospheric condi
tions, degradation of satellite sensors over time, and complex
changes in the reflectance of different materials under varying illu
mination and viewing conditions.
Once reproducible and physically meaningful spectral measure
ments are obtained from satellites, they can be combined with the
results of field investigation to develop techniques for estimating
ground surface properties. The use of multispectral reflectance data
to estimate physical parameters such as leaf area index, as well as
related climate and soil conditions is well-established (Wiegand et
al. 1992; Penuelas et al. 1992; Moran et al. 1996). Considerable
improvement in the accuracy and spatial scale of these estimates is
expected with the development and launch of new sensor systems
that better describe surface reflectance characteristics. These ad
vances along with improved temporal coverage, will enable the
routine use of satellite data for agro-ecological characterization,
precision farming, and agricultural decision support systems.
Taking full advantage of improvements in satellite sensor design
depends on accurate characterization of the reflectance properties of
major crops at different stages of their growth cycles and in different
soil conditions. Very few studies of these relationships have been
carried out in southwest Asia, and considerable research remains to
be done before satellite-derived data can be fully integrated into
agricultural research and development in the region. For this reason,

  



   

we have begun a program of field research that uses portable spec
trometers to acquire high-resolution spectra from crops in different
settings and stages of growth. Much of this fieldwork is scheduled
during times of satellite overpass to insure the comparability of in
situ and satellite data.
This research, carried out in collaboration with scientists from
the International Center for Agricultural Research in Dry Areas
(ICARDA), has focused primarily on the region around Aleppo,
Syria, where rainfall varies between 300 and 350 mm/year. The first
season of field research in this region during the late summer and
early autumn of 1997 focused on major irrigated crops such as
cotton (Gossypium), potato (Solanum erianthum), soybeans (Glycine
max), corn (Zea mays), sunflower (Helianthus), and various veg
etables. At each of 231 different locations, we measured the spectral
characteristics of crop and soil, and took samples for laboratory
measurement of wet biomass and leaf areas index. In the analysis of
these data we have focused on characterizing the relationship be
tween conventional spectral indices such as NDVI and developing
new indices which are more closely related the physical characteris
tics of different crops. In general, we found that NDVI explained
between 50 and 80% of the observed variability in wet biomass and
leaf area index for the five crops intensively studied. The closest
relationship between spectral and biophysical variables was observed
for cotton and soybean (Figure 17). In most cases, the relationships
between the variables were non-linear, as other researchers have
found (e.g. Wiegand et al. 1992).
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CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have illustrated some modern methods for
analyzing spatial and temporal patterns of climate and vegetation in
southwest Asia. These methods combine conventional climate ob
servations, multispectral satellite data, and computer-intensive
interpolation and clustering algorithms. When combined with more
systematic fieldwork, these approaches may ultimately provide the
level of completeness and accuracy needed for modeling, monitor
ing and managing the rapidly changing environment of the region.
As the quality and accessibility of satellite data improve, we should
expect wider application and rapid improvement of the methods.
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